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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the extent to which voluntary self-regulatory mechanisms are 
effective in ensuring that companies meet their international human rights responsibilities. 
First the thesis develops a typology of corporate self-regulatory mechanisms which 
differentiates, most importantly, between company-level (e.g. human rights policies, 
industry codes of conduct, international human rights conventions) and product-level (e.g. 
certification labels) self-regulatory mechanisms. The thesis argues that the effectiveness 
of company-level and product-level mechanisms should be evaluated collectively because 
(1) companies view them as component parts of their overarching human 
rights/sustainability strategies, and (2) they address many of the same human rights issues.  
The literature on self-regulation is then explored and a series of characteristics are 
identified for effective self-regulation, such as an inclusive drafting process, internal and 
external communication of standards, and clear sanctioning guidelines. A case study is 
then undertaken of three tea firms operating in Tanzania with differentiated levels of 
commitment to company/product level self-regulation. Field research was carried out in 
Tanzania involving 161 interviews. The field research identifies various positive human 
rights impacts of the self-regulatory mechanisms examined, but also serious deficiencies 
in design and implementation as well as inherent limitations in what human rights-based 
approaches can achieve when seeking to address critical social problems in challenging 
environments. Some of the characteristics for effective self-regulation which were earlier 
identified are found to be particularly important to well-functioning mechanisms, such as 
the  inclusion of a comprehensive set of human rights, management’s genuine motivation, 
training of workers and managers, and third-party monitoring with significant 
consequences for non-compliance. However, a number of additional factors are also 
identified which are critical to improve corporate human rights performance, such as the 
conditions under which bottom-up action from affected stakeholders occurs and the state 
of the company’s financial resources.  
On the basis of this case study, conclusions are therefore drawn about the effectiveness of 
self-regulatory mechanisms in the context of the Tanzanian tea industry. Suggestions are 
also made for further work that is then needed to address the issue of effectiveness of 
voluntary self-regulatory mechanisms in other industries and geographical settings.    
P a g e  | 20 
 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Out of the 200 biggest economies worldwide, 43 are countries and 157 are 
corporations1 2. This shows how increasingly powerful business enterprises are around 
the world, benefitting from enormous financial resources. Proportionately, the 
potential for (positive or negative) impact of business activities on human rights is 
tremendous wherever they operate – although this concern is also valid for smaller 
companies, and all business activities may have an impact on the rights of their 
employees and local communities. In this context, academic scholarship has 
increasingly acknowledged the legal human rights responsibilities of corporations. 
However, the main challenge lies with the enforcement of these international norms. 
Governments have been slow to domestically address them in a context of economic 
liberalisation and general deregulation. Other regulatory mechanisms – such as 
corporate self-regulation – have emerged in parallel in the past few decades to fill this 
regulatory vacuum3, creating a system of transnational private governance4.  
 
1.1. Aims of the thesis and research questions 
Exploring corporate self-regulation, this thesis strives to understand and systematise 
the different mechanisms used by firms when they commit to abide by human rights 
standards5, and to develop a methodology for testing their effectiveness. This thesis 
therefore explores whether voluntary corporate self-regulation is effective6 in helping 
 
1 Global Justice Now, ‘Corporations Data’, 2017, 
<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/12Jdgaz_qGg5o0m_6NCU_L9otur2x1Y5NgbHL26c4rQM/e
dit#gid=1364122473> (accessed 11 October 2019)  
2 Past rankings had compared countries’ Gross Domestic Product with corporate revenues, which was 
criticised for lack of rigour in using indicators of different nature; addressing this issue, Global Justice 
Now compares state and corporate revenues in their 2017 ranking.  
3 Laura T. Raynolds, Douglas Murray, and Andrew Heller, ‘Regulating sustainability in the coffee 
sector: A comparative analysis of third-party environmental and social certification initiatives’, 
Agriculture and Human Values 24, 2007, 147, 148. 
4 Gary Gereffi, Ronie Garcia-Johnson, and Erika Sasser, ‘The NGO-Industrial Complex’, Foreign 
Policy 125, 2001, 56, 65.  
5 However, it is notable that, whether or not companies decide to voluntarily commit to respecting 
human rights principles, they have, in any case, international human rights responsibilities. 
6 I will adopt a definition of ‘effectiveness’ derived from the ones offered by Oran Young (The 
effectiveness of international environmental regimes: causal connections and behavioural regimes, 
P a g e  | 21 
 
businesses meet their international human rights responsibilities. There has been a 
general effort in the past two decades towards more respectful business practices but 
it is difficult to determine whether the situation has really improved on the ground: 
while the standards adopted by corporations are publicly available, their 
implementation and effectiveness on the ground remain for the most part obscure.  
Before going any further, it is important to define voluntary corporate self-regulation. 
Although it may be difficult to give a general but precise definition because of the 
variety of forms it may take7, it is commonly used to describe attempts by corporations 
to voluntarily adopt internal rules on their own behaviour with no external coercive 
constraints8. Corporations commonly self-regulate by adopting, or committing to, the 
following mechanisms: corporate policies and codes of conduct, intergovernmental 
instruments, industry-level mechanisms, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and 
certification labels. It is acknowledged that not all these self-regulatory tools may be 
considered ‘mechanisms’ as they do not all include implementation processes. 
However, firms use these different types of self-regulation (including those with no 
built-in implementation process) as part of their human rights strategy. For the purpose 
of comprehensively assessing the effectiveness of self-regulation (and for ease of 
reading), I will therefore refer to all of them as ‘self-regulatory mechanisms’. 
All these mechanisms have human rights dimensions, as I will explain in more detail 
later in this chapter. Because of the influence of the United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights [UNGPs], which I will explore below, I will follow in 
this thesis the definition of corporate human rights responsibilities as set out in this 
framework, and therefore understand such responsibilities “as  those  expressed, [at a 
minimum], in  the  International  Bill  of  Human  Rights  and  the  principles  
concerning  fundamental  rights  set  out  in  the  International  labour  Organisation’s  
 
MIT Press, 1999, 5) and Edwin Stene (‘An approach to a science of administration’, American Political 
Science Review 34(6), 1940, 1124, 1127): the effectiveness of a mechanism is the extent to which a 
mechanism carries out its purpose, which includes the extent to which rules are followed, policies are 
accordingly changed, and programmes initiated to ensure implementation. 
7 Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees, ‘Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective’, Law & 
Policy 19(4), 1997, 363, 364.   
8 David Graham and Ngaire Woods, ‘Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in Developing 
Countries’, World Development 34(5), 2006, 868, 869; John W. Maxwell, Thomas Peyton Lyon, and 
Steven Curtis Hackett, ‘Self-regulation and social welfare: The political economy of corporate 
environmentalism’, The Journal of Law and Economics 43(2), 2000, 583, 584; and ibid, 364-365.  
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Declaration  on  Fundamental  Principles  and  Rights at Work”, as set out in the 
UNGPs.    
It is important to note that this thesis will look at the various mechanisms together, and 
not focus only on one type of self-regulation, for several reasons. First, I will argue 
that, all the mechanisms have – to some extent – the same aims. Second, they are all 
commonly used by corporations as complementary elements of a single strategy. 
Third, authors writing about mechanisms find broadly similar features helping 
guarantee the mechanisms’ effectiveness: inclusive drafting process; inclusion of a 
comprehensive set of human rights; training of stakeholders; strong monitoring and 
reporting systems; and a clearly defined sanctioning process. It is therefore important 
to study all mechanisms together, in order to comprehensively assess the value of 
corporate human rights self-regulation as a driver of change on the ground. Such an 
approach is particularly needed since, as will become clear, very few studies have 
empirically and holistically investigated the impact of corporate self-regulation on 
human rights. This thesis, by addressing the following research question, aims to 
contribute to filling that gap: ‘to what extent is it possible to evaluate the effectiveness 
of voluntary corporate self-regulatory mechanisms in ensuring that companies meet 
their international human rights responsibilities?’  
And, to help answer the main question, three sets of sub-questions have been 
developed:  
(1) What are the self-regulatory mechanisms used by corporations to improve their 
human rights performance? Why should one analyse them collectively? (This 
set of sub-questions will be answered in Chapters 1 and 2);  
(2) What academic scholarship has been undertaken which evaluates their 
effectiveness from a human rights perspective? How does one develop a 
methodology for testing out the human rights effectiveness of these 
mechanisms ‘on the ground’? (These questions will be answered in Chapters 3 
and 4);  
(3) Testing out that methodology, what kind of effect do these mechanisms have 
on corporate human rights performance with regard to a particular industry in 
a particular geographical setting? To what extent are those findings 
generalisable to other industries and geographical settings? (These questions 
will be answered in Chapters 5 to 8.) 
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In order to answer these questions, this thesis will engage with a number of academic 
literatures. I will start in this chapter by reviewing the relevant literature around 
corporate human rights responsibilities, which will allow me to define the nature and 
extent of such responsibilities. I will then review the literature around corporate human 
rights self-regulation, which I will use in Chapter 2 to develop a typology of the 
different self-regulatory mechanisms used by firms. In this typology, I will 
differentiate between company- and product-level mechanisms, broadly based on the 
scope of applicability of their human rights standards within firms. Building on this, I 
will engage in Chapter 3 with the (theoretical and applied) literature on effectiveness 
of self-regulation, in order to analyse the ‘key features’ identified by authors as helping 
make the different types of mechanisms effective. This will allow me to develop a 
framework for analysis of the effectiveness of self-regulation, which I will use in my 
case study of three tea corporations operating in Tanzania. I will then outline my 
empirical methodology in Chapter 4 before investigating in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 the 
human rights performance of the firms and the impact of mechanisms. Using my 
framework for analysis, the linked assessment of the three companies will allow in 
Chapter 8 for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the different self-regulatory 
mechanisms and for the identification of any other influential factors9.  
This introductory chapter is structured as follows: first, I will review the theoretical 
debates around corporate human rights responsibilities; second, I will introduce the 
various mechanisms explored by academic scholars to ensure that firms meet such 
responsibilities; third, I will briefly explain this thesis’s methodology; and finally, I 
will outline the structure of this thesis.   
 
1.2. Academic debates around corporate human rights 
responsibilities 
Academic debates around corporate human rights responsibilities have considerably 
shifted in the past seventy years. They no more focus on whether businesses have 
human rights responsibilities but rather on the extent of corporate human rights 
 
9 This may cover national legislation, collective bargaining agreements, or pressure from external actors 
such as local government representatives.  
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responsibilities10. Indeed, it is now widely accepted that private corporate entities must 
consider the human rights impact of their activities, and that they have a responsibility 
to limit negative impacts. In this section I will therefore first investigate the context 
for this shift and the progressive recognition that corporations have human rights 
responsibilities. Secondly, I will briefly look into the source of such responsibilities. 
Third, I will explore the extent of corporate human rights responsibilities as debated 
by the literature. Building on this, the next section will explore the mechanisms which 
corporations have adopted to respond to these responsibilities.  
 
1.2.1. Increased corporate power with increased corporate 
responsibilities? 
In the past few decades, a growing corporate accountability gap (mostly affecting 
multinational corporations, but relevant to all types of firms) has been identified by 
scholars, resulting from three simultaneous phenomena: first, the global deregulation 
taking place since the 1980s11 has led to the decreased willingness and/or ability of 
governments to regulate corporate behaviour; second, and linked to the first point, 
firms may engage in ‘jurisdiction shopping’, which means that they may choose where 
to conduct business (and possibly the jurisdiction with fewer regulations)12; third, the 
scale of contemporary global production has challenged the capacity of states to 
regulate activities that extend beyond their borders13. This leaves a regulatory gap 
which is particularly problematic in developing countries14 and which self-regulation 
proposes to fill15.   
 
10 Michael Addo and Jena Martin, ‘The evolving business and society landscape: Can human rights 
make a difference?’, in Jena Martin and Karen Bravo, (eds.), The Business and Human Rights 
Landscape – Looking Forward and Looking Back, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 348; Florian 
Wettstein, ‘Normativity, Ethics and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A 
Critical Assessment’, Journal of Human Rights 14(2), 2015, 162, 164; and James Harrison and Sharifah 
Sekalala, ‘Addressing the compliance gap? UN initiatives to benchmark the human rights performance 
of states and corporations’, Review of International Studies 41, 2015, 925, 927. 
11 Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, ‘Transnational Corporations and Public Accountability’, Government 
and Opposition, 39(2), 2004, 234, 246.  
12 Ibid, 257.  
13 Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions 
and The Shadow of the State’, in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds.), The Politics of Global 
Regulation, Princeton University Press, 2009, 44.  
14 Koenig-Archibugi (n. 11), 258.  
15 David Vogel, ‘The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct Achievements and Limitations’, 
Business & Society 49(1), 2010, 68, 73. 
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In this context, it has become generally accepted among scholars that increased 
globalisation and the presence of corporations in many countries and continents have 
helped produce a shift in the past century in international power relations16. This has 
led most authors to call for a redefinition of public and private entities’ responsibilities, 
and some to state that companies now hold more control over certain human rights 
than states themselves.  
Indeed, Gerald Frug questioned in 1984 the distinctive status of public and private 
entities altogether when they share many common features17 and when the legal 
arguments articulated in defence of their power are applicable to both kind of entities18. 
Professor Frug refers19 to a case of the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America20 [US], dating back to 1949, in which two judges argued that, in recognition 
of corporate power, firms should no longer be recognised as “persons” protected from 
government control by the fourteenth amendment of the US constitution. Alfred 
Chandler wrote in 1977 that the exponential growth and concentration of (American) 
corporate power goes back to the American Civil War21, whereas Wesley Cragg, 
writing in 2000, places it a century later and argues that, because of the advance of 
economic globalisation and the growing power and influence of multinational 
corporations, the social contract in place since after the Second World War (assigning 
responsibility for generating wealth to business and ensuring the equitable sharing of 
wealth to governments) is no longer viable22. He called for a new social contract that 
shares responsibility for human rights and related ethical responsibilities. Michael 
Addo and Jena Martin take a slightly different approach and argue that the traditional 
separation between the functioning of economic undertakings (which are run 
following the principles of the free market) and the social and moral expectations of 
society (which are seen as the responsibility of political authorities) is unsustainable 
 
16 Graham and Woods (n. 8), 868; and Stephen Botromley ‘Taking Corporations Seriously: Some 
Considerations For Corporate Regulation’, Federal Law Review 19, 1990, 203, 221.  
17 Gerald Frug, ‘The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law’, Harvard Law Review 97(6), 1984, 
1276, 1278.  
18 Gerald Frug, ‘The City as a Legal Concept’, Harvard Law Review 93(6), 1980, 1057, 1141. 
19 See ibid, 1133.  
20 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576, 1949 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, 
J.), as cited in Frug, ‘The City as a Legal Concept’ (n. 18), 1133.  
21 Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, Harvard 
University Press, 1977, as cited in Frug, ‘The City as a Legal Concept’ (n. 18), 1138. 
22 Wesley Cragg, ‘Human Rights and Business Ethics: Fashioning a New Social Contract’, New 
England Journal of Public Policy 16(2), 2000, 205, 205.  
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and unrealistic, leading to a search for standards “that credibly blend the economic, 
the social and the moral imperatives that exist in society”23. They trace this “campaign” 
on corporate social responsibility [CSR] to the Second World War, and state that it is 
due to the social changes resulting from the prominent roles in the economic and social 
restructuring of society played by corporate entities24. Moreover, Diane Swanson 
writes that there is a general acknowledgment within the relevant literature that the 
modern corporation operates on an expanded scale that requires a new business and 
societal relationship25. Douglas Cassel goes further and writes that this shift in 
responsibilities from the public to the private sector has led to a loss of power for 
governments and intergovernmental organisations26, who may therefore “lack 
effective power to safeguard basic rights” while this power has increasingly come to 
rest in the private hands of multinational corporations “for an important spectrum of 
rights”27. This power transfer may be linked to the regulatory vacuum left by global 
liberalisation, as explained at the beginning of this section. Keith Davis, David Kinley, 
and Junko Tadaki28 agree to some extent with Douglas Cassel but write that 
transnational companies’ power must be accompanied by commensurate responsibility 
under international human rights law29 – although they merely argue for a 
redistribution of responsibilities that would match the power shift experienced by 
states and companies. I will explore further the extent to which authors consider that 
corporations have human rights responsibilities in the third part of this section.  
It is therefore clear that authors generally agree that the shift in power between states 
and corporations in the past few decades challenges the traditionally defined social 
contract. Some scholars go particularly far in their assessment of this phenomenon and 
explain that this shift means that corporations have more power than states over a 
significant spectrum of rights. Others argue that corporate power must be accompanied 
 
23 Addo and Martin (n. 10), 351.  
24 Ibid, 352; and Michael Addo, ‘The Reality of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights’, Human Rights Law Review 14(1), 2014, 133, 146. 
25 Diane Swanson, ‘Addressing a Theoretical Problem by Reorienting the Corporate Social Performance 
Model’, Academy of Management Review 20(1), 1995, 43, 51. 
26 Douglass Cassel, ‘Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?’, Fordham 
International Law Journal 19(5), 1996, 1963, 1984. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Keith Davis, ‘Can Business Afford to Ignore Social Responsibilities?’, California Management 
Review 2(3), 1960, 70, 71; and David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, ‘From Talk to Walk: The Emergence 
of HR responsibilities for corporations at international law’, Virginia Journal of International Law 
44(4), 2004, 931, 935. 
29 Keith Davis only refers to “social responsibility”.  
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by corporate responsibility. Building on this, I will first explore the issue of the source 
of corporate human rights responsibilities, and secondly their nature and extent, as 
discussed and progressively recognised the relevant literature. 
 
1.2.2. International law and corporate human rights responsibilities 
Scholars have written about the source of corporate human rights responsibility. Some 
authors consider that international norms directly oblige corporations to respect human 
rights. Lance Compa and Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrère30 point out that it has not 
always been the case, as the globalisation of the economy and the globalisation of 
human rights concerns developed separately from each other in the second half of this 
century. However, Beth Stephen31 writes that it is precisely the great strides made in 
the past decades by international law in articulating human rights obligations 
applicable to corporations that allowed for greater corporate accountability. This 
echoes Diane Orentlicher and Timothy Gelatt’s thesis32 that international human rights 
law provides an objective basis for identifying corporate human rights responsibilities. 
Steven Ratner33 and Upendra Baxi34 have similarly identified businesses’ 
responsibilities under international law, although the latter deplores that these 
obligations remain at the level of “the law in the making”, “high on a wish list” because 
the “eminently state-centric human rights discourse extends primarily to state actors, 
and is thus not entirely open to translocation to the real world of trade, business and 
industry”. This is indeed one of the main challenges of the field of business and human 
rights, as I will explore later in this thesis: the translation of high-level human rights 
principles into implementable – and implemented – corporate standards.  
Some authors also argue that corporate human rights obligations may stem from 
national regulation. For instance, Daniel Augenstein and David Kinley argue that 
 
30 Lance Compa and Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrère, ‘Enforcing International Labor Rights through 
Corporate Codes of Conduct’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 33, 1995, 663, 665.  
31 Beth Stephen, ‘The Amorality of profit – Transnational Corporations and Human Rights’, Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 20(1), 2002, 21, 68. 
32 Diane Orentlicher and Timothy Gelatt, ‘Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on 
Business Investors in China Symposium: Doing Business in China’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 14(1), 1993, 66, 68.  
33 Steven Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’, Yale Law 
Journal 111(3), 2001, 443, 449. 
34 Upendra Baxi, ‘Market Fundamentalisms: Business Ethics at the Altar of Human Rights’, Human 
Rights Law Review 5(1), 2005, 1, 14. 
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business entities are in practice legally bound to respect human rights in their global 
operations via the medium of state regulation and control35, and Jill Murray calls for a 
binding and consistent set of labour standards which are subject to appropriate 
monitoring and enforcement36. Some states have recently adopted legislation 
(although most have, to the contrary, been liberalising their economies37, as explained 
earlier) allowing for greater responsibility for corporate human rights violations. For 
instance, the United Kingdom [UK] adopted in 2015 the Modern Slavery Act and 
France their Duty of Vigilance Law38 in 2017, both focusing on human rights due 
diligence and reporting. In the US, the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act is nowadays used 
for the remediation of human rights abuses allegedly committed abroad by 
corporations. It is interesting to see that some states are trying to strengthen the 
accountability mechanisms at their disposal to control and monitor the human rights 
performance of firms at home and abroad – and that these instruments may include 
legally-defined corporate human rights responsibilities. However, as state-based 
regulation is not the focus on my thesis, I will not explore these legislative instruments 
in more details.  
It is now clear that authors generally agree that companies do have human rights 
responsibilities under international law, although some scholars also consider that such 
responsibilities are included under national law. Moving beyond the issue of the source 
of corporate human rights responsibilities, I will now investigate their nature and 
extent, as discussed in the relevant literature.  
 
1.2.3. Extent of corporate human rights responsibilities 
Section 1.2.1. outlined the reasons which motivated some authors to call for a 
redefinition of corporate responsibilities as including, to some extent, human rights 
aspects. I will build on this global context to explore the academic debate on the nature 
 
35 Daniel Augenstein and David Kinley, ‘When Human Rights ‘Responsibilities’ become ‘Duties’: The 
Extra-Territorial Obligations of States that Bind Corporations’, in David Bilchitz and Surya Deva (eds.), 
Human Rights Obligations Of Business: Beyond The Corporate Responsibility To Respect?, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013, 275.  
36 Jill Murray, ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct and Labour Standards’, Corporate Codes of Conduct, Paper 
7, 1998, 1, 60.  
37 Dara O’Rourke, ‘Multi-stakeholder Regulation: Privatizing or Socializing Global Labor Standards?’, 
World Development 34(5), 2006, 899, 899. 
38 LOI n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises 
donneuses d'ordre.   
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and extent of corporate human rights responsibilities. To do so, I will first briefly 
outline the evolution of academic opinions before investigating the current debate, 
which focuses on how far corporate responsibility should go, and how corporations 
should be held to account for human rights violations. 
The extent to which corporations have human rights responsibilities (and even their 
mere existence) has been widely debated in the literature. In 1979, Archie Carroll 
summarised the different academic trends from that time regarding CSR, ranging from 
profit-making only (Friedman39), all the way to corporate social responsiveness, which 
places the emphasis on what the role of corporations should be in the long-run in a 
dynamic social system (Ackerman and Bauer, Sethi)40. Building on scholars’ views, 
Carroll explains that corporate social responsibilities include the economic, legal, 
ethical, and discretionary expectations – in the order of weight afforded by the author 
to each category – which society has of organisations at any given point in time41 42.   
Today, academic debates no more focus on whether businesses have human rights 
responsibilities but rather on the extent of corporate human rights responsibilities43. 
Indeed, most authors have now accepted the idea that corporations have, to some 
extent, human rights responsibilities. Indeed, Diane Swanson argued in 1995 that many 
researchers had been interested in defining corporate responsibility for social progress 
that matches an expanded agenda of human rights issues and needs44. Eight years later, 
Scott Pegg explained that there had been a noticeable shift in the previous decade 
toward the recognition of the social responsibility of corporations45 and Michael Addo 
and Jena Martin wrote in 2015 that the fact that business entities had social 
 
39 Milton Friedman famously argued in 1962 in favour of restricting the social responsibility of 
corporations to “making as much money for their stockholders as possible”. (Milton Friedman, 
Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, 1962, 133.) 
40 Archie B. Carroll, ‘A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate performance’, Academy of 
management review 4(4), 1979, 497, 499. 
41 Ibid, 500.  
42 This is the basis for Carroll’s ‘corporate social performance model’. In order to help scholars to 
“locate works within a broad model of business-society relationships”, Donna Wood also proposed such 
a model, although hers was based upon principles of corporate social responsibility, processes of 
corporate social responsiveness, and outcomes of corporate behaviour. (Donna Wood, ‘Corporate social 
performance revisited’, Academy of management review 16(4), 1991, 691, 691.)  
43 Addo and Martin (n. 10), 348; and Wettstein, ‘Normativity, Ethics and the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: A Critical Assessment’ (n. 10), 164. 
44 Swanson (n. 25), 52.  
45 Scott Pegg, ‘An Emerging Market for the New Millenium: Transnational Corporations and Human 
Rights’, in Jedrzej Frynas and Scott Pegg (eds.), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 
Springer, 2009, 8.  
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responsibilities was no longer as contentious an issue as it used to be46. A year later, 
Denis Arnold identified multiple, compelling, and overlapping justifications of 
corporate human rights obligations47. And indeed, Klaus Leisinger, Special Advisor to 
the UN Secretary General on the Global Compact, stated in 2006 that all companies 
must avoid direct or indirect involvement with human rights abuses48 and the United 
Nations [UN] Human Rights Council endorsed in 2011 a framework allocating 
responsibility to corporations for human rights violations (the UNGPs)49, and the 
author of the framework has written that businesses themselves have acknowledged 
some responsibility50. However, the nature and extent of these responsibilities as well 
as their consequences are still debated51, and scholars’ opinions broadly sit on a 
spectrum. 
On one end of the spectrum, authors such as Paul Walken and William Mc Donough 
write that, because corporations are the “dominant institutions of the planet”, they must 
address the social and environmental problems that affect humankind in order to fulfil 
their social contract52. However, this view is not widely shared. On the other end of 
the spectrum, some authors mainly consider that corporations should not get involved 
with entities which commit human rights abuses, such as governments. Indeed, Steven 
Ratner assigned human rights responsibilities to corporations “insofar as their 
activities infringe upon the human dignity of those with whom they have special ties” 
and “insofar as [businesses] cooperate with those actors whom international law 
already sees as the prime sources of abuses – states”53. This echoes Andrew Clapham 
and Scott Jerbi’s conclusion54 that international law considers that intentional 
 
46 Addo and Martin (n. 10), 348.  
47 Denis Arnold, ‘Corporations and Human Rights Obligations’, Business and Human Rights Journal 
1(2), 2016, 255, 255.   
48 Klaus Leisinger, ‘On Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights’, 2006, 17.  
49 Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (hereinafter ‘UNGPs’), A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 
2011. Please see Section 2.2.1.2.1. for more details.  
50 John Ruggie, ‘Global Governance and “New Governance Theory”: Lessons from Business and 
Human Rights’, Global Governance 20, 2014, 5, 13.  
51 Addo and Martin (n. 10), 348.  
52 Paul Walken and William Mc Donough, ‘Seven Steps to Doing Good Business’, Inc., 1993, 79, 80; 
Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-regulation and Democracy, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, 2; and Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller, Global reach: the power of the 
multinational corporations, Simon and Schuster, 1974, 363. 
53 Ratner (n. 33), 449. 
54 Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, ‘Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses’, 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Journal 24(3), 2001, 339, 349.  
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participation of a corporation in an internationally wrongful act constitutes complicity 
in the breach of international human rights law.  
Taking a more middle ground approach, authors such as David Kinley and Junko 
Tadaki argue that companies “do have duties to prevent human rights abuses […] 
where they maintain close connections with potential victims or potential 
perpetrators”55, consider that corporations also have the responsibility to prevent 
abuses when firms generally are in a position to influence the level of enjoyment of 
human rights56. This broadens the scope of corporate responsibilities. Similary, Diane 
Orentlicher and Timothy Gelatt define corporate responsibilities as the responsibility 
to ensure that firms’ actions do not, however inadvertently, contribute to the systematic 
denial of human rights57. 
Finally, part of the literature assesses corporate human rights responsibilities by 
linking firms’ responsibility to their proximity to the violations. For instance, Barbara 
Frey58 states that the continuum of human rights responsibilities of corporations is 
constructed according to the relationship between the corporations’ activities in a 
country, and the degree to which human rights are respected in that country. Similarly, 
Cassel59 suggests that the level of responsibility for a corporation depends on the 
proximity of the corporation's operations to human rights violations, in combination 
with the seriousness of the violations. He then outlines five gradations of 
responsibility: treatment of firm or contractor employees; directly supporting the 
repressive activities of a repressive regime; supporting the non-repressive activities of 
a repressive regime; corporate advocacy on issues related to its operations; corporate 
advocacy on issues not directly related to its operations.  
The debate around the scope of corporate human rights obligations as explored above 
was reshaped by the adoption of the UNGPs in 2011 by the UN Human Rights Council, 
three years after the publication of the “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” framework by 
John Ruggie and his team. The Guiding Principles are grounded in recognition of “the 
role of business enterprises as specialized organs of society performing specialized 
 
55 Kinley and Tadaki (n. 28), 964.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Diane Orentlicher and Timothy Gelatt (n.32), 68. 
58 Barbara Frey, ‘The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protection 
of International Human Rights’, Minnesota Journal of International Trade 6, 1997, 153, 180.   
59 Cassel, ‘Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?’ (n. 26), 1964.  
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functions, required to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights.” 
The UNGPs were generally celebrated as an advancement60 in the prevention and 
remediation of corporate human rights abuses. As Florian Wettstein explains61, by 
complementing governments’ duty to protect with direct corporate responsibilities, 
Professor Ruggie “move[s] decisively beyond the traditional view”, and “has 
effectively abandoned state-exclusivity in human rights matters”: the UNGPs signal a 
shift in the mainstream debate, traditionally conservative, towards shared 
responsibility. However, Wettstein also highlights the inherent danger of the voluntary 
nature of the instrument, which would be stripping corporate responsibility to its bare 
minimum62. Some authors also criticised the instrument for not going far enough, 
including because it maintains the main responsibility on states63.  
Beyond debates about its value, the framework has had a deep influence on the field. 
Most articles64 written after the publication of the tripartite framework and of the 
UNGPs build upon the principles outlined within these two complementary documents 
– or, at the least, make reference to them. Florian Wettstein stated that the business 
and human rights debate today revolves around it65, and Peter Muchlinski qualified the 
debate set in motion by John Ruggie and the Guiding Principles as “perhaps the most 
comprehensive discussion to date of the relationship between corporations and human 
rights”66. Larry Catá Backer concurs, in particular regarding the elaboration of a 
corporate governance framework that is meant to apply concurrently with corporate 
 
60 Nicola Jägers, ‘The UN Guiding Principles, Making Headway Towards Real Corporate 
Accountability?’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 29(2), 2011, 159, 159; Larry Catá Backer, 
‘From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guiding Principles for the 
Implementation of the United Nations Protect, Respect and Remedy and the Construction of Inter-
Systemic Global Governance’, Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 25, 
2012, 69, 98; and Wettstein, ‘Normativity, Ethics and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: A Critical Assessment’ (n. 10), 163.  
61  Wettstein, ‘Normativity, Ethics and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A 
Critical Assessment’ (n. 10), 166.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Robert Blitt, ‘Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:  Charting an 
Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance’, Texas International Law Journal 48(1), 
2012, 33, 44. 
64 E.g. ibid; Florian Wettstein, ‘CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great 
Divide’, Business Ethics Quarterly 22(4), 2015, 739. 
65  Wettstein, ‘CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great Divide’ (n. 64). 
66 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications 
for Corporate Law, Governance, and Regulation’, Business Ethics Quarterly 22, 2012, 145, 145.  
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obligations under the laws of the jurisdiction in which they operate, which he considers 
one of the greatest advancements of this framework67.  
The way the broader debates in the field have shifted over the years may also be 
reflected in the changing opinion of certain authors. For instance, referring to the 2008 
‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’ framework, Denis Arnold68 stated in 2010 that only a 
moral account of the basic human rights duties of transnational companies provides a 
sufficiently deep justification of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
feature of the tripartite framework. It is interesting to see that, six years later, Professor 
Arnold wrote the following: “The international legal system of human rights includes 
explicit expectations for [transnational corporations] to respect the international 
human rights regime”69. This seems to indicate a shift in what he conceives is the 
source of corporate human rights responsibilities, moving from a moral to a legal type 
of responsibility, which is the view shared by most authors.  
Over the past 30 years, the opinion of scholars has generally greatly evolved, starting 
from a conservative approach – although sometimes balanced with cautious calls for 
greater accountability for corporate human rights violations – to a proactively 
progressive stance on the social (and environmental) role played by the private sector 
and the responsibilities associated with it. Culminating with the adoption of the 
UNGPs, the view that corporations do have human rights responsibilities is nowadays 
widely accepted – albeit with some differences in opinion as to how extensive these 
responsibilities are. However, no system or mechanism for ensuring that firms meet 
these responsibilities is universally supported by scholars, and the main debate in 
academia on this issue revolves around the ‘hard law versus soft law’ and ‘compulsory 
versus voluntary’ conundrum – of which a significant part is the ‘regulation versus 
self-regulation’ debate70. As self-regulatory mechanisms are increasingly adopted by 
corporations, it is sometimes said that such mechanisms may redress many human 
 
67 Larry Catá Backer, ‘On the Evolution of the United Nations’ 'Protect-Respect-Remedy' Project: The 
State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context’, Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law 37(9), 2011, 37, 43. 
68 Denis Arnold, ‘Transnational Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights’, Business 
Ethics Quarterly 20(3), 2010, 371, 389.  
69 Arnold, ‘Corporations and Human Rights Obligations’ (n. 47), 21. 
70 Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson, ‘Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation’, in Martin Cave, 
Robert Baldwin, and Martin Lodge, The Oxford Handbook on Regulation, Oxford University Press, 
2010, 146-147; John C. Ruhnka and Heidi Boerstler ‘Governmental Incentives for Corporate Self-
Regulation’, Journal of Business Ethics 17(3), 1998, 309, 309; and Gunningham and Rees (n. 7), 363-
364. 
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rights issues and achieve more than what formal regulation can do. It is therefore 
important to investigate the extensive literature on self-regulation – starting with 
general self-regulation, then focusing on corporate self-regulation, and finally on 
corporate human rights self-regulation – with the aim to understand where corporate 
human rights self-regulatory mechanisms sit within the broader context of the 
regulation of corporate behaviour, and to identify the mechanisms’ strengths and 
weaknesses, as informed by scholars’ writings.  
 
1.3. Introduction to self-regulation 
In this section, I will define ‘self-regulation’ as it applies to corporations and outline 
the different types of (business) self-regulation, before focusing on its ‘voluntary’ and 
‘coerced’ forms. Building on the strengths and weaknesses of the former, I will explain 
why some scholars believe that the latter is the best solution. This debate is an 
important one in the literature on corporate self-regulation, and it highlights the many 
challenges inherent to voluntarism as well as theoretical solutions which I will consider 
and test out in this thesis. Finally, I will introduce corporate human rights self-
regulation, explain why it is important to study its different mechanisms together, and 
outline the divides within scholarship as to its potential effectiveness. Taken against 
the previously-explored backdrop of corporate human rights obligations, this will set 
the context for my research into the effectiveness of firms’ self-regulatory mechanisms 
in meeting their international human rights responsibilities – before I move on to 
laying out the methodology which I have used to explore this question. 
I will first briefly introduce the concept of regulation taken generally (i.e. not focusing 
on the regulation of corporations specifically). Any regulatory approach has four 
characteristics: target (“the individual or organisation to which a regulatory instrument 
applies and on whom or which consequences can be imposed”), regulator (“the entity 
that creates the rule and dispenses the consequences”), command (“a rule [which] 
direct that a target adopt means or achieve ends”), and consequences (penalty or 
reward)71. In the case of self-regulation, the regulator and the target will either be the 
 
71 Cary Coglianese, ‘Engaging Business in the Regulation of Nanotechonology’, in Christopher John 
Bosso (ed.), Governing Uncertainty: Environmental Regulation in the Age of Nanotechnology, 
Routledge, 2010, 50.  
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same entity, or the target will have voluntarily accepted the authority of the (non-
governmental) regulator72. It follows that the most general definition of self-regulation 
may be the performance of a regulatory function by an entity or group of entities acting 
together, in respect of themselves, and others who accept their authority73. However, 
different types of self-regulation exist. They can all be placed on a spectrum, 
depending on the degree of freedom afforded by the government to self-regulating 
entities: Anthony Ogus writes that, at one extreme, rules may be private to an entity 
whereas, on the other, they may have to be approved by government or a public 
authority74. Similarly, Julia Black differentiates between voluntary self-regulation, 
sanctioned self-regulation, mandated self-regulation, and coerced self-regulation75. 
However, this thesis will focus on the first type – voluntary self-regulation – and more 
specifically on the self-regulation of corporations, on which I will now concentrate.   
 
1.3.1. Introduction to corporate self-regulation 
Although it is difficult to give a general but precise definition76 because of the different 
forms it may take77, I understand ‘corporate self-regulation’78 in this thesis as attempts 
by corporations to adopt rules to control their own behaviour with no external coercive 
constraints79. These rules may be developed by the firm itself, intergovernmental 
organisations, by non-governmental entities whose authority the firm voluntarily 
 
72 Coglianese and Mendelson (n. 70), 150. 
73 Julia Black, ‘Constitutionalising Self-Regulation’, The Modern Law Review 59(1), 1996, 24, 27. 
74 Anthony Ogus, ‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15(1), 1995, 97, 100.  
75 As the ‘voluntary’ and ‘coerced’ types of self-regulation will be defined later in this section, I will 
here only provide the definition of the ‘mandated’ and ‘sanctioned’ self-regulation: first, mandated self-
regulation happens when “a collective group, an industry or profession for example, is required or 
designated by the government to formulate and enforce norms within a framework defined by the 
government, usually in broad terms”. Second, sanctioned self-regulation happens when “a collective 
group itself formulates the regulation, which is then subjected to government approval” (Black (n. 73), 
27).  
76 Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson write that there is no “agreed-upon definition” for self-
regulation (Coglianese and Mendelson (n. 70), 147). Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees stated that “no 
single definition [of self-regulation] is entirely satisfactory.” (Gunningham and Rees (n. 7), 364).   
77 Self-regulation used to control the behaviour of business entities may take a variety of forms of 
expression (Gunningham and Rees (n. 7), 364.) and may happen at different levels: the firm, the 
industry, and the economy (Ian Maitland, ‘The Limits of Business Self-Regulation’, California 
Management Review, 27(3), 1985, 132, 135). This thesis will focus on self-regulatory instruments 
adopted at firm-level, although industry mechanisms will be included to the extent that corporations 
voluntarily adopt them.  
78 To make this thesis easier to read, I will refer to ‘corporate self-regulation’ as ‘self-regulation’.  
79 Graham and Woods (n. 8), 869; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (n. 8), 584; and Gunningham and Rees 
(n. 7), 364-365. 
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accepts80, and may cover areas of concern such as labour rights, health and safety, non-
discrimination, environmental issues, community rights, or women’s rights. Generally, 
it “promises simultaneously to allay business fears of further government 
encroachment and to restore the public's faith in business”81. Some authors such as 
Christopher Stone believe that, rather than relying on the “insufficient” deterrent effect 
of legal sanctions to prevent harmful corporate behaviour, the law could most 
effectively shape organisational behaviour by generating normative commitments 
through systemic internal controls82. There are different ways to do so: as for general 
self-regulation, different types of corporate self-regulation exist. General self-
regulation, as I have explained above, may take different forms, depending on how 
free it is from government intervention: the same dynamic also exists for self-
regulation focused on corporate activities. Indeed, Jean-Pascal Gond, Nahee Kang and 
Jeremy Moon83 offer a typology mirroring Julia Black’s typology outlined above and 
setting corporate self-regulation on a spectrum: they distinguish between (1) Self-
regulation as self-government (voluntary and non-enforceable); (2) Self-regulation as 
facilitated by government; (3) Self-regulation as partnership with government; (4) 
Self-regulation as mandated by government84; and (5) Self-regulation as a form of 
government.  
Building on the two typologies cited above, I will now outline the dichotomy between 
voluntary and coerced self-regulation. Comparing the two most different forms of self-
regulation allows for a deeper understanding of the characteristics and potential value 
(as assessed by authors) of voluntary self-regulation, which is the focus of this thesis. 
On the one hand, self-regulation is considered voluntary when there is no active state 
involvement, direct or indirect, in promoting or mandating self-regulation85. Some 
authors consider that this approach holds promise, mainly based on the speed and 
 
80 Black (n. 73), 27.  
81 Maitland (n. 77), 132. 
82 Christopher D. Stone, Where the law ends : the social control of corporate behaviour, Waveland 
Press, 1991, as cited in Jodi Short and Michael W. Toffel, ‘Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely 
Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment’, Administrative Science Quarterly 55(3), 2010, 
361, 362.  
83 Jean-Pascal Gond, Nahee Kang and Jeremy Moon, ‘The government of self-regulation: on the 
comparative dynamics of corporate social responsibility’, Economy and Society 40(4), 2011, 640, 642. 
84 Because Gond et al define ‘mandated self-regulation’ as ‘regulated by government’ and using “ex 
ante governmental framing” of initiatives through the “control of outcomes or disclosure”, I understand 
the fourth category as covering ‘coerced’ forms of self-regulation. 
85 Black (n. 73), 27.  
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flexibility it allows86. Other arguments in favour of voluntarism include the fact that 
firms are more knowledgeable about their own operations and therefore more likely to 
find effective solutions87 with reduced costs88, and that they may comply with their 
own rules more readily than they would with national legislation89. Moreover, some 
argue that it may allow for a lesser disruption of corporate activities than legislation90. 
Self-regulation may also be more effective in preventing infringements, whereas 
government regulation only punishes violations once serious problems have arisen91. 
Generally, some authors believe that self-regulation may help the firm enmesh together 
economic and non-economic goals, thereby triggering a virtuous circle between the 
firm’s new structure and the employees’ attitude92.  
However, other scholars have mixed opinions about the effectiveness of voluntary self-
regulatory. While John Braithwaite writes that corporate inspectors may be better 
trained than their government counterparts, and that their power to trap suspected 
wrongdoers is often greater than that possessed by government investigators93, he also 
considers that voluntary self-regulation is most attractive in areas of business 
regulation where the public interests threatened are not great and where industry does 
not have much to lose or something to gain because it is the cheapest option94. David 
Vogel writes that, while some self-regulatory instruments have improved aspects of 
corporate conduct, business compliance with their own rules has been uneven95. He 
has also stated that a voluntary programme will only stop violations that cost the 
company money and some violations that benefit the company financially in the short-
term for the sake of the long-term benefit of fostering employee commitment to 
compliance – but the rest will commonly be ignored96.  
 
86 Coglianese and Mendelson (n. 70), 152; Gunningham and Rees (n. 7), 366; Ruhnka and Boerstler (n. 
70), 314. 
87 Coglianese and Mendelson (n. 70), 152. 
88 Ruhnka and Boerstler (n. 70), 316.  
89 Coglianese and Mendelson (n. 70), 152. 
90 Harvey L. Pitt and Karl A.  Groskaufmanis, ‘Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A 
Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct’, Georgetown Law Journal 78, 1990, 1559, 1561.   
91 Ruhnka and Boerstler (n. 70), 314.  
92 Oren Perez, Yair Amichai-Hamburger, and Tammy Shterenta, ‘The Dynamic of Corporate Self‐
Regulation: ISO 14001, Environmental Commitment, and Organizational Citizenship Behavior’, Law 
& Society Review 43(3), 2009, 593, 594. 
93 John Braithwaite, ‘Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control’, 
Michigan Law Review 80(7), 1982, 1466, 1468-69. 
94 Ibid, 1501.  
95 Vogel (n. 15), 79-80.  
96 Ibid. 
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Other voices are even more critical and state that corporate self-regulation is a 
“dubious proposition”97 and not a serious solution. Marc Jones writes that the “prime 
directive is to act according to the tenets of social responsibility if it pays”98. Ronen 
Shamir agrees and states that, “while counter-hegemonic pressures often seek the 
backing of law and regulation”, corporations seek to invest in self-regulatory schemes 
that have the capacity to open up new market opportunities99 and to pre-empt viable 
threats to corporate interests100. Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee is as sceptical, 
considering that “corporate strategies will always be made in the interests of enhancing 
shareholder value and return on capital, not social justice or morality”101.  Mark 
Suchman concurs and suspects that corporations engaging in self-regulation favour the 
“flexibility and economy of symbolism” over “substantive responses”102  and real 
change. The main issue with voluntary corporate self-regulation is therefore that 
implementation is left up to the discretion of managers103, which is why some authors 
argue that self-regulation will not work unless there is some element of external 
coercion104 105 and sanctions106. It also leads some scholars to write that voluntary self-
regulation will be more effective if it is combined with legal regulation107. Another 
 
97 Ronnie D. Lipschutz and James K. Rowe, Globalization, Governmentality and Global Politics: 
Regulation for the Rest of Us?, Psychology Press, 2005, 132.  
98 Marc T. Jones, ‘Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Critique of the Social Responsibility Concept and 
Discourse’, Business & Society 35(1) 1996, 7, 35.  
99 Ronen Shamir, ‘The age of Responsibilization: On Market-embedded Morality’, Economy & Society 
37(1), 2008, 1, 14.  
100 Ronen Shamir, ‘The De-Radicalization of Corporate Social Responsibility’, Critical Sociology 
30(3), 2004, 669, 680.   
101 Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, ‘Corporate social responsibility: The good, the bad and the ugly’, 
Critical Sociology 34(1), 2008, 51, 74. 
102 Mark Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’, Academy of 
Management Review 20(3), 1995, 571, 576. 
103 Coglianese and Mendelson (n. 70), 153.  
104 Maitland (n. 77), 139; Abe de Jong, Douglas V. DeJong, Gerard Mertens, and Charles E. Wasley, 
‘The role of self-regulation in corporate governance: evidence and implications from The Netherlands’, 
Journal of Corporate Finance 11(3), 2005, 473, 500; Coglianese and Mendelson (n. 70), 161; and Short 
and Toffel (n. 82), 366. 
105 Kathleen Segerson and Thomas J. Miceli believe that “the agreed upon level of [commitments] will 
be directly related to the magnitude of the threat” (‘Voluntary approaches to environmental protection: 
the role of legislative threats’, in Carlo Carraro and Francois Leveque (ed.) Voluntary approaches in 
environmental policy, Springer, 1999, 105, 119). Moreover, Mancur Olson specifies that, “in a large 
group in which no single individual’s contribution makes a perceptible difference to the group as a 
whole, […] it is certain that a collective good will not be provided unless there is coercion or some 
outside inducements that will lead the members of the large group to act in their common interest” (The 
Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, 1965, 44).  
106 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, ‘Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment’, Law & Social 
Inquiry16(3), 1991, 435, 490. 
107 Gunningham and Rees (n. 7), 396; and Annette Elisabeth Töller, ‘Voluntary Approaches to 
Regulation – Patterns, Causes and Effects’, in David Levi-Faur (ed.) Handbook of the Politics of 
Regulation, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, 507.  
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important limit to voluntarism is the fact that managers’ discretion itself is limited 
because they operate in a market economy so that, no matter how well-intentioned they 
are, they are unable to subordinate profit-maximisation to social objectives108. These 
limitations lead some scholars to favour coerced self-regulation. 
Coerced self-regulation implies that there is some degree of external coercion from the 
government – but not all authors agree on the degree to which the government 
intervenes in the enforcement of self-regulation. Some consider that it happens when 
an entity (or a group of entities) “itself formulates and imposes regulation in response 
to threats by the government that, if it does not, the government will impose statutory 
regulation”109. Others deem self-regulation to be coerced when criminal sanctions 
apply for the violation of self-regulatory rules110. It follows that there is no universally 
accepted definition of coerced self-regulation. Despite this problem, proponents of this 
form of self-regulation argue that enforced self-regulation achieves the ‘best of both 
worlds’. The main weakness of voluntary self-regulation is the fact that entities may 
not be willing to self-regulate effectively111 whereas weaknesses inherent to 
government regulations include delay, red, tape, costs, and stultification of 
innovation112. Enforced self-regulation is therefore seen by some as combining the 
“versatility and flexibility of voluntary self-regulation, but avoid[ing] many of the 
inherent weaknesses of voluntarism”113, and thus as a guarantee that rules will be 
properly implemented114. For instance, it is argued that it would reduce “the confusion 
that flows from having two rulebooks (the government’s and the company’s)”, and 
that compliance would be the “path of least corporate resistance”115. Relatedly, some 
authors argue that the threat of governmental punishment is counterproductive, and 
that positive governmental incentives is more likely to push firms to implement self-
regulation116. A few scholars point to the necessity of collective action if self-
regulation is going to be effective as self-regulated entities may not be willing to 
implement the rules if they are not assured that all will do the same117: only self-
 
108 Maitland (n. 77), 133. 
109 Black (n. 73), 27.  
110 Braithwaite (n. 93), 1470. 
111 Ibid, 1469.  
112 Ibid, 1470.  
113 Ibid.  
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid, 1482-3.  
116 Ruhnka and Boerstler (n. 70), 325.  
117 Maitland (n. 77), 139; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971, 270.  
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regulation at the level of the economy (business-wide) would allow managers to “heed 
society’s demands that the firm behave responsibly while at the same time protecting 
them from the charge that their generosity at the stockholders' expense was 
jeopardizing the firm's competitive position”118. Finally, some scholars point to the 
fact that compliance works best when management can say that the government insists 
upon it119.  
As Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson explain, “understanding what efforts work 
best to foster positive forms of self-control — whether these efforts take the form of 
conventional regulatory strategies or of alternatives like meta-regulation — should 
remain at the centre of social scientists’ agenda for research on regulatory 
governance”120. Accordingly, some scholars have attempted to identify characteristics 
of effective corporate self-regulation, of which I will provide a brief overview here 
and a detailed analysis in Chapter 3. Beyond the call of certain authors for collective, 
business-wide action121, which is outside the scope of this thesis, others have stated 
that the effectiveness of self-regulation depends on the firms’ “intrinsic and 
reputational motivations”122, and especially whether firms believe it is in their interest 
to implement their own rules. Another crucial element is performance and compliance 
monitoring123, including by third parties124. Some scholars also advocate for sanctions, 
although others warn that certain enforcement tools may undermine intrinsic 
motivations to cooperate with others or execute certain tasks125. I will explore these 
features in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
It has become clear in this section that the literature is divided as to the value of 
voluntary self-regulation, especially in contrast to what some scholars believe coerced 
forms of self-regulation can potentially achieve. Some authors write that it offers 
flexibility, reduced costs, and efficiency in the implementation of rules, whereas others 
believe that implementation will not happen without external constraints. It follows 
 
118 Maitland (n. 77), 138; Olson (n. 105) 138. 
119 Braithwaite (n. 93), 1497.  
120 Coglianese and Mendelson (n. 70), 164.  
121 Maitland (n. 77), 145.  
122 Short and Toffel (n. 82), 366. 
123 Ibid, 386. 
124 De Jong, DeJong, Mertens, and Wasley (n. 104), 474. 
125 Short and Toffel (n. 82), 366.  
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that research is needed into the value of voluntary self-regulation as a tool to change 
corporate behaviour. More specifically, as this thesis focuses on corporate human 
rights self-regulation, it is important to assess whether (human rights) self-regulation 
can help firms improve their human rights performance on the ground. I will therefore 
explore the literature on corporate human rights self-regulation in the next section, 
with the aim to identify the relevant mechanisms used by firms and explain why I 
chose in this thesis to study them all together. 
 
1.3.2. Introduction to corporate human rights self-regulation 
As was outlined in section 1.2., it has become progressively accepted that firms have 
human rights obligations, and companies themselves have been feeling increasing 
pressure126 around the globe to acknowledge their responsibilities and show that they 
are taking them seriously. Accordingly, firms have been adopting human rights self-
regulatory mechanisms, such as company codes, industry codes, multi-stakeholder 
initiatives, intergovernmental instruments, and certification labels127. Before getting to 
the question of the effectiveness of these different mechanisms, it is important to 
outline first why I argue that they are all forms of voluntary human rights self-
regulation, and second why it is important to study them all together.  
I will start by explaining why each type of instruments (human rights policies and 
codes, intergovernmental instruments, industry and multi-stakeholder initiatives, and 
certification labels) is a form of voluntary human rights self-regulation. First, human 
rights policies are instruments developed and adopted by the firm itself outlining 
commitments to (specific) human rights, potentially by referring to intergovernmental 
instruments such as international conventions – which I review below. Codes of 
conduct are also written and adopted by the corporation itself, but they will commonly 
 
126 Ronen Shamir, ‘Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept 
of Corporate Social Responsibility’, Law & Society Review 38(4), 2004, 635, 659; Laura Albareda, 
‘Corporate responsibility, governance and accountability: From self-regulation to co-regulation’, 
Corporate Governance International Journal of Business in Society 8(4), 2008, 430, 438; De Jong, 
DeJong, Mertens, and Wasley (n. 104), 474.  
127 Perhaps as a consequence, a study concluded that business enterprises recognise the significance of 
human rights in their daily activities both as a matter of legal compliance and as part of good practice 
(Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporation and other business enterprises, ‘Human Rights Policies and Management 
Practices: Results from questionnaire surveys of Governments and Fortune Global 500 firms’, 28 
February 2007, A/HRC/4/35/Add.3, as cited in Addo, The Reality of the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (n. 24), 135.)  
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outline practical means to implement the general commitments to human rights made 
by the same firm. They are both attempts by corporations to voluntarily adopt internal 
rules on its own behaviour, which follows the definition of self-regulation given at the 
beginning of this chapter. Human rights policies commonly set out goals whereas 
codes of conduct typically detail how to achieve the goals in question.  However, even 
when I study stand-alone human rights included in corporate policies and codes 
developed by firms themselves, I do not claim that such principles were solely created 
by corporations, but rather that they emerged from a “networked governance”128 of 
States, Non-Governmental Organisations [NGOs], and the private sector, and as part 
of the global conversation on the relationship between business and human rights129. 
For instance, Unilever’s Human Rights Policy covers the following human rights 
(among others), and the firm’s Code of Business Principles outlines the behaviour 
expected of management, employees, and suppliers to ensure that the following human 
rights (among others) are respected across all its operations: right to be free from 
exploitative child labour and from forced labour, just and favourable working 
conditions, freedom from discrimination, fair wages, and the freedom of association 
and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.  
Second, firms may commit to intergovernmental instruments, which were not 
developed by corporations themselves, but rather by international organisations – 
mainly the UN, such as for the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights [ICESCR], or International 
Labour Organisation [ILO] Conventions. The Unilever Declaration of Human Rights 
covers the following human rights (among others): right to life, freedom from slavery, 
freedom of association, right to work, right to equal pay, freedom from discrimination, 
freedom from forced labour, right to just and favourable working conditions, right to 
just and favourable remuneration, right  to  an  adequate standard  of  living,  including  
adequate housing,  clothing,  and  food, right to health, right to a family life, and right 
to education. The ICCPR covers the following human rights (among others): right to 
life, freedom from slavery and from forced labour, and freedom of association. The 
ICESCR covers the following human rights (among others): freedom from forced 
 
128 Abbott and Snidal (n. 13), 57. 
129 Baxi (n. 34).  
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labour and from discrimination, right to work, right to just and favourable conditions 
of work, right  to  an  adequate standard  of  living,  including  adequate housing,  
clothing,  and  food, right to a family life, freedom of housing, right to health, and right 
to education. ILO Conventions cover the following human rights (among others): 
freedom from exploitative child labour, from forced labour, and from discrimination, 
equal pay, right to just and favourable working conditions, right to just and favourable 
remuneration, freedom of association, and right to strike. Although these texts were 
not originally drafted for the purpose of regulating corporate behaviour, firms may 
choose to unilaterally commit to respecting the principles laid out in these texts, either 
as stand-alone commitments or as part of a human rights (or other) policy, thereby 
imposing rules on themselves. These instruments are therefore used by businesses as 
part of corporate self-regulatory mechanisms, relevant to this research. However, it is 
notable that, whether or not companies decide to voluntarily commit to respecting 
human rights principles, they have, in any case, international human rights 
responsibilities, as explained in Section 1.2.  
Third, industry and multi-stakeholder initiatives are relevant to this thesis to the extent 
that companies may decide to take part in these initiatives on a voluntary basis. Doing 
so, firms voluntarily commit to behave according to the standards (which may be 
included in a code or policy) from the initiative in question, and (if relevant) accept 
the authority of an external industry body monitoring adherence to the standards. 
Voluntary industry and multi-stakeholder initiatives are therefore voluntary self-
regulatory mechanisms which will be relevant to this thesis. Moreover, they may have 
human rights aspects. As an example, the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition 
Code of Conduct is “derived from key international human rights standards including 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights” 130. The Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights also recognise the “importance of the promotion and protection of 
human rights throughout the world and the constructive role business and civil society 
[…] can play in advancing these goals”131. Moreover, the Global Network Initiative 
requires participants to commit to implement the organisation’s Principles on Freedom 
 
130 Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition, ‘Code of Conduct’, 2014, 1.  
131 Steering Committee of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, ‘Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights’, 2000, 1. 
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of Expression and Privacy, which are a framework established to “provide direction 
and guidance to the ICT industry and its stakeholders in protecting and advancing the 
enjoyment of these human rights globally”132. These few examples show that industry 
and multi-stakeholders initiatives may have human rights dimensions and aims.  
Finally, certification labels are mechanisms in which companies may choose to take 
part: they voluntarily adopt the label’s standards, choose to behave accordingly, and 
accept the authority of the certifying body. Certification labels are therefore self-
regulatory mechanisms as defined in this thesis. Furthermore, they often include 
human rights standards, whether or not these standards are framed in such terms. For 
instance, Fairtrade is a certification label which has developed standards which firms 
must meet in order to get specific products certified; on its website, the organisation 
states that “human rights are an integral part of [the certification label’s] mission”133. 
Among others, Fairtrade covers the following human rights: freedom from exploitative 
child labour and from forced labour, right to just and favourable remuneration, right 
to just and favourable working conditions, freedom of association, freedom from 
discrimination, right to an adequate standard of living, right to a clean environment, 
right to health, and right to education. Moreover, the certification label Rainforest 
Alliance has adopted a “human rights approach” and acknowledges that “advancement 
of basic human rights is intrinsic to sustainable land management and forest 
conservation”134, which sit at the heart of the organisation’s mission. Among others, 
the Rainforest Alliance covers the following human rights: freedom from exploitative 
child labour and from forced labour, right to just and favourable remuneration, right 
to just and favourable working conditions, freedom of association, freedom from 
discrimination, right to an adequate standard of living, right to a clean environment, 
land rights, right to health, and right to education. 
I will explore each of these mechanisms in more detail in Chapter 2, but first – and 
expanding on the explanation provided in the introduction to this chapter – I will 
explain why it is important to study all these mechanisms together: firstly because of 
 
132 Global Network Initiative, ‘GNI Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy’, 2017, 2. 
133 Fairtrade’s Media Centre, ‘Six Ways Fairtrade Strengthens Human Rights’ (Fairtrade Blog, 10 
December 2018) <https://www.fairtrade.org.uk/Media-Centre/Blog/2018/December/Six-Ways-
Fairtrade-Strengthens-Human-Rights> (accessed 19 October 2019) 
134 Rainforest Alliance, ‘Advancing the Human Rights of Rural People’ (Rainforest Alliance’s website, 
25 June 2018) <https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/articles/advancing-the-human-rights-of-rural-
people> (accessed 19 October 2019)  
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their substantive content and objectives, secondly because of the way which firms use 
them, and third because of their similar ‘key features’, as identified by scholars looking 
at what would make mechanisms effective.  
First, the various mechanisms are adopted by corporations with social and/or 
environmental goals in mind. It follows that the standards which are included in the 
self-regulatory mechanisms will have social and/or environmental dimensions. 
Whether they are framed in human rights terms or not, they will therefore be expected 
to have positive human rights impacts – and the rights in question are fairly similar 
across the different types of mechanisms. Commonly included are the right to health, 
the right to fair remuneration, or the prohibition of discrimination in the workplace, 
which all are for instance covered by Pepsi’s Human Rights Policy135, ILO 
Conventions C100136, C111137, and C155138, the Electronic Industry Citizenship 
Coalition Code of Conduct139, and the Food Alliance140, Fairtrade141, and Rainforest 
Alliance142 certification labels. Moreover, all mechanisms also purport to achieve the 
same goal: they aim to shape corporate behaviour along the lines of certain social, 
economic, and environmental principles143. These may include human rights principles 
– again, whether they are explicitly formulated in human rights terms or not –, which 
aim to ensure that business activities do not negatively impact the human rights of 
workers and of community members living nearby. For instance, Unilever’s Human 
Rights Policy contains “over-arching principles which [the firm] embed[s] into [its] 
policies and systems” to ensure that “human rights are upheld across [its] operations 
and [its] value chain”144. ILO conventions aim to “lay down the basic minimum social 
 
135 PepsiCo, ‘Global Human Rights Policy’, 2017.  
136 ILO Convention C100, ‘Equal Remuneration Convention’, 1951.  
137 ILO Convention C111, ‘Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention’, 1958. 
138 ILO Convention C155, ‘Occupational Safety and Health Convention’, 1981. 
139 Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition, ‘Code of Conduct’, 2014. 
140 Food Alliance, ‘Sustainability Standard for Crop Operations’, 2018.  
141 Fairtrade, ‘Hired Labour Standard’ (hereinafter ‘Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’’), 2014.  
142 Rainforest Alliance, ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’ (hereinafter ‘Rainforest Alliance 
‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’’), 2017.  
143 This is also true for intergovernmental instruments. Although these instruments target states, I argue 
that, when firms decide to commit to implement these principles, they broaden the scope of application 
of these instruments and, as a result, expands their objectives and targets to encompass corporate 
activities. Importantly, the ILO itself has acknowledged that many companies had committed in their 
codes to principles derived from ILO conventions, and stated that, while these “codes are no substitute 
for binding international instruments, they play an important role in helping to spread the principles 
contained in international labour standards.” (ILO, ‘How International Labour Standards are used’ 
<https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/international-
labour-standards-use/lang--en/index.htm> (accessed on 19 October 2019)) 
144 Unilever, ‘Human Rights Policy’, 2014, 1. 
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standards agreed upon by all the players in the global economy” and to achieve the 
“goal of decent work”, based on “social protection, rights at work and social dialogue”, 
among others145. Fairtrade standards aims to “ensure that the conditions of production 
and trade of all Fairtrade certified products are socially, economically fair and 
environmentally responsible”146. It is therefore clear that these different types of 
mechanisms share many standards and aim to shape corporate behaviour towards more 
human rights-friendly practices. When assessing whether they achieve these goals, it 
is therefore important to do it across all mechanisms.  
This leads me to the second reason why it is crucial to assess them together: 
corporations themselves see these different types of mechanisms as parts of a single 
strategy. Indeed, businesses do not differentiate between the different mechanisms: 
firms’ priority is to communicate to the outside world (and perhaps first and foremost, 
to their customers) that they are aware of the potential impact of their activities on a 
whole range of stakeholders, and that they are addressing associated human rights 
risks. This becomes obvious when looking at corporate websites: when explaining 
their efforts in the area of sustainability, firms mention all of their initiatives together 
in signposting their human rights and/or sustainability commitments. For instance, 
Unilever mentions certification as part of their sustainability and human rights efforts, 
alongside their Human Rights Policy and other internal human rights instruments. 
Nestlé’s Cocoa Plan147 includes their own instruments, certification mechanisms (such 
as UTZ and Fairtrade), a private-public partnership initiative, and an annual third-party 
auditing mechanism, all part of the same efforts towards human rights-friendly cocoa 
farming and harvesting. Mars references ILO conventions in their own policies and 
mentions certification as part of their sustainable cocoa plan148. PepsiCo’s human 
rights strategy includes commitments to its own Global Code of Conduct, the 
International Bill of Human Rights, the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, the UN Global Compact, and the UNGPs – all mentioned in its 
 
145 ILO, ‘The benefits of International Labour Standards’ (ILO’s website) 
<https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/the-benefits-of-
international-labour-standards/lang--en/index.htm> (accessed on 19 October 2019)  
146 Fairtrade, ‘What does it guarantee?’ (Fairtrade’s website) 
<http://www.vartotojai.lt/en/fairtrade/what-is-fairtrade/guarantees> (accessed on 19 October 2019).  
147 Nestlé has created a website dedicated to their Cocoa Plan, which is accessible here: 
<https://www.nestlecocoaplan.com/> (accessed on 19 October 2019) 
148 Mars, ‘Our Cocoa and Forests Policy’ (Mars’s website, 21 March 2019) 
<https://www.mars.com/about/policies-and-practices/cocoa-and-forests-policy> (accessed 19 October 
2019) 
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Human Rights Policy149 –, and includes its commitment to only use Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil-certified oil by 2020150. It is therefore clear that corporations 
themselves see these various mechanisms as part of a unique ‘human rights’ strategy.  
Third, as briefly outlined at the beginning of this chapter and in the previous section, 
authors writing about general self-regulation and those writing about individual 
mechanisms find broadly similar features helping guarantee the mechanisms’ 
effectiveness (although, as will become clear in Chapter 3, literature on product-level 
mechanisms is narrower than the literature on product-level mechanisms). In 
summary, the following features were identified: the need for an open and transparent 
process; clear and specific standards developed by a whole range of stakeholders; 
monitoring of implementation; reporting of progress; and sanctions for non-
compliance. Indeed, most of them highlight the importance of opening the drafting 
process to all stakeholders, including worker representatives, NGOs, and experts, to 
ensure that the views all concerned will be considered. It is also crucial to cover a 
comprehensive set of human rights in the mechanisms’ standards, so as to ensure that 
no human right is forgotten. Moreover, the training of relevant stakeholders is deemed 
crucial by most authors – although, depending on the type of mechanisms, the 
stakeholders in question may not be the same. For instance, scholars writing on 
certification labels mainly focus on the training of auditors151. Furthermore, a strong – 
internal and/or external – monitoring system is underlined as an essential guarantee of 
the effectiveness of mechanisms. Finally, setting up a sanctioning process, with clearly 
defined consequences for breaches of standards, is seen as a helpful feature by most of 
the literature, across mechanisms. It is therefore clear that the different types of self-
regulatory mechanisms share many ‘key features’ which would, according to scholars, 
ensure their effectiveness, and that it is important to investigate the extent to which 
these features actually help mechanisms across the board impact firms’ human rights 
performance on the ground. I will expand on the identified features and the framework 
of analysis which will result from their investigation in Chapter 3.  
 
149 PepsiCo (n. 135), 1.  
150 PepsiCo, ‘Palm Oil Sustainability – Our Approach and Policy’ (PepsiCo’s website) 
<https://www.pepsico.com/sustainability/palm-oil> (accessed on 19 October 2019) 
151 Although I acknowledge that audits are an integral part of product-level mechanisms, I argue in 
Chapter 3 that scholars should not adopt such a narrow focus, and that most of the features identified 
by authors regarding company-level mechanisms (and those writing generally about self-regulation) are 
relevant to product-level mechanisms as well. 
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Corporate self-regulatory mechanisms therefore share many standards, aim to shape 
corporate behaviour towards more human rights-friendly practices, are used by 
corporations as parts of a unique ‘human rights’ strategy, and finally share many ‘key 
features’ which would, according to scholars, ensure their effectiveness. It is therefore 
important to study them all together, as it will allow for the comprehensive evaluation 
of the value of voluntary corporate human rights self-regulation in driving respectful 
business practices.  
Now that the different types of human rights self-regulatory mechanisms have been 
introduced, it is important to investigate their value in improving corporate human 
rights performance, as assessed by relevant scholarship. Indeed, these self-regulation 
mechanisms all claim to be able to achieve a great deal and to contribute to the global 
regulation of corporate behaviour. Some authors explain that it is an attempt to “extend 
regulation to a wide range of global business practices for which the scope or 
effectiveness of national and international government authority is currently either 
weak, limited, or non-existent”152. Whether these goals are met in reality is a complex 
question and authors writing on corporate human rights self-regulation are as divided 
about their effectiveness as scholars writing about self-regulation in general, whose 
opinions I explored in Section 1.3.1. above. Some are sceptical: Upendra Baxi writes 
that human rights instruments may become meaningless references153 and that 
voluntarism necessarily seeks to “minimise the range of human rights responsibilities 
extendable to trade and business”154. Similarly, Tony Royle underlines the importance 
of binding international labour standards and stronger national law, without which it 
will be impossible to “significantly change the status quo”155, and Mathias Koenig-
Archibugi writes that robust accountability mechanisms require state action156. Ans 
Kolk and Rob Van Tulder agree to a certain degree as they write that “codes will not 
be effective if they substitute for government regulation”157. Similarly, while writing 
about certification systems, Ewald Rametsteiner and Markku Simula advocate for 
 
152 Vogel (n. 15), 73, also citing Koenig-Archibugi (n. 11), 235; Short and Toffel (n. 82), 391.  
153 Baxi (n. 34), 4; Baxi also cites Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings, Stanford 
University Press, 1964, 235.  
154  Baxi (n. 34), 23.  
155 Tony Royle, ‘The ILO's Shift to Promotional Principles and the 'Privatization' of Labour Rights: An 
Analysis of Labour Standards, Voluntary Self-Regulation and Social Clauses’, International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law 26(3), 2010, 249, 271. 
156 Koenig-Archibugi (n. 11), 259. 
157 Ans Kolk and Rob Van Tulder, ‘The Effectiveness of Self-regulation: Corporate Codes of Conduct 
and Child Labour’, European Management Journal 20(3), 2002, 260, 262 and 270. 
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“comprehensive development strategies”158 on a global scale involving governments 
and in which certification and labelling would only play a “complementary” role. 
Moreover, Michael Addo and Jena Martin argue that voluntarism has constrained 
progress on CSR by separating it from firms’ legal and economic responsibilities and 
privileging the economic case for corporate policy159. They also write that the wide 
discretion afforded to corporations by voluntarism, the lack of accountability of such 
corporate initiatives, and the challenges of implementation have all contributed to the 
credibility and effectiveness gaps in the field160. Finally, Jean-Pascal Gond, Nahee 
Kang, and Jeremy Moon argue that self-regulation gives corporations a “façade of 
morality” which frees them from governmental pressures161.  
Others are more optimistic and believe that the private sector has an active role to play 
in the full development and realisation of human rights: Jodi Short and Michael Toffel 
believe that “it can play an important role in promoting compliance”162. Moreover, 
Adelle Blackett writes that corporate self-regulation initiatives are emerging forms of 
labour regulation163, while Florian Wettstein advocates for proactive company 
involvement “in the protection and realization of human rights” 164. Perhaps reflecting 
the academic split, an examination of 79 studies into the effectiveness of corporate 
codes showed mixed results, with 35% of the studies finding that codes are effective, 
16% that the relationship is weak, 33% that there is no significant relationship, and 
14% presenting mixed results165.  
Scholarship is therefore split as to the potential of corporate self-regulation in helping 
businesses respect human rights. However, researchers have rarely gone into the field 
to verify their respective claims: out of the 79 studies mentioned above – although only 
 
158 Ewald Rametsteiner and Markku Simula, ‘Forest certification—an instrument to promote sustainable 
forest management?’, Journal of Environmental Management 67, 2002, 87, 97.  
159 Addo and Martin (n. 10), 356.  
160 Ibid, 349. 
161 Gond, Kang, and Moon (n. 83), 641. 
162 Short and Toffel (n. 82), 391.  
163 Adelle Blackett, ‘Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law 
Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 8(2), 2001, 401, 
402.  
164 Wettstein, ‘CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great Divide’ (n. 64), 
757.  
165 Muel Kaptein and Mark S. Schwartz, ‘The Effectiveness of Business Codes: A Critical Examination 
of Existing Studies and the Development of an Integrated Research Model’, Journal of Business Ethics 
77(2), 2008, 111, 115. 
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concerning corporate codes –, only one uses field research166, the rest relying on desk 
research, questionnaires (mostly about perception of practice), interviews with 
managers or marketing researchers, or laboratory tests. This illustrates the lack of 
research into the impact of self-regulation on the ground. Yet it is crucial to go in the 
field to assess whether self-regulation mechanisms do help companies effectively 
implement their human rights commitments and meet their human rights 
responsibilities167, in order to hold firms to account for the pledges which they publicly 
make (and use as part of their marketing strategy). This thesis aims to help fill that 
gap; the next section will outline the methodology which I have used to do so.   
 
1.4. General methodology 
I will here outline the methodology I have used to conduct my research. Firstly, as 
recommended by scholars writing on methodology168, I started my research by 
reviewing the relevant literature. Second, answering this thesis’s main question 
requires empirical research into the implementation of human rights commitments. I 
will now explore the two in more detail.  
1.4.1. Literature review conducted in this thesis 
I started my research by conducting a thorough literature review which, as outlined in 
Section 1.1. above, covered the following literatures: the literature around corporate 
human rights responsibilities (which allowed me to define the nature and extent of 
such responsibilities), the literature around corporate human rights self-regulation 
(replied upon in Chapter 2 to develop a typology of the different self-regulatory 
mechanisms used by firms), and the (theoretical and applied) literature on 
effectiveness of self-regulation (in order to analyse the ‘key features’ identified by 
authors as helping make the different types of mechanisms effective). This allowed me 
 
166 See César Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Global Governance and Labor Rights: Codes of Conduct and Anti-
Sweatshop Struggles in Global Apparel Factories in Mexico and Guatemala’, Politics Society 33, 2005, 
203. 
167 James Harrison and Sharifah Sekalala explain that there are few significant studies looking into how, 
and whether, corporate human rights responsibilities are meaningfully enacted (Harrison and Sekalala 
(n. 10), 927). 
168 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 
1984, 21; H M Cooper, The integrative research review, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1984; and Lisa Webley, 
‘Stumbling Blocks in Empirical Legal Research: Case Study Research’, Law and Method, 2016, 6.  
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to identify the gaps in academic debates, to define my research questions accordingly, 
and to determine the various theories to be tested as part of this research169.  
As I have briefly mentioned in this chapter and will further explore in Chapter 2, there 
is little scholarship looking at all mechanisms together, and no holistic typology has 
yet been developed. However, such a typology is necessary if I am to analyse different 
types of corporate mechanisms together and from a human rights perspective170. This 
thesis’s typology therefore allows for the classification of corporate human rights self-
regulatory mechanisms, for the identification of the strengths and weaknesses of each 
type of instrument, and for the formulation of expectations as to how they work in 
practice. It also allows for the comparison of not only different types of mechanisms, 
but also of different mechanisms within the same category.  
Once the self-regulatory mechanisms are mapped out, I explore in Chapter 3 the 
theories put forward by scholarship about the features which would make self-
regulation effective. For instance, what is the value afforded by authors to 
transparency, inclusiveness, training, or sanctions for non-compliance? These 
hypotheses will be tested out empirically during the case study to find out if they 
contribute to making human rights self-regulation effective (in a specific setting).  
Once I have defined my research questions (Chapter 1), developed a typology mapping 
out relevant mechanisms (Chapter 2), and formulated various hypotheses (Chapter 3), 
I need to design an empirical study to test these out. Although I will outline my 
methodology in detail in Chapter 4, I will explain here why conducting a case study is 
the most appropriate empirical method for this research.  
 
1.4.2. Empirical methods used in this thesis 
Empirical methods may be case studies, experiments, surveys, archival analyses, and 
histories171. I eliminated from the start the option of conducting archival analyses and 
histories as this thesis focuses on a current phenomenon. Moreover, experiments focus 
on current phenomena but presuppose that they can be studied in a controlled 
 
169 Webley (n.168), 6; and Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage, 2018. 
170 The importance of analysing corporate mechanisms from a human rights perspective will be 
explained in Section 3.1.2. 
171 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage, 2009, 8. 
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environment, separated from the real-world172 and with few variables. Surveys allow 
researchers to study phenomena in their context but allow no room for the complexities 
of real-life situations173. All these research methods are therefore inadequate. 
However, case studies are real-world, holistic, and in-depth investigations of current 
complex phenomena174. They focus on only a limited geographical area, with a specific 
number of subjects of interest175, and aim to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: 
why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result176. They 
generate data which, when triangulated, provides a means through which to draw 
robust, reliable, valid conclusions about law in the real world177. Case studies as a 
research method are recommended by the academic literature when the boundaries 
between phenomena and context are not quite clear and cannot be separated178, or 
when contextual conditions are highly pertinent to the phenomenon of study179. It 
therefore helps to explain the complexities of real-life situations which may not be 
captured through experimental or survey research180. A case study is therefore well-
suited to address my main research question, which focuses on the effectiveness of 
corporate mechanisms in helping businesses respect human rights and requires the 
exploration of the impact on the ground of mechanisms from drafting stage to 
implementation. It follows that I will have to study how business activities are 
conducted in general, which means that I cannot separate the context from the object 
of the study. Another advantage of case studies is the fact that they allow for the 
understanding of perceptions of processes and how they influence behaviour181, and 
are specifically suited to situations when the main research questions are “how” and 
“why” questions182.  They allow researchers to “explain the presumed causal links in 
real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies”, 
and to “enlighten those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no 
 
172 Zaidah Zainal, ‘Case study as a research method’, Jurnal Kemanusiaan bil 5(1), 2007, 4. 
173 Yin (n.171), 18. 
174 Ibid.  
175 Zainal (n. 172), 1. 
176 Wilbur Schramm, ‘Notes on Case Studies of Instructional Media Projects’, California Institute for 
Communication Research, Stanford University, 1971, 6.  
177 Webley (n.168), 2. 
178 Robert Yin and Darnella Davis ‘Adding New Dimensions To Case Study Evaluations: The Case Of 
Evaluating Comprehensive Reforms’, New Directions for Evaluation 2007 (113), 2007, 75. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Zainal (n. 172), 1. 
181 Yin (n. 171), 4. 
182 Yin (n. 168), 21.  
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clear, single set of outcomes”183. The study of the way in which self-regulatory 
mechanisms influence decision-making and how standards are implemented is central 
to this thesis’s research question, which means that I will study the behaviour of 
decision makers and of individuals in charge of implementing these decisions on the 
ground, as well as the results of these decisions184. The way a business conducts its 
activities may be influenced by a range of factors, such as the economic context, 
available labour force, personality of managers, the national and local environment, 
the type of industry, or the resources available where the company operates. This 
complex real-life environment may be captured by a case study, which is best equipped 
to deal with a context where a significant number of external variables, and not only 
the studied phenomenon, may affect the object of study185. It will therefore be possible 
to explore complex issues, including the behavioural conditions through the 
perspective of actors186 such as managers and workers, and for the understanding of 
both the process and outcome of the phenomenon187 of corporate behaviour. Finally, 
case studies are helpful when researchers cannot control the behaviour of 
participants188, and when multiple sources of evidence are used189, which is the case 
here as I will have no control over the subjects of the study (e.g. managers; workers; 
community members), and will use interviews, observations, and document analysis 
for my data collection190. 
However, case studies do present some drawbacks. One of the risks of conducting a 
case study is a lack of rigour191, which can be mitigated against with a robust research 
design192. Secondly, it may be difficult to generalise the results beyond the scope of 
the case study193. However, some authors consider that, if researchers establish 
 
183 Yin (n .171), 19. 
184 Robert Yin gives “small group behaviour, organisation and managerial processes, neighbourhood 
change” as good as examples of the kind of research focus for which case studies are best suited (Yin 
(n. 171), 18).   
185 Ibid. 
186 Zainal (n. 172), 1. 
187 Winston Tellis, ‘Introduction to Case Study’, The Qualitative Report, 3(2), 1997, 1, 6.  
188 Yin (n. 171), 2. 
189 Ibid.  
190 As is recommended by Muel Kaptein and Mark S. Schwartz, who write that “measuring the 
effectiveness of a business code requires multiple methods and sources of data.”  (Kaptein and Schwartz 
(n. 165), 122) 
191 Yin (n. 171), 14. 
192 Zainal (n. 172), 2. 
193 Tellis (n. 187), 5.  
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parameters and set specific objectives to be met, a small sample size is acceptable194 
195. Third, it is often said that case studies produce a lot of data, which may become 
problematic when it is not systematically managed and organised196. All three 
criticisms of case studies can be mitigated against with serious preparation and solid 
research design, which I will outline in the rest of this chapter and in more detail in 
Chapter 4.  
Having identified the case study as the best research method to adopt, I must define its 
parameters. As I explain below when outlining the details of the selected firms, my 
study will include many variables of interest, and primarily seeks to identify which 
processes and characteristics make corporate self-regulation effective. Consequently, 
a causal197 and linked multiple case-study198 – which is likely to be stronger than a 
single-case study199 – would be best suited to my research, although I will make sure 
to set all my individual cases in one region and one industry to reduce the risks of 
inferential error as much as possible. In particular, I will choose to study companies in 
one country to make sure that differences in corporate impacts on human rights would 
not stem from national legislation200. Moreover, I will select corporations of different 
sizes, including small and medium enterprises201 as this category of firms has been 
largely ignored in the business and human right debate202. Assessing the effectiveness 
of mechanisms in helping all types of corporations meet their human rights 
responsibilities is therefore important to contribute comprehensive evidence to this 
debate.  
 
194 Ibid, citing Jacques Hamel et al., Case study methods Vol. 32, Sage, 1993, and Yin (n. 168), 23. 
195 I will also address this particular issue in this thesis’s concluding chapter. 
196 Yin (n. 168), 21. 
197 A case study is causal when it “looks for causal relationships between concepts”, as outlined in Yin 
(n. 169)). 
198 “If limited to a single practice, project, or program, a “single-case” study is the result. However, the 
same evaluation could cover practices at several sites that might be part of the same program. Under 
this circumstance, if the practice remains the unit of analysis, the result is a “multiple-case” study.” (Yin 
and Davis (n.178), 80) 
199 Yin (n. 169). 
200 This means that my case study will follow a theoretical, rather than literal, replication model, as 
explained in Yin (n. 169). 
201 As Michael Addo explains, the definition of a small and medium enterprise may vary across the 
world; Addo for instance compares the definition used by the African Development Bank (up to 50 
employees) and the one used by the World Bank (up to 300 employees and $15 million in turnover). 
(Michael Addo, ‘Business and Human Rights and the Challenges for Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises’, in Thilo Rensmann (ed.), Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in International Economic 
Law, Oxford University Press, 2017, 319.) 
202 Ibid, 313.  
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This fieldwork will allow for the comparison of mechanisms on paper with practice on 
the ground and involve a review of existing (non-human rights) studies of corporate 
activities and site visits. So as to have a ‘best-case’ scenario and test out whether self-
regulatory mechanisms are truly effective in preventing and remedying human rights 
breaches, I conducted fieldwork in a particular industry where human rights issues are 
widespread and standards are common, and in a location where human rights issues 
are prevalent. Consequently, I chose to focus on agricultural firms operating in 
Tanzania, and more specifically producing tea. Indeed, human rights violations are 
commonplace in this field: among others, labour rights issues – with 60% of child 
labour happening in agriculture203, for instance –, issues with the right to water and 
sanitation, and with the right to land204. Furthermore, human rights self-regulation is 
common in agriculture: of the ten biggest tea companies worldwide, all have adopted 
self-regulatory standards, including five with company-level mechanisms and seven 
with product-level mechanisms (see Annex 1 for details)205. Finally, I chose to focus 
on Tanzania as the country’s law enforcement is weak, leaving gaps in state protection 
and allowing corporations to commit human rights violations on a regular basis across 
the country206. As a result, the country still faces widespread human rights violations: 
in their 2016 Human Rights and Business Report207, the Legal and Human Rights 
Centre [LHRC] identified the following human rights issues in the country: labour 
rights, land rights, gender-related rights, environmental justice, CSR, regulatory 
authorities performance, and taxation. I also chose Tanzania as it is a country with 
numerous tea companies operating side by side, and so where it is possible to compare 
and contrast human rights conditions in tea plantations and factories in a limited 
amount of time.  
Keeping all this in mind, I identified three – multinational and national – companies 
producing tea in Tanzania, which all offer very different approaches to sustainability 
 
203 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Polity, 2008, 103; and Susan Mapp, Human 
Rights and Social Justice in a Global Perspective: An Introduction to International Social Work, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, 34. 
204 Peter Nestor, ‘Four Human Rights Issues Every Food and Agriculture Company Needs to 
Understand’ (Business for Social Responsibility’s blog, 12 February 2013) 
<https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/blog-view/four-human-rights-issues-every-food-and-agriculture-
company-needs-to-unders> (accessed on 24 October 2019) 
205 Research undertaken on websites of relevant companies on 21 October 2019. 
206 See Section 4.1.2.3.3. for details.  
207 LHRC, ‘Report on Human Rights and Business 2016’, 2017, xxvi. 
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and human rights protection208: Unilever, Mufindi Tea and Coffee Ltd. [MTC], and 
Chai Bora. I chose to name the three companies of my study for three reasons: first, 
all three companies are large enough to ensure the anonymity of all interviewees, 
including managers and workers. Second, a number of studies on self-regulation do 
include the names of the corporations which they investigate209. Third, it will allow 
me to discuss their structures and performance, as set in their specific environment, 
more easily.  
Of all three companies, Unilever is the only firm which makes use of all types of 
mechanisms mentioned above (company-level (internal and external instruments) and 
product-level mechanisms) and, perhaps as a result, the firm has made the most 
extensive range of commitments of all three corporations and has been recognised as 
a human rights leader globally210. MTC has had its plantations certified by Fairtrade 
and the Rainforest Alliance and has committed to some ILO conventions. By adopting 
these mechanisms, both Unilever and MTC have committed to labour rights, 
community rights, and education- and health-related rights. Finally, Chai Bora has not 
adopted any human rights self-regulatory mechanism. Given the extensive range of 
human rights mechanisms and approaches used by the three companies, this case study 
will allow for the assessment of the potential effectiveness of all mechanisms, which 
will be carried out by analysing the human rights performance of the three 
companies211 and (if applicable) the impact of self-regulatory mechanisms on 
 
208 Please see Annex 3 for a table summarising the differences between the companies in this regard. 
209 For instance, see Allison Loconto, ‘Sustainabilitea: Shaping Sustainability In Tanzanian Tea 
Production’, Department of  Sociology, Michigan State University, 2010; Johannes Brinkmann and 
Ronald Sims, ‘Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More than Codes)’, Journal of Business Ethics 45(3), 
2003, 243, 243; and Mark Moberg, ‘Fair trade and eastern Caribbean banana farmers: Rhetoric and 
reality in the anti-globalization movement’, Human organization 64(1), 2005, 4.  
210 For instance, Rachel Wilshaw, author of a book on labour rights in Unilever’s supply chain and 
Oxfam’s Ethical Trade Manager, wrote that the company showed ‘leadership’ by carrying out and 
publishing its 2015 Human Rights Report (‘Unilever opens a can of worms on corporate human rights 
reporting’ (Oxfam blog, 12 August 2015) <https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/unilever-opens-a-can-of-
worms-on-corporate-human-rights-reporting/> (accessed on 19 October 2019)); and John Morrison, 
Chief Executive of the Institute for Business and Human Rights, referred to Unilever’s report as a 
‘benchmark’ (‘How elephants can dance: Unilever’s human rights report sets a new benchmark for 
business’  (Institute for Business and Human Rights’s website, 30 June 2015) 
<https://www.ihrb.org/focus-areas/benchmarking/how-elephants-can-dance-unilevers-human-rights-
report-sets-a-new-benchmark> (accessed 19 October 2019)).   
211 This method is supported by Kaptein and Schwartz: “the content of a business code is the basis for 
determining the indicators for measuring its effectiveness: the behavior that is addressed in the code is 
the behavior that is expected.” (Kaptein and Schwartz (n. 165), 122) 
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corporate behaviour, as assessed using the framework of ‘key features’ which I will 
develop in Chapter 3 and based on scholars’ hypotheses.  
It is important to note that this case study does not aim to directly compare individual 
corporate performances. However, covering three companies which operate side-by-
side, produce the same product, and have adopted very different types of mechanisms, 
makes it possible to draw stronger conclusions about the kind of impact which self-
regulation may have on corporate human rights performance.   
It is especially important to explain why I selected Chai Bora as one of my case studies. 
I will here rely on two concepts developed by Yin when exploring multiple-case study 
design: “theoretical replication” and “rival explanations”212. I will first offer some 
detail about both concepts and then link them to my own empirical research. First, 
when a multiple-case study follows the “theoretical replication” model, it includes a 
case for which some of the experimental conditions considered challenges to the 
original finding are altered to see whether the finding may be duplicated. An example 
of such a multiple-case study is Peter Szanton’s book, Not Well Advised213, in which 
Szanton analyses the attempts of academics and other consultants to provide useful 
advice to officials of city government during the urban crisis of the 1970s and 80s. To 
support his analysis, Szanton conducts a multiple-case study with (1) studies of 
university groups providing research to city governments; (2) studies of non-university 
groups doing the same thing; (3) studies of university groups providing research to 
sectors other than city government (e.g. businesses); and (4) studies of groups which 
were able to help city government. Bringing in a broad array of evidence from all these 
case studies helped strengthen Szanton’s overall conclusion – as will including Chai 
Bora in this thesis’s multiple-case study, as explained below. The second concept taken 
from Yin – addressing the “rival explanations” for the case study’s findings – is also 
considered a “major” strategy for strengthening the findings in question. Yin gives the 
following example of addressing ‘rivals’: “the original hypothesis might be that 
summer reading programmes improve students’ reading scores, and [the researcher] 
already might have shown this result through two or three programmes whose case 
studies served as literal replications. A rival explanation might be that parents also 
work more closely with their children during the summer and that this circumstance 
 
212 Yin (n.169).  
213 Peter Szanton, Not Well Advised, iUniverse, 2001, cited in Yin (n.169).  
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can account for the improved reading scores. [The researcher] would then find another 
case, with parent participation but no summer reading programme, and in this 
theoretical replication, [they] would predict that the scores would not improve.”  
Building on these two concepts, it is expected that including Chai Bora in my multiple-
case study will strengthen my findings. First, following Yin’s “theoretical replication” 
model, it is important to include at least one case study where some of the experimental 
conditions are altered, leading to different results for “anticipable reasons”214. 
Studying Chai Bora meets this criterion as the firm has not adopted any self-regulatory 
mechanisms, contrary to the other two companies. Moreover, drawing from the 
relevant literature outlined earlier in this chapter, these ‘altered conditions’ are 
expected to lead to different results; as in, the firm’s human rights performance is 
anticipated to be worse than the other two companies’. It is however important to keep 
in mind that the ultimate aim of this thesis is not to compare the situation in the three 
companies, but rather draw on a broader array of evidence than would be available if 
only Unilever and/or MTC were considered. This is where Yin’s “theoretical 
replication” model draws its strength from, and why it is important to include Chai 
Bora. Second, including Chai Bora will help me address some “rival explanations” as 
to why the human rights performance of Unilever and MTC improved on certain issues 
(the original explanation lying with the sole adoption of self-regulatory mechanisms). 
This will be particularly helpful when it is difficult to trace the improvement to the 
adoption of self-regulation. Yin writes that “the more rivals that have been addressed 
and rejected, the stronger will [the findings] be”. As will be uncovered during the 
analysis of the multiple-case study, some of the ‘rivals’ relevant to this research 
hypothesis will indeed be rejected, and others will not. Again following Yin’s 
recommendation, I included data about the ‘rivals’ as part of my data collection and 
analysis in Chapters 7 and 8. Overall, including Chai Bora allows for this side of the 
empirical analysis to take place and, in turn, to make my answers to the research 
questions more robust.  
By going beyond theoretical analysis of corporate standards, this thesis’s fieldwork 
will contribute to academic debates by introducing empirical evidence about the 
potential of different self-regulation mechanisms in corporate mitigation of human 
 
214 Yin (n.169). 
P a g e  | 59 
 
rights risks and compliance with firms’ human rights obligations, albeit in a small-
scale study. More broadly, this study aims to contribute empirical evidence to 
academic debates about the potential of self-regulation as a complementary (or 
alternative) mechanism to traditional, state-centred regulation215. Further details about 
case selection, data collection methods, and methods of analysis will be outlined in 
Chapter 4. 
 
1.5. Conceptual framework 
This thesis explores the concept of corporate human rights self-regulation, both 
theoretically and empirically. Building on this, the conceptual framework used in 
thesis is fourfold.  
First, I adopt in this thesis a legal positivist approach in regards to international human 
rights law and, following the majority of academic authors, I endorse the UNGPs’ 
framework laying out the corporate responsibility to respect human rights as follows: 
corporate responsibilities, applicable to all corporate entities around the globe, extend 
– at a minimum – to those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the 
principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the ILO’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. This is outlined primarily in this chapter.  
Second, I investigate the concept of ‘human rights self-regulation’, which is 
operationalised through specific mechanisms (with human rights aims) voluntarily 
adopted by corporations (as explained in Section 1.1.). As this thesis aims to address 
the extent to which it is possible to assess the effectiveness of corporate human rights 
self-regulation as a form of regulation, a key aspect of my conceptual work is to 
explore the full range of self-regulatory mechanisms which companies can adopt. This 
is outlined primarily in Chapter 2, where I explore the relevant self-regulatory 
mechanisms adopted by companies: corporate policies and codes of conduct, 
intergovernmental instruments, industry-level mechanisms, multi-stakeholder 
initiatives, and certification labels. I explore typologies for conceptualising and 
organising self-regulatory mechanisms and, taking the form as a starting point, I 
develop my own typology which divides these mechanisms into two broad categories: 
 
215 Abbott and Snidal (n. 13); and Section 1.3.2. generally. 
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mechanisms which cover the whole corporate structure (which I dub ‘company-level 
mechanisms’), and those who do not (dubbed ‘product-level mechanisms’).  
On the one hand, company-level mechanism are applicable to the entire firm and 
involve the setting-up of processes across the whole company, covering all 
departments, products, and staff members (e.g. from field labourer to customer 
service); the adopted standards included in these mechanisms are supposedly upheld 
in all corporate processes, and that all the products made by the firms in question will 
have been made respectfully of the human rights included in the company-level 
mechanisms used by the firms. More details about the concept of company-level 
mechanisms as I adopt it in this thesis are available in Section 2.2.1.  
On the other hand, product-level mechanisms aim to guarantee that certified products 
have been made in certain conditions using certain materials. It is acknowledged that 
these mechanisms may be developed internally216 – however, the vast majority are 
developed by external organisations. Moreover, while some product-level mechanisms 
do not include a certification process, such as the international code for the production 
of cut flowers, most do. I therefore focus in this thesis on the initiatives which involve 
the “(voluntary) assessment and approval by an (accredited) party on an (accredited) 
standard’’217. As such, they allow corporations to label some of their products as 
having been produced in a way that did not infringe on human rights. However, how 
this is achieved will greatly vary from one certification system to the next: some 
certification schemes will focus on environmental, social, or economic criteria, while 
others will be more all-encompassing. More details about the concept of product-level 
mechanisms as I adopt it in this thesis are available in Section 2.2.2. 
Finally, I make an important conceptual contribution by developing a framework of 
‘key features’ which allows for the investigation of the effectiveness of the various 
mechanisms used by the firms in this thesis’s case study in helping them meet their 
human rights responsibilities. This contribution builds on two elements of my 
 
216 One of the rare examples of internal product-level mechanism would be Sainsbury’s recent ‘Fairly 
Traded’ certification (more information is available on the company’s website, available here: 
<https://www.about.sainsburys.co.uk/news/latest-news/2017/27-10-17-fairlytraded-faq>, accessed on 
20 October 2019) 
217 Miranda P.M. Meuwissen, Annet G.J. Velthuis, Henk Hogeveen and Ruud B. M. Huirne, ‘Technical 
and economic considerations about traceability and certification in livestock production chains’, in New 
Approaches to Food-Safety Economics, A.G.J. Velthuis, L.J. Unnevehr, H. Hogeveen, R.B.M. Huirne 
(ed.), Springer Science & Business Media, 2003, 53. 
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conceptual framework which I develop in my thesis. First, I explore the value given to 
voluntary self-regulation by scholars throughout the thesis, with the aim to reflect on 
the validity of their claims (this is outlined primarily in this chapter); second, I assess 
the features identified by scholars as helping guarantee the effectiveness of 
mechanisms with, again, the aim to reflect on the validity of authors’ claims. This is 
outlined in this chapter and formalised as part of a framework (created for this thesis) 
laid out in Chapter 3. Two bodies of literature have traditionally been developed 
separately: the literature exploring the effectiveness of company-level mechanisms 
and that exploring the effectiveness of product-level mechanisms. However, I argue 
that both literatures (and both types of self-regulation) should be considered together, 
firstly because of their substantive content and objectives, secondly because of the way 
which firms use them, and third because of their similar ‘key features’, as identified 
by scholars looking at what would make mechanisms effective. These three arguments 
were outlined in more detail in Section 1.3.2. above. When both literatures are 
examined together, it is clear that they share key aspects in their approach to evaluating 
the value of self-regulation, and that the remaining aspects are important to include for 
both types of mechanisms. Indeed, as will be outlined in more detail in Sections 3.2. 
and 3.3., the importance of good and operationable criteria developed by a broad range 
of stakeholders, a strong external monitoring process with trained and independent 
investigators, and the genuine motivation of firms are included in the literature looking 
at company-level mechanisms and looking at product-level mechanisms. Moreover, 
the embedding of standards (communication of policies, and training of employees 
and managers), regular monitoring of compliance, the setting up of free and 
anonymous complaints mechanism(s), and sanctions for non-compliance are included 
in product-level mechanisms themselves and in the literature looking at self-regulation 
generally. From this common approach I draw out a set of ‘key features’, divided into 
five main categories: drafting of standards; embedding of standards into everyday 
operations; monitoring and reporting of compliance; setting up of complaint 
mechanism(s); and sanctioning. To the extent possible, motivation may also be taken 
into account.  This framework of ‘key features’ allowsfor the investigation of the 
effectiveness of the various mechanisms used by the firms in this thesis’s case study 
in helping them meet their human rights responsibilities. It also allows for the analysis 
of the value of each ‘key feature’ in supporting the effectiveness of mechanisms. 
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Finally, any other factors which are found to play a role in the effectiveness of 
mechanisms or in the human rights performance of companies will also be examined. 
Corporate self-regulatory mechanisms therefore share many standards, aim to shape 
corporate behaviour towards more human rights-friendly practices, are used by 
corporations as parts of a unique ‘human rights’ strategy, and finally share many ‘key 
features’ which would, according to scholars, ensure their effectiveness. It is therefore 
important to study them all together, as it will allow for the comprehensive evaluation 
of the value of voluntary corporate human rights self-regulation in driving respectful 
business practices.  
In summary, this thesis explores the concept of corporate human rights self-regulation 
by taking a legal positivist approach. I investigate the scholarship on self-regulation 
with a human rights focus, bringing together two literatures traditionally kept apart. 
This allows me to identify gaps in the scholarship and to comprehensively explore the 
effectiveness of corporate human rights self-regulation. 
 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
This chapter introduced crucial elements for the rest of the thesis. First, it was 
established that businesses have human rights responsibilities. Second, in order to 
ensure that firms meet their responsibilities, academic scholarship consider a variety 
of regulatory instruments, including self-regulatory mechanisms, and more 
specifically voluntary self-regulation. Third, scholars have contrasting opinions 
regarding the (potential) effectiveness of the latter, ranging from those who see it as 
an inherently positive mode of regulation to those who are sceptical that it has any 
positive role to play. Fourth, scholars fail to study all these mechanisms together 
despite the fact that they address the same human rights issues, are used by firms as 
part of single strategies, and the same features may be used to assess their 
effectiveness. Five, little scholarship has looked into the impact on the ground of such 
mechanisms – an issue which I will explore further in Chapter 3. Considering the 
paucity of empirical research, and the importance of conducting such investigation, it 
is necessary to contribute to filling that gap with a case study in an appropriate setting: 
the Tanzanian tea industry. This will help develop appropriate methods for 
investigating the effectiveness of different types of self-regulatory mechanisms. It will 
also start contributing empirical evidence as to their effectiveness (including the role 
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played by key features), albeit restricted to a certain industry and geographical 
location.  
This thesis is divided into eight chapters: in Chapter 1, I introduce the research project, 
set out the main questions which this thesis strives to answer, and lay out my 
methodology; in Chapter 2, I outline my typology of corporate self-regulatory 
mechanisms; Chapter 3 offers theoretical insight into what may make these 
mechanisms effective; in Chapter 4, I detail my case selection, data collection 
methods, and methods of analysis; in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, I lay out a detailed account 
of the human rights performance of the three companies selected for my case study 
(Unilever, MTC, and Chai Bora) as assessed against their own human rights 
commitments (if relevant) and using the framework of ‘key features’ developed in 
Chapter 3; finally, in Chapter 8, I outline the general findings of the case study, answer 
the thesis’s questions, and set forth areas for further study.  
Chapter 2 will now outline my typology of corporate human rights self-regulatory 
mechanisms. 
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Chapter 2 – Typology of Corporate Human Rights Self-
Regulatory Mechanisms 
 
This chapter will explore the different types of self-regulatory mechanisms which 
corporations use to improve their human rights performance, as categorised in a new 
typology. I will first briefly review the existing typologies and explain why they are 
not adequate for the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of mechanisms on the 
ground. I will then outline my typology and, building on the information provided in 
Chapter 1, explore each type of mechanism in more detail.   
 
2.1. Existing typologies 
Adopting a typology of corporate human rights self-regulatory mechanisms is 
necessary prior to conducting my study: businesses use different kinds of mechanisms, 
it is therefore indispensable to map these out before I can move on to analysing their 
content, their implementation, and their impact, as explained in Chapter 1. Before 
reviewing existing typologies, it is crucial to highlight that I need a typology which 
would categorise mechanisms at the level of the firm: I am interested in how self-
regulation helps firms improve their human rights performance. It follows that the 
point of focus of this thesis is the way which companies use these mechanisms, and 
what kind of effect this has on their behaviour. An adequate typology therefore needs 
to take the firm as a starting point, and assess the mechanisms based on how firms will 
use them. Building on this, I felt it was necessary to develop my own typology of 
mechanisms as the four which are publicly available did not seem adequate as they 
were not developed for the same purpose. It is important to note that I do not claim 
that my typology is superior than the other typologies, but only that it fits my research 
aims better.   
First, to examine the relevance and limitations of codes of conduct designed to promote 
the effective application of labour standards in the manufacturing operations of 
multinational corporations, Olivier Boiral identified in 2003 four types of voluntary 
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instruments available to corporations [typology 1 in the table below]218: 1) “certified 
social labels”; 2) “certified external codes”; 3) “ethical investment and sourcing”; and 
4) “in-house codes of conduct”. These four categories are unsatisfactory because they 
leave out all company-level mechanisms except for corporate codes of conduct – 
which means that instruments such as ILO conventions, industry codes, or multi-
stakeholder initiatives are not included. Furthermore, Boiral includes “ethical 
investment and sourcing” as an instrument which may be used by firms to “promote 
labour standards”, but ‘ethical investment and sourcing’ may be considered as goals 
or perhaps processes but, as such, do not qualify as formal instruments in 
themselves219. Finally, it distinguishes between certification standards and labelling 
schemes, which I argue should be considered part of the same mechanisms: once a 
firm implements the labelling scheme’s certification standards, it is allowed to use the 
label as part of its communication efforts about (relevant) products. It follows that 
certification standards and labelling schemes overlap and should not fall into two 
different categories.  
Second, the typology developed by Gary Gereffi, Ronie Garcia-Johnson, and Erika 
Sasser [typology 2] to study whether “certification arrangements really affected 
corporate behaviour” only covered mechanisms which included a “reporting or 
monitoring” component220, thereby leaving out important mechanisms, such as ILO 
conventions or (certain) company and industry codes.  
Third, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi’s typology [typology 3], developed in 2004 while 
considering the issue of public accountability of transnational corporations in the light 
of the experiences of the previous 30 years, differentiated between 1) internal 
standards and certification; 2) sectoral standards and certification; and 3) external 
standards and certification221. This typology is not adequate for two reasons: first, it 
primarily focuses on the entity which created the mechanisms, rather than the internal 
dynamic of the mechanisms and the use which firms will make of them. This is 
problematic, as I explained at the beginning of this section. Second, it leaves out 
 
218 Olivier Boiral, ‘The certification of corporate conduct: issues and prospects’, International Labour 
Review 142(3), 2003, 317, 326. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, and Sasser (n. 4), 57.  
221 Koenig-Archibugi (n. 11), 251-257.  
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intergovernmental instruments, such as international human rights conventions, which 
are instruments commonly used by firms to improve their human rights performance.  
Fourth, with the aim to “identify, enhance as needed, and promote the best existing 
standards (developmental, social and environmental) for responsible investment in 
value chains and voluntary investor compliance with these standards”, the UN 
categorised in 2011 business standards as follows [typology 4]222: 1) 
intergovernmental organisation standards derived from universal principles; 2) multi-
stakeholder initiative standards; 3) industry association codes; and 4) individual 
company codes. This categorisation did not differentiate between internal and external 
mechanisms, which does not allow for the assessment of the role played by certain 
features in the effectiveness of the mechanisms in question223. Moreover, the UN 
categorisation left out product-level mechanisms, despite their playing an important 
part in firms’ human rights self-regulation. Missing them out would therefore paint an 
incomplete picture of self-regulatory mechanisms and of their potential effectiveness.  
  
 
222 Inter-Agency Working Group on the Private Investment and Job Creation Pillar of the G-20 Multi-
Year Action Plan on Development, ‘Promoting Standards for Responsible Investment in Value Chains: 
Report to the High-Level Development Working Group’, UN Conference on Trade and Development, 
2011, 3, as cited in James Jackson, ‘Codes of Conduct for Multinational Corporations: An Overview’, 
US Congressional Research Service, 2013, 5. 
223 E.g. standard drafting. I will go into more detail about this in Chapter 3.  
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The four existing typologies (as well as mine, for ease of comparison) are summarised 
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As I explained in Chapter 1, it is important to assess the effectiveness of various types 
of self-regulatory mechanisms together as their aim is similar, because they all include 
(at least some) human rights standards, and because companies themselves see them 
as different parts of one strategy. Since none of the existing typologies is adequate, I 
have developed my own typology, which I will now outline.  
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2.2. Typology of corporate human rights self-regulation 
Taking the firm as a starting point, mechanisms as part of this typology fall into two 
broad categories: mechanisms which cover the whole corporate structure (company-
level mechanisms), and those who do not (product-level mechanisms). On the one 
hand, company-level mechanism are applicable to the entire firm and involve the 
setting-up of processes across the whole company, covering all departments, products, 
and staff members (e.g. from field labourer to customer service); the adopted standards 
will therefore be applicable to the whole corporate structure. Company-level 
mechanisms are themselves divided into two sub-categories: internal and external 
instruments. The former includes instruments which were developed and adopted by 
the firm itself, such as human rights policies and codes of conduct. The latter 
encompasses all instruments which were not developed by the firm itself (or at least 
not only by the firm) but by external entities (or group thereof): first, intergovernmental 
instruments; second, industry-level instruments; and third, multi-stakeholder 
initiatives. The origin of the mechanisms, and whether they are created by the firm 
itself or an external category, are important to the extent that it will determine whether 
the firm will have control over certain stages of the process, such as the drafting phase. 
However, they are matters of secondary importance in the context of this thesis 
because they will not determine the dynamic of the mechanism. 
On the other hand, product-level mechanisms are only relevant to specific products 
and include processes starting and ending with the product; it follows that the standards 
adopted by the firm will only be applicable to the certified product. Similarly to 
company-level mechanisms, product-level mechanisms may be internally or externally 
developed. However, as there are very few internal product-level mechanisms, I will 
not divide this category further.  
I will first review company-level mechanisms and secondly product-level 
mechanisms. 
 
2.2.1. Company-level mechanisms 
Company-level mechanisms are applicable to the whole corporate structure. It follows 
that the standards included in these mechanisms are supposedly upheld in all corporate 
processes, and that all the products made by the firms in question will have been made 
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respectfully of the human rights included in the company-level mechanisms used by 
the firms. I have broadly divided this type of mechanisms into two categories, based 
on whether the instruments were developed by the firm itself (internal mechanisms) or 
by external entities (external mechanisms).  
 
2.2.1.1. Internal instruments 
Internal company-level mechanisms are developed and adopted by the firm itself and 
are usually human rights policies or codes of conduct – for ease of reading, this section 
will refer to ‘corporate codes’ to refer to both these instruments. The explicit intention 
behind corporate codes is to set clear standards regarding corporate conduct224 and 
create a “set of activities that a company commits to undertake when a conflict arises 
between a business and society at large”225, which in practice translates into “written 
statements of principle or policy intended to serve as the expression of a commitment 
to particular enterprise conduct”226. However, such instruments are also sometimes 
labelled ‘paradoxical’: Jill Murray writes that they are “a creature of the firm, yet are 
used to temper the power of the firm in relation to its dealings with its employees”227. 
Perhaps because of this paradoxical nature, many authors underline the fact that 
companies may adopt corporate codes for reasons other than ethical behaviour and 
social responsibility228. Whatever hidden motives corporations may have for adopting 
corporate codes, they are the most common means for companies to express and 
implement their human rights responsibility229.  
Before getting into further analysis of internal company-based mechanisms, it is 
important to note that corporations may adopt sub-codes to elaborate the general 
principles outlined in their main corporate code230. Sub-codes focus on particular 
issues and outline with more details the principles laid out in general policies. Beyond 
 
224 Krista Bondy, Dirk Matten, and Jeremy Moon, ‘Multinational Corporation Codes of Conduct: 
Governance Tools for Corporate Social Responsibility?’, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 16(4), 2008, 294, 299. 
225 S. Prakash Sethi, Setting Global Standards: Guidelines for Creating Codes of Conduct in 
Multinational Corporations, John Wiley & Sons, 2003, 64.  
226 Janelle Diller, ‘A social conscience in the global marketplace? Labour dimensions of codes of 
conduct, social labelling and investor initiatives’, International Labour Review 138(2), 1999, 99, 102.  
227 Murray (n. 36), 1.  
228 Ibid; and Michael Lenox, ‘The Prospects For Industry Self-Regulation Of Environmental 
Externalities’, Working Paper, 2003, 1, 10. 
229 Kolk and Van Tulder (n. 157), 260. 
230 Kaptein and Schwartz (n. 165), 117.  
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its Human Rights Statement and its Code of Business Principles, Unilever has for 
instance adopted a Responsible Business Partner Policy, a Responsible Sourcing 
Policy, a Fairness in the Workplace Policy, and Opportunities for Women Policy.  Sub-
codes are relevant to this thesis since the extent to which companies’ main codes are 
elaborated in sub-codes may be taken into account when evaluating their 
implementation and effectiveness231. 
Twenty years ago, corporate codes were still uncommon: Douglas Cassel232, as well 
as Lance Compa and Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrère233, wrote in the mid-1990s that 
most multinational corporations had not issued codes covering labour or human rights, 
although companies were then starting to do so. Although Steven Ratner dates the 
emergence of corporate codes back to the beginning of the twentieth century234, one 
of the very first (and most influential) ‘modern’ corporate codes was published in 1974 
by Caterpillar235.  The basis for the code was the following: “we support laws of all 
countries which prohibit restraint of trade, unfair practices, or abuse of economic 
power. And we avoid such practices in areas of the world where laws do not prohibit 
them”236. The scope of commitments was not as large as it may generally be today, but 
it is typical of corporate codes adopted in the 1970s237. Levi Strauss was a pioneer in 
this regard, with their own code developed in 1975 indicating that compliance with 
laws was in addition to its promise to treat workers “fairly” and “well above the 
minimum legal standard”238.  
The situation has changed dramatically, as most multinational corporations today have 
adopted corporate codes (which may take different names, such as “human rights 
statement”, “codes of business ethics”, or “codes of business standards”). Of the 
biggest 40 companies in six of the biggest industries worldwide (automobile, 
commodities, construction, electronics, food and drinks, and pharmaceuticals), 33 
have specific (and publicly available) codes of conduct, two have published ‘human 
 
231 Kaptein and Schwartz (n. 165), 120.  
232 Cassel, ‘Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?’ (n. 26), 1974.  
233 Compa and Hinchliffe-Darricarrère (n. 30), 686.  
234 Ratner (n. 33), 531.  
235 Max Stackhouse, On Moral Business: Classical and Contemporary Resources for Ethics in 
Economic Life, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1995, 796. 
236 Ibid.  
237 David Doorey, ‘The Transparent Supply Chain: from Resistance to Implementation at Nike and Levi-
Strauss’, Journal of Business Ethics 103, 2011, 587, 595.  
238 Ibid.  
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rights statements’ only, and five have not adopted any publicly available mechanisms 
or commitments (see Annex 2 for details). It is important to note that the literature 
overwhelmingly focuses on standards adopted by multinational corporations, which 
leads me to believe that multinationals are most likely to have human rights policies239, 
such as Unilever’s human rights statement.  
I will now move to the second category of company-level mechanisms: external 
mechanisms.  
 
2.2.1.2. External mechanisms 
External mechanisms are developed by entities external to the company which will 
adopt them; they are broadly divided between intergovernmental instruments; 
industry-level instruments; and multi-stakeholder initiatives.  
 
2.2.1.2.1. Intergovernmental instruments 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, companies commit to intergovernmental instruments in 
their company-level internal mechanisms, or as stand-alone commitments. 
Intergovernmental instruments include standards to which companies commit but 
which were not developed by the firms themselves. They are mostly developed by the 
international community and have traditionally been adopted by states only. The fact 
that corporations now commit to such instruments may reflect the shift in international 
law regarding corporate human rights responsibilities.  
I distinguish here between two types of intergovernmental instruments. First, 
instruments simply citing international principles as recognised by international law – 
using ‘ends’-type of command which lays out the aim(s) to be achieved240. Second, 
 
239 This may be explained by the fact that multinationals face greater exposure to – and so pressure from 
– civil society to publicly commit to uphold human rights. Pressure is also necessarily greater as 
multinational corporations, because of their very nature, operate in different jurisdictions and it may be 
more difficult to hold them accountable for human rights breaches. Finally, it may be a matter of 
resources: smaller firms may face a shortage of expertise and human capital when trying to address their 
potential human rights impact. The main issue remains: are these self-regulatory mechanisms effective 
in improving the human rights situation on the ground? 
240 I am using here the differentiation made by Cary Coglianese between ‘ends’ or ‘means’ commands. 
The former lays out the aim(s) to be achieved whereas the latter focuses on how to achieve them 
(Coglianese (n. 71), 50). I will further explore these concepts in Chapter 3.  
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mechanisms developed by the international community to implement these principles 
– using ‘means’-type of command which explains how to achieve the aim(s) to be 
achieved.  
In the first category are (among others) the International Bill of Human Rights, 
composed of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, its two 
protocols, the ICESCR, and eight fundamental ILO Conventions241. Firms regularly 
refer to these instruments, understood as directly applicable to companies242, when 
they make human rights commitments. They will commit to respect instruments in full 
– like Unilever243 and PepsiCo244 do, with the International Bill of Rights –, or 
individual rights such as the right to a safe working environment, to freely join trade 
unions, to be free from forced labour, hazardous child labour, and discrimination – as 
Coca-Cola does245.  
Second, mechanisms developed by the international community to implement these 
standards were first tentatively drafted in the 1970s and 1980s. One of the most famous 
attempts was the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations Draft Code, which meant 
to establish a multilateral framework to define, in a balanced manner, the rights and 
responsibilities of transnational corporations and host country governments in their 
relations with each other246. Codes were also developed by the European Community 
in 1977, and by Canada in 1985247.  
Most famously, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD] also developed such an instrument. Adopted as an annex to the OECD 
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, the Guidelines 
 
241 ILO Conventions C029 (‘Forced Labour Convention’, 1930), C087 (‘Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention’, 1948), C098 (‘Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention’, 1949), C100 (‘Equal Remuneration Convention’, 1951), C105 (‘Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention’, 1957), C111 (‘Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention’, 1958), C138 (‘Minimum Age Convention’, 1973), and C182 (‘Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention’, 1999).  
242 Kendyl Salcito, Chris Wielga, and Burton Singer, ‘Corporate human rights commitments and the 
psychology of business acceptance of human rights duties: A multi-industry analysis’, The International 
Journal of Human Rights 19(6), 2015, 673, 673.  
243 Unilever ‘Human Rights Policy’ (n. 144), 1.  
244 PepsiCo (n. 135), 1.  
245 Coca-Cola, ‘Human Rights Policy’, 2014, 2-3. 
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for Multinational Enterprises248 [OECD Guidelines] were developed as an 
international code of conduct for corporations. Before the endorsement of the UNGPs 
in 2011, they were the only corporate responsibility instrument adopted by 
governments249. As of 2019, all 36 OECD Member States and 12 non-OECD countries 
had subscribed to the Guidelines250, which are addressed to (and endorsed by) 
corporations and cover the following areas251: human rights, employment and 
industrial relations, the environment, corruption, competition, taxation, consumer 
interest, disclosure, and science and technology. The National Contact Points [NCPs], 
located in each OECD Member State, play a big part in the implementation of the 
Guidelines, and are responsible for ensuring that they are well understood by the 
business community252, although some commentators have questioned the 
effectiveness of NCPs253.   
Moreover, the Global Compact was launched by the UN in 2000 to align “corporate 
strategies and operations with universal principles” on human rights, labour (freedom 
of association and collective bargaining; prohibition of forced labour; prohibition of 
child labour; prohibition of discrimination), environment (precautionary principle; 
development of environmentally-friendly technologies), and anti-corruption.254 It 
prescribes ten principles to which participating companies are required to commit, and 
encourages firms to take strategic actions to advance societal goals, including through 
networks, dialogues, learning, initiatives and partnership projects255. When it was first 
introduced by the UN Secretary General, it was understood more as a basis for 
 
248 OECD, ‘Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, the Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’ (hereinafter ‘OECD Guidelines’), 1976. 
249 Jernej Letnar Černič, ‘Corporate responsibility for human rights: A critical analysis of the OECD 
guidelines for multinational enterprises’, Hanser Law Review 3(1), 2008, 71, 77. 
250 OECD, ‘OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises’, available at: <http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-
policy/oecddeclarationanddecisions.htm> (accessed on 19 October 2019)  
251 OECD Guidelines, 5. 
252 UN Global Compact Office and the OECD Secretariat, ‘The UN Global Compact And The OECD 
Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises: Complementarities And Distinctive Contributions’, OECD 
Investment Committee, 2005, 6.  
253 Christian Aid, Amnesty International, and Friends of the Earth, ‘Flagship or failure? The UK’s 
implementation of the OECD guidelines and approach to corporate accountability’, 2006, 3.  
254 UN Global Compact, ‘The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact’ (UN Global Compact’s 
website) < https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles> (accessed on 19 October 
2019) 
255 UN Global Compact, ‘Local Network Issue Engagement Framework’ (UN Global Compact’s 
website) <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/engage-locally/manage/engagement> (accessed on 19 
October 2019) 
P a g e  | 74 
 
dialogue and sharing of best practice than a prescriptive code of conduct256. However, 
before the adoption of the UNGPs, Wagaki Mwangi, Lothar Rieth, and Hans Peter 
Schmidz257 wrote that the Global Compact was the main UN-sanctioned soft law 
designed to commit corporations to international standards of human rights and 
environmental protection – although some authors disagree with this terminology and 
affirm that the initiative is nothing more than a “set of ideals”258. In 2010, the Global 
Compact partnered with the Global Reporting Initiative to help corporations fulfil their 
reporting obligations259.  
Finally, the UNGPs are to date the most authoritative and inclusive normative 
framework on business responsibilities for human rights260. The Guiding Principles 
aim to “reflect a common understanding of existing standards between stakeholders as 
distilled from many multi-stakeholder consultations over many years”261. The UNGPs 
were adopted in 2011 and build upon the ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ Framework 
which was unanimously endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2008262. Since the 
adoption of the Guiding Principles, corporations have increasingly endorsed the 
framework, which is currently at the core of corporate human rights management263. 
The UNGPs were developed by the team of former UN Special Representative on 
business and human rights Professor John Ruggie, and are divided into three pillars: 
(1) the state’s duty to protect human rights; (2) the corporation’s responsibility to 
respect human rights; and (3) the duty to remedy any human rights violations. The first 
pillar outlines the duty of states to adopt effective policies, legislation and regulations 
 
256 Uwe Kerkow, Jens Martens, and Tobias Schmitt. ‘The limits of voluntarism: Corporate self-
regulation, multistakeholder initiatives and the role of civil society.’ World Economy, Ecology and 
Development Association, 2003, as cited in Dilek Cetindamar, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Practice 
and Environmentally Responsible Behaviour: The Case of the United Nations Global Compact’, 
Journal of business Ethics, 76(2), 2007, 163, 167. 
257 Wagaki Mwangi, Lothar Rieth, and Hans Peter Schmidz, ‘Encouraging Greater Compliance: local 
networks and the Global Compact’ in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The 
Persistent Power of Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 203. 
258 Cubie Lau, Cliff Fisher, John Hulpke, William Kelly, and Susanna Taylor, ‘United Nations Global 
Compact: The Unmet Promise of the UNGC, Social Responsibility Journal 13(1), 2017, 48, 50.  
259 Jiri Hřebíček, Jana Soukopová, Michael Štencl, and Oldrich Trenz, ‘Integration of Economic, 
Environmental, Social And Corporate Governance Performance and Reporting in Enterprises’, Acta 
universitatis agriculturae et silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis 59, 2011, 157, 159. 
260 Karlijn Kuijpers, Mariëtte van Huijstee, and Joseph Wilde-Ramsing, ‘A normative-empirical 
analysis of state duties and corporate responsibilities related to adverse human rights impacts on the 
Amazonian minerals-energy frontier’, Journal of cleaner production 84, 2014, 786, 787.  
261 Addo, The Reality of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (n. 24), 
135.  
262 Ibid, 141.  
263 Salcito, Wielga, and Singer (n. 242), 673.  
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to prevent, investigate, punish and redress human rights abuses264. The last two pillars 
aim to help companies respect their human rights responsibilities, and require the 
embedding of human rights due diligence, corporate reporting, and grievance 
mechanisms in business strategy. At the core of the instrument lies the requirement 
that companies respect international human rights standards, understood “at a 
minimum” as those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the 
principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the ILO’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Although the Principles encourage 
companies to prioritise actions to address the most adverse actual and potential 
impacts265, it does require firms to commit to respect all international human rights 
standards. 
Most scholars believe that the UNGPs have helped build momentum around the issue 
of corporate human rights responsibilities and contributed to advance global 
governance266, including by making human rights matters more customary in corporate 
management procedures267. It was also argued in 2013 that the UNGPs may contribute 
to higher levels of accountability and awareness within corporations in respect of the 
negative impact of business activities on human rights268. Moreover, it is notable that 
the UNGPs have influenced a number of self-regulatory initiatives. This is for example 
the case for the Fair Labor Association, the Global Network Initiative, the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights, and the Thun Group of Banks269. 
However, some authors have criticised the UNGPs for restricting the role of 
corporations to ‘doing no harm’ instead of actively contributing to realising human 
rights270, especially in contexts where governments are unwilling or unable to 
adequately protect human rights271. Parts of the literature are also sceptical about the 
 
264 Addo, The Reality of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (n. 24), 
134.  
265 UNGPs, Principle 24. 
266 Susan Ariel Aaronson and Ian Higham, ‘Re-righting business: John Ruggie and the struggle to 
develop international human rights standards for transnational firms’, Human Rights Quarterly 35, 
2013, 333, 337; and Jägers (n. 60), 163. 
267 Björn Fasterling and Geert Demuijnck, ‘Human Rights in the Void? Due Diligence in the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, Journal of Business Ethics 116 (4), 2013, 799, 799.  
268 Ibid.  
269 Addo, The Reality of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (n. 24), 
145.  
270 Florian Wettstein calls this “human rights minimalism” (Wettstein, ‘CSR and the debate on business 
and human rights: Bridging the great divide’ (n 64), 745). 
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(potential and actual) impact of the instrument, especially because of the lack of 
enforcement tools which would hold non-compliant firms to account272. Indeed, the 
mechanism remains voluntary and therefore depends on the good will of corporations 
not only for endorsement, but for full implementation. To help guarantee 
implementation, authors outline the importance of educating firms regarding their 
human rights responsibilities273. Another limit of the mechanism may also lie with the 
lack of actual incorporation by firms of the UNGPs into corporate processes, which is 
a necessary step in the implementation of the mechanism. As Kendyl Salcito et al. 
uncovered274, over half of the largest companies in six of the biggest industries 
worldwide had taken no action to incorporate the Principles into policies or 
management systems as of 2015. Ken McPhail and Carol Adams275 find a similar 
trend: while they find “emergent” human rights due diligence procedures, there is little 
engagement with the ‘Access to Remedy’ pillar of the Guiding Principles. Finally, the 
UNGPs were criticised for providing benchmarks for corporate self-reporting which 
may lead to the superficial legitimation of corporate human rights performance 
(without evidence that substantive action has taken place) and for failing to provide a 
process creating conditions under which engagement of appropriate third-party can 
occur276. 
Despite the UNGPs’ potential as a transformative mechanism for corporations in their 
approach to human rights, it is therefore important to study their impact on the ground 
as a mechanism for helping corporations meet their human rights responsibilities – 
which this thesis aims to do as part of a broader study into the impact of company-
level mechanisms, albeit focusing on a specific industry in a specific region.  
 
2.2.1.2.2. Industry-level mechanisms 
Some industries have also come together and adopted sets of bespoke principles, 
especially industries where human rights risks are high. Principles are usually put 
 
272 Jägers (n. 60), 163.  
273 Aaronson and Higham (n. 266), 337. 
274 Salcito, Wielga, and Singer (n. 242), 690.  
275 Ken McPhail and Carol A. Adams, ‘Corporate respect for human rights: meaning, scope, and the 
shifting order of discourse’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 29(4), 2016, 2016, 650, 
668-669.  
276 Harrison and Sekalala (n. 10), 928. 
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together in a comprehensive document277, relevant to all companies in the specific 
industry, thus putting pressure on individual companies to publicly commit to common 
principles.  
The banking industry is a particularly interesting example in this regard as its potential 
impact on human rights is further reaching than most industries: the lending power of 
banking institutions may allow corporate borrowers to breach fundamental rights. To 
respond to this risk, the banking industry has adopted principles striving to regulate 
the lending behaviour of the sector, and so control corporate impact on human rights. 
Such codes require that, in addition to carrying out the usual financial checks, banks 
conduct human rights due diligence, and only lend to companies which have 
mechanisms in place to prevent and mitigate human rights risks. The most widely 
endorsed instrument is the Equator Principles278, a benchmark for determining, 
assessing, and managing environmental and social risks in projects. This “commitment 
code”, covering both principles and intended behaviours279, is based on the 
International Finance Corporation performance standards on social and environmental 
sustainability and on the World Bank Group’s Environmental, Health, and Safety 
general guidelines280.  As of April 2017, 89 financial institutions representing over 
70% of project lending in emerging nations had adopted the Principles281. However, 
some authors are sceptical about this initiative: in his preliminary analysis of the 
Equator Principles, Franck Amalric formulates three hypotheses, all based on the 
assumption that companies that have endorsed the instrument have done so because it 
will enhance firm value282. Bert Scholtens and Lammertjan Dam concluded that the 
adoption of the Principles is mainly used to signal responsible conduct283, and that the 
main difference between adopters and non-adopters was their social, ethical, and 
 
277 An example is the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition’s Code of Conduct. 
278 Equator Principles, ‘Principles’, 2013.  
279 Christopher Wright and Alexis Rwabizambuga, ‘Institutional Pressures, Corporate Reputation, and 
Voluntary Codes of Conduct: An Examination of the Equator Principles’, Business and Society Review 
111(1), 2006, 89, 99. 
280 John Conley and Cynthia Williams, ‘Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators?: The 
Equator Principles’, Law & Policy 33(4), 2011, 542, 544.  
281 Peter Gould, ‘Collision or Collaboration? Archaeology Encounters Economic Development: An 
Introduction’, in Peter G. Gould and K. Anne Pyburn (eds.), Collision or Collaboration, Archaeology 
Encounters Economic Development, Springer, 2016, 3.     
282 Franck Amalric, ‘The Equator Principles:  A Step Towards Sustainability?’, Centre for Corporate 
Responsibility and Sustainability Working Paper 01/05, 2005, 2.  
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environmental policies. Niahm O'Sullivan and Brendan O'Dwyer’s analysis shows that 
the initial group of banks created the Equator Principles partly to repair the perceived 
reputational damage caused to them by NGO campaigns284. Some authors also criticise 
the instrument for not providing affected citizen groups with a mechanism to directly 
challenge screening decisions or the adequacy of environmental or social management 
plans285. Furthermore, Avital Eshet conducted a study into the environmental impact 
of the Equator Principles and concludes that membership does not lead to 
improvements in environmental performance286. The Principles are therefore an 
interesting (and one of the most studied) example of an industry mechanism. However, 
I will not be looking into their effectiveness myself as this thesis’s case study is set in 
the food and drinks industry.  
 
2.2.1.2.3. Multi-stakeholder initiatives 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives are mechanisms created and managed collaboratively by 
several types of organisations, usually corporations, business associations, and NGOs, 
but also sometimes governments and international organisations287. They set social and 
environmental standards, monitor compliance, promote reporting auditing, and 
encourage stakeholder dialogue and “social learning”288. It is acknowledged that 
certain multi-stakeholder initiatives may also be considered product-level 
mechanisms, if they focus on specific products, such as the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil or the Roundtable on Responsible Soy. 
 
284 Niahm O'Sullivan and Brendan O'Dwyer, ‘Stakeholder perspectives on a financial sector 
legitimation process: the case of NGOs and the Equator Principles’, Accounting Auditing & 
Accountability Journal 22(4), 2009, 553, 564-5.  
285 S. L. Kass and J. M. McCarroll, ‘The Equator Principles: Lending with an environmental string’, 
New York Law Journal 23, 2004, as cited in Wright and Rwabizambuga (n. 279), 99; and John Ruggie, 
‘Protect, respect and remedy: A framework for business and human rights’, Innovations: Technology, 
Governance, Globalization 3(2), 2008, 189, 208. 
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Multi-stakeholder codes primarily focus on issues that cross both industry-specific 
concerns and national and regional boundaries289. As explained by Lance Compa and 
Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrère290, behind the emergence of some of these codes is a 
strategy to promote the use of consistent language in codes of conduct and benchmarks 
for evaluating and comparing codes adopted unilaterally. 
Regularly mentioned in the literature are the Sullivan Principles, regarding South 
Africa, and the MacBride principles, concerning Northern Ireland. Both focused 
primarily on labour standards, particularly equality of employment opportunities291. 
The Sullivan code was developed in 1977 for US companies operating in South Africa, 
and initially included six principles: the desegregation of the workplace, fair 
employment practices for all employees, equal pay for equal work, job training and 
advancement of black people, increasing the number of black people in management, 
and the improvement of the quality of workers' lives outside of the work-place292. 
Authors293 generally recognise some (albeit limited) degree of effectiveness to the 
Principles.  
As Kevin McNamara writes294, the MacBride Principles, published in 1984, were 
greatly influenced by the Sullivan Principles. They included ‘equal opportunity’ 
guidelines intended to curb discriminatory hiring practices by US firms operating in 
Northern Ireland by prohibiting violence in the workplace and requiring that 
employers recruit underrepresented, minority applicants for job openings295. 
Authors296 mostly agree that the MacBride principles played an important role in 
ending employment discriminatory practices in Northern Ireland. Christopher 
McCrudden also mentions the existence of similar private-initiative codes such as the 
 
289 S. Prakash Sethi, Globalization and Self-Regulation: The Crucial Role That Corporate Codes of 
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Slepak Principles, the Miller Principles, the Maquiladora Standards of Conduct, the 
Valdez Principles, the Caux Principles, and the Kyosei Principles297.    
 
In conclusion, company-level mechanisms are broadly divided into internal and 
external mechanisms, based on whether the entity which develops the set of standards 
is the firm itself or an external entity. This categorisation will help with the analysis of 
the effectiveness of mechanisms. I will now move on to product-level mechanisms.     
 
2.2.2. Product-level mechanisms 
Product-level mechanisms guarantee that certified products have been made in certain 
conditions using certain materials. It is acknowledged that these mechanisms may be 
developed internally298 – however, the vast majority are developed by external 
organisations. I will therefore not divide this category further and will focus on 
externally developed product-level mechanisms. Moreover, while some product-level 
mechanisms do not include a certification process, such as the international code for 
the production of cut flowers, most do. This is why I will focus in this thesis on the 
initiatives which involve the “(voluntary) assessment and approval by an (accredited) 
party on an (accredited) standard’’299. As such, they allow corporations to label some 
of their products as having been produced in a way that did not infringe on human 
rights. However, how this is achieved will greatly vary from one certification system 
to the next: some certification schemes will focus on environmental, social, or 
economic criteria, while others will be more all-encompassing. It follows that certain 
multi-stakeholder initiatives may also be considered product-level mechanisms, if they 
focus on specific products, such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil or Soy, as 
mentioned in Section 2.2.1.2.3. 
 
297 Ibid, 168.  
298 One of the rare examples of internal product-level mechanism would be Sainsbury’s recent ‘Fairly 
Traded’ certification (more information is available on the company’s website, available here: 
<https://www.about.sainsburys.co.uk/news/latest-news/2017/27-10-17-fairlytraded-faq>, accessed on 
20 October 2019) 
299 Miranda P.M. Meuwissen, Annet G.J. Velthuis, Henk Hogeveen and Ruud B. M. Huirne, ‘Technical 
and economic considerations about traceability and certification in livestock production chains’, in New 
Approaches to Food-Safety Economics, A.G.J. Velthuis, L.J. Unnevehr, H. Hogeveen, R.B.M. Huirne 
(ed.), Springer Science & Business Media, 2003, 53. 
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This section will briefly outline the history of product-level mechanisms before 
exploring their functioning further, including their risks and advantages. Finally, I will 
further explain why these certification labels – and in particular those relevant to the 
food and drink industry, as the case study will be focused on this industry – are human 
rights mechanisms, building on what was briefly outlined in Chapter 1. I will here 
focus on labels which are relevant to the tea industry, to make it as relevant as possible 
in preparation for the case study.  
Certification labels are not new, as one of the first reported schemes was set up in the 
US in 1875 by the Cigar Makers’ Association of the Pacific Coast. However, the 
motivations behind this particular certification label were fuelled by racist, anti-
immigration sentiments as union members were threatened by the low wages and low 
standard of living acceptable to Chinese workers300. In the following decades, ‘union 
labels’ multiplied in the US, allowing consumers to identify products which had been 
made by union members301. In parallel, other schemes were established; the “white 
list” was for instance set up in the late 1890s in New York City (US) and allowed 
customers to identify shops where female sale clerks enjoyed fair pay and working 
conditions302. This included equal pay between men and women, minimum wage, 
compensation of overtime, limited working hours, paid holidays, and prohibition of 
employment of children under 14 years old. Building on this, Tim Bartley traces the 
inspiration for modern social and environmental labels (aiming to verify compliance 
with standards of sustainability and social justice on the ground) to the 1970s when 
the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements [IFOAM] started 
developing standards and organic certification labels emerged, such as the Blue Angel 
label in Germany303. Social (and environmental) labels such as Max Havelaar (later 
Fairtrade) and the Rainforest Alliance followed and proliferated in the 1980s304.  
Certification schemes stand out as mechanisms used by companies because they are 
product-based. When firms apply to become certified, they demonstrate that they fulfil 
 
300 Wendy A. Wiedenhoft, ‘Consumer Tactics as "Weapons": Black Lists, Union Labels, and the 
American Federation of Labor’, Sociology 14, 2006, 261, 270.  
301 Ibid, 269-271.  
302 Wendy A. Wiedenhoft, ‘An Analytical Framework for Studying the Politics of Consumption: The 
Case of the National Consumers' League’, Sociology 15, 2008, 281, 285.  
303 Tim Bartley, ‘Certification as a Mode of Social Regulation’, in Levi-Faur (n. 107), 444. 
304 Daniel Jaffee, Brewing Justice: Fair Trade Coffee, Sustainability, and Survival, University of 
California Press, 2014, 13. 
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all the criteria – but only as it affects the product in question. They do not need to make 
general commitments applicable to the whole corporate structure. A certified product 
will usually be regularly reassessed and the certification renewed (or not). Moreover, 
the process requires independent assessment from a third party: experts, usually from 
the certification organisation, conduct inspections on the ground. Organisations may 
also hire external audit firms to carry out such assessments. It is for instance the case 
of the Rainforest Alliance, which requires applicants to contact the relevant 
accreditation body in their country and will issue its certification for three years to 
products which have successfully passed the third-party inspection305. As for Fairtrade, 
the certification is issued for three years after third-party inspection by FLOCERT 
auditors and renewed every three years after a successful inspection306. 
It follows that these mechanisms derive their power not from the state but from the 
market307. This is because, contrary to company-level mechanisms, product-level 
mechanisms allow for the easy identification of products whose production has been 
officially recognised as meeting certain standards. Such a label gives certified products 
visibility on the market and is therefore attractive to firms as a way to distinguish 
themselves as responsible businesses. Authors explain that, within these ‘information-
based’ mechanisms, the application of rewards and penalties is left to external 
audiences – but issues arise when the information is either publicly unavailable or 
misleading308. One of the reasons this could happen is lax auditing practices309 and, 
because of the direct link between certifying organisations and companies seeking 
certification, there is some degree of scepticism among scholars about the impartiality 
of labels and the objectivity of audits. It is acknowledged that certification bodies are 
often competing for credibility and recognition and depend on the support of firms310. 
I will look into these issues in more detail in Chapter 3.  The risk of “greenwashing” 
is particularly high with certification labels because they are made to be easily 
identifiable on products – contrary to company-level mechanisms. This is one of the 
 
305 Rainforest Alliance, ‘Certification Rules’, 2017, 11-12. 
306 Fairtrade, ‘How Fairtrade Certification Works’ (Fairtrade’s website) 
<https://www.fairtrade.net/about/certification> (accessed on 14 October 2019) 
307 Raynolds, Murray, and Heller (n. 3), 148; and Bartley (n. 303), 442.  
308 Bartley (n. 303), 442.  
309 Ibid, 442.  
310 Ibid, 442.  
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reasons why it is so important to check what is happening in reality, and whether 
product-level mechanisms are effective on the ground.  
Finally, as explained in Chapter 1, many social and environmental certification 
schemes include human rights elements – many of which are specifically relevant to 
the food and drink industry. It follows that I will take the Rainforest Alliance and 
Fairtrade as examples. The Rainforest Alliance includes the following general criteria: 
fair wages (right to a just remuneration); health and safety (right to life, and right to 
just and favourable conditions of employment); community relations (indigenous 
rights311, right to land, and cultural rights); water protection (right to water and 
sanitation); right to association. More specifically, it is noticeable that Fairtrade 
requires corporations to pay their suppliers a minimum set price for their products – 
striving to respect workers’ right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity312 –, whereas the 
Rainforest Alliance only requires buyers to respect the suppliers’ rights to fair 
remuneration, but without setting a fixed price. Both the Rainforest Alliance and 
Fairtrade require that certified products be made while respecting the prohibition of 
child labour313 and workers’ right to be free from discrimination at work314. In an effort 
to respect indigenous and cultural rights, the Rainforest Alliance requires the 
involvement of local communities in decision-making, contrary to Fairtrade or UTZ, 
for instance. Furthermore, in order to help workers fulfil their rights to just and 
favourable working conditions315, and to protection against unemployment316, 
Fairtrade requires that a written contract317 be signed between buyers and sellers, 
contrary to the Rainforest Alliance or IFOAM, for instance. It is therefore clear that 
certification labels’ standards commonly have broad human rights aims, covering 
labour rights, community rights, environmental rights, civil rights, economic rights, 
and cultural rights.  
 
311 In general, I understand ‘indigenous rights’ as the rights included in the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples and in ILO Convention C169 (‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention’, 
1989).  
312 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), 
Article 23(3). 
313 As is prescribed by ILO Conventions C138 and C182. 
314 As is prescribed by ILO Convention C111.  
315  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(1).  
316 Ibid.  
317  Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.6.  
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Product-level mechanisms have a very contrasting dynamic to company-level 
mechanisms. Focusing on specific products, they involve third-party organisations in 
compliance monitoring processes and allow for the clear identification of their label 
on certified products. They also include human rights elements, and firms use them as 
part of their human rights strategy, alongside company-level mechanisms.  
 
2.3. Conclusion 
As explained in Chapter 1, it is important to study all types of corporate mechanisms 
together. To do so, it is necessary to first understand how the mechanisms work and 
identify their common and distinctive features, which requires a typology of 
mechanisms. As the existing typologies were not adequate for this research, I 
developed my own, taking the firm as a starting point to broadly differentiate between 
company- and product-level mechanisms. Chapter 3 will build on this typology and 
explore academic scholarship into the impact of the different types of self-regulatory 
mechanisms, with the view to investigate the key characteristics which authors 
consider as helping mechanisms be effective on the ground. I will then use the 
typology to design my case study and test out hypotheses put forward by the literature 
as to the effectiveness of corporate self-regulation.  
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Chapter 3 – Framework for Analysis of Effective Self-
Regulation 
 
This chapter has a double aim: first, explore the literature studying the impact of self-
regulatory mechanisms on corporate human rights performance; second, highlight the 
‘key features’ which scholars have identified as potentially contributing to the 
effectiveness of each type of self-regulatory mechanisms (using the typology 
developed in the previous chapter), and demonstrate that the same set of features 
should be used when assessing both types of self-regulation. 
First, this chapter will investigate the extent to which scholars have looked empirically 
into the human rights impact of company- and product-level mechanisms on the 
ground. This will allow for the identification of important gaps in the literature since, 
as will become clear, very little literature has empirically explored the impact of 
company-based mechanisms on corporate behaviour on the ground. On the other hand, 
empirical studies on product-level mechanisms are more common, but they have a 
limited focus and do not take a broad human rights approach, which will necessarily 
restrict the assessment of the effectiveness of the mechanisms from a human rights 
perspective and may miss out on important effects.  
Second, I will examine the literature which has identified features contributing to the 
effectiveness of these self-regulatory mechanisms. I will first outline the 
characteristics identified by scholars writing on corporate self-regulation in general, 
and then focus on company-level mechanisms and finally on product-level 
mechanisms, based on the typology outlined in Chapter 2. As will become clear, 
similar features are relevant to both types of self-regulatory mechanisms and it will be 
important to use the same set of features when evaluating the effectiveness of both. 
Building on this, the chapter will close with the framework for analysis (using the ‘key 
features’ identified throughout the chapter) which will be used in the context of this 
thesis’s case study, and which will inform the assessment which I will make of the 
effectiveness of the different mechanisms in my own case study. 
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3.1. Existing research into the effectiveness of corporate self-
regulatory mechanisms on human rights 
This section will investigate the existing studies into the effectiveness of self-
regulation, first focusing on existing research into company-level mechanisms and 
second on studies into product-level mechanisms. 
 
3.1.1. Research into company-level mechanisms 
As seen in Chapter 2, there is extensive literature on the development, content, and 
implementation of company-based mechanisms but only limited scholarship has 
looked into the impact of these mechanism. I will expand on the detailed findings of 
this scholarship in the second part of this chapter, but I will now briefly outline the key 
studies.  
Kaptein and Schwartz’s review of 79 studies into the effectiveness of internal 
mechanisms (company codes) produced conflicting results318. As explained in Chapter 
1, 35% of the studies found that codes are effective, 16% that the relationship is weak, 
33% that there is no significant relationship, 14% presenting mixed results, and 2% 
(one study) finding that codes had a negative impact. However, there is limited 
literature empirically testing the impact of such mechanisms on human rights on the 
ground. With the exception of César Rodríguez-Garavito’s research319, the studies into 
the implementation (and potential impact) of internal company-level mechanisms do 
not rely on data which the researchers have collected in the field themselves to verify 
 
318 Kaptein and Schwartz (n. 165), 111.  
319 Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166). 
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firms’ claims320. It is also the case for the first two categories of external company-
level mechanisms (intergovernmental instruments and industry-level instruments)321.  
Finally, the range of multi-stakeholder initiatives is very broad; and it is therefore 
necessary to focus on what is most relevant to this thesis: the food and drink industry. 
In this context, there is no literature on the impact of relevant multi-stakeholder 
initiatives from a human rights perspective on the ground. Most scholars in this field 
focus on the development and adoption of these instruments and overlook their 
implementation and impact322 323. Further research is therefore needed, in order to 
determine whether firms in the food and drinks industry go beyond adopting these 
multi-stakeholder mechanisms and set up processes effectively implementing 
commitments with a positive impact on human rights on the ground.  
The paucity of the literature focusing on impact is problematic as it does not allow for 
an independent assessment of the implementation of company-based mechanisms and 
 
320 Kaptein and Schwartz (n. 165), 111; also see Mark Schwartz’s study, which looked into the influence 
of codes on behaviour by interviewing corporate employees but did not observe or measure “actual 
behaviour” (‘The Nature of the Relationship between Corporate Codes of Ethics and Behaviour’, 
Journal of Business Ethics 32(3), 2003, 247, 259); Margaret Cleek and Sherry Leonard conducted a 
similar study, although focusing on business students (‘Can corporate codes of ethics influence 
behavior?’, Journal of Business Ethics 17(6), 1998, 619); Jang B. Singh, after stating that there was a 
lack of research into the effectiveness of codes, purported to identify the determinants of the 
effectiveness of codes by solely collecting managers’ answers to a questionnaire (‘Determinants of the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Codes of Ethics: An Empirical Study’, Journal of Business Ethics 101(3), 
2011, 385); finally, also see generally, Brenda Joyner and Dinah Payne’s study which “identified the 
[…] implementation of values, business ethics, and CSR actions” within two corporations, although 
relying exclusively on information provided by managers (in ‘Evolution and Implementation: A Study 
of Values, Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility’, Journal of Business Ethics 41(4), 
2002, 297, 309)  
321 Apart from Ariel Meyerstein’s study into the effectiveness of the Equator Principles, (‘On the 
Effectiveness of Global Private Regulation: The Implementation of the Equator Principles by 
Multinational Banks’, University of Berkeley, 2011), and Syamantak Bhattachary’s study into the 
effectiveness of the International Safety Management code which focuses on maritime health and safety 
(‘The effectiveness of the ISM Code: A qualitative enquiry’, Marine Policy 36(2), 2012, 528), I could 
not find any relevant empirical study into the effectiveness industry codes relying on data which had 
been collected on the ground. No study looked into the human rights effectiveness of industry codes on 
the ground. 
322 Domenico Dentoni and H. Christopher Peterson, ‘Multi-stakeholder sustainability alliances in agri-
food chains: A framework for multi-disciplinary research’, International Food and Agribusiness 
Management Review 14, 2011, 83, 90.  
323 An example of such a study would be: Greetje Schouten, Pieter Leroy, and Pieter Glasbergen, ‘On 
the deliberative capacity of private multi-stakeholder governance: the roundtables on responsible soy 
and sustainable palm oil’, Ecological Economics 83, 2012, 42. Moreover, John McCarthy and Zen 
Zahari’s study into the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil did use empirical methods, including 
fieldwork, but the empirical investigation did not focus on the multi-stakeholder initiative but rather on 
the role which this initiative could play to help improve the situation (‘Regulating the oil palm boom: 
assessing the effectiveness of environmental governance approaches to agro‐industrial pollution in 
Indonesia’, Law & Policy 32(1), 2010, 153). 
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of their effect on human rights324. In turn, it is impossible to draw any serious 
conclusion as to the impact of the adoption of company-based mechanisms on firms’ 
human rights performance. 
 
3.1.2. Research into product-level mechanisms 
Authors writing about product-level mechanisms are generally more interested in 
impact than the literature studying company-based self-regulation. However, most 
studies explore the effect of (relevant) product-level mechanisms specifically on 
income. Ruerd Ruben and Guillermo Zuniga’s comparative impact of coffee 
certification schemes focuses on certification’s effect on income, production and 
investments325. Similarly, Pradyot Jena et al assess the impact of certification on 
producers’ livelihoods, productivity, price premiums, and access to credit326. Andréa 
Cristina Dörr and Ulrike Grote’s study327 on the impact of certification in the Brazilian 
fruit sector focused on the productivity and income of farmers. This clear economic 
focus is most striking with Fairtrade, which is devoted to increasing income. Ruerd 
Ruben and Ricardo Fort 328, when studying the impact of Fairtrade certification for 
coffee farmers in Peru, compare the net effects on “production, income, and 
expenditures, wealth and investment”, and do not address the potential impact of the 
certification on social or labour rights, for instance. The same researchers conducted a 
study on the impact of Fairtrade on banana producers in Northern Peru329, assessing 
whether income and other welfare indicators (such as household consumption 
expenditures, value of agricultural assets, animal stocks) improved with Fairtrade. 
Christopher Bacon examined330 whether Fairtrade and organic certifications reduced 
 
324 Harrison and Sekalala (n. 10), 927.  
325 Ruerd Ruben and Guillermo Zuniga, ‘How standards compete: comparative impact of coffee 
certification schemes in Northern Nicaragua’, Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 
16(2), 2011, 98. 
326 Pradyot Ranjan Jena, Bezawit Beyene Chichaibelu, Till Stellmacher, and Ulrike Grote, ‘The impact 
of coffee certification on small-scale producers’ livelihoods: a case study from the Jimma Zone, 
Ethiopia’, Agricultural Economics 43, 2012, 429.  
327 Andréa Cristina Dörr and Ulrike Grote, ‘The Role of Certification in The Brazilian Fruit Sector’, 
Revista de Economia Contemporânea 13(3), 2009, 539. 
328 Ruerd Ruben and Ricardo Fort, ‘The Impact of Fair Trade Certification for Coffee Farmers in Peru’, 
World Development 20(10), 2012, 570. 
329 Ruerd Ruben and Ricardo Fort, ‘The impact of Fairtrade on banana producers in Northern Peru’ in 
Ruerd Ruben (ed). The impact of Fairtrade. Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2008. 
330 Christopher Bacon, ‘Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Can Fair Trade, Organic, and Specialty Coffees 
Reduce Small-Scale Farmer Vulnerability in Northern Nicaragua?’, World Development 33(3), 2005, 
487.  
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small-scale farmers’ livelihood vulnerability in northern Nicaragua. In their study, 
Marc Poncelet et al concluded in passing that the impact of Fairtrade on “rights, 
gender” was “insufficient” without giving out more details331. Finally, Sarah Lyon’s 
research332 on the certification system and its relationship to human rights in 
Guatemala was approached through the lens of the political–economic forces shaping 
the transnational fair trade and organic coffee market, and of attempts to forge 
equitable trade relationships between producers and consumers by making visible the 
social and environmental conditions of coffee production. Lyon also says that she 
studied producers’ livelihoods and production practices but Fairtrade human rights 
standards are not mentioned and she does not seem to explore human rights conditions 
on and around coffee plantations.  
Some studies include social and/or environmental elements in their evaluation of the 
impact of labels, but always in addition to financial considerations and, most 
importantly, not touching upon certain important issues that would be covered by a 
human rights approach. Joni Valkila and Anja Nygren’s study of the impact of 
Fairtrade on coffee farmers, cooperatives, and labourers in Nicaragua only includes 
the working conditions of hired coffee labourers333. Mark Moberg conducted a study 
of Fairtrade Eastern Caribbean Banana Farmers in which he touched upon the impact 
of the label’s environmental criteria on local agricultural practices and briefly on the 
social effect of Fairtrade’s democratic community organisations and social premiums, 
but only in addition to addressing economic benefits of the scheme for producers334. 
Sally Smith, as commissioned by the Fairtrade foundation, studied the impact of the 
certification scheme on the banana industry in a number of Central and Latin American 
countries and Ghana, but she focused on social differentiation, the socio-economic 
situation of workers and their households, the organisation of workers, the local and 
national development, and the management of natural resources335. Stacy Philpott et 
al assessed the ecological and economic benefits of coffee certification programmes 
 
331 Marc Poncelet, Jacques Defourny, and Patrick De Pelsmaker, ‘A Fair and Sustainable Trade, between 
Market and Solidarity: Diagnosis and Prospects’, Belgian Science Policy, 2005, 116.  
332 Sarah Lyon, ‘Fair Trade Coffee and Human Rights in Guatemala’, Journal of Consumer Policy 30(3), 
2007, 241. 
333 Joni Valkila and Anja Nygren, ‘Impacts of fair trade certification on coffee farmers, cooperatives, 
and laborers in Nicaragua’, Agriculture and Human Values 27(3), 2009, 321.  
334 Moberg (n. 209). 
335 Sally Smith, ‘Fairtrade Bananas: A Global Assessment of Impact’, Institute of Development Studies, 
2010.  
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and left out crucial human rights issues (e.g. right to clean water)336. Finally, Raluca 
Dragusanu et al337 provide an overview of the theory and empirical evidence available 
about Fairtrade, and conclude that the certification (and other environmental labels) 
have been successful in promoting more environmentally friendly farming practices 
among certified farmers, but they did not touch upon other crucial human rights issues 
(e.g. working conditions). In general, Valerie Nelson and Barry Pound, who conducted 
a review of impact studies carried out about Fairtrade, found that few of the studies 
assess social impacts in any great depth (e.g. changes in health and education)338.  
Allen Blackman and Jorge Rivera have conducted some research into the study of the 
impact of certification, which concludes that, of only 14 studies (out of 37 relevant 
studies) using methods likely to generate credible results, only 6 find that certification 
has environmental or socioeconomic benefits.339 These findings are consistent with 
Daniele Giovannucci and Jason Potts’s study, which concluded that the effectiveness 
of sustainability initiatives is heavily influenced by local conditions in terms of the 
manner in which they are implemented and enforced. They used the Committee on 
Sustainability Assessment, which strives to allow stakeholders to assess and predict 
what sort of social, economic and environmental outcomes they may have by 
implementing different sustainability initiatives340. In the same vein, Ann Le Mare 
conducted341 a literature review into social and economic impacts of Fairtrade and 
drew similar conclusions. Le Mare stated that, although the certification can be seen 
as making a significant contribution to development by improving the well-being of 
individuals and families and in fostering sustainable institutions, the actions of 
Fairtrade practitioners and organisations are complex and variable, with multiple 
outcomes with rather less of the certainty than is offered in some marketing portrayals 
of the label. 
 
336 Stacy M. Philpott, Peter Bichier, Robert Rice, and Russell Greenberg, ‘Field-Testing Ecological and 
Economic Benefits of Coffee Certification Programs’, Conservation Biology 21(4), 2007, 975. 
337 Raluca Dragusanu, Daniele Giovannucci, and Nathan Nunn, ‘The Economics of Fair Trade’, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 28(3), 2014, 217. 
338 Valerie Nelson and Barry Pound, ‘The Last Ten Years: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature 
on the Impact of Fairtrade’, Natural Resources Institute, 2009, 1. 
339 Allen Blackman and Jorge Rivera, ‘The Evidence Base for Environmental and Socioeconomic 
Impacts of “Sustainable” Certification’, Discussion Paper, 2010, 1. 
340 Daniele Giovannucci and Jason Potts, ‘Seeking Sustainability COSA Preliminary Analysis of 
Sustainability Initiatives in the Coffee Sector’, Committee on Sustainability Assessment: Winnipeg, 
Canada, 2008, ix. 
341 Ann Le Mare, ‘The Impact of Fairtrade on Social and Economic Development: A Review of the 
Literature’, Geography Compass 2(6), 2008, 1922.  
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Some studies go beyond the impact on stakeholders and focus on how certification 
standards fit into local institutions. Sietze Vellema and Jeroen van Wijk342 state that 
certification standards govern by facilitating the emergence of agencements, whereby 
a range of actors and devices are brought together in order to achieve both global and 
local objectives. Allison Loconto343 concurs in that, when global and local partnerships 
interact – not only via hierarchically organised value chains, but also via a newly 
emerging public space –, co-creation in standard-setting and certification may occur. 
So, certification processes may also give more vulnerable stakeholders a platform to 
help create standards. However, these studies do not touch upon the impact of these 
same (sometimes co-created) standards in facilitating change on the ground.   
 
The literature on product-level mechanisms is much more focused on impact than the 
literature on other types of self-regulatory mechanisms. However, authors have so far 
mainly focused on income and livelihoods and ignored the impact of certification 
standards on a comprehensive set of human rights. This is problematic as important 
issues, such as working conditions or discrimination, may fall outside the scope of 
impact studies as a result.  While it is important to test whether Fairtrade and the 
Rainforest Alliance help guarantee better income, it is similarly crucial to study 
whether certification helps guarantee that labourers have safe and healthy working 
conditions, or that there is no negative impact on the environment, for instance.  
Studies have also rarely touched upon the effect of certification on corporate practices 
or examined whether labels may help businesses ensure that they are respectful of 
human rights, but rather tend to focus on smallholder farmer organisations344. Yet, it 
is crucial to also check whether the certification of corporations helps them respect 
human rights as they employ a considerable number of workers and may impact the 
lives of an even higher number of community members. For instance, about a fifth of 
all organisations certified with Fairtrade were companies in 2016345.  
 
342 Sietze Vellema and Jeroen van Wijk ‘Partnerships intervening in global food chains: the emergence 
of co-creation in standard-setting and certification’, Journal of Cleaner Production 107, 2015, 105, 105. 
343 Allison Loconto, ‘Assembling governance: the role of standards in the Tanzanian tea industry’, 
Journal of Cleaner Production 107, 2015, 64, 64; and Loconto ‘Sustainabilitea: Shaping Sustainability 
in Tanzanian Tea Production’ (n. 209), 193. 
344 Valerie Nelson and Barry Pound’s research into Fairtrade impact studies found that, out of 33 studies, 
31 were of smallholder farmer organisations, and only two of hired labour situations (see above: Ruben 
and Fort (n. 329); and Moberg (n. 209)) (Nelson and Pound (n. 338), 6) 
345 Fairtrade, ‘Monitoring the Scope and Benefits of Fairtrade -9th Monitoring Report’, 2016, 1, 17.  
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In conclusion, studies looking empirically at the impact of self-regulatory mechanisms 
remain, for the large part, focused on product-level mechanisms; they also mainly 
address pre-defined issues and rarely investigate corporate practices. The paucity of 
this literature is denounced by Jodi Short and Michael Toffel346, who volunteered 
several explanations for it. They explain that it partly comes from a desire to “move 
law and society scholarship beyond simple measurements of the distinction between 
formal law […] and legal outcomes […] toward a more complicated understanding of 
the processes by which both law and legal outcomes are constructed” 347. They also 
point out the difficulty of obtaining data on the existence of internal compliance 
structures and the outcomes they produce. 
It follows that there is a need for empirical studies looking into the impact of self-
regulation on corporate human rights performance – a gap which this thesis aims to 
help fill. In order to assess the effectiveness of self-regulatory mechanisms, it is 
necessary to identify the features which scholars believe are important to ensure these 
mechanisms’ effectiveness – which I will do in the next section.  
 
3.2. Key features for effective self-regulation 
Some authors are sceptical of “perfect recipes”348  for efficient mechanisms due to the 
great differences in cultures and structures of corporations using self-regulation, but 
others have attempted to identify the features which may make these mechanisms 
effective. It is notable that, as explained in Chapter 1 and in the first part of this chapter, 
these scholars have rarely gone into the field to collect empirical evidence supporting 
their claims, which is what this thesis purports to do. This chapter, building upon the 
typology developed in Chapter 2, therefore reviews the characteristics identified by 
scholars as helping guarantee the effectiveness of both company- and product-level 
mechanisms. Reviewing the literature on company-level mechanisms, it became 
evident that most scholars write on internal mechanisms. However, most 
characteristics will also be relevant for external company-level instruments, as they all 
apply to the whole corporate structure. It follows that, except for the drafting stage 
 
346 Short and Toffel (n. 82), 361.  
347 Ibid, 387.  
348 Parker (n. 52), 55. 
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which will not be carried out at company level but rather at or intergovernmental-, 
industry-, or ‘organisational’-level, the characteristics which could help make internal 
mechanisms effective will be equally applicable to external company-level 
mechanisms. Once authors’ claims have been discussed, I will use them to inform the 
design of my case study with the aim of testing them out empirically.  
Before going into detail and reviewing scholars’ writings about specific mechanisms, 
I will briefly explore the literature studying self-regulation generally. Although a fair 
share of the relevant scholarship is sceptical about what self-regulation can achieve, 
the writers who put forward characteristics for effective mechanisms generally agree 
on the same ones. First, a few authors underline the importance of the genuine 
motivation of firms to implement the standards349. Second, objectives must be defined 
“precisely and transparently enough to make it possible to determine clearly whether 
they have been attained”350. Third, ‘values’ and standards must be embedded into the 
practice and structure of the enterprise, which can be done by publicising policies, 
practicing sensitive recruitment of staff, inculcating appropriate attitudes and habits, 
establishing special units to implement policies affecting the well-being of employees, 
or environmental and consumer protections, and by cooperating with relevant outside 
groups, such as trade unions and public agencies351. Fourth, an independent monitoring 
system (including by third parties) must be set up352. Finally, sanctions for non-
compliance must be put in place353. Generally, processes must be transparent, and 
striving to be continuously improving354.  
 
I will now review what authors say specifically about internal company-level 




349 Coglianese and Mendelson (n. 70), 161; Short and Toffel (n. 82), 369.  
350 Töller (n. 107), 506. 
351 Ibid, 506; and Philip Selznick, The Communitarian Persuasion, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2002, 101. 
352 Töller (n. 107), 506; Short and Toffel (n. 82), 386; and De Jong, DeJong, Mertens, and Wasley (n. 
104), 500.  
353 Töller (n. 107), 506; Archong Fung, Dara O’Rourke, and Charles Sabel, Can We Put an End to 
Sweatshop?,  Beacon Press, 2001, 19. 
354 Fung, O’Rourke, and Sabel (n. 353), 19.  
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3.2.1. Key features for effective company-level mechanisms 
Some academics have suggested some characteristics which would help make 
company-level mechanisms effective. These ‘key features’ may be broadly divided 
into five stages of the process: drafting of standards; day-to-day implementation; 
monitoring and reporting of their implementation; setting up of a complaints 
mechanism; and sanctioning in case of non-compliance.  
 
3.2.1.1. Drafting of standards 
At the drafting stage, which Muel Kaptein and Johan Wempe consider as even more 
important than the instrument itself355, I have identified four key features: an inclusive 
and open process; the inclusion of a comprehensive set of internationally-recognised 
human rights; clear and reasonable targets; and regular revision and updating of codes. 
However, it is notable that authors such as Gary Weaver are sceptical of the value of 
scholars’ “putatively ideal formats and contents for codes” since, in his opinion, “this 
advice often is of an intuitive, unsystematic, and ambiguous character”356 357. Even if 
this were true, one of the aims of this thesis is to test out the value of the key features 
identified by scholarship; it is therefore necessary to first review these features.  
Firstly, most authors highlight the need for an open and transparent process with 
oversight from stakeholders to mitigate against the risk of developing a policy 
perceived as illegitimate to those outside the organisation if the process is closed to 
outside scrutiny358. Moreover, to be effective, a code of conduct must be acceptable to 
 
355 Muel Kaptein and Johan Wempe, ‘Twelve Gordian Knots When Developing an Organizational Code 
of Ethics’, Journal of Business Ethics 17(8), 1998, 853, 853. 
356 Gary Weaver, ‘Does Ethics Code Design Matter? Effects, of Ethics Code Rationales and Sanctions 
on Recipients' Justice Perceptions and Content Recall’, Journal of Business Ethics 14(5), 1995, 367, 
367. 
357 As examples, Weaver cites Stephen Landekich, Corporate Codes of Conduct: An Examination and 
Implementation Guide, National Association of Accountants, 1989; Walter Manley, Executive's 
Handbook of Model Business Conduct Codes, Prentice-Hall Direct, 1991; Earl A. Molander, ‘Paradigm 
for Design, Promulgation and Enforcement of Ethical Codes’, Journal of Business Ethics 6(8), 1987, 
619; Cecily A. Raiborn and Dinah Payne, ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct: A Collective Conscience and 
Continuum’, Journal of Business Ethics 9(11), 1990, 879.   
358 Bob Hepple, ‘Equality and Empowerment for decent work’, International Labour Review 140(1), 
2001, 5, 17; Virginia Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global 
Economy, Carnegie Endowment, 2013, 72. 
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all the relevant stakeholders359 and a sense of ownership developed360. All parties 
potentially affected by business activities should take part in the self-regulatory 
process361. This especially concerns trade unions362, representing workers363, and 
communities living near corporate facilities364, with the view of allowing all to wield 
some influence on management365.  A code unilaterally imposing outcomes on the 
workforce may be criticised for lacking independence and representativeness366 and 
may be harmful and counterproductive367. In Europe, codes are reportedly increasingly 
negotiated between workers’ organisations and enterprises, and most of these codes 
incorporate international labour standards in a more consistent pattern than do other 
types of codes368. This brings me to the second important characteristic of the drafting 
of codes: the inclusion of a comprehensive range of internationally recognised human 
rights.  
Upendra Baxi wrote that, as a minimum, companies should include violations of 
international humanitarian law, including benefiting from war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, torture, hostage taking, and extrajudicial or summary or arbitrary 
executions369. However, the general level and extent of corporate commitments is 
debated – perhaps because it is difficult to find trends among corporate codes of 
conduct370. On the one hand, some authors argue that firms generally go beyond legal 
 
359 Sethi (n. 225), 64; and Ans Kolk, Rob van Tulder, and Carlijn Welters, ‘International codes of 
conduct and corporate social responsibility: can transnational corporations regulate themselves?’, 
Transnational Corporations 8(1), 1999, 143, 151. 
360 Ethics Resource Center, Creating a Workable Company Code of Ethics, Ethics Resource Center 
Incorporated, 1990, as cited in Kaptein and Schwartz (n. 165), 119.  
361 Pins Brown, ‘Principles that make for effective governance of multi-stakeholder initiatives’, UN 
SRSF/CCC Expert Workshop on Improving Human Rights Performance of Business through Multi-
stakeholder Initiatives, 2007, 19-20; Greg Wood and Malcolm Rimmer, ‘Codes of Ethics: What Are 
They Really and What Should They Be?’, International Journal of Value-Based Management 16(2), 
2003, 181, 191. 
362 Tony Royle, although otherwise sceptical about the potential of self-regulation as a driver of change, 
wrote that strong unions are needed to protect and improve labour conditions (Royle (n. 155), 269); and 
Haufler (n. 358), 57. 
363 Neil Kearney mentions workers specifically (Neil Kearney, ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct: The 
Privatised Application of Labour Standards’, in Sol Picciotto and Ruth Mayne (eds.), Regulating 
International Business: Beyond Liberalization, Springer, 2016, 211.) 
364 Hepple, ‘Equality and Empowerment for decent work’ (n. 358), 17.  
365 Parker (n. 52), x.  
366 Abbott and Snidal (n. 13), 47.  
367 Murray (n. 36), 60; and Kearney (n. 363), 211.  
368 Diller (n. 226), 110.  
369 Baxi (n. 34), 15.  
370 Michael Urminsky, ‘Self-regulation in the workplace: Codes of conduct, social labelling and socially 
responsible investment’, Series on Management Systems and Corporate Citizenship, ILO, Working 
Paper 1, 2001, 1, 21; and Jackson (n. 222), 1. 
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requirements in terms of social and environmental standards371, and that the following 
rights are commonly included in codes: labour rights, including prohibition of child 
labour372 and forced labour373; freedom from discrimination374; health and safety375; 
freedom of association376; minimum wage377.  Others consider that most standards 
included in codes are inferior to what is demanded by national law378. Further criticism 
rests on the tendency for codes to focus on particular issues regarded as highly 
damaging for companies379, and especially issues that are considered most newsworthy 
to consumer and advocacy groups in developed countries. Part of the scholarship 
regrets that some core ILO standards may be overlooked as a result380, and authors 
therefore recommend including the ILO core standards381 382 as a minimum, which 
may then be expanded in the light of local conditions383. The inclusion of the local 
needs of workers and the payment of a living wage384 are also flagged up as important 
minimum guarantees.  
Beyond this debate, some authors distinguish between different types of standards: as 
was explained in Chapter 2, the distinction is made between ‘ends’ or ‘means’ 
commands385. The former lays out the aim(s) to be achieved whereas the latter focuses 
on how to achieve them. For instance, a company writing that they commit to 
respecting their workers’ “right to equal pay” is an ‘end’ command, and the same firm 
 
371 Lenox (n.228), 1.  
372 Margaret Emmelhainz and Ronald Adams, ‘The Apparel Industry Response to “Sweatshop” 
Concerns: A Review and Analysis of Codes of Conduct’, The Journal of Supply Chain Management 
35(2), 1999, 51, 56.  
373 Urminsky (n. 370), 25.  
374 Ibid, 21. 
375 Ibid; and Emmelhainz and Adams (n. 372), 56.  
376 Kearney (n. 363), 211. 
377 ILO, ‘Overview of global developments and Office activities concerning codes of conduct, social 
labelling and other private sector initiatives addressing labour issues’, GB.273/WP/SDL/1, 1998. 
378 Kearney (n. 363), 209.  
379 Rhys Jenkins, ‘Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in a Global Economy’, UN Research Institute for 
Social Development, 2001, 28; and Pamela Varley, The  Sweatshop  Quandary, Corporate 
Responsibility on the Global Frontier, Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1998, as cited in Ruth 
Pearson and Gill Seyfang, ‘New Hope or False Dawn? Voluntary Codes of Conduct, Labour Regulation 
and Social Policy in a Globalising World’, Global Social Policy 1(1), 2001, 48, 56. 
380 Bob Hepple, ‘New Approaches to International Labour Regulations’, Industrial Law Journal 26(4), 
1997, 353, 364; and Claire Ferguson, ‘A Review of UK Company Codes of Conduct’, UK Department 
for International Development, Social Development Division, 1998, as cited in Pearson and Seyfang 
(n.379), 73.  
381 Kearney (n. 363), 211.  
382 For details about the ILO’s core standards, please see (n. 241). 
383 Bob Hepple, ‘A Race to the Top – International Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of 
Conduct’, Comparative Labour and Policy Journal 20(3), 1999, 347, 363. 
384 Murray (n. 36), 60; and Kearney (n. 363), 209. 
385 Coglianese (n. 71), 50. 
P a g e  | 97 
 
explaining that they commit to auditing the salary levels of all their employees yearly 
to check whether male and female workers are paid the same amount for the same 
work and remedy any discrepancies would be a ‘means’ command. It is said that 
standards using ‘means’ command work well when the regulator understands what 
actions are needed and when the targets covered by the regulation are similar enough 
that the mandated means will work when applied universally386. It follows that ‘means’ 
standards would work best if they are tailored to a specific industry, so that they are 
relevant to each corporate operation. Finally, and similarly to some extent to Kaptein 
and Wempe’s opinion about the development of codes, some authors take the view 
that the mere presence of a code is more important than the content of the code per se: 
codes may influence behaviour more by generally legitimising and communicating the 
importance of appropriate behaviour than by educating employees about what 
specifically constitutes ethical behaviour387.  
Thirdly, codes should also be strict in their wording388, and have clearly defined 
objectives389: in their review of 79 studies into the effectiveness of corporate codes of 
conduct – of which only one uses field research, as mentioned in Chapter 1 –, Muel 
Kaptein and Mark Schwartz conclude that “the more difficult it is to realise the 
objectives of a code, the greater the chance that it will be ineffective”390. However, it 
is important that these objectives are not too ambitious, or it is said that codes will also 
be less likely to be effective.  
Finally, some authors underline that it is important that codes be regularly reviewed391 
to include up-to-date rules.  
However, other features are disputed: some scholars write that codes need to be 
detailed392, but others warn that “an exhaustively detailed code risks becoming so 
 
386 Ibid.  
387 Janet S. Adams, Armen Tashchian, and Ted H. Shore ‘Codes of Ethics as Signals for Ethical 
Behavior’, Journal of Business Ethics 29(3), 2001, 199, 208. 
388 Kolk and Van Tulder (n. 157), 262.  
389 Singh (n. 320), 390; and S. Prakash Sethi, and Donald H. Schepers, ‘Developing a framework for 
critiquing multi-stakeholder codes of conduct’, in Knut J. Ims and Lars J.T. Pedersen (eds.) Business 
and the Greater Good, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, 209.  
390 Kaptein and Schwartz (n. 170), 115.  
391 Patrick E. Murphy, ‘Implementing Business Ethics’, Journal of Business Ethics 7(12), 1988, 907, 
909; and Singh (n. 320), 392. 
392 Kaptein and Wempe (n. 355), 859.  
P a g e  | 98 
 
unwieldy as to be ignored by most people”, whereas a generalised code risks “being 
so open-ended that impartial and unambiguous application is difficult”393.  
 
3.2.1.2. Embedding of code policies in corporate processes 
Once a code has been drafted and adopted, some authors point to the importance of 
embedding its principles into the firm’s operating procedures, everyday decision-
making, ordinary performance appraisal systems, and reward systems394 395. Although 
some authors say that financial executives are more likely to integrate their company’s 
business code into their strategic decision-making processes if they are under pressure 
from market stakeholders to do so396, others write that the company must be genuinely 
interested in going beyond mere declarations if they want to create change397, with the 
aim of making the principles part of the everyday functioning of the company at every 
level. This applies to everyone, from top management, who should publicly support 
the standards398, to low-level employees. To this end, publicity should be given to 
policies as widely as possible within and outside the corporation399, and in languages 
understood by the workforce in every region where the company is present400. 
Supporting the need for publicity, some authors assert that codes may create ethical 
behaviour by creating dialogue among employees about ethical issues401. However, 
others argue that mere communication of policies is unlikely to capture employees’ 
 
393 Weaver (n. 356), 367.  
394 Parker (n. 52), 55. Christine Parker supports this finding with the conclusions of studies conducted 
by leading scholars: John Braithwaite (Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Routledge, 
1984, and To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of coal mine safety, State University of New York 
Press, 1985), Pastin and Brecto (‘Survey by Council of Ethical Relations of 750 000 employees in 203 
large US companies over five years’, 1995), and Alison Eyring and Bette Ann Stead (‘Shattering the 
Glass Ceiling: Some Successful Corporate Practices’, Journal of Business Ethics 17(3), 1998, 245, 245). 
Also see Sethi and Schepers (n. 389), 209.  
395 This whole process is sometimes called ‘institutionalisation’, see Ronald R. Sims, ‘The 
Institutionalization of Organizational Ethics’, Journal of Business Ethics 10(7), 1991, 493, 493.  
396 John Stevens, Kevin Steensma, David Harrison and Philip Cochran, ’Symbolic or Substantive 
Document? The Influence of Ethics Codes on Financial Executives Decisions’, Strategic Management 
Journal 26(2), 2005, 181, 193. 
397 Hepple, ‘Equality and Empowerment for decent work’ (n. 358), 16; Royle (n. 155), 263; Kearney 
(n. 363), 211; and Kaptein and Wempe (n. 355), 862.  
398 Sims (n. 395), 504; Gary R. Weaver, Linda Klebe Treviño, and Philip L. Cochran, ‘Integrated and 
Decoupled Corporate Social Performance: Management Commitments, External Pressures, and 
Corporate Ethics Practices’, Academy of Management Journal 42(5), 1999, 539, 550. 
399 Wood and Rimmer (n. 361), 192; and Singh (n. 320), 390. 
400 Haufler (n. 358), 60.  
401 Adams, Tashchian, and Shore (n. 387), 208; Margaret Cleek and Sherry Leonard concur, although 
more in a much more nuanced way, writing that “ perhaps wording and content […] is not as important 
as how they are communicated to employees” (Cleek and Leonard (n. 320), 627). 
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attention402. Beyond this debate, some authors write that it is important that corporate 
codes of conduct be communicated externally, so that information about commitments 
become known to consumers and other stakeholders403. It is especially necessary when 
codes are directly applicable to suppliers404, sometimes with potential far-reaching 
consequences for non-compliance (e.g. end of business relationship, as will be covered 
below). Further, training of employees and managers should be conducted with 
appropriate resources405, and should notably cover practical cases406 to best translate 
abstract concepts into concrete measures. Finally, reward systems may reinforce the 
message of the codes407, including rewards for whistleblowing408 409.  
 
3.2.1.3. Monitoring and reporting of implementation 
Another key stage of the process is the monitoring of corporate performance410, by the 
firm itself but also by local workers’ representatives and independent experts411. First, 
internal monitoring, including through due diligence and impact assessments, is 
important for the company to anticipate and prevent issues412. Regular internal 
monitoring may also be done by dedicated employees in charge of monitoring 
 
402 Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo, Communication and persuasion: central and peripheral 
routes to attitude change, Springer, 1986, 183, as cited in Weaver, Treviño, and Cochran (n. 398), 541. 
403 Diller (n. 226),102 and Leisinger (n. 48), 10. 
404 E.g. Levi Strauss’s 1991 code (Compa and Hinchliffe-Darricarrère (n. 30), 677-678). Also, 
Caterpillar encouraged its dealers worldwide to adopt the standards contained in their 1974 code. 
405 Kearney (n. 363), 211; Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166), 228; Schwartz (n. 320), 258; Peter J. Dean, 
‘Making codes of ethics real?’ Journal of Business Ethics, 11(4), 2012, 285, 285; Patrick Maclagan, 
‘The Concept of Responsibility: Some Implications For Organizational Behaviour And Development’, 
Journal of Management Studies, 20(4), 1983, 411, 415.  
406 Sims (n. 395), 504.   
407 Linda K. Treviño, ‘A cultural perspective on changing and developing organizational ethics’, 
Research in organizational change and development 4(2), 1990, 195, cited in Weaver, Treviño, and 
Cochran (n. 398), 541; and Wood and Rimmer (n. 361), 191.  
408 Sims (n. 395), 504. 
409 Some authors such as Grace and Cohen, or Jang Singh, only mention the protection of whistle-
blowers (Damian Grace and Stephen Cohen, Business Ethics: Australian Problems and Cases, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, 154; and Singh (n. 320), 390). 
410 Kearney (n. 363), 211; Forest L. Reinhardt, Down to Earth: Applying Business Principles to 
Environmental Management, Harvard Business School Press, 2000, 54; and Renée De Nevers, ‘The 
effectiveness of self-regulation by the private military and security industry’, Journal of Public Policy 
30(2), 2010, 219, 223. 
411 Kolk and Van Tulder (n. 157), 262 and 270; Hepple, ‘A Race to the Top – International Investment 
Guidelines and Corporate Codes of Conduct’ (n. 383), 363; McCrudden (n. 247), 198; Cragg (n. 22), 
118; and Sethi and Schepers (n. 389), 210.  
412 James Harrison, ‘Establishing a meaningful human rights due diligence process for corporations: 
learning from experience of human rights impact assessment’, Impact Assessment and Project 
Appraisal 31(2), 2013, 107, 108.  
P a g e  | 100 
 
corporate behaviour and compliance in order to swiftly detect and remedy any 
breach413. Second, involving local workers in monitoring activities means that working 
conditions are recorded first-hand and that any violations of labour standards will be 
reported by workers themselves. The involvement of independent experts is important 
as third-party monitoring keeps external pressure on the firm to uphold their principles. 
Overall, internal monitoring needs to be conducted by the firm itself (first-party) in 
parallel to the monitoring carried out by (second-party) workers and (third-party) 
independent experts414 to guarantee objectivity to the extent possible and prevent 
potential corporate attempts to ignore violations. The company’s subcontractors’ 
behaviour must also be subject to independent verification by third-party assessors415. 
The lack of such independent monitoring would give rise to suspicion that codes are 
nothing more than a communication exercise, and that they will not be used as 
instruments capable of genuinely improving working and living conditions416. 
However, be it for internal or external monitoring, it is acknowledged that information 
requirements for effective monitoring may be tremendous417 considering that one 
buyer might have agreements with literally thousands of suppliers, and each of their 
suppliers may have their own suppliers. Some therefore suggest that systems such as 
SA 8000 may be part of the solution: “each separate facility would seek out its own 
certification, and ultimately the hope is that buyers would only contract with certified 
factories”418.  
Finally, resources must also be allocated by firms for the reporting of standards’ 
implementation419, to guarantee transparency and encourage the monitoring of 
implementation420, especially in countries without capacity to closely and effectively 
regulate business activities421. Because instruments such as codes of conduct are 
criticised for consistently – with few exceptions – keeping the processes leading to 
 
413 Tara J. Melish, and Errol Meidinger, ‘Protect, respect, remedy and participate: ‘new governance’ 
lessons for the Ruggie framework’, in Radu Mares (ed.), The UN Guiding Principles On Business And 
Human Rights: Foundations And Implementation, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, 321.  
414 Ibid. 
415 Kearney (n. 363), 212. 
416 Jenkins (n. 379), 27; and De Nevers (n. 410), 223.  
417 Haufler (n. 358), 78.  
418 Ibid.  
419 Kearney (n. 363), 211; Brown (n. 361), 21; and Short and Toffel (n. 82), 367.  
420 Harrison and Sekalala (n. 10), 941-942.; and Sethi and Schepers (n. 389), 210.  
421 Graham and Woods (n. 8), 868. 
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human rights due diligence opaque422, César Rodríguez-Garavito writes that 
transparency is a challenge but that it is crucial423. David Graham and Ngaire Woods 
concur and explain that transparency “offers a relatively more straightforwardly 
enforceable standard than direct regulation of practices but by catalysing other social 
forces” 424.  
 
3.2.1.4. Complaints mechanisms 
Another important feature identified by scholars is an effective complaints mechanism 
at company-level, which must be free and anonymous so as to encourage workers and 
third parties to speak out about any violations of corporate standards425. A genuinely 
accessible complaints mechanism demonstrates the real motivation of a firm to 
implement the principles it has adopted426. Authors also mention the need for 
complaints mechanisms at national and international level427.   
 
3.2.1.5. Sanctioning 
Finally, monitoring and sanctioning are two sides of the same coin: monitoring with 
no sanction mechanism means there will be no consequences for violations. In the 
context of self-regulation, and therefore of ‘soft’ regulation, a wide range of authors 
envisage sanctions as in integral part of the process. Such sanctions may be similar to 
sanctions included in traditional regulation, or take different forms. In any case, the 
forms of sanctions involved here are different from the forms of sanctions involved in 
traditional command and control regulation: it is not the state which is the party who 
imposes the sanctions but rather it is a range of non-state actors (e.g. certification 
bodies or the company itself). For instance, sanctions for breaches of corporate policies 
may be disciplinary measures that will be taken by a company when an employee 
violates standards (e.g. dismissal) or, in the case of an industry code, when a company 
 
422 Salcito, Wielga, and Singer (n. 242), 688.  
423 Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166), 228.  
424 Graham and Woods (n. 8), 879. 
425 Ruggie, ‘Protect, respect and remedy: A framework for business and human rights’ (n. 285), 208; 
Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166), 228; and Brown (n. 361), 21-22. 
426 Brown (n. 361), 21.  
427 Hepple, ‘A Race to the Top – International Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of Conduct’ 
(n. 383), 363. 
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fails to uphold the code’s standards (e.g. fines, expulsion from industry association)428. 
In the case of breaches down the supply chain, sanctions may include cancellations of 
orders429 and ending of contract – although Rhys Jenkins warns that this approach may 
not be the most desirable as contractor workers end up suffering most430. In any case, 
some authors believe that sanctions make it much more likely that codes will have an 
impact431. Even if the codes are voluntary mechanisms, it is therefore clear that authors 
generally advocate for ‘hard’ sanctions in case of violations of code standards. And 
some mechanisms used by corporations do include sanctions. It is for example the case 
of Unilever’s Code of Business Principles, which include dismissal and/or legal action. 
However, others warn against the risk that an employee “be treated as a scapegoat to 
be sacrificed to public demands that something be done to remedy a company's ethical 
failings”, pointing out that such punishment “may do little to make employees more 
concerned about ethics” 432. Relatedly, some scholars also advocate for clear 
guidelines within codes as to how to deal with compliance failure433 434. Including 
penalties for non-compliance is another way for firms to show that they are serious 
about their commitments.   
 
In conclusion, the key features identified by scholars writing on company-level 
mechanisms may be broadly divided into five categories: drafting of standards; 
embedding of standards into everyday operations; monitoring and reporting of 
implementation; setting up of complaints mechanisms; and sanctioning non-
compliance. I will now review the key features which authors consider help make 
product-level mechanisms effective.  
 
428 De Nevers (n. 410), 224. 
429 Emmelhainz and Adams (n. 372), 56. 
430 Jenkins (n. 379), 26.  
431 Harvey Hegarty and Harry Sims, ‘Organizational philosophy, policies, and objectives related to 
unethical decision behavior: A laboratory experiment’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 64(3), 1979, 
331, 337; Gene R. Laczniak and Edward J. Inderrieden, ‘The Influence of Stated Organizational 
Concern upon Ethical Decision Making’, Journal of Business Ethics 6(4), 1987, 297-307, 298, also 
citing Theodore Purcell, 'Institutionalizing Ethics on Corporate Boards', Review of Social Economy 
36(1), 1978, 41, and James Weber, 'Institutionalizing Ethics into the Corporation', MSU Business Topic, 
1981; and Schwartz (n. 320), 258.  
432 Weaver, Treviño, and Cochran (n. 398), 549-550.  
433 Sims (n. 395), 504; Jenkins (n. 379), 26; and Emmelhainz and Adams (n. 372), 56.  
434 In 2001, Rhys Jenkins stated that 60% of codes within the OECD did not specify any penalties for 
non-compliance. (Jenkins (n. 379), 26.) 
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3.2.2. Key features for effective product-level mechanisms 
There appears to be a consensus among authors writing about product-level 
mechanisms – although literature in this area remains scarce compared with 
scholarship on company-level mechanisms435 – agreeing that the strength of product-
level mechanisms is on-site investigations conducted by the certifying body436 with 
non-renewal of the certification as the main sanction. However, this important 
independent monitoring system437 could be compromised by various factors, including 
the fact that certifiers are paid by the certified companies438 (with related issues of 
“low-balling”439); that certifiers often seek to reduce audit costs and so may want to 
conduct superficial inspections440; that auditing focuses on measuring procedure 
implementation rather than substance441; that auditing processes fail to thoroughly 
investigate all stakeholders and everyday corporate performance442; that consequences 
for gross negligence in carrying out inspection duties are insignificant443; that 
individual inspectors may be bribed444, and that companies may not be interested in 
the highest possible standard of inspection and so may seek auditors known to employ 
 
435 Friederike Albersmeier, Holger Schulze, Gabriele Jahn, and Achim Spiller, ‘The reliability of third-
party certification in the food chain: From checklists to risk-oriented auditing’, Food Control 20(19), 
2009, 927, 927; Anne Tallontire, Valerie Nelson, Jami Dixon and Tim G. Benton, ‘A review of the 
literature and knowledge of standards and certification systems in agricultural production and farming 
systems’, University of Greenwich Natural Resource Institute Working Paper series on sustainability 
standards No. 2, 2012, 1, 91; and Axel Marx, ‘Global Governance And The Certification Revolution 
Types, Trends and Challenges’, Working Paper No. 53, University of Leuven, 2010, 1, 5.    
436 Marx (n. 435), 95; Hanne Haaland and Øystein Aas, ‘Eco-tourism Certification – Does it Make a 
Difference? A Comparison of Systems from Australia, Costa Rica and Sweden’, Scandinavian Journal 
of Hospitality and Tourism 10(3), 2010, 375, 382; and Gabriele Jahn, Matthias Schramm, and Achim 
Spiller, ‘Differentiation of Certification Standards: The trade-off between generality and effectiveness 
in certification systems’, IAMA’s 14th World Forum and Symposium, Montreux, Switzerland, June 
2004, 335, 336. 
437 Rametsteiner and Simula (n. 158), 87; Oliver von Hagen, Stephen Manning, and Juliane Reinecke, 
‘Sustainable Sourcing in the Food Industry: Global Challenges and Practices’, Moderne Ernährung 
Heute 4, 2010, 1, 7; Haaland and Aas (n. 436), 382; and Jahn, Schramm, and Spille (n. 436), 1. 
438 Albersmeier, Schulze, Jahn, and Spiller (n. 435), 927 
439 Michael Calegari, Jeffrey Schatzberg and Galen Sevcik, ‘Experimental Evidence of Differential 
Auditor Pricing and Reporting Strategies’, The Accounting Review 73(2), 1998, 255. 
440 Albersmeier, Schulze, Jahn, and Spiller (n. 435), 929.  
441 Shamir, ‘The De-Radicalization of Corporate Social Responsibility’ (n. 100), 680. 
442 Genevieve LeBaron and Jane Lister, ‘Benchmarking global supply chains: the power of the ‘ethical 
audit’ regime’, Review of International Studies 41(5), 2015, 905, 919-920. 
443 Robert Grabosch and Christian Scheper, ‘Corporate Obligations with Regard to Human Rights Due 
Diligence: Policy and Legal Approaches’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015, 1, 52. 
444 Lambros Pechlivanos, ‘Self-enforcing corruption: Information transmission and organizational 
response’, in Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Matthias Schramm, and Markus Taube (Eds.), Corruption and 
the new institutional economics, Routledge, 2004, 92-104.  
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low inspection standards445. These risks are exacerbated by the intensive competition 
between certification labels446: as certifications multiply, they compete for clients 
(certified firms), and seek to reduce their prices and so their costs as much as 
possible447. All this may impede efforts for thorough and high-quality audits and could 
lead to considerable credibility losses448.  
More broadly, authors such as Genevieve LeBaron and Jane Lister criticise audit 
systems for addressing labour and environmental issues unevenly because “ ‘people’ 
are more difficult to classify and verify through numbers” 449 and because of the more 
tangible business value gains of environmental versus social programmes450. They also 
argue that auditing conceals “real problems in global supply chains” by creating the 
appearance of independent supply chain monitoring while the information produced is 
partial, highly political, and fundamentally shaped by the client451, in particular 
regarding the timing of audits, the auditors selected, and the communication of 
results452. Relatedly, they denounce the lack of transparency around auditing processes 
and results453.  
Perhaps because of these difficulties, sceptical authors write that certification systems’ 
only potential is to help raise awareness of related human rights and environmental 
issues454. However, not all scholars share this opinion, and various key features have 
been put forward in the literature which would help guarantee the effective 
implementation of product-level standards, mainly focusing on firms’ genuine 
motivation for getting certified, on effective criteria, on measures to help guarantee the 
independence of certification systems, and on auditors’ training.   
 
445 Bernard Pierce and Breda Sweeney, ‘Cost–quality conflict in audit firms: an empirical investigation’, 
European Accounting Review 13(3), 2004, 415; and Gabriele Jahn, Matthias Schramm, and Achim 
Spiller, ‘The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool’, Journal of 
Consumer Policy 28(1), 2005, 53, 60.  
446 Jahn, Schramm, and Spiller (n. 445), 54; and Chema Abderrazak and Adel Ben Youssef, ‘Multiplicity 
of eco-labels, competition, and the environment’, Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial 
Organization 7(2), 2009. 
447 LeBaron and Lister (n. 442), 918.  
448 Albersmeier, Schulze, Jahn, and Spiller (n. 435), 930.   
449 LeBaron and Lister (n. 442), 908. 
450 Ibid, 921.  
451 Ibid, 908 and 914.  
452 Ibid, 917.  
453 Ibid, 915.  
454 Rametsteiner and Simula (n. 158), 97.  
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First, some authors explain that, from a political-institutional perspective, one would 
expect certification to work when firms think that it is in their best interest not only to 
get certified, by also to uphold the standards as best they can455. However, some warn 
that the large amount of regulations and documentation requirements could 
significantly reduce the willingness to implement the necessary programs and thus 
reduce intrinsic quality motivation456.  
The second important characteristic of effective certification systems is good and 
operational criteria457, developed by a broad range of stakeholders458, including 
relevant professionals and/or scientists.  
Third, as mentioned above, a big part of the literature around the effectiveness of 
product-level mechanisms focuses on audits. For instance, to help guarantee the 
integrity and effectiveness of certification systems, scholars recommend intensifying 
control in areas (e.g. child labour; land issues; health and safety) where the risk has 
been assessed by auditors as being high459 , thereby making the self-responsibility of 
auditors central to the process460.  Similarly, some scholars also recommend not having 
a detailed specification of auditing procedures to help boost the personal responsibility 
of auditors to individually improve auditing quality461. This could also reduce the risk 
of audits becoming mere ‘box-ticking’ exercises. It also follows from the ‘risk-
approach’ that time, expenditures, and intervals between audits can vary depending on 
risk factor462. Moreover, authors are advocating for the possibility of random audits463. 
Finally, some authors underline the importance of adequate training for auditors if 
certification schemes are to be successful in creating a positive net outcome464. Poor 
training may indeed be reflected in the high variability between the reports of different 
auditors of the same scheme (with a number of standard requirements overlooked)465. 
 
455 Marie-France Turcotte, Juliane Reinecke, and Frank den Hond, ‘Explaining variation in the 
multiplicity of private social and environmental regulation: a multi-case integration across the coffee, 
forestry and textile sectors’, Business and Politics 16(1), 2013, 151, 154-155.  
456 Jahn, Schramm, and Spille (n. 436), 13.  
457 Haaland and Aas (n. 436), 384.  
458 Ibid. 
459 Wayne Alderman and Richard Tabor, ‘The Case for Risk Driven Audits’, Journal of Accountancy 
167(3), 1989, 55, 55. 
460 Albersmeier, Schulze, Jahn, and Spiller (n. 435), 931. 
461 Ibid, 932. 
462 Ibid. 
463 Ibid.  
464 Jahn, Schramm, and Spiller (n. 445), 67. 
465 Marx (n. 435), 95.  
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This leads to corporations not taking certification systems seriously and refusing to 
accept them as elements of the learning process466. Consequently, it is important to 
ensure that auditors are adequately trained to guarantee consistency in auditing results 
and standard implementation.   
It follows that the strongest feature of product-level mechanisms, third-party auditing, 
is also their riskiest and one of the most criticised processes. It is generally 
acknowledged that on-site verification of the implementation of standards carried out 
by independent auditors is indispensable to an effective (and credible) self-regulatory 
mechanism. The fact that all certification systems inherently include such a process is 
generally perceived by scholars as an advantage over corporate policies, for instance. 
However, as was observed, it also carries considerable risk, mainly because of the 
potential poor training and lack of integrity of auditors themselves, and the possibly 
problematic organisation of audits. This is the reason why some authors suggest a few 
measures to implement if the independence of certification systems is to be guaranteed 
at the stage of audits. It was important to review the literature and to understand what 
authors think would improve the effectiveness of product-level mechanisms – 
however, guaranteeing the independence, integrity and skills of third-party 
certification auditors sits outside certified firms’ sphere of influence, and will therefore 
be outside the scope of this research. It follows that I will not assess the value of these 
‘key features’. However, I will evaluate the role played by third-party audits in the 
effectiveness of product-level mechanisms as this ‘key feature’ is directly relevant to 
corporate behaviour. 
Now that I have highlighted the ‘key features’ which authors writing on each type of 
self-regulatory mechanisms consider as playing an important role in their 
effectiveness, I will briefly analyse both literatures and sets of key features together. 
 
3.2.3. Key features for both types of mechanisms 
Studying the literature around effective corporate self-regulation allows me to paint a 
comprehensive picture of inherent features that may help company- and product-level 
mechanisms drive change on the ground. I now have an idea of the features which will 
 
466 Jahn, Schramm, and Spiller (n. 431), 12. 
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theoretically impact the effectiveness of self-regulation, and which I will be able to 
test on the ground as part of my case study. It is now important to carry out a brief 
comparative analysis of the key features of both types of mechanisms. I have divided 
this section into two parts: I will first review the common features to company- and 
product-level mechanisms, and secondly those ones which were mostly (or only) 
relevant to one type of self-regulation. I will conclude by arguing that the effectiveness 
of both types of mechanisms should be assessed using the same framework of key 
features.  
First, I broadly find the same characteristics for both types of mechanisms: the need 
for an open and transparent process; clear and specific standards developed by a whole 
range of stakeholders; monitoring of implementation; reporting of progress; and 
sanctions for non-compliance467. Motivation of management may also come into 
play468. This (mostly) matches the findings from the literature studying self-regulation 
in general, which was investigated at the beginning of section 3.2. in this chapter. It 
follows that scholars mostly consider that the same features will help guarantee the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms, despite the fact that these mechanisms, by definition, 
operate differently. Nevertheless, the actors expected to implement these features are 
different depending on whether one is concerned with (internal or external) company-
level mechanisms, or product-level mechanisms. The responsibility to guarantee an 
inclusive and transparent drafting process rests on companies for the development of 
their own policies, whereas it rests on external actors for external company-level 
mechanisms and on certifiers for the drafting of certification criteria. Similarly, the 
monitoring of implementation of company- and product-level mechanisms rests 
primarily with, respectively, firms and certifiers. As for sanctions, they shall be 
internally driven for violations of company-level internal mechanisms, whereas they 
are struck by industry/multi-stakeholder bodies in case of violation of industry/multi-
stakeholder codes or by certifying bodies in case of violations of product standards.  
Second, some features are highlighted as important only for one type of mechanism. 
It is the case for the embedding of standards into corporate processes or for complaints 
mechanisms, on which the literature around product-level mechanisms remains silent 
 
467 The sanction for non-compliance with certification standards will be non-renewal of the certification. 
468 As explained in this chapter, I will attempt to assess corporate motivation but only as a general 
feature and not as a stand-alone category of ‘key features’.  
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– contrary to the literature around company-based mechanisms. Similarly, regular 
internal monitoring of firms’ performance is mentioned by some scholars writing 
about company-based mechanisms but is missing in the certification literature, which 
for the most part leaves the monitoring of implementation to certifiers. Moreover, the 
issue of transparency is mentioned by a few scholars writing about company-based 
mechanisms but not by scholars writing about product-level mechanisms. These 
disparities are mostly due to the narrow focus of scholars studying the latter category. 
Indeed, they mainly focus on audits and how to mitigate the risks associated with the 
auditing process, and therefore miss out on other important features which are covered 
by the literature on company-based mechanisms. This is problematic as these missing 
key features, such as embedding of standards or internal monitoring of implementation 
may play an important role in the effectiveness of product-level mechanisms – just as 
they may do for company-based mechanisms. And indeed, the literature looking at 
self-regulation in general outlines the importance of these features469, as I have 
explained earlier in this chapter. Moreover, product-level mechanisms themselves 
include most of the features which were identified as important by scholars writing on 
company-level mechanisms: Fairtrade, the Rainforest Alliance, and the Ethical Tea 
Partnership [ETP] seek to ensure the embedding of their standards into the operations 
of companies by requiring that relevant standards be communicated to employees in a 
language which they understand470, and that training be provided to ensure that 
employees (and management, for ETP471) are familiar with the relevant standards472. 
 
469 Selznick (n. 351), 101; and Fung, O'Rourke, and Sabel (n. 353), 19. 
470 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’: Standards 3.6.1. and 3.6.3. about health and safety, Standard 
3.5.27. about grievance mechanisms, Standard 3.5.10. about exceptions to mandatory days of rest, 
Standard 3.4.4. about freedom of association, and Article 9 of the Freedom of Association Protocol; 
Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’: Continuous improvement criterion 4.22. about 
terms of work, Critical criterion 4.14. about health and safety and occupational health; ETP, ‘Global 
Standard’ (hereinafter ‘ETP ‘Global Standard’’), 2016: Standard 1.1. about forced and bonded labour, 
Standard 1.3. about freedom to leave employment, Standards 2.1. and 2.2. about freedom of association 
and collective bargaining, Standard 3.12. about health and safety and medical aid, Standard 4.2. about 
child labour remediation, Standard 9.1. about harsh and inhumane treatment of workers and grievance 
mechanism, and Standard 9.2. about disciplinary procedure.  
471 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 9.1., requiring that managers be trained in fair treatment of workers 
and on disciplinary and grievance procedures.  
472 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’: Standard 2.1.17. on risk assessments for premium fund 
administering, Standard 2.3.3. on training Premium fund committee worker members, Standard 2.2.4. 
on training trade union representatives, Standard 3.3.4. on child labour, Standard 3.5.27. on the 
grievance mechanism, Standards 3.6.2., 3.6.6., 3.6.7., 3.6.16., 3.6.22., and 4.2.4. on health and safety 
and occupational health, Standard 3.6.15. on evacuation procedures, 4.4.1. on waste handling, and 
Standard 2.2.6. and Article 6 of the Freedom of Association Protocol on women’s training and 
empowerment; Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’: Continuous improvement 
criteria 1.8.; and ETP ‘Global Standard’: Standard 2.2. on collective bargaining, Standards 3.2. and 3.3. 
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Moreover, all three certification labels require that companies provide a free and 
anonymous complaints mechanism to workers and community members473, and 
Fairtrade requires the company to regularly monitor its compliance with the label’s 
standards474. Furthermore, the main sanction of product-level mechanisms is the non-
renewal of certification (it is for example the case for both Fairtrade and the Rainforest 
Alliance). Finally, an important feature which should be taken into account for both 
types of mechanisms is transparency: it is crucial for firms to be as transparent as 
possible when implementing the labels’ standards, for the same reasons as for 
company-based mechanisms but also because of the risks associated with auditing – 
as I have explained in section 3.2.2. above.  
So, the literature on self-regulation generally and on company-level mechanisms (and, 
to some extent, on product-level mechanisms), as well product-level mechanisms 
themselves, all cover the same ‘key features’. It follows that this thesis will use these 
features to help assess the effectiveness of both types of mechanisms. They are broadly 
divided into the following five categories: drafting of standards; embedding of 
standards into day-to-day operations; monitoring and transparent reporting of 
implementation; setting up of a complaints mechanism; and sanctions. Motivation, as 
it was highlighted generally as an important feature, will also be taken into account 
whenever possible – although it is acknowledged that it may be difficult to assess it 
rigorously. However, it is important to note that, as my thesis focuses on whether self-
regulation is effective in helping corporations meet their human rights responsibilities, 
I will only study those features which are within the control of firms. It follows that, 
as mentioned above in section 3.2.2., certain features (i.e. drafting of standards of all 
mechanisms apart from internal company-level mechanisms; training, skills, and 




on health and safety and the proper use of equipment, Standard 3.12. on first aid, Standard 9.1. on fair 
treatment of workers and on disciplinary and grievance procedures (specifically for managers), Standard 
10.2. for workers coming into contact with agrichemicals, Standard 10.4. on ecosystem conservation. 
473 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’: Standard 3.5.27.; Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture 
Standard’, Critical criterion 4.9.; and ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 9.1.  
474 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 1.2.1.  
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This chapter allowed for the identification of an important gap in the literature: 
research into the impact of corporate human rights self-regulatory mechanisms on 
firms’ human rights performance. This thesis aims to contributing to filling that gap 
by conducting empirical research. In order to assess the effectiveness of mechanisms 
on the ground, it was necessary to identify the key features which, according to 
scholars, would help guarantee it, which the second part of this chapter covered. On 
the one hand, authors writing on company-level mechanisms identified the following 
key features, broadly divided into five stages. First, the drafting process should be 
inclusive and open; a comprehensive set of internationally recognised human rights 
should be included; clear and reasonable targets should be set; and standards should 
be regularly revised and updated. Second, policies should be embedded in everyday 
corporate processes, through internal and external communication, training, and 
reward systems. Third, internal and third-party monitoring and transparent reporting 
of implementation should be carried out. Fourth, complaints mechanism(s) should be 
set up. Finally, clear sanctioning guidelines for non-compliance should be provided.  
On the other hand, the key features explicitly identified by authors writing on product-
level mechanisms are narrower: good and operationable criteria475, developed by a 
broad range of stakeholders, a strong auditing process with trained and independent 
auditors, and genuine motivation on the part of the certified firms. While the key 
features specific to product-level mechanisms are indeed important, those features 
identified in the context of company-level mechanisms also look essential for product-
level mechanisms. Indeed, the embedding of standards (communication of policies, 
and training of employees and managers), regular monitoring of compliance, the 
setting up of free and anonymous complaints mechanism(s), and sanctions for non-
compliance are included in product-level mechanisms themselves and in the literature 
looking at self-regulation generally.  
It follows that, in this thesis’s case study, both types of mechanisms will therefore be 
analysed following the same set of features: drafting of standards; embedding of 
standards into everyday operations; monitoring and reporting of compliance; setting 
up of complaint mechanism(s); and sanctioning. To the extent possible, motivation 
may also be taken into account.  This framework of ‘key features’ will allow for the 
 
475 Haaland and Aas (n. 436), 384.  
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investigation of the effectiveness of the various mechanisms used by the firms in this 
thesis’s case study in helping them meet their human rights responsibilities. It will also 
allow for the analysis of the value of each ‘key feature’ in supporting the effectiveness 
of mechanisms. Finally, any other factors which are found to play a role in the 
effectiveness of mechanisms or in the human rights performance of companies will 
also be examined.   
Chapter 4 will outline the methodology for this thesis’s case study, covering the 
selection of the case study, and specifically the choice of country, industry, and 
individual corporations, the design of my data collection, and my interpretation 
methods. 
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Chapter 4 – Methodology of empirical research 
 
 
The previous chapter started with an exploration of the literature on the impact of 
corporate self-regulation. This led to the conclusion that, while such self-regulatory 
mechanisms were being investigated, studies focusing on the effectiveness of these 
initiatives on human rights in the real world were lacking. This thesis aims to start 
filling that gap by conducting a case study evaluating the effects of the different types 
of self-regulatory mechanisms on corporate behaviour in a single industry and 
location, and testing out the theories put forward by the academic literature regarding 
the impact of self-regulation on the ground. 
I do not claim that this case study allowed me to give definitive answers about the 
effectiveness of all self-regulatory mechanisms in all industries everywhere on the 
planet. A case study is necessarily limited in scope, and different findings will emerge 
from different circumstances – especially since corporate activities are very specific 
to the firm’s industry. Another crucial factor is the area where the firm operates, which 
came with specific challenges. However, I designed this case study so that it could 
provide lessons about the effectiveness of mechanisms in a challenging environment 
and in a problematic industry, providing a blueprint methodology that could be adapted 
and used in studies in other industries and geographical regions, as I explore in the 
concluding chapter.  
This chapter builds upon the introduction made to this thesis’s methodology in Chapter 
1, and outlines the case study’s selection by exploring first the tea industry worldwide 
and second the Tanzanian business and human rights context, before investigating the 
Tanzanian tea industry in general and finally the three specific companies which I have 
selected for my case study. This will allow for a deeper understanding of the context 
of my empirical research, and for the formulation of expectations as to the human 
rights performance of each company. This chapter will conclude with further details 
about my methodology, including the design of my data collection and interpretation 
of my findings, building on what was already outlined in Chapter 1. 
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4.1. Selection of the case study 
As explained in Chapter 1, this thesis required fieldwork in a particular industry where 
human rights issues are widespread and self-regulation is common, and in a location 
where human rights issues are prevalent and state enforcement is weak. This allowed 
for the testing of the potential of self-regulation in helping firms respect human rights 
and prevent, to the extent possible, any ‘false positives’ mistakenly attributed to self-
regulation but truly taking place because of the unproblematic environment. The 
impact of self-regulation was more easily identified in an environment where human 
rights violations are rife; any improvement stemming from the implementation of self-
regulatory mechanisms was more easily identified as such. 
Moreover, one of the main considerations for choosing a case study is accessibility of 
the data, “whether to interview people, review documents or records, or make 
observations in the field”476. Keeping this in mind, researchers select the cases that 
will most likely help answer their research questions477: for this case study, I therefore 
identified three agricultural firms operating in Tanzania (and more specifically 
producing tea), which would be accessible and help determine the potential 
effectiveness of corporate self-regulation. Given the fact that there is such an extensive 
range of mechanisms adopted by companies, it is a ‘best case’ study which tests out 
the potential of all mechanisms to have an effect on the ground.  
I will now outline the reasoning behind my choice of case study, starting with the tea 
industry, and then moving on to the country, region, and specific corporations. 
 
4.1.1. Introduction to the tea industry worldwide 
This section will start by introducing the tea industry generally, before outlining the 





476 Yin (n. 171), 26.  
477 Ibid. 
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4.1.1.1. Description of the tea industry worldwide 
Tea is the manufactured drink most consumed in the world478 and comes from the 
leaves of camellia sinensis. It was domesticated in China millennia ago479, for its 
medicinal and stimulating properties as well as for its refreshing taste480, and six main 
varieties are today available for consumption (white, green, yellow, oolong, black, and 
post-fermented)481. Native to South Asia, it is now widely found in tropical and 
subtropical zones and grows best in temperatures ranging from 18°C to 25°C482. Left 
undisturbed, tea trees will grow up to ten meters, but domesticated trees are pruned 
and so will be kept under one meter high483. It takes bushes four to twelve years to 
bear leaves484, which are then plucked every seven to fifteen days485. As tea leaves are 
mostly made of water, picked leaves are to be dried before they may be fit for 
consumption. 
The global tea industry amounted to an annual turnover of almost US$50 billion in 
2017486, with a price at US$2.21/kilo in October 2019487. The biggest tea producers in 
the world are China, India, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, making up 79% of the 
global production of 5.95 million tonnes in 2016488.  Tanzania produced 32.400 tons 
in 2013, making the country the world’s 14th, and Africa’s 4th, largest tea producer489.  
I will now explore the human rights issues commonly recorded in tea industry. 
 
478 Kaison Chang ‘World Tea Production and Trade, Current and Future Development’, Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the UN, I4480E/1/03.15, 2015, 2; and Ashis Biswas, ‘Global warming hits 
tea industry worldwide’ (Dhaka Tribune, 20 February 2018) 
<https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2018/02/20/global-warming-hits-tea-industry-worldwide/> 
(accessed on 21 October 2019) 
479 Houyuan Lu et al, ‘Earliest tea as evidence for one branch of the Silk Road across the Tibetan 
Plateau’, Nature 6:18955, 2016, 1, 1.  
480 Ibid. 
481 Chang (n. 478), 2. 
482 Tong Liu, Chinese Tea, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 9.  
483 Ibid, 11.  
484 James A. Duke, CRC Handbook of Alternative Cash Crops, CRC Press, 1993, 87. 
485 Ibid, 88. 
486 Zion Market Research, ‘Tea Market By Product Type (Green Tea, Black Tea, Oolong Tea, Herbal 
Tea, and Others), By Application (Household and Commercial), By Packaging (Plastic Container, 
Loose Tea Packets, Tea Bags, and Aluminum Tins), and By Distribution Channel 
(Supermarket/Hypermarket, Convenience Store, Specialty Store, Online Retail and Others): Global 
Industry Perspective, Comprehensive Analysis and Forecast, 2017– 2024’, 2018.  
487 Index Mundi, ‘Tea Monthly Price’ (21 October 2019) 
<https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=tea&months=60> (accessed on 21 October 
2019) 
488 Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, Statistics Division, ‘World tea production in 2016; 
Crops/World Regions/Production Quantity from picklists’, 2017. 
489 Chang (n. 478), 4. 
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4.1.1.2. Human rights issues in the tea industry worldwide 
The tea industry is known for difficult working conditions490 and wages failing to meet 
the basic needs of workers491. This remains a problem even though tea workers are 
often provided with in-kind benefits, such as accommodation and health care492. As a 
result, many tea workers have a secondary source of income, working a second job or 
conducting business on the side493. It is also important to note that tea workers’ wages 
are usually based on the weight of plucked tea, with a fixed per-kilo rate, rather than 
on the number of hours worked. This means that factors such as physical fitness and 
seasons will impact workers’ pay494.  
Moreover, corporations employ workers on a temporary basis because tea is a seasonal 
crop495. However, seasonal workers are generally paid a lower wage than permanent 
workers and are commonly denied access to benefits and social protection for 
themselves and their family496. This casualisation of workers becomes particularly 
problematic when tea companies employ these seasonal workers for years without 
offering them a permanent contract497 – a practice to which firms such as Unilever 
have admitted498.  
Health and safety is also a problem, including because protective equipment is not 
always (freely) provided499 and some products used by workers are toxic500. General 
health issues such as Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome [HIV/AIDS] and malnutrition – one reason for the latter being 
 
490 Sanne van der Wal, ‘Sustainability Issues in the Tea Sector: A Comparative Analysis of Six Leading 
Producing Countries’, Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO), 2008, 27. 
491 This is true despite the potential bonuses to which tea pluckers may have access when they exceed 
targets (Ann-Marie Brouder, Simon Billing and Sally Uren, ‘The Future of Tea, A Hero Crop for 2030’, 
Forum for the Future, 2014, 14; Ethical Tea Partnership & Oxfam, ‘Understanding Wage Issues in the 
Tea Industry, Report from a Multi-Stakeholder Project’, 2013, 17; Tulshi Kumar Dass and M. Hasan 
Zakirul Islam, ‘Human Rights Of The Tea Gardeners: Case Study of selected gardens In Sylhet’, Asian 
Affairs 28(3), 2006, 25, 32; ibid, 27; and Michael Groosman, ‘Tea sector overview’, Sustainable Trade 
Initiative, 2011, 9).   
492 Van der Wal (n. 490), 27.  
493 Ibid. 
494 Ibid. 
495 Groosman (n. 491), 9.  
496 Brouder, Billing and Uren (n. 491), 14; and Van der Wal (n. 490), 27. 
497 Van der Wal (n. 490), 33.  
498 Ibid.  
499 ILO, ‘Hazardous child labour in agriculture, tea sector (Safety and health)’, UN, International 
Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, 2004, 2. 
500 Ibid. 
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the poor nutritious value of the workers’ lunch provided in the field501 – are common. 
Discrimination based on ethnicity, migrant status, and gender are also reported in the 
tea industry502.  
Research into the tea industry has also concluded that local trade unions tended to be 
weak or non-existent, and bargaining processes are often absent503. Child labour is also 
common in tea plantations around the world, mostly due to poverty504. Gender 
inequality505 and sexual harassment (including of children)506 were also reported as 
important issues.  
Furthermore, tea workers’ housing is often in bad condition507, with poor sanitation, 
limited access to drinking water or electricity, and overcrowding issues, and its 
allocation is “riddled with allegations of corruption, tribalism, and sexual 
harassment”508.   
Finally, issues with the right to water and sanitation509, to education510, and to land511 
are frequent in the tea industry.  
However, and perhaps as a reaction to the issues described above, some experts have 
noted that tea corporations have increasingly been adopting mechanisms to help them 
conduct business in a socially responsible way, and the ten biggest tea companies in 
the world have indeed done so512. It is therefore necessary to investigate the impact of 
these self-regulatory mechanisms on working and living conditions in, and around, tea 
plantations.  
As explained in Chapter 1, the case study needed to be set in an industry where human 
rights abuses are commonly reported. As outlined above, a number of human rights 
issues are ordinarily reported in the tea industry, which therefore offered a good setting 
 
501 Van der Wal (n. 490), 30.  
502 Ibid, 32; and Groosman (n. 491), 10. 
503 Van der Wal (n. 490), 32; Brouder, Billing and Uren (n. 491); and Groosman (n. 491), 10.  
504 Dass and Islam (n. 491), 34; and Van der Wal (n. 490), 35.  
505 Dass and Islam (n. 491), 36. 
506 ILO (n. 499), 2.  
507 Groosman (n. 491), 9.  
508 Van der Wal (n. 490), 29.  
509 Dass and Islam (n. 491), 36. 
510 Ibid, 31. 
511 Peter Nestor, ‘Four Human Rights Issues Every Food and Agriculture Company Needs to 
Understand’ (Business for Social Responsibility, 12 February 2013) < https://www.bsr.org/en/our-
insights/blog-view/four-human-rights-issues-every-food-and-agriculture-company-needs-to-unders> 
(accessed 21 October 2019); and Van der Wal (n. 490), 46.  
512 See Annex 1.  
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to study whether corporate self-regulation may have a positive human rights impact. 
Moreover, this study allowed for global relevance as it investigated one of the most 
consumed goods in the world. Now that I have selected the industry, I will explain 
why Tanzania is the right location for my case study.  
 
4.1.2. Introduction to Tanzania  
This section will explore the demographic, economic, and social context of Tanzania, 
before studying the relevant international conventions and national legislation in force 
in the country, and finally investigating the business-related human rights issues 
commonly reported nationally. This will allow for the understanding of the context in 
which corporations operate as well as the challenges facing companies and relevant 
stakeholders. 
 
4.1.2.1. National context 
It is essential to understand the social context in which companies operate in Tanzania: 
a firm does not operate in a vacuum, but must consider its environment, including the 
community living in the same area. I will therefore start this section by briefly 
exploring the demographic, economic, and social context of the country before 
investigating specifically the extent to which the health and education needs of the 
Tanzanian population are met. Finally, I will end this section with some labour 
statistics, in order to provide some context for the operation of businesses in the 
country, and more specifically of tea corporations.   
 
4.1.2.1.1. General statistics 
The United Republic of Tanzania was created in April 1964 with the union of recently 
independent mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) with the archipelago of Zanzibar. It has 
a population of 56 million, with a high population growth rate (3%513) and a life 
expectancy of 66 years514. The country has sustained a high economic growth rate, 
 
513 UN Population Division, ‘Population Growth (annual %) – Tanzania’ 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=TZ> (accessed on 21 October 2019)  
514 Ibid. 
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between 6% and 7% annually for the past decade515, and the poverty levels have 
decreased in recent years, although remaining high at 27%516, which means that 13 
million Tanzanians are still living in poverty. Moreover, vast geographical disparities 
remain as the national poverty decrease is mainly driven by gains in large urban centres 
to the detriment of rural regions517. Furthermore, electrification rates have hugely 
improved in the past three decades: 32.8% of Tanzanian households had electricity in 
2017, from 4.2% in 1993518 – although, again, there are vast disparities between rural 
areas (16.8%) and urban centres (65.3%). Moreover, only 7% of rural residents and 
20% of urban residents had access to improved sanitation facilities in 2010 and 56% 
of the rural population and 21% of urban residents did not have access to drinking 
water in 2010519. Finally, 60.6% of households were constructed with earth floors, 
51.8% were built with non-durable walls, and over 50% with non-durable roofs520 in 
2011/12. In rural areas, most materials are bamboo, timber, round pole, straw, grass 
and mud or adobe, leading to poor housing conditions521.  
 
Now that I have provided basic demographic, economic, and social information about 
Tanzania, I will investigate the extent to which the health and education needs of the 
population are met. This is particularly important to understand since a corporation 
may have an important impact on the community. It may, for instance, bring in a 
significant number of migrant workers, which risk putting a strain on the local health 
and education services and may have public health implications, such as transmission 
of diseases or reduced access to water. The latter is an especially important risk in a 
country like Tanzania, as I have explained above. Understanding this context will help 
with the assessment of firms’ human rights performance and of the effectiveness of 
their self-regulatory mechanisms (if relevant). I will therefore briefly explore the 
 
515 USAID, ‘Economic Growth and Trade’ (19 August 2019) 
<https://www.usaid.gov/tanzania/economic-growth-and-trade>  (accessed on 21 October 2019) 
516 World Bank, ‘Tanzania – Overview’ (30 September 2019) 
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tanzania/overview> (accessed on 21 October 2019) 
517 Ibid. 
518 World Bank, ‘Access to Electricity (% of population) – Tanzania’ 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locations=TZ> (accessed on 21 October 
2019)  
519 UN-Water, ‘Country Brief: United Republic of Tanzania’, 2013,  4.  
520 Elias M. Kwanama, ‘The Present Housing Challenge In Tanzania And Efforts Towards Provision 
Of Affordable Housing’, Paper Presented to the 28th National Conference 2015 of The Institution of 
Engineers Tanzania, 2015, 2.  
521 Ibid, 9-10.  
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coverage of two of the most important social needs of the population, education and 
health, in the next section.  
4.1.2.1.2. Social development indicators 
4.1.2.1.2.1. Education 
Access to education is improving, with 76% of women522 and 69% of men523 having 
completed primary education, and 32% of women524 and 37% of men525 having 
completed secondary education. The literacy rate has also improved in the past decade, 
reaching 78% in 2015526. Enrolment in primary and secondary schools has increased 
in the past 25 years, growing from 48% in 2005 to 94% in 2008 but falling to 80% in 
2014527. This trend is true at all education levels (pre-school, primary, and 
secondary)528, and may be linked to the fading enthusiasm over the government’s 
announcement of free education, followed by the subsequent realisation that the 
schooling conditions were rather poor529 (as will be covered at the end of this section). 
The graph below illustrates the rates of enrolment in educational institutions in the 









522 UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics, ‘Primary 
completion rate, female (% of relevant age group) – Tanzania’ 






528 Uwezo, ‘Are Our Children Learning? Uwezo Tanzania Sixth Learning Assessment Report’, 
Twaweza East Africa, 2017, 37. 
529 Ibid, 54.  
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Figure 1 – Rates of enrolment in educational institutions (by age and survey 
year) 
 
(Source: Uwezo (2017) ‘Are Our Children Learning? Uwezo Tanzania Sixth Learning 
Assessment Report’, Twaweza East Africa, 37) 
 
Despite high levels of enrolment, there are big differences between children living in 
urban and rural environments, as described by the following graph, showing rates of 
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Figure 2 – Rates of enrolment in educational institutions by age, location, 
and survey year 
 
(Source: Uwezo (2017) ‘Are Our Children Learning? Uwezo Tanzania Sixth Learning 
Assessment Report’, Twaweza East Africa, 39) 
 
Furthermore, the quality of free public education leaves much to be desired, mostly 
because of inadequate curricula, lack of teachers530, and overcrowded classrooms531. 
Poor infrastructure has also been linked to poor results532, considering that fewer than 
one in four schools nationally has access to electricity, that only 40% have access to 
clean water, and that there is on average one toilet for every 50 pupils and one textbook 
for every three pupils533. This leads to poor results: in 2015, it was estimated that only 
 
530 It is estimated that there is on average one teacher for every 44 pupils, but that teacher’s absenteeism 
reaches 25% nationally (Uwezo (n. 523), 49). 
531 Interview with civil society representative A2. 
532 Uwezo (n. 523), 52.  
533 Uwezo (n. 523), 48; although it should be noted that, in 2013, the ratio was 30 pupils for one textbook. 
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56% of the children in standard 3 were able to read a simple standard 2 Swahili text534, 
and only 35% were able to do multiplications which they were required to learn in 
standard 2. Pupils’ absenteeism is also high, with a national average of 29%535. The 
situation may improve following the recent budget increase voted by the Parliament, 
which will allow for the recruitment of 54.000 new teachers536.  This may help tip the 
scales back in favour of public schools, which are free and have fallen behind private 
schools in terms of the quality of the education which they offer537.  
 
4.1.2.1.2.2. Health  
Tanzania’s national health services have historically been poor, and mostly 
concentrated in big urban centres538. However, the government has been working to 
improve the situation in recent years by setting up hospitals in each district, and health 
centres at local level539, so that most people now have access to primary health care 
wherever they are in the country540. The Parliament has also recently approved a 
budget increase that will allow for the recruitment of 15.000 new healthcare 
professionals541. However, cost is still an issue as healthcare is not free and health 
insurance is too expensive for a significant part of the population542.  
Furthermore, Tanzania has a high rate of HIV/AIDS, as explained above543: in 2016, 
it was estimated that 4.7% of the population were living with the disease544, 62% of 
which were receiving antiretroviral therapy [ART]545. In the region where the case 
study is set (Iringa), 11.3% of the population lives with HIV/AIDS, which makes it the 
region with the second highest rate nationally behind Njombe (11.4%)546. However, 
 
534 Ibid, 19; although the passing rate was 29% in 2011.   
535 Ibid, 51.  
536 Interview with civil society representative A2. 
537 Interviews with civil society representatives A3 and A7. 
538 Interview with civil society representative A2. 
539 Interview with civil society representative A7. 
540 Interview with civil society representative A2. 
541 Interview with civil society representative A2. 
542 Interview with civil society representative A7. 
543 See Section 4.1.2.3.2.2. 
544 UN Agency UNAIDS, ‘Country Factsheet – Tanzania’, 2016. < 
https://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/unitedrepublicoftanzania> (accessed on 21 
October 2019) 
545 Ibid.  
546 PHIA Project, ‘Tanzania Impact HIV Survey’, Colombia University, 2019, 2.  
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the government is trying to provide education on this issue to the population547, and 
there has been a sharp decline in both the amount of new infections and the amount of 
AIDS-related deaths over the past 20 years548, and a great increase in the ART 
coverage of HIV/AIDS-infected individuals549. The figures are encouraging but 
education efforts must continue as part of the population, especially in rural areas, do 
not know enough to adequately protect themselves against the spread of HIV/AIDS550. 
In order to help fight against the disease and help the lives of workers living with 
HIV/AIDS, all businesses are legally required to have an HIV/AIDS policy in place, 
and to financially support employees living with the disease551. However, 
implementation of these provisions is very low552, despite a good response coming 
from some corporations in the country553.   
 
The health and education needs of the Tanzanian population are not therefore met 
evenly across the country and public services are generally insufficient, although the 
situation is improving in some respects. This broader social context helps understand 
the environment in which corporations must operate and informed my evaluation of 
the performance of each firm as part of the case study. It was particularly important to 
investigate whether corporations have taken measures to mitigate against the health 
and education impact of employing a significant number of migrant workers in this 
context of overstretched public services. I will now provide some labour-related 







547 Interview with civil society representative A7. 
548170,000 people got infected in 1998, and 60,000 people in 2016; 120,000 AIDS-related deaths were 
reported in 2004, and 33,000 in 2016 (UNAIDS (n. 539)). 
549 18% of people living with HIV/AIDS were receiving treatment in 2010 (ibid). 
550 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
551 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
552 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
553 Interview with civil society representative A1.  
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4.1.2.1.3. Labour statistics 
In 2014, it was estimated that less than 2% of the male workforce554, and less than 3% 
of the female workforce555 were unemployed. As of 2017, 67% of the Tanzanian 
employed workforce were working in the agricultural sector556 (64% of the male 
employed workforce557, and 70% of female employed workforce558), of which 89% 
are considered ‘vulnerable’559, placing them at a higher degree of economic risk and 
vulnerability than other employees.  
In 2017, it was reported that almost 30% of Tanzanian children aged 5-14 were 
working560, accounting for 3.6 million children, of which 94% were working in 
agriculture – including tea561. This mainly comes from the fact that children 
traditionally help their parents with farming; in a country such as Tanzania, it is 
sometimes difficult to distinguish between children helping the family, and doing work 
at the expense of their education562. It is therefore difficult for the government to 
intervene in matters seen as private by most of the population, as the culture sees state 
intervention into familial matters as intrusive. As part of my case study, I therefore 
investigated whether child labour was an issue in the operations of the selected tea 
companies.  
The Tanzanian workforce is therefore overwhelmingly employed and, for the most 
part, works in the agricultural sector. However, high rates of child labour and of 
vulnerable employment across the country are important issues, which will be relevant 
in the context of my case study. I will now explore the international conventions and 
national legislation which Tanzania has adopted and which are relevant to my research.  
 
 
554 ILO, ‘Unemployment, male (% of male labor force) (national estimate) – Tanzania’, ILOSTAT 
database <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.NE.ZS?locations=TZ> (accessed 





559 Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, ‘2014 Integrated Labour Force Survey’, 2015, 29. 
560 United States Department of Labor, ‘2017 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Tanzania’, 
2017, 1. 
561 Ibid.  
562 Interview with civil society representative A1. 
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4.1.2.2. Relevant international conventions and national 
legislation 
The United Republic of Tanzania has committed to protecting the rights enshrined in 
several international treaties, among the most important of which are the ICESCR563, 
the ICCPR564, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of  Racial 
Discrimination565, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women566, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery567, and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child568. At the regional level, Tanzania has 
ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights569, the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child570, and signed the Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa571.  
Moreover, the United Republic of Tanzania has ratified 37 ILO conventions572 
(including the eight fundamental conventions), of which four do not apply to 
Zanzibar573. However, Tanzania has yet to ratify the Labour Inspection (Agriculture) 
Convention (C129). Implementing these conventions, the Tanzanian government 
undertook comprehensive labour law and regulatory reforms in the early 2000s, 
culminating the in the adoption of the following574:  
• The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 2003 
• The Employment and Labour Relations Act, 2004 
• The Labour Institutions Act, 2004 
• Workmen’s Compensation Act, 2008 
 
563 Accessed on 11 June 1976. 
564 Accessed on 11 June 1976.  
565 Accessed on 27 October 1972.  
566 Ratified on 20 August 1985.  
567 The full name of the Convention is the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, to which Tanzania accessed on 28 
November 1962.  
568 Ratified on 10 June 1991. 
569 Ratified on 18 February 1984. 
570 Ratified on 16 March 2003. 
571 Signed on 5 November 2003. 
572 The full list is available on the ILO’s website, available at this address:  
<https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:1
03476>  (accessed on 21 October 2019) 
573 ILO, ‘Technical Memorandum, United Republic of Tanzania labour administration and inspection 
audit’, 2010, 16. 
574 ILO, ‘Tanzania – Labour Inspection Structure and Organisation’ 
<http://www.ilo.org/labadmin/info/WCMS_122481/lang--en/index.htm> (accessed on 21 October 
2019) 
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• Social Security (Regulatory Authority) Act, 2008 
In addition to these reforms, it was reported during interviews that a bill was tabled in 
Parliament in 2014 to make CSR compulsory575. In 2017, Parliament amended mining 
laws to require that companies prepare a “credible CSR plan” which shall take into 
account “environmental, social, economic and cultural activities based on local 
government authority priorities of host community”576. In turn, “every local 
government authority shall (a) prepare guidelines for CSR within their localities; (b) 
oversee the implementation of CSR action plan; and (c) provide awareness to the 
public on projects in their areas”577. The Tanzanian government is therefore starting to 
legislate about the impact of corporate activities on issues such as the environment or 
the local community – although no similar law was adopted for the agricultural sector. 
In addition, the Tanzanian government committed in 2014 to the adoption of a National 
Action Plan578 [NAP], which would be a one-stop-shop policy document for all 
business and human rights issues in the country.  The NAP is currently being drafted 
by the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance [CHRAGG] and is 
expected to take several years to complete579. This NAP would address the widespread 
human rights violations which the country faces: as mentioned in Chapter 1, the LHRC 
identified in their 2016 Human Rights and Business Report numerous business-related 
human rights issues in the country580.  
Relatedly, I will now provide background information about corporate practice in the 
country by referring to the LHRC report(s). Relevant aspects of business and human 
rights issues are divided into the following three overarching categories: labour rights, 
discrimination issues, and the performance of Tanzanian labour authorities.   
 
4.1.2.3. Business and human rights issues in Tanzania 
This section will explore business-related human rights issues in Tanzania, for which 
I will mainly refer to the LHRC’s recent Business and Human Rights reports. I will 
here cover labour rights, discrimination issues, and the performance of official 
 
575 Interview with civil society representative A1. 
576 The Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2017, Articles 102(5)(1) and 105.  
577 The Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, Article 105(4). 
578 Interview with civil society representative A7. 
579 Interview with civil society representative A7. 
580 LHRC (n. 207). 
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regulatory authorities. For each theme, I will first investigate the relevant legal 
provisions before exploring the common problems encountered with corporate 
activities in practice. This informed my assessment of the human rights performance 
of the case study’s firms. 
 
4.1.2.3.1. Labour rights 
This section covers the following issues: right to fair and decent pay, contracts, 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, injuries and compensation, right to 
a safe working environment, and the working conditions of seasonal workers.  
 
4.1.2.3.1.1. Right to fair and decent pay 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone who works has the 
right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an 
existence worthy of human dignity”581, and the ICESCR requires that the level of 
remuneration allow workers to make “a decent living for themselves and their 
families”582. However, there is no Tanzanian provision implementing this principle 
into national legislation, and the central government only sets the level of minimum 
wage per sector. The last update to minimum wage in the tea sector took place in 2013, 
when the government set the amount to Tsh100.000 monthly for the agricultural 
sector583. This contrasts with the monthly average (Tsh750.000) which would allow a 
couple with four children to live decently, according to a study conducted by the Trade 
Union Congress of Tanzania [TUCTA]584 585. The issue of low wages is prevalent in 
Tanzania: pay is an “auction for the lowest bidder”586, even regarding managers’ 
 
581 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(4). 
582 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (hereinafter 
‘ICESCR’), 16 December 1966, Article 7(a). 
583 Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania, Supplement No. 24, Vol. 94, No. 26, 28 June 2013, 
Second Schedule (a).  
584 Interview with trade union representative F1. 
585 Another study from January 2018 found that, for a ‘standard’ family of two parents and two children, 
the cost of living amounted to between Tsh406.700 and Tsh584.100 (Wage Indicator, ‘Living Wage 
Series – Tanzania’, 2018. <https://wageindicator.org/salary/living-wage/tanzania-living-wage-series-
january-2018-country-overview> (accessed on 21 October 2019)) 
586 Interviews with civil society representative A1 and trade union representative F2. 
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salary587 and, because of underlying poverty issues, employees accept low wages588. 
Employers are also known to ask employees to lie to regulatory authorities and state 
that they earn higher wages than what they actually receive589. In addition to the fact 
that the minimum set by the government has not been updated in six years – while 
inflation rates have remained between 3.5% and 6.1% annually since 2013590 –, one of 
the main problems remains the difficulty for employees to bargain above the minimum 
amount set at national level591, especially considering that trade unions are not always 
effective, as will be explored in Section 4.1.2.3.1.3. below.  
 
4.1.2.3.1.2. Contracts 
Section 15 of the Employment and Labour Relations Act592 requires employers to 
provide employees with, among others, a job description, date of commencement, 
form and duration of contract, place of work, working hours, and remuneration. 
However, the contract must be in writing only for employees stationed outside of 
Tanzania593.  
According to LHRC’s study, 62% of employees across the country do not have 
employment contracts594 - but even when corporations offer contracts, they often use 
a ‘one-size-fits-all’ type of document, which leaves no room for negotiation of 
terms595, and sometimes is in a language other than Swahili596. Businesses also do not 
always provide employees with a copy of their contract597. Moreover, the LHRC 
denounced the abusive reliance on seasonal contracts to exploit cheap labour598 and to 
 
587 Interview with civil society representative A8.  
588 Interviews with civil society representatives A1, A3, and A7. 
589 Interview with civil society representative A1. 
590 Knoema, ‘United Republic of Tanzania - Average consumer prices inflation rate’, 2018. 
<https://knoema.com/atlas/United-Republic-of-Tanzania/Inflation-rate> (accessed on 21 October 
2019) 
591 Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania (n. 583). 
592 Employment and Labour Relations Act (No. 6 of 2004) (Cap. 366) (hereinafter ‘Employment and 
Labour Relations Act’), 2004.  
593 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Section 14(2).  
594 LHRC (n. 207), xxvi; and interview with civil society representative A1.  
595 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
596 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
597 LHRC (n. 207), xxvii.  
598 Ibid, 31.  
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keep employees from making demands599, and called on the government to reform the 
Employment and Labour Relations Act to protect ‘short-term’ workers600.  
 
4.1.2.3.1.3. Freedom of association and collective 
bargaining 
Freedom of association is guaranteed under both international and national law. 
Firstly, ILO Conventions C087 and C098 guarantee the right of workers and 
employers to establish and join unions, and their right to be protected from anti-union 
discrimination at work. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights601,the African 
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights602, and the ICESCR also guarantee freedom of 
association. Secondly, the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania states that 
“every person has a freedom to freely and peaceably assemble, association and 
cooperate with other persons, and for that purpose […], to form and join with 
associations […] formed for purposes of preserving or furthering his beliefs or interests 
[…]”603. Accordingly, the Labour and Employment Relations Act604 protects the right 
of employees to form and join trade unions, and to not be discriminated for exercising 
this right. Considering that ‘employee’ is defined as an individual who “has entered 
into a contract of employment”605, this includes seasonal and permanent workers.  
Despite this strong constitutional and legislative framework, union-related rights are 
at risk in Tanzania. At national level, some civil society representatives denounce the 
fact that umbrella union organisations are staffed with individuals close to the 
government606. It follows that workers’ associations may not be well represented at 
national level, and that trust and confidence in unions may be undermined. A national 
civil society organisation also said that unions fear the government, and so do not stand 
up for their members607.  
 
599 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
600 LHRC (n. 207), 33.  
601 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 20. 
602 Organisation of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter ‘African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights’), 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3, 1982, Articles 10 and 11.  
603 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, (Cap. 2), 1977, Article 20.  
604 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Articles 9(1) and (3). 
605 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 4.  
606 Interview with civil society representative A3.  
607 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
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At local level, the LHRC reported that almost 36% of employees said that their trade 
union did not have the capacity to represent them608, including because of mistrust 
between workers and union representatives609 and the fact that some workers feel that 
their representatives are on the employers’ side610. It follows that workers may not 
want to join unions which they see as unrepresentative or useless611.  
A related problem is the miscommunication between workers and their 
representatives: 90% of workers are not aware of the existence of collective bargaining 
agreements [CBAs], and most companies treat CBAs as confidential agreements 
which are not made available to employees612. These figures confirm the fact that 
workers’ awareness of their rights is crucial but presently too low, as denounced by 
Tanzanian civil society613. 
Another reason why freedom of association is under threat in the country is firms’ 
intimidation of workers who strive to be unionised614. Because of underlying poverty 
and unemployment issues, businesses may take advantage of workers and ensure that 
unions remain inexistent or weak615. The common use (and abuse) of seasonal and 
day-by-day contracts exacerbates this problem616.  
Perhaps because of all the reasons outlined above, the right to strike is not often used 
by workers, and commonly suppressed by the government or corporations617.  
 
4.1.2.3.1.4. Injuries and compensation 
ILO Convention C121, adopted in 1964 and revising Conventions C012 on 
agricultural workers’ compensation618 and C019 on equality of treatment for accident 
compensation619, requires all signatory States to enact legislation requiring the 
provision of medical care and compensation to workers suffering from work-related 
 
608 LHRC (n. 207), xxvii.  
609 Ibid, 40.  
610 Ibid, 44.  
611 Interviews with civil society representatives A6 and A7. 
612 LHRC (n. 207), 40-41; and my personal experience. 
613 Interview with civil society representative A5. 
614 Interview with civil society representative A1. 
615 Interviews with civil society representatives A3 and A7. 
616 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
617 Interview with civil society representative A6. 
618 ILO Convention C012, ‘Workmen's Compensation (Agriculture) Convention’, 1921.  
619 ILO Convention C019, ‘Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention’, 1925.  
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injury or condition, and to persons suffering from the loss of income as result of the 
work-related death of the breadwinner. In order to implement Convention C121620, the 
Workers Compensation Act was enacted by the Tanzanian Parliament in 2008, 
establishing the Workers’ Compensation Fund [WCF] to ensure that all workers 
(seasonal and permanent employees) would be compensated for injuries and death 
resulting from work accidents – unless the injury is attributable to the misconduct of 
the employee and does not result in death or permanent total disablement621. The WCF 
is paid for by compulsory employers’ contributions622, amounting to 1% of their 
annual tax bill for private sector employers and 0.5% for public sector employers623.  
However, LRHC reported that corporations did not always provide compensation for 
work-related injuries624, which is one of the main business and human rights issue in 
the Mufindi region625. Even though employers are legally required to do so626, work 
accidents and diseases are not usually communicated to all the relevant authorities: 
while it is mainly communicated to the Labour Commissioner, information is not 
shared with Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA] investigators627, 
which means that no investigation into the accident will be conducted. 
 
4.1.2.3.1.5. Right to a safe working environment 
The ILO has adopted several health and safety conventions, mainly the 1981 
Occupational Health and Safety Convention, which Tanzania has never ratified. The 
main piece of legislation regulating health and safety in Tanzania is the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act enacted in 2003. The national authority in charge of health and 
safety regulation and implementation is OSHA, although experts denounce issues of 
capacity and implementation encountered by the Administration628, as will be covered 
below in section 4.1.2.3.3. Across the country, numerous companies generally fail to 
 
620 LHRC (n. 207), 8.  
621 Workers Compensation Act (No. 20 of 2008) (Cap. 263) (hereinafter ‘Workers Compensation Act’), 
2008, Articles 4 and 19(2). 
622 Workers Compensation Act, Article 5.  
623 LHRC (n. 207), 11.  
624 Ibid, 51.  
625 Interview with trade union representative F2. 
626 Workers Compensation Act, Article 34; and Occupational Health and Safety Act (No. 5 of 2003) 
(Cap. 297) (hereinafter ‘Occupational Health and Safety Act’), 2003, Article 90(1)(d). 
627 ILO (n. 573), 39.  
628 Interview with civil society representative A5. 
P a g e  | 132 
 
provide safety gear to their employees629, including to employees handling 
chemicals630, resulting in poor working conditions631 and injuries632. There are also 
recorded cases of workers having to pay for health and safety gear themselves633, 
especially seasonal workers634.  
 
4.1.2.3.1.6. Working conditions of seasonal workers 
As mentioned throughout this chapter, seasonal workers in Tanzania are commonly 
treated differently from permanent employees. Indeed, they may be denied access to 
trade unions635, which is illegal under the Employment and Labour Relations Act636. 
Moreover, they may be asked to pay for their own protective gear637, which goes 
against the provisions of the Occupational Health and Safety Act638. Finally, they may 
have their legal notice before termination of employment illegally shortened639 640. 
Civil society explained that the abusive reliance on seasonal contracts was motivated 
by the fact that it allowed employers to keep employees from making demands641, and 
so to exploit cheap labour642. Consequently, the LHRC called on the government to 
reform the Employment and Labour Relations Act to protect ‘short-term’ workers643, 
although stronger enforcement of the current law should also be a priority.  
 
4.1.2.3.1.7. Other key issues  
Other key issues cover working time, paid leave, education on workers’ rights, and 
outsourcing.  
 
629 LHRC (n. 207), 57.  
630 Interview with civil society representative A7. 
631 Interview with civil society representative A7. 
632 Interview with civil society representative A5. 
633 LHRC (n. 207), 57.  
634 Interview with civil society representative A1. 
635 LHRC (n. 207), 30.  
636 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 9(1). 
637 Interview with civil society representative A1. 
638 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Sections 62, 63, and 65. 
639 LHRC (n. 207), 30.  
640 This violates Section 41 of the Employment and Labour Relations Act.  
641 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
642 LHRC (n. 207), 31.  
643 Ibid, 33.  
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First, the ILO has adopted several conventions regulating working time, none of which 
Tanzania ratified apart from ILO Convention C148 on Paid Educational Leave644. 
National legislation abides by most of the basic principles enshrined in the ILO 
conventions, such as the 6-day working week645, the 45-hour week646, and overtime 
(paid extra647) capped to 3 hours per day648 and to 50 hours in a four-week cycle649. 
The Employment and Labour Relations Act also provides for 60-minute breaks every 
5 hours650, and daily rest of at least twelve consecutive hours in between two shifts651. 
However, employers regularly breach the legally defined working hours and fail to 
pay any extra overtime652. 
Second, national legislation requires employers to grant employees at least 28 
consecutive days of annual paid leave653, 126 days of paid sick leave (63 days with 
full pay, and 63 more days with half pay, as long as the employee has a medical 
certificate)654, 84 days of paid maternity leave655, 3 days of paternity leave656, and 4 
days of compassionate leave657. Whilst the majority of companies offers leaves, it was 
reported that a majority of workers do not take any kind of leaves, often for fear of 
losing their job658. This may be the reason behind the recent legislative amendment 
requiring employers to ensure that employees apply for the annual leave every year659.  
Third, experts generally agree that labour rights problems stem from stakeholders’ lack 
of education about workers’ rights660 and that, despite improvements in recent years661, 
a lot of work remains to be done at local and national level662. Indeed, 80% of LRHC’s 
 
644 ILO Convention C148, ‘Paid Educational Leave Convention’, 1974.  
645 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 19(2)(a).  
646 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 19(2)(b). 
647 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 19(5). 
648 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 19(1). 
649 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 19(3)(b). 
650 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 21(1). 
651 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 24(1)(a). 
652 LHRC (n. 207), 61.  
653 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 31. 
654 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 32. 
655 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 33. 
656 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 34(1)(a). 
657 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 34(1)(b). 
658 LHRC (n. 207), 46.  
659 Employment and Labour Relations (General) Regulations (G.N. No. 47 of 2017), 2017, Regulation 
14(2); although the same regulation adds that this is “notwithstanding an agreement to work for payment 
in lieu of annual leave”. 
660 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
661 Interview with civil society representative A2. 
662 Interview with civil society representative A7. 
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respondents had no basic knowledge of Tanzanian labour laws and related 
obligations663. 
Finally, outsourcing is a big problem in Tanzania, as many corporations use the 
services of external providers without taking responsibility for their labour 
practices664. As a remedy, the ILO encourages unions to push for the inclusion into 
CBAs665 of a clause making corporations responsible for the conduct of their 
contractors – although, to my knowledge, it has yet to happen. In order to regulate such 
conduct at national level, the legislation was amended in 2017 to require firms to take 
responsibility for the behaviour of their service providers and make sure that they 
respect national legislation, including by writing a clause into their contract to that 
effect666. The new legislation states that any differences in treatment between regular 
and outsourced workers must be considered discrimination667.   
 
Now that I have investigated issues related to labour rights, I will explore common 
issues related to discriminatory practices within corporations in the country.  
 
4.1.2.3.2. Discrimination 
The ILO adopted Convention C111 in 1958, which Tanzania ratified in 2002, 
prohibiting discrimination in respect of employment and occupation made on the basis 
of “race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin”668. 
In addition, the ICESCR specifically requires “equal opportunity for everyone to be 
promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no 
considerations other than those of seniority and competence”669. Accordingly, 
Tanzanian legislation prohibits discrimination at the workplace670 on the same grounds 
as included in ILO Convention C111, as well as on the basis of gender, pregnancy, 
tribe or place of origin, marital status or family responsibility, disability, HIV/AIDS 
 
663 LHRC (n. 207), 73.  
664 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
665 Interview with civil society representative A1. 
666 Labour Institutions (General) Regulations (G.N. No. 45 of 2017) (hereinafter ‘Labour Institutions 
(General) Regulations’), 2017, Article 9.  
667 Labour Institutions (General) Regulations, Article 9(3). 
668 ILO Convention C111, Article 1. 
669 ICESCR, Article 7(c). 
670 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 7. 
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status, age, or station of life671. In particular, Tanzania has committed to the principle 
of ‘equal pay for equal work’. The ICESCR requires that all workers receive, as a 
minimum, “fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without 
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not 
inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work”. The principle of 
equal pay for equal work is also enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights672, ILO Convention C100673, as well as in the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights674. Accordingly, Tanzanian legislation prohibits discrimination in 
remuneration675.  
Despite the safeguards provided by international and national law, there have been 
reports of discriminatory practices at workplaces. This section will first cover gender-
based discrimination and secondly any other types of discriminatory practices.   
 
4.1.2.3.2.1. Gender-based discrimination 
There is legislation in place prohibiting any kind of sexual harassment or gender-based 
discrimination at work676, reinforced by recent amendments to the penal code677. As a 
women’s rights expert explained, “everything is designed to guarantee a safe working 
environment”678, but the issue comes with the implementation of these laws.  
In practice, there are conflicting reports about discrimination faced by women at the 
workplace. On the one hand, most participants (79%) to LHRC’s study have never 
faced any kind of discrimination at the workplace679. There are also reports of general 
improvement of behaviour680, although some participants said that women were still 
barred from performing certain jobs as they were considered as not fitting for 
women681. On the other hand, experts say that gender discrimination is still a problem 
 
671 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 7(4). 
672 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(2). 
673 ILO Convention C100, Article 2(1).  
674 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 15.  
675 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 7(1) and (7)(9)(c). 
676 Penal Code, Chapter 16 of the Laws (Revised) 1998, Article 138D, and especially Article 138D(3); 
and Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 4(4). 
677 Interview with civil society representative A2. 
678 Interview with civil society representative A2. 
679 LHRC (n. 207), 77.  
680 Interview with trade union representative F1. 
681 LHRC (n. 207), 78.  
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in Tanzania682, including at the hiring stage683. For instance, women are more likely to 
be employed on a temporary basis684. Moreover, discrimination against pregnant 
women during the hiring process is a reality in the country685. Finally, some women 
also face issues when they come back to work after giving birth, as some employers 
deny them time to breastfeed686.  
 
4.1.2.3.2.2. Other types of discrimination  
This section will cover discriminatory practices first against people living with 
HIV/AIDS, second against people living with a disability, third against people coming 
from certain tribes, and finally based on nationality or origin. 
First, the rate of people living with HIV/AIDS across the country is 4.7%687, as was 
explained in section 4.1.2.1.2.2. In the Iringa region, where my case study is located, 
the rate is 9%, which makes it the second-highest region in the whole country, with a 
higher prevalence in the employed population than in the unemployed population688. 
Although it is illegal to discriminate against people living with HIV689, some cases of 
such corporate discrimination were brought before the Commission for Mediation and 
Arbitration690. Second, despite legislation prohibiting discrimination against people 
living with a disability691, LHRC found that 46% of respondents had witnessed 
discriminatory practices in the workplace692. There is also an issue of discrimination 
against workers who become disabled as a result of work-related injuries693. Third, 
LHRC reported that 19% of respondents said that there was an issue of tribal 
discrimination694 despite express legislative prohibition695. Finally, although opinions 
 
682 Interviews with civil society representatives A1 and A2.  
683 Interview with civil society representative A7. 
684 Interview with civil society representative A5. 
685 Interviews with civil society representatives A1 and A2.  
686 Interviews with civil society representative A1.  
687 UNAIDS (n. 544). 
688 LHRC (n. 207), 192.  
689 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 4(4). 
690 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
691 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 4(4). 
692 LHRC (n. 207), xxix.  
693 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
694 LHRC (n. 207), 165.  
695 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 4(4). 
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are not unanimous on the issue of discrimination based on nationality696, there are 
reports697 of discrimination against Tanzanians of foreign descent, especially in the 
transportation sector, and against Tanzanians working for foreign corporations or 
alongside foreigners698.  
 
Now that I have explored common business-related human rights issues, I will 
investigate the performance of Tanzanian labour regulatory authorities with the aim of 
determining the extent to which they monitor and regulate corporate behaviour across 
the country. 
 
4.1.2.3.3. Performance of labour regulatory authorities 
Tanzania ratified the ILO Convention C081 on labour inspections in 1962 (and later 
its 1995 Protocol699) requiring signatory States to maintain a system of labour 
inspections in industrial workplaces. The system shall, among others, secure the 
“enforcement of the legal provisions relating to conditions of work and the protection 
of workers while engaged in their work” and “bring to the notice of the competent 
authority defects or abuses not specifically covered by existing legal provisions”700. 
Moreover, the Convention requires that “the number of labour inspectors [be] 
sufficient to secure the effective discharge of the duties of the inspectorate”701 and that 
inspectors have appropriate “material means”702. Finally, “workplaces shall be 
inspected as often and as thoroughly as is necessary to ensure the effective application 
of the relevant legal provisions”703. 
Labour inspections are mainly the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour, Youth and 
Employment Development [MoLEYD] in mainland Tanzania, and of the Ministry of 
Labour, Youth, Women and Children Development in Zanzibar704. Mainland Tanzania 
 
696 Civil society representative A5 said that nationality-based discrimination was uncommon in the 
country.  
697 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
698 LHRC (n. 207), 29.  
699 ILO (n. 574). 
700 ILO Convention C081, ‘Labour Inspection Convention’, 1947, Article 1(a) and (c).  
701 ILO Convention C081, Article 10.  
702 ILO Convention C081, Article 10(a)(ii). 
703 ILO Convention C081, Article 16. 
704 ILO (n. 574).  
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is divided into 32 labour ‘area offices’, 20 of which are regional offices and 12 are 
district offices. Unless the inspection was triggered by workers’ complaint, the 
corporation will be informed of the visit ahead of time705. Labour inspectors may 
prosecute employers but not fine or sanction them706.  
Even though labour inspections are “the bedrock of the implementation of labour 
standards”707, responsible authorities lack the human and financial resources necessary 
to plan and carry out regular and effective inspections. Indeed, there is a shortage of 
labour inspectors708, almost two-thirds of regulatory authorities feel that they do not 
have the capacity to execute all mandated activities to the expected standard709 
(perhaps because of the lack of available training resources710), and 74% say that they 
do not have sufficient monitoring capacity to cover all businesses across the country711. 
In 2016, only 53% of regulatory authorities knew the exact number of corporations 
which they were supposed to oversee712.  
It is difficult to obtain specific figures as to how many labour inspections are carried 
out every year; however, it was reported that, in 2008, only 20 inspections were 
conducted by the head office in Dar es Salaam713. This figure is made even smaller 
considering the ever-expanding informal sector714: it is estimated that between 
27.500715 and 50.000716 workplaces operate in mainland Tanzania, of which only 6.599 
were registered in 2013717. Offices generally plan out more inspections (12-16 
inspections per month), but they are not all carried out due to lack of resources718.  
In the Mufindi region, no regular inspection has reportedly taken place in the past three 
years, despite requests from local trade unions719. This gives corporations little 
 
705 ILO (n. 574); and ILO (n. 573), 39.  
706 Labour Institutions Act (No. 7 of 2004) (Cap. 300), 2004, Section 45 and 46. 
707 Interview with civil society representative A1. 
708 ILO (n. 563), 64.  
709 LHRC (n. 207), xxix; and interview with trade union representative F1. 
710 ILO (n. 574). 
711 LHRC (n. 207), 263.  
712 Ibid, 262.  
713 ILO (n. 573), 33.  
714 Interview with trade union representative F1. 
715 Ministry of Labour and Employment and the Occupational Safety and Health Authority, 
’Performance Audit Report On The Management Of Occupational Health And Safety In Tanzania’, 
National Audit Office, 2013, xi. 
716 ILO (n. 573), 38. 
717 Ministry of Labour and Employment and the Occupational Safety and Health Authority (n. 715), xi. 
718 ILO (n. 573), 33.  
719 Interview with trade union representative F2. 
P a g e  | 139 
 
incentive to respect the law – even though experts agree that, when labour inspections 
happen, they are effective720. Beyond the issue of resources, the requirement that 
labour inspectors seek a special certification from the Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions before bringing a case to court721 is a hindrance to effective prosecution 
of illegal labour practices722.  
Specific issues related to occupational health and safety are devolved to OSHA in 
mainland Tanzania, and to the Occupational Safety and Health Directorate in 
Zanzibar723, such as industrial hygiene surveys, medical health examinations, training 
and awareness raising programmes, and investigation of accidents724. OSHA’s 
services also cover the registration of new workplaces, the gathering of data, and the 
monitoring of workplaces725.  For the purpose of OSHA’s mission, mainland Tanzania 
is divided into six zones, with only five inspectors per zone726. 90% of inspections are 
routine or planned visits, with the remaining 10% of inspections being triggered by 
workers’ complaints727. OSHA conducted 3.500 inspections in 2008728. OSHA 
inspectors may prohibit employers from behaving dangerously and take specific steps 
to improve the situation within a defined period of time729, and enforce it by blocking, 
barring, barricading or fencing off that part of the factory or workplace, plant or 
machinery to which the prohibition applies730. OSHA inspectors may levy a fine 
(“compounds”), but only if the employer officially admits to an infraction731.  
In practice, the quality of OSHA inspection plans is considered “inadequate”732 by the 
Labour Ministry’s Controller and Auditor General. Indeed, “one of the key issues 
considered [by OSHA] when planning inspection is the cost to be incurred against the 
revenue expected to be collected from the conducted inspection”, resulting in the rare 
inspections of workplaces located in remote areas733. Another problem is the fact that 
 
720 Interview with civil society representatives A1, A2, and A7, and trade union representative F1. 
721 ILO (n. 573), 75.  
722 Ibid. 






729 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 51(1), (2), and (3).  
730 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 51(5).  
731 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 88; also see the ILO recommendation that this 
requirement be discontinued (ILO (n. 573), 75). 
732 Ministry of Labour and Employment and the Occupational Safety and Health Authority (n. 715), xi. 
733 Ibid, xi.  
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inspectors are not trained or provided with details as to how inspections are to be 
conducted734.  
Most of the difficulties encountered by OSHA are due to the lack of resources allocated 
to it by MoLEYD735, but also to the absence of a centralised registry of corporations 
(or of frequent communication between the central and regional offices), hindering the 
planning and regular monitoring of labour and OSHA inspections736. Out of the 
estimated 27.500-50.000 workplaces in the country, only 4.000 are registered with 
OSHA737.  
 
In conclusion, the Tanzanian legislation extensively protects workers’ rights, including 
regarding corporate discriminatory practices. However, it is evident that in many cases 
the law is not adequately implemented, partly because of the weak performance of 
labour regulatory authorities, leaving gaps in state protection and allowing 
corporations to commit human rights violations on a regular basis across the country. 
Tanzania is therefore a good location to test out the effects of corporate self-regulation 
and whether it could help improve firms’ human rights performance. I have now 
explained why I selected the tea industry and Tanzanian for my case study. Next, I will 
look into the characteristics of the Tanzanian tea industry, first at national level and 
second at the regional level where the case study will specifically take place. This will 
explain why the Mufindi region is particularly well suited for this thesis’s case study 
and will set the context for the selection of the study’s corporations: Unilever, MTC, 
and Chai Bora, as based on their self-regulatory mechanisms and implementation 
processes. 
 
4.1.3. Characteristics of the tea industry in Tanzania 
This section will first cover the characteristics of the tea industry at national level 
before investigating the tea industry in Mufindi specifically. This will include a brief 
 
734 Ibid; and ILO (n. 573), 74. 
735 Ministry of Labour and Employment and the Occupational Safety and Health Authority (n. 715), 
xiii. 
736 ILO (n. 574); and Ministry of Labour and Employment and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Authority (n. 715), xi.  
737 Ministry of Labour and Employment and the Occupational Safety and Health Authority (n. 715), xi. 
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introduction of the industry in the region and secondly a detailed study of three of the 
main tea corporations operating in Mufindi: Unilever, MTC, and Chai Bora. 
 
4.1.3.1. Description of the tea industry at national level 
Tanzania is the 4th African producer of tea and produces about 1% of the global tea 
output738. Tea is also one of the country’s largest crop export although the country’s 
tea production declined by 26% between financial year [FY] 2014-2015739 and FY 
2016-2017, dropping to an annual production of 26.975 tons740. However, the 
production seems to have stabilised, with 13.575 tons741 produced nationwide between 
July and December 2017. This worldwide phenomenon has been linked to climate 
change742, and the Tanzanian fall was explained by the prolonged dry spell particularly 
in Rungwe District and unreliable rainfall distribution in Mufindi district743. 
Conversely, the portion of Tanzanian tea exported has been increasing, albeit impeded 
by the production shortfall in the last two years: 82% of the national production was 
exported between July 2014 and June 2015744, 92% in FY 2015/2016745, and 85% in 
FY 2016/2017746. As the average price per kilogram also increased from US$1.56 in 
FY 2014/2015 to US$1.77 in FY 2016/2017747, exports earned a total of US$40.3 
million in FY 2016/2017748.  
The tea industry supports about 50.000 families in Tanzania749. Half of the land used 
to produce tea is farmed by big estates, and half by smallholders, for a total of 22.721 
 
738 Chang (n. 478), 4. 
739 Intergovernmental Group on Tea of the Committee on Commodity Problems, ‘Report of the Tea 
Industry in Tanzania’, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN, 25-27 May 2016, 1.  
740 Tea Board of Tanzania, ‘National Made Tea Production By District From July 2016 To June 2017’, 
2017.  
741 Tea Board of Tanzania, ‘National Made Tea Production By District From July To December 2017’, 
2017. 
742 Brouder, Billing and Uren (n. 486), 11; and Biswas (n. 478). 
743 Tea Board of Tanzania, ‘An Overview Of Tea Production For The Financial Year 2015/2016 
Compared To The Previous Season’, 2016, 1. 
744 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (n. 739), 1. 
745 Tea Board of Tanzania (n.743) 1, 6. 
746 Tea Board of Tanzania, ‘National Tea Export By Country Of Destination July 2016 -June 2017’, 
2017. 
747 Tea Board of Tanzania, ‘National Tea Exports By Country Of Destination From July To December 
2017’, 2017. 
748 Tea Board of Tanzania (n. 746). 
749 John Baffes, ‘Tanzania’s Tea Sector Constraints and Challenges’, World Bank, 2003, 1.  
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hectares750. Two trade unions have tea workers as members: the Tanzania Plantation 
and Agricultural Workers Union [TPAWU] and the Tanzanian Union of Industrial and 
Commercial Workers [TUICO]. On the one hand, TPAWU is the trade union for tea 
plantation workers (although factory workers employed at a company where the 
majority of employees are plantation workers also have access to TPAWU 
membership), with 47.861 members registered nationally, including 10.900 members 
in the Mufindi region alone751. Every two years, TPAWU negotiates the content of 
CBAs752 at the national level with the Tea Association of Tanzania [TAT], which 
represents the main employers in the tea industry in the country. TPAWU first collect 
workers’ opinions on the different issues covered by CBAs, and then will meet with 
TAT. On the other hand, TUICO is the trade union for tea factory workers, and had 
84.889 members registered nationally in 2016753 754. They have 22 regional offices and 
865 field branches755, and negotiate CBAs at the national level756. Both trade unions 
are responsible for dealing with labour rights issues, which are rife in the tea industry, 
as explored at the beginning of this chapter.  
I will now explore the tea industry in the region of Mufindi, introducing three of the 
main tea corporations operating in the area and exploring their activities and human 
rights self-regulatory mechanisms in detail, with the aim to determine the efforts – as 
publicly disclosed – which they make to address their human rights issues globally (if 





750 Dan Bolton, ‘Tanzania Bets Big on Tea with Plans for In-country Auction’ (World Tea News, 30 
October 2018) <https://worldteanews.com/tea-industry-news-and-features/tanzania-bets-big-on-tea-
with-plans-for-in-country-auction> (accessed 21 October 2019);  and Apolinari Tairo, ‘Tanzania targets 
five regions to boost tea yields and sales’ (The East African, 15 October 2018), 
<https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Tanzania-targets-five-regions-to-boost-tea-yields-and-
sales/2560-4804830-a69rkrz/index.html> (accessed 21 October 2019)  
751 LHRC (n. 207), 44; and interview with trade union representative F2.  
752 Interview with trade union representative F2. 
753 TUICO’s General Secretaries Service, ‘Union Profile’, TUICO, 2018, 7.  
754 I have tried to get in touch with the branch of TUICO operating in Iringa to find out how many 
registered members the union had in the region but did not receive a reply.  
755 TUICO, ‘About TUICO’ < https://www.tuico.or.tz/about.php> (accessed 21 October 2019)  
756 Interview with trade union representative F3.  
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4.1.3.2. Description of the tea industry at local level (Mufindi) 
Mufindi is one of the four districts of Iringa, with a population of 246.090757. The 
district has 149 primary schools, 43 secondary schools, one hospital, eight health 
centres, and 60 dispensaries758. It is mostly known for its production of tea and timber. 
It is one of the highest and coolest regions in the country, rising 1.884 meters above 
sea level759, making it ideal for tea crops760. Mufindi contributes heavily towards the 
country’s tea industry: it produced 43% of the national tea production in FY 
2016/2017761. This intensive output makes it the ideal place for my case study as the 
working and living conditions in and around tea firms in the region will therefore affect 
many workers and community members.   
Moreover, there are a number of business-related human rights issues in Mufindi: low 
wages762, lack of compensation for work-related injuries763, and low frequency of 
labour inspections – despite calls from trade unions764. Another important problem in 
Mufindi is the difference in treatment between permanent and seasonal workers. A 
trade union representative said that equal treatment would be one area which unions 
will push forward during the next round of CBA negotiation with companies, who 
have been resisting any changes765. Relatedly, it was reported that some corporations 
regularly ask employees to change their names so that businesses may keep them as 
casual employees, so as not provide them with benefits (e.g. annual leave) reserved for 
permanent employees766 and seasonal workers employed for at least six months767.  
Mufindi is therefore a good setting for my case study, where the potential effectiveness 
of self-regulation for improving corporate human rights performance may be 
significantly tested. In this context, I will now introduce three of the main tea 
corporations operating in Mufindi: Unilever, MTC, and Chai Bora. 
 
757 Official Website of the Mufindi District, ‘Statistics’ <http://mufindidc.go.tz/> (accessed 21 October 
2019) 
758 Ibid.  
759 Geoview, ‘Mufindi District’ <http://tz.geoview.info/mufindi_district,152698> (accessed on 21 
October 2019) 
760 John Sutton and Donath Olomi, An Enterprise Map of Tanzania Vol. 3, International Growth Centre 
in association with the London Publishing Partnership, 2012, 36. 
761 Tea Board of Tanzania (n. 740). 
762 Interview with trade union representative F2.  
763 Interview with trade union representative F2. 
764 Interview with trade union representative F2. 
765 Interview with trade union representative F2. 
766 Interview with civil society representative A8. 
767 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 29(2)(a). 
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4.1.3.2.1. Introduction to the main tea corporations operating in 
Mufindi 
My study will look at the influence of self-regulation on corporate behaviour, and I 
therefore need to limit the influence of state regulation on business operations. It 
follows that I chose to study companies in one country to make sure that differences 
in corporate impacts on human rights would not stem from national legislation. Given 
that all corporations must abide by the same set of rules and regulations, their 
performance will be similarly influenced by national legislation. Moreover, I chose 
three corporations operating in the same area and producing the same kind of product, 
again to limit influences of factors external to self-regulatory mechanisms on corporate 
behaviour (i.e. social and environmental environment; industry-specific constraints). 
For the reasons exposed in the previous section, I identified the Mufindi tea industry 
as the right setting for my case study, and selected three businesses (one multinational 
firm, one regional corporation, and one national company) operating in the region: 
Unilever, MTC, and Chai Bora, respectively. All three corporations operate tea-
manufacturing factories, and Unilever and MTC also grow tea. These two corporations 
are the main tea growers in Mufindi and produced 96% of the tea which came out of 
Mufindi between July and December 2017768. Chai Bora blends and packages tea 
bought mainly from Unilever and MTC.  
These three corporations operate side by side in Mufindi, but all offer very different 
approaches to human rights769. As I outlined above, this case study is designed so that 
limited variables come into play beyond the firms’ self-regulatory mechanisms. 
Although it is acknowledged that it is impossible to eliminate all external interference, 
this study therefore allowed me to analyse their human rights performance with as little 
interference from outside causes as possible.  




768 Tea Board of Tanzania (n. 741). 
769 Please see Annex 3 for a table summarising the differences between the companies in this regard. 
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4.1.3.2.2. Description of firms’ activities 
4.1.3.2.2.1. Unilever 
Unilever is a multinational corporation headquartered in the Netherlands and in the 
UK, employing 161.000 people worldwide770. Owning over 400 brands, it is the 
world’s largest consumer goods company with €53.7 billion in turnover in 2017771 and 
products available in 190 countries772. The company is also the world’s biggest tea 
company773, and own leading tea brands such as Lipton and PG Tips774. All Lipton tea 
has been certified with the Rainforest Alliance since 2015, and Unilever aims to have 
all its tea certified by 2020775. 
In Tanzania, Unilever bought in 1984 Brooke Bond Liebig776, the company which has 
owned tea estates in the region since 1940, when German settlers, who owned the 
estates prior to Brooke Bond acquiring them, lost their property777. Unilever’s branch 
producing tea in the country is registered as Unilever Tanzania Tea Limited and 
employs over 4.000 permanent workers and up to 3.000 temporary workers778 on tea 
estates and factories in the Mufindi region and more recently in Njombe, a 
neighbouring region in the south of Mufindi. Unilever’s Tanzanian subsidiary has a 
99-year land lease arrangement with the government for 19.682 hectares779, including 
3.418 hectares of plantations780, for the most part irrigated781, 7.000 hectares of natural 
 
770 Unilever, ‘About Unilever’ <https://www.unilever.com/about/who-we-are/about-Unilever/> 
(accessed on 21 October 2019) 
771 Ibid.  
772 Unilever, ‘Operational highlights - At a glance’, < 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140402110549/http:/unilever.com/sustainable-
living/ourapproach/ourbusinessataglance/> (accessed on 21 October 2019) 
773 Groosman (n. 491), 1.  
774 Unilever, ‘Sustainable tea – leading the industry’ <https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-
living/reducing-environmental-impact/sustainable-sourcing/sustainable-tea-leading-the-industry/> 
(accessed on 21 October 2019) 
775 Ibid. 
776 Sutton and Olomi (n. 760), 35; and Loconto ‘Sustainabilitea: Shaping Sustainability in Tanzanian 
Tea Production’ (n. 209), 176.  
777 Sutton and Olomi (n. 760), 35. 
778 Temporary workers are employed during the high season, which runs between November and April 
(interview with manager D1; and ‘Tanzania: Unilever Tanzania Impresses Magufuli’ (Daily News, 11 
April 2019) <https://dailynews.co.tz/news/2019-04-115caf074ab588a.aspx> (accessed on 21 October 
2019)) 
779 Baffes (n. 749), 13. 
780 AfriCERT, ‘Public Summary of Audit Report – Unilever Tea Tanzania Limited’, Rainforest 
Alliance, 2018, 3.  
781 Sutton and Olomi (n. 760), 36.  
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forest782, and over 1.400 hectares of eucalyptus trees783 which the firm uses as 
firewood for the factories784. The firm’s annual production is between 6.670785 and 
10.000786 metric ton of tea, which accounts for 33% of the country’s tea output. 70% 
of Unilever’s tea production is exported787, and the firm’s turnover from its tea 
activities in Tanzania was US$16 million in 2010788. In 2013, the company committed 
to doubling its business in the country by 2020 “whilst reducing [its] environmental 
footprint and increasing [its] positive social impact”789. According to a Unilever 
manager, the company is set to deliver on their commitment790 as they have since 
purchased 1.300 hectares in Njombe. Most of the new estate, including the newly built 
factory, became operational mid-2018.  
Unilever has also started a ‘Mufindi Outgrowers Project’791: the company provides 
smallholding farmers with agricultural training, zero-interest loans to buy supplies, 
and general support. About 1.400 farmers are now involved in the project, including 
1.276 who are now certified with the Rainforest Alliance, spanning 1.200 hectares of 
tea plantations. Unilever also buys tea from the smallholders involved in the project. 
 
4.1.3.2.2.2. MTC  
MTC is owned by Rift Valley Tea, a company incorporated in Mauritius and operating 
in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Tanzania. Rift Valley Tea produces tobacco, 
agricultural products (tea, coffee, bananas, maize, soybeans, wheat, macadamias, 
avocados), forestry, and renewable energy792. The company employs over 7.800 
people across East and Southern Africa and had a turnover of US$192 million in 
 
782 Interview with manager D1.  
783 Sutton and Olomi (n. 760), 36.  
784 Interview with manager D7; and ibid.  
785 Tea Board of Tanzania (n. 741); and Tea Board of Tanzania (n. 740).  
786 Unilever ‘Unilever and government of Tanzania sign agreement on tea’ (2 September 2013) 
<https://www.unilever.com/news/press-releases/2013/13-09-02-Unilever-and-government-of-
Tanzania-sign-agreement-to-accelerate-sustainable-agriculture-growth-for-tea.html> (accessed on 21 
October 2019)  
787 Interview with manager D1, although John Sutton and Donath Olomi reported in 2012 that 98% of 
the production was exported (Sutton and Olomi (n. 760), 36).  
788 Ibid, 35. This is the most recent figure which I could find.  
789 Unilever (n. 786). 
790 Interview with manager D1.  
791 Interview with manager D1.  
792 Interview with manager D2; and Rift Valley Tea, ‘Agriculture’ 
<http://www.riftvalley.com/agriculture/#1466153186667-d02648f1-4fa1> (accessed on 21 October 
2019) 
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2015793. Rift Valley Tea has four companies registered in Tanzania: MTC (Mufindi), 
Kibena (Njombe), Ikanga (Njombe), and Rift Valley Tea Solutions (Dar es Salaam). 
My case study focuses on MTC – which was established in 1954794 – and more 
specifically on MTC’s main estate, located in Mufindi (Itona), where the MTC’s head 
office is. MTC also have four other estates795: Stoning Valley, Makanga, Itambo, and 
Luponde – the latter being itself divided into five estates796. MTC uses 2.583 hectares 
of land797, of which 901 hectares are tea plantations, and produces a little over 2.000 
metric tons of tea annually, which accounts for 8.1% of the country’s total output798. 
In addition to its plantations, MTC has a factory where it processes its tea leaves. With 
800 permanent employees and up to 400 seasonal workers799, MTC’s operations are 
on average seven times smaller than Unilever’s operations. After facing financial 
difficulties, MTC was recently taken over by a Kenyan investor800. 
MTC are also part of the Mufindi Outgrower Project and support smallholding 
farmers801, from whom the company buys 30% of the tea which it processes at its Itona 
factory802. 
4.1.3.2.2.3. Chai Bora 
Chai Bora is a Tanzanian company which started out in 1994 in Dar es Salaam as a 
brand of Tanzania tea company Tatepa and moved to Mafinga in 1998 to be closer to 
tea plantations803. The company was incorporated in Tanzania as a standalone firm in 
2006804. It is now part of Catalyst Principal Partners, an Eastern Africa-focused private 
equity fund805. Its annual turnover is Tsh 20 billion806 (£6.7 million807). 
 
793 Rift Valley Tea, ‘Sustainability Report’, 2015, 3, 4.  
794 Loconto ‘Sustainabilitea: Shaping Sustainability in Tanzanian Tea Production’ (n. 209), 193. 
795 Interview with manager D2.  
796 This last estate is in Njombe, about 200 km away from the Mufindi estates (interview with manager 
D2).  
797 NEPCon Kenya, ‘Public Summary of Audit Report – MTC’, Rainforest Alliance, 2019, 3. 
798 Tea Board of Tanzania (n. 740); and Tea Board of Tanzania (n. 741). 
799 Interview with manager D2.  
800 Interviews with manger D2 and community member C62. 
801 Interview with manager D2. 
802 Rift Valley Tea, ‘Tea’ <http://www.riftvalley.com/tea-2/#1466409040758-02cad734-24705ec3-
9757> (accessed 21 October 2019)  
803 Interview with manager D4. 
804 Chai Bora, ‘About Us’ <http://chaibora.com/about-us/> (accessed 21 October 2019) 
805 Catalyst Principal Partners, ‘Our Fund’ <https://www.catalystprincipal.com/fund/> (accessed on 21 
October 2019) 
806 Catalyst Principal Partners, ‘Creating Jobs in Tanzania’ < https://www.cdcgroup.com/en/impact-
investing/creating-jobs-tanzania/> (accessed on 21 October 2019) 
807 As of 21 October 2019.  
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Chai Bora specialises in the blending and packaging of tea808; the company does not 
have any plantations as it does not grow its own tea but buys it from nearby estates, 
including Unilever and MTC,  and employs 300 people in the country, including 120 
permanent workers at its factory, located in Mafinga809. The firm may also employ up 
to 80 seasonal workers810, but the company did not reportedly employ any seasonal 
workers at the time when the fieldwork was conducted811. Moreover, a few 
interviewees stated that Chai Bora had not hired any new permanent workers in 
years812. Most current workers come from Iringa and Njombe813.   
Now that I have explored the activities of the three corporations, I will outline the self-
regulatory mechanisms which they have adopted.  
 
4.1.3.2.3. Firms’ publicly available human rights self-regulatory 
mechanisms 
This section introduces the self-regulatory mechanisms (if any) of each company. 
Using the typology developed in Chapter 2, it will briefly analyse the different 
mechanisms used by each company. I will focus on those ones which companies have 
publicly adopted. Indeed, as explained in Chapter 1, firms tend to mention their 
mechanism(s) as part of a broader strategy to ensure that their operations do not impact 
negatively workers, community members, and the environment, and it is important to 
hold firms to account for the declarations which they publicly make, and check 
whether they are fully implementing their commitments. Building on Chapter 3, I will 
then briefly examine whether the main processes which scholars have identified as 
important for ensuring that self-regulatory mechanisms are effective are theoretically 
in place in each company.  
Building on these considerations, I will assess in Chapters 5-7 the kind of effect which 
self-regulatory mechanisms have on corporate human rights performance, including 
by using the ‘key features’ which were explored in Chapter 3: drafting of mechanism 
(where applicable); embedding of standards into everyday operations; monitoring and 
 
808 Chai Bora (n. 804). 
809 Interview with manager D3.  
810 Interview with manager D3.  
811 Interview with manager D3. 
812 Interviews with trade union representative F3 and worker B13.  
813 Interview with manager D4.  
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reporting; setting up of a complaints mechanism; and sanctions. This will help analyse 
the three companies’ human rights performance and the overall effectiveness of the 
various mechanisms which were adopted by the firms.  
I will now examine the self-regulatory mechanisms adopted first by Unilever, second 
by MTC, and third by Chai Bora.  
  
4.1.3.2.3.1. Unilever 
Unilever, which has been generally recognised as a human rights leader globally814, is 
the company with the broadest range of mechanisms: in the context of its Tanzanian 
tea operations, the firm has adopted most types of standards included in the typology 
outlined in Chapter 2 and, perhaps as a result, the company has made the most 
extensive range of commitments of all the corporations. I will first explore Unilever’s 
company-level mechanisms, and then product-level mechanisms which the firm has 
adopted for its tea production in Tanzania.  
Firstly, Unilever has adopted a human rights policy outlining standards to uphold in 
all its business activities across the world. In this policy, the firm commits to respecting 
the following intergovernmental instruments: the International Bill of Human Rights, 
ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, as well as the 
OECD Guidelines. In addition, Unilever has adopted a Code of Business Principles, 
policies on Responsible Business Partner and Responsible Sourcing, a Sustainable 
Agriculture Code, as well as a Framework for Fair Compensation and ‘Fairness in the 
Workplace’ and ‘Opportunities for Women’ strategies. The company has also 
committed to the UNGPs, which means (among others) that it must adopt a human 
rights policy, conduct human rights due diligence throughout its operations, and set up 
processes for the remediation of its human rights violations815. I will further outline 
the place and role played by each instrument in Chapter 5. 
Second, the company has had the tea which they produce on their Mufindi tea estate 
certified with the Rainforest Alliance.   
 
814 For instance, Wilshaw (n. 210); and Morrison (n. 210).  
815 UNGPs, Principle 15. 
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Overall, Unilever makes use of internal and external company-based mechanisms, and 
product-level mechanisms, and commits to the following standards: fair pay 
progressively reaching towards living wage levels; freedom of association and 
collective bargaining; provision of employment documentation; occupational health 
and safety (including regular medical exams); right to compensation for work-related 
injuries and death; no temporary workers employed when nature of work if permanent; 
business integrity, and so prohibition of corruption; respect of data confidentiality; 
respect of land rights; principle of free, prior, and informed consent; reasonable 
working hours and no compulsory overtime; right to annual, sick, and maternity leave; 
promotion of the rights of women; respect of human dignity; access to potable water 
for workers and their families; right to an adequate standards of living; freedom of 
housing; engagement with, and support of, the local community; prohibition of 
discrimination (on the grounds of race, age, role, gender, gender identity, colour, 
religion, country of origin, sexual orientation, marital status, dependants, disability, 
social class or political views), forced and child labour, and harassment; rights of 
migrant workers; right to a clean environment; right to health; right to education; fair 
complaints procedures; and effective remedy. Unilever does not have a comprehensive 
list of human rights they have committed to respecting but the firm makes reference to 
rights in different sections of their website816, and in reports. It is therefore clear that 
Unilever has not only made commitments to labour rights but also to community rights 
and education- and health-related rights. I have included as an annex to this thesis a 
comprehensive list of all human rights covered by the different self-regulatory 
mechanisms adopted by Unilever817.  
I will now review what Unilever says that it is doing to implement its commitments at 
the global level. Informed by scholars’ suggestions from Chapter 3, I will look at the 
development of standards, the general embedding of its commitments in its activities, 
 
816 For instance, Unilever, ‘Sustainable Sourcing’ < https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/the-
sustainable-living-plan/reducing-environmental-impact/sustainable-sourcing/> (accessed on 21 
October 2019);  ‘Enhancing Livelihoods’ https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/the-sustainable-
living-plan/enhancing-livelihoods/fairness-in-the-workplace/> (accessed on 21 October); and ‘Human 
Rights’ <https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/the-sustainable-living-plan/enhancing-
livelihoods/fairness-in-the-workplace/advancing-human-rights-in-our-own-operations/> (accessed on 
21 October 2019) 
817 See Annex 3. 
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its monitoring and reporting processes, its complaints mechanism(s), and finally its 
sanctions.  
First, the development and update of product-level mechanisms such as the Rainforest 
Alliance is the responsibility of labelling organisations, and therefore sits outside the 
scope of this thesis – I will therefore not review it. It follows that this section will only 
focus on the development of standards included in Unilever’s internal company-level 
mechanisms. Drawing from the (sub-)key features identified in Section 3.2.1.1., I will 
review the extent to which Unilever’s drafting process was inclusive and open (1), and 
the extent to which the firm’s codes and policies include a comprehensive set of 
internationally-recognised human rights (2), clear and reasonable targets (3), and are 
regularly updated (4). First, Unilever developed its Human Rights Policy in 
consultation with “key external stakeholders, colleagues in [the firm’s] legal, human 
resources, advocacy and communications teams, and approved by members of the 
Unilever Leadership Executive”818. The company’s Responsible Sourcing Policy was 
finalised after “consultation with NGO partners and other experts”819. Moreover, the 
firm updated its Sustainable Agriculture Code in 2015 based on feedback from 
suppliers and civil society820. The company therefore seems to have developed its 
standards in an inclusive manner, as scholars suggested. However, I could not find any 
information about the drafting process of the Code of Business Principles (or of its 
updates). Second, the firm’s Human Rights policy refers to a number of international 
human rights conventions, as mentioned above, and Unilever operationalises the 
implementation of this policy in the rest of its internally developed instruments (e.g. 
Framework for Fair Compensation, Sustainable Agriculture Code) – which I have 
mentioned above. The company therefore includes a broad range of internationally 
recognised human rights, as is suggested by scholars. Third, this translation of abstract 
human rights goals – as defined in the company’s Human Rights Policy – into concrete 
practice and targets in the firm’s various codes and strategies means that Unilever 
workers have guides about which behaviours they must adopt or avoid821. For instance, 
Unilever’s commitment to respecting their employees’ “right to freedom of association 
 
818 Unilever, ‘Human Rights Report’, 2015, 15. 
819 Ibid. 
820 Ibid. 
821 The most concrete example is Unilever’s Code of Business Principles (available at this address: 
<https://www.unilever.com/Images/code-of-business-principles-and-code-policies_tcm244-
409220_en.pdf> (accessed on 21 October 2019)), which is supported by 24 internal Code Policies.  
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and collective bargaining”822 was made concrete by explaining that the firm would 
“respect employees’ rights to join or not to join a legally recognised trade union, or 
any other body representing their collective interests, and establish constructive 
dialogue and bargain in good faith with trade unions or representative bodies on 
employment conditions, labour management relations and matters of mutual concern, 
to the extent practicable taking national laws into consideration”823. Finally, Unilever’s 
Code of Business Principles was first adopted in 1995 and has since been regularly 
updated; the latest update took place in April 2019824. The firm’s Responsible Business 
Partner Policy was piloted in 2015 and updated in 2017825. The company’s 
Responsible Sourcing Policy was last updated in 2017826. The firm’s Sustainable 
Agriculture Code was first published in 2010 and was last updated in 2017827. ‘Fairness 
in the Workplace’828 and ‘Opportunities for Women’829 strategies are regularly 
updated, including with new targets and the firm’s performance assessed against 
targets. In conclusion, with the exception of Unilever’s Human Rights Policy – which 
has not been updated since its adoption in 2014830 –, the firm regularly updates its 
standards, as is suggested by scholars.  
Second, as covered in Chapter 3, scholars point to the importance of embedding 
standards into everyday activities, with the main measures covering internal and 
external publicity, and training of management and employees. Unilever’s Code of 
Business Principles requires managers to ensure that all their team members have read 
and understood the Code and completed any mandatory training831, and is the only 
internal company instrument which has such a requirement. In 2017, Unilever said that 
all their employees were “trained on respect for human rights every three years” and 
that this training was supported by their “new internal ‘Integrated Social 
Sustainability’ online hub which contains [the company’s] key policy publications and 
 
822 Unilever ‘Human Rights Policy’ (n. 144), 2.  
823 Unilever, ‘Code of Business Principles’, 2019, 24. 
824 Ibid, 2. 
825 Unilever, ‘Human Rights Progress Report: Compliance and Beyond’, 2017, 2. 
826 Unilever, ‘Responsible Sourcing Policy’, 2017, 3. 
827 Unilever, ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’, 2017.  
828 Unilever, ‘Fairness in the Workplace’ <https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/enhancing-
livelihoods/fairness-in-the-workplace/> (accessed on 21 October 2019)  
829 Unilever, ‘Opportunities for Workplace’ < https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/enhancing-
livelihoods/opportunities-for-women/> (accessed on 21 October 2019) 
830 Unilever ‘Human Rights Progress Report: Compliance and Beyond’ (n. 825), 2. 
831 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 9.  
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reports, and best practice guidance documents”832. Further, Unilever said they had 
developed a specific training for managers, testing “participants’ knowledge of 
Unilever’s policies, and international labour standards, and build[ing] their ability to 
analyse complex situations under pressure”833. Moreover, the Rainforest Alliance 
requires Unilever to train their workers on the skills required to carry out their work in 
compliance with the certification’s standards834.  
Third, Unilever’s compliance with its commitments is monitored (and reported) 
internally and externally. In its Human Rights Policy, the firm commits to conducting 
“human rights due diligence”835, which they recognise is an “ongoing process” which 
may have to be adapted depending on the risk-level of the countries where they 
operate. In particular, they acknowledge that there are particularly high, systemic risks 
of human rights abuses in certain countries, which means that they “must put in place 
additional due diligence to assess these risks and address them effectively, where 
appropriate, using [their] leverage to work either in one-to-one relationships or in 
broad-based partnerships”. In addition, the company’s Sustainable Agricultural Code 
requires the evaluation of the situation on farms and take practical and reasonable 
measures to reduce hazards and risks, with the aim of minimising workplace fatalities, 
injuries and disease and also impacts on bystanders and local community836. The Code 
also requires workers or workers’ representatives to be involved in this risk assessment 
process and help identify priorities837. In their 2017 Human Rights Report, the 
company explain how they address salient human rights issues838, and state that they 
have conducted “human rights impact assessments” in Myanmar and that they would 
conduct similar assessments with a particular focus on Africa and Asia – but the 
company did not offer more detail839. They also outline their methodology for risk 
mapping and auditing of suppliers, based on Unilever’s Responsible Sourcing 
Policy840, and state that 2.084 sites were audited in 2015/2016, although they did not 
specify whether that figure included sites in Tanzania. Tanzanian consulting firm 
 
832 Unilever ‘Human Rights Progress Report: Compliance and Beyond’ (n. 825), 71. 
833 Ibid. 
834 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous Improvement Criterion 1.8.  
835 Unilever ‘Human Rights Policy’ (n. 144), 3.  
836 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F101.  
837 Ibid, Standard F102. 
838 Unilever ‘Human Rights Progress Report: Compliance and Beyond’ (n. 825), 6. 
839 Ibid, 71.  
840 Unilever ‘Human Rights Progress Report: Compliance and Beyond’ (n. 825), 18. 
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TRES Consult has also conducted 11 studies and environmental impact assessments 
between 2014 and 2016841 for Unilever, although these assessments are not publicly 
available842. Moreover, the company regularly publishes human rights reports since 
2015, which Unilever says is part of the firm’s implementation of the UNGPs843 844. 
In its 2017 report, Unilever outlines the tracking tools it has developed to monitor its 
own compliance as well as its suppliers’845, and its position on external scrutiny and 
stakeholder engagement: it says that they “track reported issues through code breaches, 
grievances reporting and engagement with worker representatives, supported by 
regular training and monitoring”846. Furthermore, the company states in its Code of 
Business Principles that any breaches “must be reported” and that “assurance of 
compliance” is annually monitored and reviewed by Unilever’s Board of Directors847. 
Finally, Unilever’s tea activities in Tanzania and the firm’s compliance with 
certification standards are also monitored by the Rainforest Alliance, and the 
certification is renewed every three years by AfriCERT after a social and 
environmental assessment of the plantations and factories848. However, the Rainforest 
Alliance may conduct additional (on-site or desk-based) audits in-between renewal 
audits for specific sites which have been deemed at an enhanced risk of non-
compliance with their respective standards or when a complaint has been made or an 
incident reported849. Auditing reports are published on the label’s website850. 
Fourth, Unilever appears to have the most extensive complaints mechanism network 
of the three companies. The company’s Human Rights Policy states that they have 
complaints mechanisms in place, and that they encourage their employees to “speak 
up, without retribution, about any concerns they may have, including through [their] 
 
841 TRES Consult, ‘Projects’ <http://tresconsult-tz.com/2019-projects> (accessed 21 October 2019) 
842 I have contacted Unilever and the organisation who conducted the assessments in an effort to get 
access to the content of the assessments but, after multiple email exchanges, it became clear that 
difficulties were too great and that I would not be able to gain access.  
843 Unilever ‘Human Rights Progress Report: Compliance and Beyond’ (n. 825), 1. 
844 The company uses the UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework; more details about the 
Framework may be found on this webpage: <http://www.ungpreporting.org/> (accessed on 21 October 
2019)  
845 Unilever ‘Human Rights Progress Report: Compliance and Beyond’ (n. 825), 72. 
846 Ibid. 
847 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 7. 
848 For latest audit report, see AfriCERT (n. 780). 
849 Rainforest Alliance ‘Certification Rules’ (n. 305), 11-12. 
850 Public auditing reports may be found on this webpage: <https://www.rainforest-
alliance.org/business/solutions/certification/agriculture/certificate-search-public-summaries/> 
(accessed on 13 October 2019) 
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grievance channels”851. They also promote the provision of effective complaints 
mechanisms by their suppliers852. Moreover, Unilever’s website states that employees 
can raise issues with union representatives, line manager, and human resources 
representatives. The firm also has set up a complaints platform online853. In 2017, the 
firm reported 1.654 cases of reported integrity concerns across all areas of their Code 
and Code policies – of which 47% were breaches of Code policies on respect, dignity, 
and fair treatment, and occupational health and safety –, with 709 confirmed 
breaches854. The same year, the company said that they monitored pay structures in 
every country in which they operate to ensure that they remain compliant with the 
principles of ‘equal pay for equal work’855. They also stated that they conducted audits 
to check compliance with their commitment to pay workers a living wage, which in 
2017 allowed for the identification of 7.252 employees below the living wage in 37 
different countries856 – although the firm did not say whether Tanzania was one of 
those countries. Moreover, Unilever said that they began in 2016 a survey to assess 
(among others) the terms and working conditions of seasonal workers857. Other areas 
of monitoring are land rights858, palm oil production859, and suppliers’ respect of 
human rights860. In plantations, welfare officers are also available, although no 
information is specifically available on the firm’s operations in Tanzania. Moreover, 
the Rainforest Alliance requires the company to implement complaints mechanisms 
and to inform workers of their right to access external complaints mechanisms 
(including through the label’s certification bodies)861.  
Finally, of all the company-level mechanisms which the company uses, Unilever’s 
Code of Business Principles is their only instrument with sanctions, which include 
dismissal and/or legal action862. Indeed, there are also no sanctions for non-compliance 
 
851 Unilever ‘Human Rights Policy’ (n. 144), 3. 
852 Ibid, and Unilever, ‘Responsible Business Partner Policy’, 2017, 8.  
853 The Platform may be accessed at this address: <https://app.convercent.com/en-
us/LandingPage/99b958aa-55a1-e611-80d3-000d3ab1117e> (accessed on 21 October 2019) 
854 Unilever, ‘Business Integrity’ <https://www.unilever.com/about/who-we-are/our-values-and-
principles/business-integrity/> (accessed on 21 October 2019)  
855 Unilever ‘Human Rights Progress Report: Compliance and Beyond’ (n. 825), 21. 
856 Unilever, ‘Fair Compensation’ <https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/enhancing-
livelihoods/fairness-in-the-workplace/fair-compensation/> (accessed on 21 October 2019)   
857 Unilever ‘Human Rights Progress Report: Compliance and Beyond’ (n. 825), 43. 
858 Ibid, 53. 
859 Ibid, 63. 
860 Ibid, 2017, 59, 62, 70, 71. 
861 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.9.  
862 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 8. 
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with external company-based mechanisms to which the firm has committed, such as 
the UNGPs. On the other hand, the main sanction for non-compliance with the 
standards of their product-level mechanism, the Rainforest Alliance, is non-renewal of 
the certification label for Unilever’s tea plantations in Tanzania. 
 
In conclusion, Unilever has made extensive commitments using most human rights 
self-regulatory mechanisms covered by the typology outlined in Chapter 2. The firm 
has also published a broad range of information about the implementation of its 
commitments. As far as I can gather from the company’s public declarations, Unilever 
in theory implements most of the key features identified by scholars for effective self-
regulation. In order to verify these claims, and thereby testing the importance of the 
key features identified in Chapter 3 and answering this thesis’s research questions, I 
will go over the standards covered by each mechanism in more detail and study their 
implementation on the ground in Chapter 5.  
 
I will now explore the self-regulatory mechanisms adopted by MTC and the extent to 




MTC makes human rights commitments using only two types of self-regulatory 
mechanisms: an external company-based mechanism and several product-level 
mechanisms. On the one hand, the company has publicly stated that it would respect 
ILO Conventions C100 and C111, respectively guaranteeing equal remuneration and 
prohibiting discrimination, as well as to Conventions C138 and C182 on child labour. 
The company does not have any publicly available codes of conduct or human rights 
policies. On the other hand, MTC’s estates are all certified by Fairtrade and the 
Rainforest Alliance, and the company is also a member of ETP.  
Overall, MTC makes commitments to the following principles across its different 
human rights self-regulatory mechanisms: prohibition of discrimination and child 
labour; fair pay progressively reaching towards living wage levels; health and safety; 
occupational health with free occupational healthcare; reasonable working time and 
P a g e  | 157 
 
leaves; freedom of association and collective bargaining; decent housing conditions 
for workers; prohibition of sexual harassment; equitable working conditions for 
seasonal and permanent workers; environmental protection; access to potable water 
for workers and their families; land rights; right to health; engagement with, and 
support of, the local community; and anonymous complaints mechanism. As for 
Unilever, MTC does not have a comprehensive list of human rights which they have 
committed to respecting but all these rights are mainly covered by Fairtrade, the 
Rainforest Alliance, and ETP, as well as by the various ILO conventions to which 
MTC has individual committed. It is therefore clear that, similarly to Unilever, MTC 
has not only made commitments to labour rights but also to community rights and 
education- and health-related rights. I have included as an annex to this thesis a 
comprehensive list of all human rights covered by the different self-regulatory 
mechanisms adopted by MTC863.  
As I did for Unilever above, I will now review what MTC says that it is doing to 
implement its commitments. Informed by scholars’ suggestions from Chapter 3, I will 
look at the development of standards, the general embedding of its commitments in its 
activities, its monitoring and reporting processes, its complaints mechanism(s), and 
finally its sanctions.  
First, as MTC did not write their own standards, the firm was not in control of the 
development process: ILO Conventions C100, C111 C138, and C182 were written and 
adopted by signatory states and, as was mentioned in the previous section, labelling 
organisations (Fairtrade, the Rainforest Alliance, and ETP) developed their own 
standards. The writing process of the self-regulatory mechanisms used by MTC 
therefore sits outside the scope of this thesis.  
Second, regarding embedding of standards, MTC has not publicly disclosed any 
communication to, or training of, the workforce or management about the ILO 
conventions to which it has committed. Regarding its product-level mechanisms, the 
Rainforest Alliance requires that MTC train its workers on the label’s standards, and 
Fairtrade requires that management be trained on the certification’s standards864.The 
latter also requires MTC to communicate, in the workers’ own language, about certain 
 
863 See Annex 3. 
864 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 1.2.3. and 2.2.1.  
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standards such as health and safety865, the right to unionise866, or the existence of a 
complaints mechanism867.  
Third, MTC’s activities are monitored internally (to some extent) and externally. I will 
first investigate the firm’s internal monitoring. MTC has not publicly stated that it 
conducted human rights due diligence, and perhaps the closest processes would be the 
firm’s Environmental and Social Management System [ESMS] and the Biodiversity 
Risk and Opportunities Assessment tool, but the company does not give out any details 
as to what these processes look like868. Moreover, the only impact assessment publicly 
mentioned is the environmental impact assessment conducted for the Mwenga Hydro 
Power Project869, which will provide the tea company’s plantations in electricity. 
However, the firm did not conduct this assessment itself, and the results are not 
publicly available. Furthermore, MTC reportedly conducts “internal audit review 
processes”870 (and perhaps this includes the Fairtrade officer who is supposed to 
oversee monitoring compliance with the label’s standards, as required by the 
certification itself871), but no more detail is given. Moreover, the “Head of Corporate 
Affairs report[s] to the CEO and [the] Sustainability Steering Committee any 
critical concerns on sustainability issues and constraints on non-financial capitals”872. 
As for external monitoring of the firm’s human rights performance, MTC have had all 
their estates certified by Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance, and ETP, and so will have 
official third-party assessors from the respective organisations check the company’s 
compliance with the certifications’ standards873. Certificates issued by both Fairtrade 
and the Rainforest Alliance are valid for three years, and both bodies therefore conduct 
certification renewal audits every three years. However, both Fairtrade and the 
Rainforest Alliance may conduct additional (on-site or desk-based) audits in-between 
renewal audits for specific sites which have been deemed at an enhanced risk of non-
 
865 Ibid, Standards 3.6.1. and 3.6.3. 
866 Ibid, Standard 3.4.4. 
867 Ibid, Standard 3.5.27. 
868 The only way to get more information on this Biodiversity Risk and Opportunities Assessment tool 
is to visit the following dedicated website: >http://www.businessandbiodiversity.org/> (accessed on 21 
October 2019) 
869 European Commission, ‘Delivering results in the Decade of Sustainable Energy for All’, 2014, 17.   
870 Rift Valley Tea ‘Sustainability Report’ (n. 793), 7.  
871 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 1.2.1.  
872 Rift Valley Tea ‘Sustainability Report’ (n. 793), 7.  
873 Rainforest Alliance, ‘Chain of Custody Certification’ <https://www.rainforest-
alliance.org/business/solutions/certification/agriculture/how-certification-works/chain-of-custody/> 
(accessed on 21 October 2019); and FLOcert, ‘Audits: Standard Operating Procedure’, 2017, 6.  
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compliance with their respective standards or when a complaint has been made or an 
incident reported874. As for ETP, the organisation used to conduct certification audits 
but has since decided to “phase out its independent audit programme”. Referring to 
Fairtrade, the Rainforest Alliance, and UTZ, ETP stated that “there is a large-scale 
certification in the tea sector”875 already, and therefore agreed not to duplicate audits. 
However, it still functions as a product-level mechanism, and I will then consider it as 
such. Moreover, the company stated that their performance would be analysed by 
“external rating agencies and research organisations”876, but there is no detail as to 
what the processes are. Finally, MTC reports on its efforts: in 2015, the firm publicly 
outlined how it manages and mitigates each of the following identified main risks877: 
political shifts and dynamics; land sensitivity and tenure issues; climate change; 
biohazard and disease; crop losses; community and labour dynamics; financing and 
cashflows; currency fluctuation; habitat loss; and decline in soil health. The Rainforest 
Alliance also publishes audit reports878, but not Fairtrade.  
Fourth, MTC say that they have various complaints mechanisms, depending on each 
business operation and circumstance. They also mention their newly drafted ESMS as 
allowing for the identification and remedy of any gaps in this area879. However, no 
further details as to how they operate in any particular site are available. As mentioned 
above, Fairtrade880 and the Rainforest Alliance881 require that, respectively, the firm 
have a complaints mechanism in place, and that workers have access to the labelling 
bodies’ complaints mechanisms. 
Finally, there are no sanctions for non-compliance with the external company-based 
mechanisms to which the firm has committed. Fairtrade and the Rainforest Alliance 
certification labels would mainly sanction MTC for non-compliance with their 
respective standards by not renewing MTC’s tea certification. 
 
874 Rainforest Alliance ‘Certification Rules’ (n. 305), 11-12. 
875 Ethical Tea Partnership, ‘History’ <http://www.ethicalteapartnership.org/about-us/history/> 
(accessed on 21 October 2019)  
876 Rift Valley Tea ‘Sustainability Report’ (n. 793), 7. 
877 Ibid. 
878 Public auditing reports may be found on this webpage: <https://www.rainforest-
alliance.org/business/solutions/certification/agriculture/certificate-search-public-summaries/> 
(accessed on 13 October 2019) 
879 Rift Valley Tea ‘Sustainability Report’ (n. 793), 2.  
880 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.27.  
881 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.9.  
P a g e  | 160 
 
 
In conclusion, MTC’s commitments stem mainly from product-level mechanisms, and 
the firm’s implementation of these standards is mostly based on certification labels’ 
requirements. The company does not publish as much information about its processes 
as Unilever does and, as far as I can gather from the information which the firm has 
made public, not as many key features identified by scholars are implemented in the 
context of MTC’s activities as was the case in Unilever’s Tanzanian tea operations. 
However, MTC does make a certain number of claims about its human rights 
performance and it is necessary to verify them on the ground. Accordingly, I will study 
in Chapter 6 all individual standards made by MTC across the two types of 
mechanisms which the firm uses, look into their implementation on the ground, and 
test out the (relevant) features identified as important by authors in Chapter 3.  
 
4.1.3.2.3.3. Chai Bora  
Chai Bora is the only company which has not made any commitment to do business in 
a sustainable manner and has not adopted any self-regulatory mechanism to that effect. 
It is interesting to note that the company’s website882 is up-to-date and includes 
extensive information about their products – and even recipes –, but that it does not 
say anything about the human rights impact of their operations.  
The investigation into the human rights performance of this company in Chapter 7 
allows for the analysis of the performance of a company which has not adopted any 
self-regulatory mechanism and therefore helps to strengthen my conclusions about the 
impact of voluntary self-regulation when they are made by the other companies. 
 
4.1.3.2.4. Expectations as to the firms’ human rights 
performance 
Informed by the main scholars’ hypotheses as outlined in Chapter 3, this preliminary 
assessment of the three companies anticipates that the situation in the plantations and 
factories will greatly differ from one corporation to the other.  
 
882 The company’s website is accessible at this address: <http://chaibora.com/> (accessed on 21 October 
2019) 
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Because of its standards, embedding processes, internal and external monitoring and 
reporting, complaints mechanisms, and sanctions, I could expect Unilever to take more 
steps to prevent human rights violations, and therefore have a better human rights 
performance. To the contrary, the absence of all these features in Chai Bora’s 
operations leads me to expect that the company does not see the human rights impact 
of its activities as a priority.  
Somewhere in between sits MTC, whose commitments, embedding processes, internal 
and external monitoring and reporting processes, complaints mechanism, and 
sanctions leads me to expect the company to be aware of the impact that its activities 
may have on stakeholders and make efforts to mitigate human rights risks – and in 
particular risks that may affect its certified product(s). Moreover, MTC is relying 
heavily on product-level mechanisms and has adopted more of this type of mechanism 
than Unilever – it therefore allows me to compare and contrast the effects which 
company- and product-level mechanisms have on corporate human rights 
performance.  
In conclusion, these three companies, operating in the same area and industry, have 
very distinct levels of commitments, but also of implementation processes. If corporate 
self-regulation is effective – and if its effectiveness depends on scholars’ suggestions 
as outlined in Chapter 3 –, it is therefore expected that different levels of human rights 
performance would follow and that substantial differences in the impact of each firm’s 
activity on human rights would materialise, with Unilever on the ‘best’ end of the 
spectrum and Chai Bora on the ‘worst’ end. As the empirical research is based on 
linked case studies, my overall aim was not to directly compare and contrast corporate 
performance in each case. Rather it was to have a rich and diverse range of mechanisms 
and standards adopted by the three companies which, as a result, strengthens my ability 
to draw conclusions about why and how self-regulation might be having effects, and 
what other factors might also be important to the human rights performance of the 
studied corporations. However, it is acknowledged that further research will be needed 
to reach more general conclusions, especially in other industries and regions.    
Now that I have set the context for my case study and given an overview of its subjects, 
I will outline how I designed the data collection and interpreted my findings.  
 
4.2. Data collection design  
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Once the object of my case study was selected, I determined that organising two trips 
to collect the data was most appropriate. The first trip would scope out the corporations 
and my access to the relevant stakeholders, after which I would analyse the collected 
data and identify the most important issues to be pressed further during the second trip. 
The second trip would then investigate these issues in more detail, involving both new 
and old interviewees.  
I determined that two months in the field was sufficient to thoroughly collect my data; 
three weeks for the first trip, and five weeks for the second trip. This gave me enough 
time to interview relevant stakeholders in Mufindi: managers of Unilever, MTC, and 
Chai Bora, workers and trade union representatives for each of the companies, 
community members (including staff members of public and company schools and of 
public and company health centres) and local government representatives (including 
local government leaders and council chairmen), as well as civil society 
representatives from, among others, the following organisations: Legal Rights 
Enlightenment Organisation, Youth Development and Empowerment, Tanzania 
Health and Social Welfare Foundation, Afya Women Group, and Mufindi 
Outgrowers’ Organisation.  It was necessary to spend some time in Dar es Salaam in 
addition to Mufindi, to interview stakeholders and paint a picture of the situation at 
national level. In Dar es Salaam, I therefore met with civil society representatives from 
the following organisations: CHRAGG, the Tanzania Human Rights Defenders 
Coalition, LHRC, the Tanganyika Law Society [TLS], the Tanzania Women Lawyers 
Association [TAWLA], ILO Regional Office, and academics from the Dar es Salaam 
University. 
High season for tea is from November until April, so I decided to organise the first trip 
so that I would arrive in Mufindi late October until early November, and the second 
trip so that I would be in the tea plantations from late March until mid-April. The first 
trip therefore took place in October-November 2017, and the second trip in March-
April 2018. Overall, I spent my time as follows:  
• In Dar es Salaam: 8 days (scoping trip); 12 days (second trip); 
• In Mufindi: 
o In Mafinga: 6 days (scoping trip) + 9 days (second trip); 
o In tea plantations: 4 days (scoping trip, including 1 day in Kibao; 1 day 
in Lugoda; and 2 days in Itona) + 10 days (second trip, including 2 days 
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in Sawala; 1 day in Mtwango; 2 days in Kibao, 1 day in Lugoda; 3 days 
in Itona; and 1 day in Mtili); 
• 8 days travelling (2 days travelling between the UK and Tanzania for each trip; 
2 days travelling between Dar es Salaam and Mafinga for each trip). 
 
As illustrations, I include the following maps:  
- Map of Tanzania (including localisation of Mafinga (Mufindi region)); 
- Aerial view of Unilever, MTC, and Chai Bora’s sites in Mufindi; 
- Aerial view of Unilever’s plantations and factory; 
- Aerial view of MTC’s plantations and factory; 
- Aerial view of Mafinga, with Chai Bora’s factory in the city centre. 
 
 
Picture 1 – Map of Tanzania  
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 (Source: Tanzania Orphan’s Upendo Community, accessible here: 
<http://www.touco.org/about/upendo-family-centers/> (accessed 21 October 2019))  
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Picture 2 – Aerial view of Unilever, MTC, and Chai Bora’s sites (Mufindi) 
 
(source: Google Earth) 
Picture 3 – Unilever’s tea plantations and factory 
 
(Source: Google Earth)  
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Picture 4 – MTC’s tea plantations and factory 
 
(Source: Google Earth) 
Picture 5 – Mafinga 
 
(Source: Google Earth) 
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The collection of data was carried out via interviews, observation, and document 
review, as follows.  
 
4.2.1. Interviews 
As it is acknowledged that collecting reliable data in an environment where 
perpetrators are likely to hide abuses is challenging883, interviewing a wide range of 
stakeholders first-hand was the best method to find out accurate information. I 
therefore identified six main groups of stakeholders who were likely to be most 
familiar with the situation on the ground884, as well as (if relevant) with the impact of 
self-regulatory mechanisms on working and living conditions in and around firms: 
workers, trade union representatives, corporate managers, community members, local 
government representatives, and civil society representatives. It was important to 
interview workers to collect first-hand testimony about working conditions in each of 
the company as well as awareness of corporate standards (if relevant) and of their 
implementation885. Moreover, speaking with trade union representatives allowed for 
the understanding of the relationship between company and union, the process of 
collective bargaining and the general protection of workers and union rights – as 
assessed against each firm’s standards. It was equally important to interview managers 
to understand how corporate standards are communicated from head office to the 
ground, the impact that they have on everyday business operations, as well as another 
perspective (in addition to the workers’) on working conditions and the firms’ human 
rights efforts. Moreover, community members had valuable insight about the impact 
of the relevant firm on living conditions around the plantations and/or factories. It was 
also important to interview local government representatives to understand the 
company’s engagement with the local community and potential broader human rights 
issues resulting from their activities, always as assessed against their standards (if 
 
883 Harrison and Sekalala (n. 10), 927.  
884 Andrew Pettigrew, ‘Longitudinal field research on change: Theory and practice’, Organization 
Science 1(3), 1990, 267, 277. 
885 Christine Benedichte Meyer, ‘A case in case study methodology’, Field methods 13(4), 2001, 329, 
337.  
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relevant). Finally, civil society representatives had insight about specific issues which 
may be relevant to corporate activities in the area.   
Within each group, I started with individuals who were likely to be most informed, 
and then used the “snowballing” technique886 to interview as many individuals in these 
six categories as possible. I also made sure that workers whom I interviewed had 
different roles within the company, so as to have a thorough understanding of how the 
company functions across all its operations. Finally, interviewees were balanced along 
gender lines.    
Overall, I interviewed 161 individuals, of which: 
• 53 workers887; 
• 9 managers (from all 3 companies); 
• 7 local government representatives; 
• 3 trade union representatives (from TUICO, TPAWU, and TUCTA888); 
• 13 civil society organisations representatives (national and local level); 
• 76 community members (including doctors and teachers). 
 
All qualitative research interviews seek to uncover information on both a factual and 
a meaning level, investigating the signification of central themes in the life world of 
the subject889. Interviews can be structured, semi-structured, or unstructured. I chose 
to conduct semi-structured interviews, which meant that the questions were 
predetermined, but their order could be modified based upon the interviewer’s 
perception of what seemed most appropriate890. Moreover, the wording of the 
questions could be changed and explanations given, inappropriate questions for a 
particular interviewee could be omitted, and additional ones included.891 This type of 
 
886 The snowballing technique “identifies cases of interest from people who know people who know 
what cases are information-rich” (Matthew Miles and Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: 
An Expanded Sourcebook, Sage, 1994, 28). 
887 10 workers for Chai Bora; 22 workers for Unilever; and 22 workers for MTC. It was difficult to 
interview Chai Bora workers as most of them were too scared of potential consequences if they agreed 
to be interviewed.  
888 TUCTA is the only Tanzanian trade union federation.  
889 Steinar Kvale, Doing Interviews, Sage, 2008, 12.  
890 Edwin van Teijlingen, ‘Semi-structured interviews’, Bournemouth University Graduate School, 
2014, 17. 
891 Ibid.  
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interview is a conversation with a purpose892, allowing researchers to focus on the 
same themes and issues throughout the study while giving interviewees the possibility 
to raise any issues which they think are important893, and to express themselves most 
comfortably.  
The objective of my interview schedules was first to determine whether behaviour of 
the corporations was in line with human rights and (if relevant) with their 
commitments. Secondly, and where relevant, whether there was evidence that self-
regulatory mechanisms had had an impact on firms’ compliance. Third, whether the 
key features identified in Chapter 3 played a role in corporate human rights 
performance and (if relevant) in corporate compliance with their self-regulatory 
commitments. It follows that I designed the set of questions by first focusing on 
internationally recognised human rights as included in the main human rights 
instruments (i.e. International Bill of Human Rights) as well as ILO conventions to 
which companies have committed, with the aim of determining whether corporate 
activities were respectful of these rights. I also made sure that important issues 
included in the LHRC reports (mainly see Section 4.1.2.3., in this chapter) were 
covered. Once this was done, I included any other standard covered by relevant self-
regulatory mechanisms as to ensure that corporate performance would be 
comprehensively assessed against all applicable standards. Moreover, I consistently 
asked interviewees for each issue whether they knew whether (where relevant) self-
regulatory mechanisms had had an impact on the way which the firm approached the 
issue in question. This aimed to uncover the influence which mechanisms had on 
corporate behaviour. However, it is acknowledged that causality may be hard to pin 
down and that interviewees’ ignorance does not necessarily mean that there has been 
no influence. If interviewees were not aware of any impact, I simply interpreted it as 
the absence of positive evidence of impact. Finally, it is important to note that each 
interview was informed by the previous one, i.e. by the information and patterns 
discovered within earlier interviews, as is recommended in the literature on semi-
structured interviews894 and as illustrated below.  
  
 
892 Ibid.  
893 Kvale (n. 889), 12. 
894 Van Teijlingen (n. 890), 17.  
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Figure 3 – Semi-structured interview cycle 
 
(Source: Edwin van Teijlingen, ‘Semi-structured interviews’, Bournemouth University 
Graduate School, 2014, 11) 
 
I include at the end of this thesis895 the sets of questions which were specifically 
designed for workers, community members, and managers. I also include the schedule 
of the questions which were prepared for the interview with the civil society 
representative working at the ILO office in Dar es Salaam as an example of the bespoke 
questions prepared for civil society representatives based on their respective area of 
expertise896 897. For these experts, I mainly focused on the topics about which they 
would be most informed (e.g. health, education, labour rights, women’s rights) to 
benefit from their extensive knowledge as much as possible. If time allowed, I also 
covered other relevant subjects, which I selected depending on the interviewee and 
context (e.g. national, regional, or local level). For ease of reference, I used the 
following categorising system for the purpose of organising and analysing my 
interview data: ‘A’-category interviewees are civil society representatives; ‘B’-
 
895 See Annexes 5A-5C. 
896 See Annex 5D. 
897 The rest of the schedules are available upon request.  
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category interviewees are workers; ‘C’-category interviewees are community 
members; ‘D’-category interviewees are managers; ‘E’-category interviewees are 
local government representatives; and ‘F’-category interviewees are trade union 
representatives.  
I slightly changed the sets of questions between my two trips to focus on the most 
relevant issues and answer my research question as accurately as possible. One of the 
aims of the scoping trip was to paint an overall picture of the most important human 
rights issues in the area and in the selected companies, so that I could focus on these 
issues during the second, longer, trip with the view of gaining a deeper understanding 
of these issues (locally and as it fits into the national picture) as well as any relevant 
causality links with corporate commitments. In particular, I gathered from interviews 
conducted during the scoping trip that there was wide agreement on the non-
problematic nature of certain issues in the area, and that it was therefore unnecessary 
to spend time on these issues when I came back. For instance, I did not focus on land 
issues considering that the firms’ estates (and factories) have been tea plantations (and 
the companies’ property) for decades898, and that there was no report of land conflict 
during my first trip. For the same reason, I do not focus on these issues in in Chapter 
5, 6, and 7 (outlining the findings about each firm). However, this does not mean that 
the issues on which I did not concentrate are not at all relevant or important but, 
because of time and space constraints, it is necessary to home in on the most 
contentious issues. However, in an effort to ensure that this study is as rigorous as 
possible, I include a table (see Annex 6) covering all the issues which I have addressed 
in the course of both trips, including those which were deemed less important than 
others and were therefore not the focus of the second trip.  
Moreover, I focused on groups of people who were most likely to see their rights 
violated as they were the lowest-earners, i.e. general workers and community 
members. The former were identified as particularly vulnerable because they were not 
in decision-making roles and were dependent on the company for their livelihood; the 
latter because, for the most part and on the one hand, they lacked the financial ability, 
the power, or the political influence to resist if the firm’s practice infringe upon their 
rights and, on the other hand, because most of them were related to the company’s 
 
898 Interview with local government representatives E1 and E7, and community members C10, C11, 
C12, C13, C14, and C15.  
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employees, and so were also economically dependent on the firm. The most vulnerable 
stakeholders were most likely to see their human rights violated by corporate activities. 
It was therefore particularly important to assess the effect of human rights self-
regulatory mechanisms on the impact which businesses have on these stakeholders. 
However, I also include any relevant information specifically related to other 
stakeholders (e.g. employees at management level) in the table in Annex 6. Finally, 
for ease of reading, I refer to anyone in a supervisory role within the firms as a 
“manager”. 
Finally, some authors warn of the following difficulties inherent to semi-structured 
interviews: “equivalence of meaning”; “preferred social response”; non-
response/particular groups being unrepresented; invasion of privacy; unique 
characteristics of interviewee; prejudices, stereotypes, appearances and/or perceptions 
of researcher may alter response899. I will now address each of these difficulties. First, 
the issue of “equivalence of meaning” is mitigated against by using simple – layman 
– terms and concepts as far as possible, by clearly explaining anything which is more 
complex, and by allowing interviewees to ask any question which they may have. 
Second, the issue of “preferred social response” is mitigated against by asking them 
for factual answers (e.g. position within the company, pay level, terms of work). Third, 
the issue of invasion of privacy is mitigated against by ensuring that I clearly explain 
the research, its aims, and its risks for interviewees, and that interviewees are aware 
that they may freely decide whether or not they are happy to take part900. Fourth, the 
issues of non-response, or particular groups being unrepresented, of unique 
characteristics of interviewee, as well as their prejudices, stereotypes and perception 
of the researcher are mitigated against by ensuring that I interview a significant  
number of people, from a wide range of backgrounds, thereby ensuring that a broad 
range of perspectives will be represented. 
 
4.2.2. Other data collection methods  
 
899 Van Teijlingen (n. 890), 22. 
900 I include as an annex the information sheet and consent form which were given to participants to 
respectively read and sign before taking part in the study (see Annexes 4A and 4B). 
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In addition to interviews, five primary sources of evidence have been identified from 
the literature901: direct observation, documentation, archival records, participant 
observation, and physical artefacts. I only used the first two sources. First, I 
endeavoured to conduct observation of business activities by touring plantations, 
factories, as well as housing sites, hospitals, and schools, at the best time to get the 
most accurate picture of the situation902. This allowed me to understand how tea 
corporations function first-hand and to investigate the living conditions around 
plantations and factories. I kept a good record of events to provide precise and solid 
descriptions for further analysis903. Second, I reviewed some key documents, such as 
environmental studies, CBAs, work contracts, pay slips, and official letters to 
companies. This multiplicity of sources has helped ensure accuracy and reliable 
results904.  
 
4.3. Interpretation of findings  
This section will cover how I interpret findings: first, the practical method used to 
organise the data; second, the method used to assess firms’ compliance with their self-
regulatory mechanisms; third, the transparency efforts made throughout this process; 
fourth, how I will deal with the issue of causality; and finally, the linear-analytic 
structure used in this thesis.  
First, after transcribing all the individual interviews, I compiled all the interviews 
relevant to the same company together, sorted into thematic categories (e.g. pay, 
working time, corporate contribution to community’s health needs). This allowed me 
to analyse the data for each issue across all relevant interviews and assess the situation 
(and the impact of relevant self-regulatory mechanisms, where relevant) in each firm.  
Second, in order to assess firms’ compliance with their self-regulatory mechanisms (in 
Chapter 5-7), I take ‘operational standards’ into account to the extent possible. Indeed, 
as seen earlier in this chapter, firms have adopted mechanisms which include both 
high-level human rights principles and standards aiming to implement these high-level 
principles on the ground. The latter were therefore designed to guide managers and 
 
901 Yin (n. 169). 
902 Robert E. Stake, The Art of Case Study Research, Sage, 1995, 63. 
903 Ibid, 62.  
904 Yin (n. 169). 
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workers towards compliant behaviour, and it was possible to directly evaluate whether 
these concrete standards are followed on the ground. This is what I do in the following 
chapters. However, there were gaps in the translation of some high-level principles 
into ground-level standards. Where this is the case, I refer to the relevant high-level 
instrument and attempt to draw conclusions as to its implementation.  
Third, I interpreted my case study’s findings as follows: when the findings are 
straightforward and undoubtedly flow from the data, I clearly state so; however, when 
the findings are not as undisputable, I triangulated the data with observation findings 
or external documents to determine whether it is possible to reach an uncontested 
conclusion. If I was unable to do so, I clearly say so as I present my evidence, and let 
the reader make up their mind905. This data triangulation, drawing from multiple 
sources of evidence and relying on a broad range of stakeholders and perspectives, 
helped mitigate against potential interviewee bias, and ensure reliable results906. I 
endeavour to be as transparent as possible throughout the writing up of the findings of 
my research.  
Fourth, as explained above, it is acknowledged that causality (between self-regulatory 
mechanisms and corporate practices) may be hard to pin down and that the fact that 
interviewees did not know about any impact of mechanisms did not necessarily mean 
that there was no impact. It follows that, in that case, I simply interpreted it as the 
absence of positive evidence of impact.  
Finally, a linear-analytic structure907 is used in this thesis to present and analyse the 
findings of my case study and answer the research questions: in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, 
I outlined the problem under scrutiny, reviewed the relevant literature, and set up my 
theoretical framework, and then proceeded in Chapter 4 to cover the case-study 
methodology and specific methods used. I now analyse in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 the data 
collected, and finally I present in Chapter 8 my conclusions and their implications for 




905 Stake (n. 902), 62.  
906 Yin (n. 169). 
907 Yin (n. 169). 
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This chapter opened with general background information first about the tea industry, 
including common human rights issues encountered in the sector, and second about 
Tanzania’s social and labour context, including business and human rights problems 
frequently reported at national level.  I then investigated the Tanzanian tea industry, 
first at national level and then specifically in the Mufindi region. This allowed me to 
understand the broader context of the industry both nationally and locally, and 
therefore to determine that the tea business in Mufindi was a good environment for my 
case study: on the one hand, a number of human rights issues are ordinarily recorded 
in the tea industry and, on the other hand, gaps in state protection are commonly 
reported in Tanzania and more specifically in Mufindi, reportedly allowing 
corporations to regularly commit human rights violations in the region. The tea 
industry in Mufindi was therefore a good setting to test out the effects of corporate 
self-regulation and whether it could help improve firms’ human rights performance. 
Once this was established, I reviewed three corporations operating in the Mufindi and 
explained why they were good candidates for this case study, including because of the 
differences in the self-regulatory mechanisms which they used, in the standards which 
they have adopted as well as in the implementation processes which they have set up. 
Informed by the key features from Chapter 3, I have three different levels of 
expectation as to the three firms’ human rights performance, which I tested out on the 
ground following the data collection design outlined in the last part of this chapter. 
Finally, I reviewed how I interpreted my findings.  
In conclusion, this chapter laid out the broader context of my case study, reviewed the 
characteristics of each company, and outlined the design of my data collection. I am 
now familiar with the environment in which companies have to operate (and of the 
most important risks associated with their industry and location), of the self-regulatory 
mechanisms used by each company (if at all), and of the processes which they have in 
theory put in place to ensure that their adopted standards would translate into concrete 
action on the ground. It is now important to review the human rights performance of 
each corporation in practice and study the impact of self-regulation on firms’ actual 
behaviour. In the next three chapters I therefore present and analyse the data collected 
for each company on the ground, thereby investigating whether Unilever’s and MTC’s 
mechanisms help them implement their respective standards and whether Chai Bora’s 
activities are respectful of human rights.  This helps me draw conclusions as to the 
effects which corporate self-regulation may have in the context of this case study and 
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the extent to which mechanisms may help tea firms in Tanzania respect human rights 
in practice – and why.  
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As outlined in Chapter 4, Unilever has made an extensive range of human rights 
commitments, using different types of self-regulatory mechanisms. The most 
comprehensive instrument which the firm has adopted is the UNGPs. As explained in 
Sections 1.2.3. and 2.2.1.2.1., the Guiding Principles were endorsed in 2011 by the UN 
Human Rights Council and build upon the ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ Framework 
adopted three years earlier. The UNGPs are currently the most authoritative instrument 
on corporate human rights responsibilities. By committing to the UNGPs, Unilever 
therefore generally acknowledges its responsibility to respect human rights. The 
UNGPs also require corporations to adopt, among others, a policy commitment to meet 
that responsibility, which Unilever has done with its Human Rights Policy. This policy 
also includes commitments to the International Bill of Human Rights and ILO 
conventions. All of these instruments cover high-level principles, such as the right to 
safe working conditions, or the right to family life. In order to operationalise these 
principles, the firm has also developed policies with concrete standards directly 
applicable on the ground. To that end, Unilever has adopted several instruments, of 
which the most important is its Code of Business Principles which contains concrete 
standards guiding the behaviour of workers and suppliers. The firm has also developed 
more specific policies: the firm’s Responsible Business Partner Policy focuses on the 
prescribed behaviour of Unilever’s suppliers, its Sustainable Agriculture Code was 
designed specifically for the company’s agricultural activities, and its Framework for 
Fair Compensation helps the firm define and assess how elements of its compensation 
packages deliver “open, fair, consistent and explainable” compensation to employees. 
Furthermore, ‘Fairness in the Workplace’ and ‘Opportunities for Women’ are 
strategies to ensure that, respectively, Unilever’s employees and suppliers are treated 
(and compensated) fairly, and that women are empowered and offered economic 
opportunities across the firm’s operations. Moreover, Unilever has committed to 
following the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which also help 
implement human rights on the ground. Finally, Unilever has had its Tanzanian tea 
plantations and factories certified with the Rainforest Alliance, whose standards are 
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directly applicable and may help the firm operationalise the high-level principles to 
which it has committed. It is important to note that the Rainforest Alliance adopted 
new standards in July 2017, which I will take into account to assess Unilever’s 
performance where relevant908. In addition to the discussion in Section 4.1.3.2.3.1., 
please see Annex 3 for more details about the human rights standards to which 
Unilever has committed. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section will review the human 
rights performance of Unilever’s Tanzanian tea operations as assessed against the 
firm’s own human rights commitments, first focusing on human rights relevant to 
workers and second on those relevant to community members. The second section of 
this chapter will investigate whether Unilever implements in its Tanzanian tea 
operations the key features which have been identified by scholars as helping corporate 
self-regulation be effective, with the aim to evaluate the extent to which the features 
are important in determining the effectiveness of self-regulatory mechanisms.  
The company’s human rights performance will now be assessed. For each section, I 
will do so by outlining the situation on the ground before laying out Unilever’s relevant 
commitments and specific standards and explaining whether the firm’s practice is 
consistent with its standards and, if relevant, whether evidence was found to link 
practice to commitment(s).   
 
 
908 The standards are divided into four different gradual categories: ‘Critical Criteria’, which the firm 
must meet in order to be (and remain) certified, and three gradual ‘Continuous Improvement Criteria C, 
B, and A’, building on the Critical Criteria and respectively entering into force at the time of 
certification, three years, and six years after the firm first got certified. The certification label has 
published rules saying that 2017 standards are binding on all certified firms from the 1st of July 2017 
(Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, 6), although they must comply with only 
critical criteria when they get audited for the first time after that date (Rainforest Alliance, ‘Transition 
Rules for Farms and Group Administrators from the 2010/11 Standards to the 2017 Sustainable 
Agriculture Standard’, 2017, 3). When the case study took place, Unilever therefore only had to comply 
with the critical criteria and 50% of continuous improvement criteria (category C) from the 2017 set of 
standards. However, the company has been certified since 2004; until 2017 the firm therefore had to 
implement the previous Rainforest Alliance set of standards, which was last revised in 2010. Moreover, 
a significant number of new standards (from 2017) are similar to the old standards (from 2010). 
Consequently, I will assess Unilever’s performance against the 2017 Critical Criteria but will take the 
2010 set of standards into account for the purpose of assessing the firm’s performance regarding the 
continuous improvement criteria which were already standards in force since 2010. I will also take the 
2017 continuous improvement criteria into account to the extent that firms must prepare for the 
implementation of those criteria which will become applicable in the future. For ease of reading, I will 
refer to both sets of standards as ‘Rainforest Alliance standards’, unless it is important to make a 
distinction between the old and new standards.  
P a g e  | 179 
 
5.2. Worker-related rights 
 This section assesses the extent to which the right to just, equitable, and safe working 
conditions of Unilever’s workers is respected, and will therefore cover the following 
issues: child labour, contractual terms offered to workers, health and safety, freedom 
of association and collective bargaining, the working conditions specific to seasonal 
workers, and finally discrimination issues. 
 
5.2.1. Child labour 
As mentioned in Section 4.1.1.2., child labour is a big issue in agriculture, including 
in tea production. This is also the case in the Mufindi region909, but there does not seem 
to be any child labour issues in Unilever plantations910, consistently with its various 
commitments. Considering the availability of the workforce, it may not be difficult for 
Unilever to steer clear from child labour, although having a clear policy on it sends the 
message to managers who are in charge of interviewing tea pluckers911 that the 
company will not consider applications from underage workers: a manager from the 
company’s Tanzanian operations stated that they had a policy prohibiting the 
recruitment of workers under 18 years old and that they would always implement it, 
although they did not specify to which policy they were referring912. The company 
committed to not using child labour in its human rights policy913 and its Sourcing 
Policy914. In its Sustainable Agriculture Code915 and its Code of Business Principles916, 
the firm specifically commits to refraining from employing individuals under the age 
of 15 or under the local legal minimum working age or mandatory schooling age 
(whichever is higher) – in the case of Tanzania, it is 15 years old917. The Rainforest 
Alliance prohibits the worst forms of child labour918 as well, which follows the 
guidelines outlined in ILO Convention C182, to which Unilever has also committed. 
 
909 Interview with civil society representatives A11 and A12.   
910 Interviews with worker B2, and community members C23, C24, C25, C26, C27, C28, C29, and C30.  
911 Interview with manager D8. 
912 Interview with manager D9.  
913 Unilever ‘Human Rights Policy’ (n. 144), 2.  
914 Unilever ‘Responsible Sourcing Policy’ (n. 826), Standards 5.1.-5.6. 
915 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F172.  
916 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 24. 
917 Caroline Dennis and Katie Stahley, ‘Universal Primary Education in Tanzania: The Role of School 
Expenses and Opportunity Costs’, Evans School Review 2(1), 2012, 1. 
918 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.6.  
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Moreover, the Rainforest Alliance prohibits any type of work for children under the 
age of 15 years old919, going further than Tanzanian legislation, which sets the 
minimum age for light work at 14 years old920 consistently with ILO Convention C138, 
to which Unilever has committed as well. The Rainforest Alliance allows work for 
minors aged 15-18 years old only under certain conditions – such as outside legally 
compulsory school hours921 – and requires that records with specific information be 
kept by the company922, as ILO Convention C138 requires. These conditions are 
generally aligned with legal requirements in Tanzania, except for working time923. The 
ICESCR (and the Committee’s General Comment of the Covenant) also protects 
children from economic exploitation, to enable them to pursue their full development 
and acquire technical and vocational education924. Finally, the OECD Guidelines says 
that enterprises should “[c]ontribute to the effective abolition of child labour, and take 
immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the 
worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency”925. In conclusion, Unilever seems 
to consistently implement its commitments to not employ children, although it is 
unclear which instrument is specifically used by the company to train its recruiters 
about this general policy. 
  
5.2.2. Contractual terms  
This subsection covers all contractual terms offered to Unilever’s permanent and 
seasonal workers: presence of contracts, pay, working time, and leaves.  
 
 
919 Except for “tasks that are traditional for children in the location and are undertaken for the purpose 
of encouraging the family’s or local culture” (Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, 
Critical criterion 4.6.(b)).  
920 Law of the Child Act (No. 21 of 2009) (Cap. 13), 2009, Article 77(2).  
921 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.6.(c). 
922 Ibid, Critical criterion 4.7. 
923 The Rainforest Alliance (critical criterion 4.6.(d)) requires that young workers work no more than 
eight hours a day, whereas national legislation (Law of the Child Act, Article 78(3)(b)) sets the 
maximum at six daily hours. Conversely, the Rainforest Alliance (critical criterion 4.6.(e)) requires that 
young workers rest overnight for at least twelve consecutive hours in between shifts, and one full day 
for every six consecutive days worked, whereas national legislation (Law of the Child Act, Article 
79(1)) only prohibits night work.  
924 ICESCR, Article 10 and General Comment 18, Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, 2006, 7-6. 
925 OECD Guidelines, Guideline V.1.c.  
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5.2.2.1. Contracts 
Unilever offers contracts to all its permanent and seasonal employees, and in that 
regard the firm performs better than other companies operating in Mufindi, as will be 
explained below. However, the company’s practice may clash with some of its 
commitments to its own Code of Business Principles, the ICESCR, and the Rainforest 
Alliance.  
On the one hand, Unilever has improved its practice and systematically offers contracts 
to its employees.  Indeed, it used to be common practice for Unilever’s seasonal 
workers to work without a contract926, as is still the case in other firms in Mufindi 
nowadays927, but the situation for Unilever seasonal workers has changed and they are 
now systematically given contracts, usually for a duration of nine months, which may 
only be renewed once every twelve months928. Permanent workers also have contracts, 
and it was indeed the case for all employees whom I interviewed. Management also 
confirmed that they request all employees to sign a contract before starting work929. 
This positive change is consistent with the Rainforest Alliance standards requiring that 
workers have a written or oral labour agreement930, informing them of “all terms of 
work”, covering labour policies, procedures, rules and conditions as, where relevant, 
is stated in their CBA. This change also helps uphold the ICESCR’s guarantee of just 
and favourable conditions of work931. However, there is no evidence that the adoption 
of the Rainforest Alliance standards or Unilever’s commitment to the ICESCR were 
responsible for Unilever’s change in practice. 
Unilever has also improved its practice by systematically translating all its contracts 
into Swahili. A worker (who does not speak English) said that their contract was only 
in English when they signed it a few years ago932, but the rest of the employees, most 
 
926 Interviews with workers B17 and B18.  
927 Interviews with civil society representatives A8 and A10; it is frequent for workers in Mufindi to 
work without a contract and, since the law prohibits seasonal workers from doing permanent work, it is 
usual for companies to demand that workers change their names regularly.  
928 This means that, if a worker wants to renew their nine-month contract, they must wait three months 
before being able to do so; interview with manager D9. 
929 Interview with manager D1.  
930 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.22, 
which states that management must “inform all workers offered employment in their native language 
about all terms of work, covering labor policies, procedures, rules and conditions either as stated in a 
collective bargaining agreement (where implemented) or as contained in the employer’s proposed labor 
agreement.”  
931 ICESCR, Article 7. 
932 Interview with worker B29.  
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of whom have worked for Unilever for a shorter time, confirmed that their own 
contracts were all in Swahili. This is an improvement which follows the Rainforest 
Alliance’s requirement that contracts be in the workers’ native language933, and the 
Code of Business Principles requiring that the firm ensure that “all employees’ work 
is conducted on the basis of freely agreed and documented terms of employment, 
clearly understood by […] relevant employees and others working for Unilever”934. 
Nevertheless, I was unable to find any evidence of influence of the Rainforest 
Alliance’s or the Code of Business Principles over the company’s change of policy.  
On the other hand, it is alleged that some workers were not given enough time to read 
the terms before signing their contract935, which may conflict with the Code of 
Business Principles’ above-mentioned requirement that all employees must 
understand their terms of employment. Another issue is the fact that workers are not 
provided with copies of their contracts, which a manager justified by saying that there 
were too many workers936. Not offering copies of their contracts to workers means that 
employees may not check the terms of their employment if necessary. It compromises 
the “just and favourable conditions of work” to which Unilever has committed and 
may be in conflict with the Rainforest Alliance standard mentioned above. It may also 
be at odds with the Code of Business principles’ requirement that “terms of 
employment [be] made available to relevant employees and others working for 
Unilever”937, with the company’s Sustainable Agriculture Code and Responsible 
Sourcing Policy that “all workers, both permanent and casual, [be] provided with 
employment documents that are freely agreed and which respect their legal rights”938.  
In conclusion, some important improvements have been made to Unilever’s contract 
practice, thereby fulfilling most of the firm’s relevant commitments, although some 
aspects of the firm’s practice are still problematic. However, I have found no positive 
evidence that improvements and current practice were linked to the adoption of 
standards.  
 
933 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.22.  
934 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 23. 
935 Interview with worker B34, who said that it was generally done this way.  
936 Interview with manager D8.  
937 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 23. 
938 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F168; and Unilever ‘Responsible 
Sourcing Policy’ (n. 826), Standard 2. 




As the issue of pay is complex, I will divide this section into three parts: first, I will 
outline the situation on the ground; second, I will quickly review relevant Unilever’s 
commitments; I will then draw a conclusion as to the level of implementation of the 
company’s commitments in practice. For ease of reading, I will include specific 
considerations about overtime at the very end of this section.  
First, levels of pay, not counting overtime, differ depending on the categories of 
workers. General workers939, be they permanent or seasonal employees, are on average 
paid Tsh 154.000940 monthly, up from Tsh 145.000 from the previous year941. It is 
important to underline that tea pickers are paid by the kilo, and that the minimum 
amount mentioned above will be paid to workers who will have picked the average 
amount of tea set for that specific month942. The average amount of tea expected to be 
picked is adjusted regularly via negotiations between trade union representatives and 
the company943. At the time of the interview, the daily average was 48 kilos; if workers 
pick more than that, they will be entitled to a bonus944 945, up to a maximum of twice 
the average daily amount as the firm does not reportedly want to give up quality for 
quantity946. This is true for all tea picked: if the quality of the tea is considered below 
expectations, workers will not get paid947. General workers with good attendance will 
also receive an attendance bonus948. The bonus system is available to managers too if 
they reach their targets, and to factory workers for quality work949.  
Second, Unilever has made a significant number of commitments about their 
employees’ salaries. Similarly to the firm’s Sustainable Agriculture Code950 and 
 
939 This includes plantation and factory workers.  
940 Interview with manager D1.  
941 Interview with manager D1. 
942 Interview with manager D1.  
943 Interview with manager D1. 
944 The bonuses were set as follows: between 49 and 58 kilos, workers would receive a 10% bonus; 
between 59 and 60 kilos, they would receive a 15% bonus. 
945 Interview with manager D1. 
946 Interview with manager D1. 
947 Interview with managers D1 and D9. 
948 Interview with manager D1. 
949 Interview with manager D1. 
950 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F173.  
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Responsible Sourcing Policy951, the Code of Business Principles requires the firm to 
ensure that “all employees are provided with fair wages including a total remuneration 
package that meets or exceeds legal minimum standards or appropriate prevailing 
industry standards, and that remuneration terms established by legally binding 
collective agreements are implemented and adhered to”952. In the same vein, the 
Rainforest Alliance requires Unilever to offer employees minimum wage953, with 
complete and timely payment to workers of all of their wages due, including for 
overtime work, in the place and with the frequency specified by collectively negotiated 
agreements or worker contracts954. The Rainforest Alliance also requires salaries to be 
adjusted according to inflation955 956. Moreover, through its Rainforest Alliance 
certification957 and its own Framework for Fair Compensation958, the company 
committed not only to meeting the minimum wage requirements with no 
discrimination between men and women, but to progress towards living wage levels. 
Certified companies are expected, if a living wage benchmark is provided, to 
“document and implement a living wage plan, to progress towards payment of living 
wage”959. In absence of a living wage benchmark, management “assess current access 
of workers and their families to health care and basic education and develop and 
implement a plan for providing access to these services.”960 The Rainforest Alliance 
defined living wage as: 
“Remuneration received for a standard work week by a worker in a particular 
place sufficient to afford a decent standard of living for the worker and her or 
his family. Elements of a decent standard of living include food, water, 
housing, education, health care, transport, clothing, and provision for 
 
951 Unilever ‘Responsible Sourcing Policy’ (n. 826), Standard 6. 
952 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 24.  
953  Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.5. 
954 Ibid, Continuous improvement criterion 4.21.  
955 Ibid, Continuous improvement criterion 4.27. 
956 It is notable that Unilever did not have to comply with that requirement at the time when the fieldwork 
was conducted. 
957 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.3. 
958 This framework is underpinned by five principles: Fair and liveable compensation; Market-based 
compensation; No discrimination in compensation; Performance-focused compensation providing 
alignment to our business; Open and explainable compensation.  
959 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.29.  
960 Ibid.  
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unexpected events. Fulfilment of these eight “essential needs” together 
constitutes a decent standard of living.”961 
Interestingly, under Unilever’s own definition of “living wage”, workers’ wages 
should be high enough to cover not only essential needs but also to allow them allow 
them discretionary income which would allow them to have access to non-essential 
goods and activities962.  
Finally, the last stage of Rainforest Alliance continuous improvement criteria requires 
the implementation of the living wage plan, but not before firms have been certified 
for at least six years963. As this new set of standards came into force in 2017, Unilever 
will not be expected to comply with this obligation until 2023. However, the firm has 
committed to implementing its living wage goals before then in its internal 
mechanisms: its Framework for Fair Compensation’s target for implementation was 
2018964, and the OECD Guidelines requires pay levels to be “at least adequate to 
satisfy the basic needs of the workers and their families”965. Moreover, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights966, which guarantees the right of workers to a just and 
favourable conditions of work and to an adequate standard of living, including 
adequate housing, clothing, and food, and ILO Convention C100 covers the right to a 
fair wage. Finally, the Economic, Social, and Cultural Committee specified that the 
right to food (as outlined in the ICESCR967) had two core dimensions: first, food must 
be available “in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of 
individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture”968; 
second, food must be accessible “in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere 
with the enjoyment of other human rights”, which means that “personal or household 
financial costs associated with the acquisition of food for an adequate diet should be 
at a level such that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not 
threatened or compromised”969. It is therefore important to assess wage levels by 
 
961 Rainforest Alliance Sustainable Agriculture Standard, 2017, 44.  
962 Unilever ‘Fair compensation’ (n. 856). 
963 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.33. 
964 Unilever ‘Fair compensation’ (n. 856). 
965 OECD Guidelines, Guideline V.4.b. 
966 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 23 and 25. 
967 ICESCR, Article 11. 
968 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, 1999, §4 
969 Ibid, §8. 
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taking into account the extent to which workers can afford all other basic necessities 
(beside food). 
It is safe to say that Unilever has made a substantial amount of commitments to paying 
their workers decent salaries, including at living wage levels, both with the internal 
and external company-level mechanisms which they have adopted, and through the 
Rainforest Alliance certification label. However, it does not immediately translate into 
a decent standard of living for workers and their families on the ground, even though 
the firm says on its website that it conducts audits to ensure that workers are paid a 
living wage970. It is true that, as will be covered in Section 5.4.4.2., strikes have had 
an impact on the level of pay and bonuses, but despite these recent improvements and 
important in-kind benefits such as access to free healthcare at Unilever’s private 
hospital, free housing with free water and electricity971 (for onsite families), as will be 
covered in Section 5.3.1., even full-time workers tend to struggle to make enough 
money for themselves and their families972. Some reported having to farm973 and/or 
have a second job to be able to make a living974. As breakfast would cost on average 
Tsh2.000, lunch Tsh4.000, and dinner Tsh4.000 for two parents with two children, the 
bare minimum for a family to survive in Mufindi would be Tsh10.000 per day, solely 
for food975, and not taking into account other basic necessities. Salaries are re-
evaluated every year976, but no living wage plan has been adopted by management 
who, when asked about it, stated that in-kind benefits should be taken into account 
when evaluating pay levels. However, a worker – who is therefore a recipient of these 
benefits – still identified the issue of low salaries as “the priority”977, and low wages 
are generally acknowledged as a problem in the Mufindi region978. In conclusion, 
Unilever does not entirely meet its commitments in terms of pay levels and of working 
towards offering a living wage. Yet, it is acknowledged that, consistently with their 
commitments, the firm does offer its workers higher wages than the minimum amount 
 
970 Unilever ‘Fair compensation’ (n. 856). 
971 Although there is no running water and electricity is not available in all houses, as will be covered 
in Section 5.3.1. 
972 Interview with workers B2, B7, B20, B21, and B35.   
973 Interview with worker B7 and community member C27.  
974 Interview with worker B24.  
975 Interviews with community members C12 and C15.   
976 Worker B2 for instance stated that the average monthly pay in 2009 was Tsh3.000.  
977 Interview with worker B2.  
978 Interviews with civil society representatives A11 and A12.  
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set by the government – Tsh100.000979 – and important in-kind benefits. However, 
most of these measures came out of the collective bargaining process, and I have not 
been able to link them to Unilever’s self-regulatory mechanisms980.  
Finally, overtime, which is 1.5 times regular pay981, as is required in the CBA982, is 
reserved in the plantations for workers who wait for trucks at the end of the day983 – 
which only men are allowed to do. Overtime is available984 for factory workers during 
high season, although there were reports of overtime payments not paid at the correct 
rate in a few months985. Unless the latter is true, Unilever’s practice seems to be in line 
with the Rainforest Alliance requirement that the payment of overtime be set at 1.5 
times the regular wage level in the absence of applicable law or collectively negotiated 
agreement986. However, I have found no evidence that the firm’s practice has been 
influenced by certification standards.  
 
5.2.2.3. Working time 
Employees all have different schedules. During low season, tea pickers work from 7am 
until 2pm, six days a week987. During high season, workers work until 5pm988. No 
overtime is available989 except for some male workers who must stay onsite and wait 
for trucks to pick up tea leaves at the end of the workday990, which may take up to four 
hours991. Tea pickers are given one-hour lunch breaks992. This means that, during high 
season, some plantation workers (those who wait for the trucks) work for longer than 
 
979 Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania (n. 583). 
980 However, it is notable that strong collective bargaining processes is a standard which is included in 
most of Unilever’s mechanisms. 
981 Interview with manager D1.  
982 TAT-TPAWU, ‘Collective Bargaining Agreement’ (hereinafter ‘TAT-TPAWU CBA’), 2016, 19.  
983 Interviews with manager D1 and worker B34.   
984 Interviews with worker B49.  
985 Interviews with worker B28. 
986 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.11. 
987 Interviews with workers B7, B17, B18, B19, and B22. 
988 Interviews with managers D1 and D9 and workers B7, B20, B21, B24, B26, B28, B31, and B34.  
989 Interviews with manager D1, and workers B17, B18, and B19. 
990 Interviews with manager D1, and workers B17, B18, B19, B20, B21, B24, B26, and B28.  
991 Interview with manager D1. 
992 Interviews with managers D1 and D9 and workers B7, and B32.  
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what is allowed by law993, or by Rainforest Alliance standards994. As Unilever’s Code 
of Business Principles995 and Sustainable Agriculture Code996 prohibits employees 
from working more than the regular and overtime hours allowed by the laws of the 
country where they are employed, Unilever’s practice appears to also be in conflict 
with its own codes.   
Plantation managers work six days a week from 7am until 6pm, with a lunch break997. 
However, they may be asked to work longer hours as they also have to wait for trucks 
picking up tea leaves, which sometimes do not come until 10pm998 during raining 
season999. This means that plantation managers work 60 regular hours a week and may 
work up to 84 hours a week if they must wait for trucks for four additional hours every 
day, which is significantly above the limit fixed by national law and by the Rainforest 
Alliance. Unilever and companies in the area must redo the dirt roads twice a year as 
they deteriorate quickly1000. When roads are in a bad state, tea trucks take longer to 
reach all estates, which means that workers and managers must wait longer hours for 
trucks to come and pick up tea leaves1001.  
Security workers have 12-hour shifts, which include overtime, seven days a week1002. 
This means that security staff work over 80 hours per week, clashing with the 
Rainforest Alliance, Unilever’s Code of Business Principles, and national legislation.  
The factory is open 24 hours. Work schedules were changed because of Rainforest 
Alliance’s working time requirements1003, and there are now three 8-hour daily shifts 
instead of two 12-hour daily shifts. Factory workers work six days a week, and may 
work overtime during high season1004, for up to four daily hours1005, which contravenes 
 
993 As mentioned in Chapter 4, national legislation limits the regular working week to 45 hours, with 
overtime capped at 15 weekly hours.  
994 The Rainforest Alliance limits the regular working week to 48 hours (Critical criterion 4.10.) with 
no more than 12 additional hours as voluntary overtime, except under exceptional circumstances 
(Critical criterion 4.11.). 
995 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 24. 
996 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F174. 
997 Interviews with managers D8 and D9. 
998 Interviews with managers D8 and D9. 
999 Interview with manager D1. 
1000 Interview with manager D1.  
1001 Interview with manager D1.  
1002 Interview with workers B27, 29, and 32.  
1003 Interview with manager D1. 
1004 Interview with worker B49. 
1005 Interview with worker B49. 
P a g e  | 189 
 
a manager’s statement that factory workers did not have any overtime1006, and 
Unilever’s commitments which requires all overtime to remain voluntary. This issue 
is related to the current CBA, which contains a provision which makes certain overtime 
compulsory: any employee who refuses to report for work without reasonable cause 
will be considered as having breached the disciplinary code on absence1007. This goes 
against the Rainforest Alliance standards1008, Unilever’s Code of Business 
Principles1009, its Sustainable Agriculture Code1010, and its Responsible Sourcing 
Policy1011, all requiring that overtime remain voluntary.  
In conclusion, there is a gap between plantation and factory workers when it comes to 
working time arrangements. On the one hand, Unilever seems to meet its standards for 
factory employees, and there is a clear link between the practice and Rainforest 
Alliance requirements. On the other hand, the firm seems to regularly breach its 
standards in terms of working time for plantation workers, and potentially in terms of 
overtime for all workers.  
 
5.2.2.4. Leaves 
Workers are allowed to take different leaves depending on their permanent or seasonal 
status, although all workers need to have been employed for at least six months before 
they can claim any paid leave1012, as is legally allowed1013. I will review leaves 
arrangements first for permanent workers, and secondly for seasonal workers.  
Permanent workers are entitled to sick leave as long as they can produce a medical 
certificate1014, although workers did not specify whether there was a time limit to the 
sick leave which they were allowed to take. Sick leave is calculated pro rata of the 
basic monthly wage1015. This seems to be consistent with national legislation 
 
1006 Interview with manager D1. 
1007 TAT-TPAWU CBA, 18-19.  
1008 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criteria 4.10. and 4.11. 
1009 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 24.  
1010 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F174. 
1011 Unilever ‘Responsible Sourcing Policy’ (n. 826), Standard 7. 
1012 Interview with manager D1, although management may discretionally decide to offer paid sick leave 
to employees who have been with Unilever for less than six months. 
1013 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 29. 
1014 Interviews with manager D1, and workers B27, B28, and B32. 
1015 Interview with manager D1. 
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provisions1016 requiring that sick workers be paid their full wages for 63 days and half 
their wages for another 63 days, as long as they can produce a medical certificate1017. 
It also seems to be in line with the Rainforest Alliance requirement that contracts 
include a provision protecting workers from loss of pay in case of illness, disability, 
or accident1018, and with Unilever’s Sustainable Agriculture Code which requires 
workers to have access to paid leave which at least meets the minimal legal 
provisions1019.   
Permanent workers are also entitled to three months of maternity leave1020, with a lump 
sum payment in addition to their regular salary1021 (although some workers said that 
they did not receive additional payment1022). Unilever’s practice seems to be consistent 
the Rainforest Alliance standard of providing employees with a minimum of 12 weeks 
for maternity leave1023, which is the same requirements as national legislation1024. It 
follows that the practice is also consistent with the firm’s Sustainable Agriculture Code 
which, as indicated above, states that workers are entitled to a paid leave package 
which meets or exceed the legal minimum standards1025. However, one permanent 
worker said that employees must wait six months before they can get pregnant, or they 
may get terminated1026. It may be so because it is Unilever’s policy not to offer paid 
leave until workers have been employed for at least six months1027.  
 
1016 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 32(1) and (2).  
1017 A “medical certificate” is defined in the Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 32(4), as a 
“certificate issued by a registered medical practitioner or any other medical practitioner accepted by the 
employer, which acceptance may not be unreasonably withheld”. 
1018 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, 20. 
1019 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), F173.  
1020 Interviews with managers D1 and D8 and workers B2, B20, B21, B23, B25, B27, B28, and B32. 
1021 The amount of the lumpsum is unclear; one worker said that it was of Tsh 400.000 (B25), another 
that it was three times the worker’s salary (B2).  
1022 Interviews with workers B20 and B21. 
1023 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.25. 
The Rainforest Alliance Sustainable Agriculture Standard also specifies that maternity leave terms 
should be included in the workers’ contracts (Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, 
20).  
1024 Although national legislation adds another 16 days if a woman has more than one child at a time 
(Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 33(6)). 
1025 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F173. 
1026 Interview with worker B32.  
1027 Interview with manager D1, although management may discretionally decide to offer paid sick leave 
to employees who have been with Unilever for less than six months, as explained above. 
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New fathers are entitled to paternity leave1028, although accounts differ as to how many 
days are allowed1029 and whether an additional lump sum is paid1030. It is therefore 
difficult to assess whether Unilever’s practice is consistent with national legislation, 
which requires three days’ leave for new fathers1031, and therefore whether it meets the 
firm’s Sustainable Agriculture Code1032. No other self-regulatory mechanism which 
Unilever has adopted includes standards about paternity leave.  
Finally, permanent workers are entitled to 28 days of annual leave1033 1034, with a 
potential additional lump sum, although there are conflicting reports on this issue1035. 
This is consistent with national legislation1036, and therefore with Unilever’s 
Sustainable Agriculture Code1037. Moreover, the company goes further than the 
Rainforest Alliance requirement that all workers receive two weeks’ paid vacation 
every year with pro-rata for seasonal and part-time workers1038, as should be included 
in their contract1039.  
Despite the fact that Unilever seems to implement all its standards in terms of leaves 
for permanent workers, no positive evidence of a link between the firm’s mechanisms 
and its practice could be found.  
As for seasonal workers’ leaves, there have been contrasting reports. Most workers 
said that they were not allowed any sick leave1040, while one said that they were 
(although only limited to two days, with a medical certificate)1041. However, workers 
 
1028 Interviews with manager D8, and workers B2, B25, B27, B28, and B32.  
1029 A manager (D8) said that new fathers are entitled to three days of paid paternity leave, while a 
worker said that it was one month (B25), and another seven days (B2).  
1030 Only two workers said that an additional payment was made to new fathers: one worker did not 
know how much this payment was (B28), and another (B25) said that Tsh 100.000 was added to new 
fathers’ salary. 
1031 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 34(a). 
1032 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F173. 
1033 Interviews with manager D8, and workers B20, B21, B23, B25, B27, B28, B29, and B32. 
1034 Only a manager (D8) and a worker (B28) said that annual leave was for 28 consecutive days. 
1035 Two permanent workers (B25 and B28) said that they received Tsh 135.000, while security workers 
(B27 and B29) mentioned Tsh 200.000-250.000. A worker (B23) said that they did receive additional 
payment but did not specify the amount.  Finally, two other workers said that they did not receive any 
additional payment (B20 and B21). 
1036 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 31(1). 
1037 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F173. 
1038 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.23. 
This criterion was also included in the previous standard (criterion 5.6.). 
1039 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, 20. 
1040 Interviews with manager D8, and workers B7 (who said that there used to be sick pay for all workers 
but not anymore), B24, B26, B31, B32, B33, B34 and B35.  
1041 Interview with worker B49.  
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may think that seasonal employees cannot get sick leave because of the firm’s general 
policy that no paid leaves shall be available for the first six months of employment, as 
explained above. And indeed, a manager said that seasonal workers did have access to 
sick leave, but only after six months of work1042. However, the practice seems to clash 
with the above-mentioned Rainforest Alliance1043 and Sustainable Agriculture 
Code1044 requirements, and may also be inconsistent with national legislation 
provisions if seasonal workers who have worked for Unilever for at least six months 
do not have access to sick leave1045.  
Moreover, seasonal workers said that they did not have access to maternity or paternity 
leave1046, although it may be because of the same “six months” rule. This practice 
would seem to be inconsistent with the Rainforest Alliance standard of providing 
employees with a minimum of 12 weeks for maternity leave1047. As for national 
legislation about maternity and paternity leaves1048, it would seem to be legal for 
seasonal workers in the first six months of their employment, but not for the last three 
months (for those seasonal workers on a 9-month contract)1049. The situation would be 
similar regarding the Sustainable Agriculture Code, which follows the national 
legislation on this issue1050. 
Finally, seasonal workers said that they were not offered annual leave1051. The practice 
seems to contrast with the above-mentioned Rainforest Alliance requirement that that 
all workers receive two weeks’ paid vacation every year with pro-rata for seasonal 
workers1052. It also seems to clash with national legislation – which also states that 
 
1042 Interview with manager D1.  
1043 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, 20. 
1044 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F173.  
1045 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 32(1) and (2).  
1046 Interviews with manager D8, and workers B24, B26, B27, B31, B32, B33, B34, and B49. 
1047 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.25. It 
also specifies that maternity leave terms should be included in the workers’ contracts. 
1048 Although national legislation adds another 16 days if a woman has more than one child at a time 
(Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 33(6)). For paternity leave, see Article 34(a) of the 
same Act. 
1049 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 29. 
1050 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F173.  
1051 Interviews with manager D8, and workers B7, B24, B26, B27, B31, B32, B33, B34, and B49.  
1052 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.23. 
This criterion was also included in the previous standard (criterion 5.6.). 
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seasonal workers are to be offered paid annual leave calculated on a pro-rata basis1053 
–, and therefore with the Sustainable Agriculture Code1054, as explained above.   
In conclusion, Unilever does not meet its various standards regarding leaves for 
seasonal workers, mainly because of the company’s rule – albeit consistent with 
national law – that no leave is allowed for workers who have been employed for less 
than six months.    
I will now review Unilever’s health and safety practice.  
 
5.2.3. Health and safety  
This section will first provide a general assessment of Unilever’s health and safety 
practice, second its specific practice regarding medical check-ups, and finally its 
record on accidents and compensation.  
 
5.2.3.1. General considerations 
Unilever has a department dedicated to Occupational Health and Safety [OHS], with 
a specific safety manager whose role is to tour the facilities and check that all is in 
order1055. This follows national legislation1056 and is consistent with the Rainforest 
Alliance requirement that Unilever have an OHS committee in charge of implementing 
the company’s OHS policy1057 and of conducting health and safety reviews1058, and 
that management document and implement procedures for emergency scenarios, 
provide training and maintain equipment1059. It is also respectful of the provisions in 
the OECD Guidelines requiring that companies take adequate steps to ensure 
occupational health and safety in their operations1060 and of Unilever’s Code of 
Business Principles on OHS1061, implementing the ICESCR, which recognises the 
 
1053 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 31(8). 
1054 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F173.  
1055 Interview with manager D1. 
1056 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 11. 
1057 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.14. 
1058 Ibid, Continuous improvement criterion 4.34. 
1059 Ibid, Continuous improvement criterion 4.44. This criterion was also included in the previous 
standard (criterion 6.18.). 
1060 OECD Guidelines, Guideline V.4.c. and §57. 
1061 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 22.  
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right to safe and healthy working conditions1062. Specifically, the Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Committee stated that the implementation of this right required 
appropriate monitoring and enforcement measures1063. Finally, it follows the standards 
of the company’s Sustainable Agriculture Code on safe machinery, buildings, 
electrical installations, as well as mitigation measures against explosions risks as well 
as fire, dust, and noise hazards1064 1065, although it is acknowledged that I had limited 
capacity to assess the technical aspects of these measures. However, I could not 
establish any link between Unilever’s mechanisms and the firm’s practice.  
I will now review the personal protective equipment [PPE] provided to workers. 
Employees are provided with different types of safety equipment, depending on their 
role, as outlined below.  
Mandatory equipment for tea plantation workers1066 consists of gun boots and aprons, 
in addition to the basket which they wear on their backs to collect tea leaves. Plantation 
workers operating machines must wear gun boots, ear and eye protection, gloves, and 
overalls1067. Raincoats are optional1068, and workers do not wear gloves1069. Permanent 
workers are provided with all the necessary equipment. Seasonal workers must buy 
their own equipment themselves1070 1071. The company said that they are provided with 
aprons1072, but acknowledge that they do not provide workers with anything else, 
although all workers and another manager said that they had to buy all their equipment 
themselves. Similarly, one community member stated that Unilever did not provide 
chemical sprayers with proper equipment for free1073 1074, and it was reported that 
security officers are only provided with gun boots and must provide the rest of their 
 
1062 ICESCR, Article 7(b). 
1063 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 23, 2016, §29. 
1064 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standards F91, F94, F95, F96, F97, F98, and 
F154.  
1065 However, one worker (B2) mentioned noise pollution.  
1066 Interview with manager D8, workers B17, B18, B19, B24, B25, B28, B31, B32, and B49. 
1067 Interview with manager D8.  
1068 Interview with manager D1,  
1069 Interview with worker B17, and my observation. 
1070 Interviews with managers D1 and D8, workers B7, B25, B26, B31, B49, and community member 
C51.  
1071 One worker (B7) said that this policy was introduced in 2015, and that seasonal workers used to be 
provided with all necessary equipment.  
1072 Interview with manager D1. 
1073 Proper equipment includes gun boots, masks, and eye protection.  
1074 Interview with community member C51.  
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equipment themselves1075. This seems to be in conflict with the Rainforest Alliance1076 
and the company’s Sustainable Agriculture Code1077 requirements that employers do 
not charge or deduct pay to cover the cost of tools, equipment or gear required for 
performance of worker duties. It may also be inconsistent with the Rainforest Alliance 
specific requirements concerning workers handling pesticides1078, and with national 
legislation1079. Unilever justified their decision not to provide seasonal workers with 
proper equipment by stating that seasonal workers are not reliable and may leave with 
the company’s material1080.  
Unilever also organises training sessions, although there have been different reports as 
to whether health and safety training takes places daily1081 or weekly1082. This is 
consistent with Unilever’s Code of Business Principles requiring that all employees 
and contractors receive proper OHS training1083 , although I could not link the firm’s 
practice to this commitment. This practice is also consistent with national 
legislation1084.  
Despite training and protective safety equipment, workers say that it is a difficult job, 
especially tea picking and boiler duty. One worker explicitly said that if they could 
find another job, they would take it1085.  
From the evidence collected, it appears that Unilever does take health and safety 
seriously, and a manager claimed that the Rainforest Alliance had had a positive 
influence by strengthening applicable rules1086. For instance, it seems that Unilever’s 
policy is (mostly) implemented as employees are not allowed to work if they are not 
 
1075 Interview with workers B27 and B29.  
1076 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.5. 
1077 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standards F100 and 154. 
1078 The Rainforest Alliance includes some criteria specifically for workers handling pesticides, 
covering training (critical criteria 3.3. and 4.16.), correct handling of substances and contaminated 
clothes (critical criterion 4.17.), and the provision of free and adapted Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE) to workers (critical criterion 4.15.). Special medical tests must be carried out (continuous 
improvement criterion 4.36.) as seen below, and only authorised personnel have access to the storage 
areas adapted to the type of chemicals used (continuous improvement criterion 4.38 and 4.39.). Finally, 
emergency showers and eye-washing facilities must be available close to the sites where chemicals are 
used. 
1079 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 62. 
1080 Interview with manager D1.  
1081 Interview with manager D1.  
1082 Interview with worker B29.   
1083 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 22.  
1084 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 34. 
1085 Interview with worker B7.  
1086 Interview with manager D1.  
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wearing the necessary equipment1087, are sent home with no pay1088, and may be 
ultimately terminated1089 – although a few workers said that there was no control from 
the company, and that it was up to the workers to ensure that they were wearing the 
proper equipment1090. However, the fact that the corporation does not provide seasonal 
workers with safety equipment appears to be in conflict with Rainforest Alliance 
standards and the OECD Guidelines. It is also in conflict with the ICESCR which, 
according to the Covenant itself and to the Economic, Social, and Cultural Committee, 
applies to all workers in all settings1091. Similarly, one interviewee stated that chemical 
sprayers were not provided with equipment for free, as mentioned above. It is difficult 
to assess the extent of this issue but, if the practice was confirmed to be widespread, 
this would be a serious problem and may breach Unilever’s self-regulatory standards 
outlined above.  
 
5.2.3.2. Medical check-ups 
Unilever conducts medical check-ups for all prospective employees before signing 
contracts1092. Permanent workers then go through check-ups every two months1093, 
consistently with the Rainforest Alliance’s standards1094 – although I could not 
establish any link between these self-regulatory requirements and the firm’s practice – 
and with national legislation1095. However, seasonal workers said that they did not have 
regular check-ups, or an exit check-up1096, which seems to be in conflict with the 
above-mentioned Rainforest Alliance requirements and with national legislation1097.  
 
5.2.3.3. Accidents and compensation 
 
1087 Interview with civil society representative A10, workers B23, B24, B25, and B26.  
1088 Interview with manager D1. 
1089 Interviews with manager D1, civil society representative A10, and workers B23, B24, and B33. 
1090 Interviews with workers B17, B18, and B19.  
1091 ICESCR, Article 2(2), and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment 23, 2016, §5. 
1092 Interviews with workers B25, B31, B32, B34, and B49. 
1093 Interviews with workers B24, B26, B27, and B29; although worker B23 said that medical check-
ups were conducted every three months. 
1094 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.41. 
1095 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 24. 
1096 Interview with workers B31, B32, B34, and B49. 
1097 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 24. 
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Accidents are reportedly rare1098, and mostly occur in the factory because workers use 
machines1099. Yet when they do happen, it is important to consider two things: whether 
employees get free medical treatment, and whether they are offered compensation.  
Firstly, permanent and seasonal employees have access to free medical treatment at 
Unilever’s hospital after work-related accidents1100. However, there were reports that 
only first aid was provided to seasonal workers1101. This practice may conflict with the 
Rainforest Alliance, which requires that all workers are offered access to 
healthcare1102, and with Tanzanian law, which requires employers to bear the costs of 
medical aid, including transportation to hospital, after a work-related accident1103. 
Secondly, permanent employees are in theory offered compensation for work-related 
accidents1104, although a few workers complained that the company usually says that 
it is the worker’s fault and so refuses to offer compensation1105. It is difficult to assess 
whether this is true or not. As for seasonal workers, Unilever says that they are entitled 
to compensation through the WCF1106, but workers and a manager said that they are 
not1107.  If the latter is true, it would conflict with national legislation, as was mentioned 
in Chapter 4. Private employers in Tanzania must contribute 1% of their tax bill to the 
WCF, which is used to compensate (permanent and seasonal) workers for work-related 
injuries and death unless the injury is attributable to the misconduct of the employee 
and does not result in death or permanent total disablement1108. The fact that 
compensation is rarely offered to workers may also conflict with the OECD 
Guidelines, which require employment and industrial relations standards to include 
compensation arrangements1109, following the spirit of the right to safe and healthy 
working conditions as recognised by the ICESCR1110.  
 
1098 A doctor (C20) said there had been a couple of accidents that year.   
1099 Interview with manager D1, who also said that a factory worker had almost lost their leg in March 
2018.  
1100 Interviews with workers B2, B20 and B21.  
1101 Interviews with manager D8, and worker B26.  
1102 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.31. 
This criterion was also included in the previous standard (criterion 5.16.). 
1103 Workers Compensation Act, Articles 61 and 62. 
1104 Interviews with managers D1 and D8 and workers B2, B7, B20, B21, B23, and B25. 
1105 Interviews with workers B32 and B33.   
1106 Interview with manager D1. 
1107 Interviews with manager D8, and workers B24, B25, B26, B27, B31, B32, B33, B34, and B49.  
1108 Workers Compensation Act, Articles 4 and 19(2). 
1109 OECD Guidelines, §57. 
1110 ICESCR, Article 7(b). 
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5.2.4. Freedom of association and collective bargaining 
This section will first provide a general assessment of Unilever’s practice regarding 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, and second of the firm’s specific 
practice regarding strikes. 
 
5.2.4.1. General considerations 
TPAWU is the trade union used by Unilever workers, with representatives chosen 
among workers1111. TPAWU representatives negotiate the price of the kilo of tea with 
human resources managers regularly1112 and report to management any issues raised 
by workers1113. Once the CBA is signed, the union trains workers on the content of the 
agreement1114, as well as on general labour rights and related issues. However, there 
were reports of issues with regard to TPAWU’s Unilever branch. First, some 
(permanent and seasonal) workers stated that seasonal workers could not join 
TPAWU1115, which would be in conflict with all the standards mentioned in the 
previous paragraph – although other (permanent and seasonal) employees said that all 
workers were members1116. Most workers also said that that it was compulsory for 
permanent workers to join the union and have their membership fee taken out of their 
monthly paycheck1117. Compulsory membership would also run counter to the 
provisions of all the commitments cited above. Second, Mufindi civil society 
representatives said that TPAWU representatives were not properly trained on labour 
issues and so could not adequately defend workers’ rights1118. Third, a local civil 
society representative said that TPAWU leaders did not adequately protect women1119. 
Fourth, there were concerns about the political bias of TPAWU as some union 
 
1111 Interviews with workers B7 and B23. 
1112 Interview with manager D1. Negotiations run every month during dry season, and every three or 
four months during raining season.  
1113 Interview with manager D1 and worker B2.  
1114 Interview with managers D1 and D8.  
1115 Interviews with workers B23 and B24.  
1116 Interviews with workers B7, B20, and B21. 
1117 Interviews with managers D1 and D8 and workers B23, B27, B29, and B32. There are conflicting 
accounts as to how much it costs to be a member, with estimates ranging from Tsh 2.000 – Tsh 5.000 
monthly, although a worker said that the fee was 1% of salary, which would explain the differences in 
estimates. 
1118 Interviews with civil society representatives A11 and A12.  
1119 Interview with civil society representative A13.  
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representatives were alleged to be members of the ruling party1120, although I could 
not verify this piece of information myself. Relatedly, the efficacy of TPAWU as a 
trade union representing workers’ interests is disputed by some workers. Indeed, 
several interviewees said that TPAWU representatives had the interests of the 
company, and not of the workers, at heart1121, and one said that they were bribed1122, 
although, again, it is difficult to verify the accuracy of this allegation. Moreover, some 
workers question TPAWU’s efficacy as the union’s complaints to the company had 
reportedly not led to any changes in working conditions1123. A worker said that 
employees used to go to TPAWU when they wanted to raise complaints with 
management, but that the union was not active anymore1124. Another worker said that 
TPAWU representatives were successful in their actions of defending workers’ rights 
only about half the time1125. On the other hand, one worker said that they would go to 
TPAWU leaders if they want to report a problem1126.  
Having a trade union representing workers and negotiating working conditions on their 
behalf is consistent with the Rainforest Alliance requirements1127, the Code of 
Business Principles1128, the Sustainable Agriculture Code1129, the Responsible 
 
1120 Interviews with civil society representatives A11 and A12. 
1121 Interview with workers B20 and B21.  
1122 Interview with worker B25.  
1123 Interview with workers B20 and B21. 
1124 Interview with worker B29.  
1125 Interview with worker B7. 
1126 Interview with worker B31.  
1127 The Rainforest Alliance states that workers have the right to establish and join worker organisations 
of their own free choice without influence or interference by management (Critical criterion 4.4.), and 
that worker organisations operate without interference or influence by management (ibid). Workers also 
have the right to collectively negotiate the elements of their employment conditions into a collective 
bargaining agreement (ibid) and are fully protected against acts of discrimination or retaliation for 
reasons of affiliation (ibid). The certification standards refer to ILO Conventions C087 and C098, to 
which Unilever has also committed in its Human Rights Policy (Unilever ‘Human Rights Policy’ (n. 
144), 1). 
1128 The Code of Business Principles states that the company must “respect employees’ rights to join or 
not to join a legally recognised trade union, or any other body representing their collective interests, and 
establish constructive dialogue and bargain in good faith with trade unions or representative bodies on 
employment conditions, labour management relations and matters of mutual concern, to the extent 
practicable taking national laws into consideration” (page 24). The Code also requires Unilever to 
“maintain a clear and transparent system of employee and management communication that enables 
employees to consult and have an effective dialogue with management” (ibid). 
1129 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F175.  
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Sourcing Policy1130, the OECD Guidelines1131, the ICESCR1132, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights1133, and national legislation1134. However, I have found 
no positive evidence of a link between Unilever’s mechanisms and the firm’s practice, 
and the numerous issues which I have outlined in this section may compromise the 
implementation of Unilever’s commitments in terms of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining.  
 
5.2.4.2. Strikes 
Workers have organised several strikes1135 in the past few years to protest against 
alleged poor working conditions and low wages1136, but they were mostly unsuccessful 
because Unilever management usually call the Field Force Unit [FFU], a division of 
the national police, to scatter the workers1137. The latest strike happened in 20161138 
1139 over low wages1140. The FFU were indeed called1141 and drove workers away. A 
manager admitted that the strike was bad and violent, that it destroyed property, and 
that it almost led to deaths1142. Although the ILO Convention 087, on which relevant 
Rainforest Alliance standards are based, does not explicitly mention the right to strike, 
the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association and the ILO Committee of Experts on 
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations have frequently stated that the 
right to strike is a fundamental right of workers and of their organisations based on 
 
1130 Unilever ‘Responsible Sourcing Policy’ (n. 826), Standard 8. 
1131 The OECD Guidelines requires firms to respect the right of workers to have trade unions and 
representative organisations of their own choosing recognised for the purpose of collective bargaining, 
and engage in constructive negotiations (Guideline V.1.b.). 
1132 The ICESCR states the right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of their 
choice (Article 8(1)(a)), which are to function freely (Article 8(1)(b)), for the promotion and protection 
of their economic and social interests. 
1133 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(4). 
1134 National legislation guarantees the right of every employee to form and join a trade union, to 
participate in the lawful activities of the union (Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 9(1)), 
and to do so without fearing to be terminated (Article 37(3)(a)(v)) or discriminated against by their 
employer (Article 9(3)). 
1135 Interviews with managers D1 and D8, local government representative E2, and workers B17, B18, 
B19, B26, B27, B28, B29, B31, B32, B33, and B34.  
1136 Interviews with workers B17, B18, B19, B26, B28, and B32. 
1137 Interviews with manager D8, and workers B17, B18, B19, B26, B27, B28, B29, B31, B32, B33, 
and B34.  
1138 As of April 2018.  
1139 Interviews with manager D1, and workers B27, B28, and B29. 
1140 Interview with worker B28.  
1141 Interviews with manager D1, and workers B27 and B29. 
1142 Interview with manager D1.  
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ILO C087’s provisions1143. The ICESCR also guarantees the right to strike1144. This 
way of handling strikes therefore conflicts with Unilever’s commitments.  
Since 2016, Unilever has therefore taken steps to prevent such violent strikes from 
happening again1145: management have intensified their relationship with TPAWU 
with more regular meetings to discuss issues and negotiate tea rates1146, and have 
introduced bonuses to keep workers happy1147, as mentioned above in Section 5.2.2.2. 
The local government acknowledged that the situation has improved under new 
management and that there have been no recent strikes1148. A manager reported that 
the Rainforest Alliance had had a positive impact in the relationship between the 
company and the trade union following the 2016 strikes, although no more details were 
provided1149. 
I will now investigate the working conditions of Unilever’s seasonal workers, 
especially as compared with permanent workers.  
 
5.2.5. Working conditions of seasonal workers 
Unilever hires up to 3.000 seasonal workers every year during high season, in addition 
to the 4.000 permanent workers employed all year round1150. However, as is common 
in the area1151, seasonal workers do not have the same rights as permanent 
employees1152, and are generally treated very differently1153 even though they have the 
same role. They are not offered compensation for work-related accidents1154 or sick 
leave, contrary to permanent workers. Neither are they given safety equipment and 
must therefore buy it themselves before starting their assignment1155. This difference 
 
1143 Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero And Horacio Guido, ‘ILO Principles Concerning the Right to 
Strike’, International Labour Reviews 137(4), 1998, 9. 
1144 ICESCR, Article 8(1)(d). 
1145 Interview with manager D1. 
1146 Management (D1) said that they have changed their approach to these negotiations and are more 
flexible: human resources officers are ready to go back to their hierarchical superiors to discuss 
TPAWU’s requests instead of simply presenting workers’ representatives with an immutable offer. 
1147 Interview with manager D1. 
1148 Interview with local government representative E2.  
1149 Interview with manager D1.  
1150 Interview with manager D1.  
1151 Interview with local government representative E2.  
1152 Interview with workers B17, B18, B19, B25, and B33.  
1153 Interview with workers B34.  
1154 See Section 5.2.3.3. 
1155 See Section 5.2.3.1. 
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in treatment clashes with the Rainforest Alliance standards which do not differentiate 
between seasonal and permanent workers. It also clashes with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights1156 and the ICESCR1157 which guarantees the right to 
just and favourable conditions of work for all workers as well as with Unilever’s Code 
of Business Principles which states that the firm must comply with legal requirements 
“in relation to short-term, casual, or agency workers”1158.  
 
5.2.6. Right to non-discrimination 
This section will be divided between discrimination at the hiring stage and during 
employment, and will be mainly focused on gender.  
 
5.2.6.1. Hiring stage 
Most interviewees reported common instances of discrimination against pregnant 
women, for both temporary and permanent positions1159, although a manager said that 
the firm did hire pregnant women1160. If this discriminatory practice did take place, it 
would clash with the OECD Guidelines, which specifically require firms to “prevent 
discrimination or dismissals on the grounds of marriage, pregnancy or parenthood”1161, 
and the Rainforest Alliance criteria prohibiting discrimination against pregnant women 
at the hiring stage1162. It would also conflict with ILO Convention C111 and national 
legislation1163. On the other hand, the company says that it has permitted temporary 
women who were pregnant to go on unpaid leave1164  and come back later to finish 
their contracts1165, instead of terminating them.  
However, there were no reports of any other type of discrimination. In a region with 
such a high HIV/AIDS rate, it is important to note that the company does seem to 
 
1156 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(1). 
1157 ICESCR, Article 7. 
1158 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 24. 
1159 Interviews with workers B7, B25, B26, B29, B31, B33, B34, B49.  
1160 Interview with manager D1. 
1161 OECD Guidelines, §54.  
1162 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.3. 
1163 See Section 4.1.2.3.2.1. 
1164 Leave would be unpaid as the worker will have been working for Unilever for less than six months.  
1165 Interview with manager D1.  
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implement its equal opportunity policy1166 regarding HIV/AIDS status1167 – although 
no positive evidence of a link between policy and practice was found.  
 
5.2.6.2. Employment stage 
Discrimination also takes place once workers are hired, mostly based on gender. 
Generally, many gender-based issues such as sexual harassment and rape have been 
reported in Mufindi, and especially in tea plantations1168. These issues have been 
linked to low levels of education, low wages, and the fact that most plantation 
managers are men1169. It is therefore not surprising that Unilever’s female workers face 
similar issues: firstly, they may be victims of sexual harassment and abuse; secondly, 
they may be discriminated against because of their gender. 
Firstly, despite the fact that there are slightly more women (52%) than men (48%) 
working in Unilever’s tea operations in Tanzania1170, there have been cases of rape, 
sexual violence and harassment on company’s premises1171, as well as alleged sexual 
exploitation of women1172, although I did not witness any such behaviour first-hand. 
Unilever has taken action to fight against gender-based violence by starting a welfare 
department in 2014, where a female manager is available to discuss any issues with 
workers and their families1173, in person or over the phone via the complaint 
hotline1174. They have also set up seminars about sexual harassment and women’s 
rights, which are also used to talk out any potential issues1175. Seminars used to be held 
daily but are now organised weekly since the firm has seen some improvement in 
employees’ behaviour1176 and workers now reportedly take these issues seriously1177. 
TPAWU leaders also reportedly train workers on gender-related issues1178. Most 
 
1166 Unilever, ‘HIV/AIDS Report: 25 years of experience’, 2014, 11.  
1167 Interview with manager D1 and worker B7.  
1168 Interviews with civil society representatives A10 and A13.  
1169 Interviews with civil society representatives A10 and A13. 
1170 Interview with manager D1. 
1171 Interviews with managers D1 and D8 and doctor C20.  
1172 Interviews with worker B25.  
1173 Interview with managers D1, D5, and D6. 
1174 Interview with managers D5 and D6. 
1175 Interview with manager D1. 
1176 Interview with manager D1, and local doctor C20.  
1177 Interview with managers D5 and D6. 
1178 Interview with trade union representative F2.  
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workers said that there was no gender-based violence or harassment1179, although 
others say that it is still an issue1180, particularly in the plantations1181. Unilever has 
committed in the following self-regulatory instruments to the prevention sexual 
harassment in its operations1182: the company’s Human Rights Policy1183, its Code of 
Business Practices1184, its Sustainable Agriculture Code1185, its Responsible Sourcing 
Policy1186, and the Rainforest Alliance1187. On its website, Unilever has also reported 
running a programme targeting 6.000 plantation workers and their children and 1.000 
women smallholder farmers (as well as managers, village elders, and medical 
professionals) with training on how to address and report all forms of violence, 
including gender-based violence and sexual harassment1188. However, the only 
instrument which the firm has acknowledged generally implementing and ‘pushing 
for’ at the time of the fieldwork was the Code of Business Principles, which prohibits 
direct or indirect behaviour that “could be construed as sexual or other harassment or 
bullying, such as making offensive or sexually explicit jokes or insults, displaying, 
emailing, texting, or otherwise distributing, offensive material or material of a sexually 
explicitly nature, misusing personal information, creating a hostile or intimidating 
environment, isolating or not co-operating with a colleague, or spreading malicious or 
insulting rumours.”1189 A manager confirmed that it includes sanctions for the violation 
of the standards1190. However, a manager explicitly stated that they did not take action 
to meet the Rainforest Alliance requirements1191. As for the rest of the instruments 
listed above, no positive evidence of a link was found between the firm’s mechanisms 
and its practice.  
 
1179 Interviews with workers B17, B18, B19, B26, B27, B29, B31, B32, B33, B34, and B49.  
1180 Interview with doctor C20,  
1181 Interview with manager D8. 
1182 Unilever also reiterated its commitment to prevent sexual harassment in 2015 (Unilever ‘Human 
Rights Report’ (n. 836), 35).  
1183 Unilever ‘Human Rights Policy’ (n. 144), 3. 
1184 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 24.   
1185 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F103; the Code also prohibits sexual 
harassment (standard F168). 
1186 Unilever ‘Responsible Sourcing Policy’ (n. 826), Standards 3 and 10.9. 
1187 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.2. 
1188 Unilever, ‘Understanding Our Human Rights Impact’ <https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-
living/enhancing-livelihoods/fairness-in-the-workplace/understanding-our-human-rights-impacts/> 
(accessed on 21 October 2019); and UN and Unilever, ‘A Global Women’s Safety Framework in Rural 
Spaces: Informed By Experience In The Tea Sector’, UN Women, 2018, III.  
1189 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 24.   
1190 Interview with manager D1.  
1191 Interviews with managers D5 and D6.  
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Secondly, female plantation workers are not allowed to stay in the plantations at the 
end of the day once plucking is over to wait for the trucks1192, which means that they 
miss out on any overtime opportunities. It is acknowledged that this comes from a 
concern for the women’s safety, but it denies them economic opportunities and is in 
conflict with the Rainforest Alliance standards1193 as well as with Unilever’s Code of 
Business Principles1194, the firm’s Human Rights Policy1195, ILO Convention C111, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1196, and the ICESCR1197. Instead of a 
blanket prohibition, measures could be taken to protect women in plantations and 
allow them to work overtime if they wish to do so.  
Finally, a nursery is available and free for all workers1198, which seems to be in line 
with Unilever’s human rights commitments to women’s opportunities, although no 
positive evidence that they are connected was found.  
Overall, Unilever has taken action to address the widespread issue of sexual 
harassment and abuse in the firm’s plantations and factories, although no link could be 
made with the firm’s self-regulatory mechanisms despite the firm’s adoption of 
multiple relevant standards. However, the situation is still problematic, and women  
still can, to some extent, be discriminated against when they apply for employment 
and later at work. 
Now that I have evaluated Unilever’s performance regarding worker-related rights, I 
will do so regarding community-related rights.  
 
5.3. Community-related rights 
In this section, I will review Unilever’s performance as set against community-related 
human rights standards, which will be relevant to workers and the broader community 
living around Unilever’s plantations. I will therefore investigate living conditions 
offsite and onsite, Unilever’s contribution to the health and education needs of the 
 
1192 Interview with worker B24.  
1193 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical Criterion 4.3.  
1194 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 23. 
1195 Unilever ‘Human Rights Policy’ (n. 144), 2. 
1196 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(1) and (3).  
1197 ICESCR, Articles 2(2) and 7.  
1198 Interview with manager D8. 
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population (and any other contribution) in the area, and the company’s impact on the 
environment. 
 
5.3.1. Housing and living conditions 
In the villages around Unilever’s plantations, houses have no running water1199 or 
electricity1200, apart from a minority who have solar panels1201. In this context, most 
workers live onsite, in around 2.000 houses1202. There are different categories of 
houses, allocated to workers depending on their hierarchic position1203 (e.g. managers’ 
houses are bigger than those of factory workers). The company offers housing to all 
employees, with free – although not running – drinking water1204. This is consistent 
with the Rainforest Alliance requirement that workers and their families have access 
to drinking water1205. The company did not specify whether the provision of water to 
employees had been influenced by the adoption of the label’s standards, although the 
Rainforest Alliance’s auditors told Unilever in 2017 that there were issues with water 
maintenance and purification on the Kibwele estate, and that the firm had to finish the 
water purification project which they had started two years before to get their 
certification renewed in 20181206. It is therefore highly likely that the label had an 
impact on the firm’s water provision. 
Houses are one or two rooms, depending on the size of the family, and only houses 
near the main factory have (solar) electricity. When fieldwork was conducted, the firm 
had recently installed a stove in each house, starting with the houses which did not 
have electricity. Once the firm has enough funding, they will reportedly install stoves 
in the rest of the houses. Taken in the context of average living conditions in Mufindi 
in 2018, the lack of electricity (and stoves in some houses) cannot be interpreted as 
clashing with the commitment made by Unilever to respect the right to an adequate 
 
1199 Interviews with local government representatives E2 and E3, and community members C50, C52, 
C53, C54, C55, and C56. 
1200 Interviews with local government representative E3, and community members C52, C53, C54, C55, 
and C56. 
1201 Interviews with local government representative E2, and community members C50 and C56. 
1202 Interview with manager D1.   
1203 Interviews with managers D1, D5, and D6.  
1204 Interviews with manager D8 and workers B20, B21, B23, B24, B25, B29,  B31, B32, B33, and B34, 
and community member C47. 
1205 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.12. 
1206 Interview with manager D1. 
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standard of living, including adequate housing, as guaranteed by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights1207 and the ICESCR1208. Indeed, the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights interprets adequate shelter as offering 
“adequate privacy, adequate space, adequate security, adequate lighting and 
ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and adequate location with regard to work 
and basic facilities - all at a reasonable cost”1209. However, it is important to note that 
what is considered “adequate basic infrastructure” in Mufindi may change over the 
years, and that Unilever may need to ensure that all houses have electricity if most 
households in the area become equipped. 
Moreover, Unilever said that the few workers who lived offsite did so because they 
were from the area1210, but most offsite workers said that they chose to live in the 
villages around the plantations because the housing conditions onsite were not 
adequate1211. I observed that houses for whole families were indeed small with, in most 
houses, only one room separated with a piece of fabric into the kitchen area on one 
side and the bedroom area on the other. The lack of space in Unilever’s housing may 
be in conflict with the Rainforest Alliance housing requirements1212. Moreover, 
Unilever has committed to the right to a family life as guaranteed by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights1213 and the ICCPR1214, and the right to an adequate 
standard of living, including adequate housing, by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights1215 and the ICESCR1216. However, and similarly to the lack of concrete policies 
on electricity in workers’ housing mentioned above, the firm has not translated these 
 
1207 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25. 
1208 ICESCR, Article 11. 
1209 UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 4, 1991, §7. 
1210 Interview with manager D1.  
1211 Interviews with manager D8, local government representative E2, and workers B7, B17, B18, B19, 
B27, B31, and B33.  
1212 The Rainforest Alliance has rules around sanitation, sleeping space, floors, beds, windows, doors, 
roofs, headroom, toilets, washing and laundry facilities, light, ventilation, cooking facilities, firewood 
smoke evacuation, fire extinguishers, safety exits, and locking mechanisms. Unilever must also provide 
areas for drying clothes (Critical and continuous improvement criteria 4.13., 4.28. and 4.30., and 
continuous improvement criterion 4.32). These criteria were also included in the previous standard 
(criterion 5.14.). 
1213 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16. 
1214 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ‘ICCPR’), 
16 December 1966, Article 23.  
1215 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25. 
1216 ICESCR, Article 11. 
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high-level rights into concrete standards, leaving a gap in the operationalisation of the 
company’s human rights commitments.  
Finally, there are privately-run shops and social halls with a television where workers 
and their families may go to relax in the evening1217. This is consistent with the 
Rainforest Alliance requirement that Unilever must also provide areas for 
recreation1218, although no positive evidence was found linking the label to the 
presence of these relaxation areas on the company’s compound.   
In conclusion, Unilever is improving the living conditions for workers living onsite, 
but no link was found between the firm’s mechanisms and its practice. Moreover, not 
all of the firm’s standards were implemented when the fieldwork was conducted. 
  
5.3.2. Right to a clean environment 
This section will first provide a general assessment of Unilever’s environmental 
impact, and second an evaluation of the firm’s specific practice around waste 
management.  
5.3.2.1. General considerations 
Unilever lost their Rainforest Alliance certification in 2014 because of environmental 
issues around natural forests and water, and the firm has since hired an environmental 
manager and made improvements to make the necessary improvements and regain its 
certification1219. Unilever has also set up a department dedicated to the preservation of 
the environment, with anti-poaching patrols to stop tree-cutting and -burning, in 
partnership with the local government1220. A manager reported that the certification 
had helped turn the firm’s agricultural business into a conversation activity1221. 
Perhaps as a result, most workers, community members, and local government 
 
1217 Interview with manager D5; although there was no television on the day I visited one of the social 
halls. 
1218 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.32. 
This criterion was also included in the previous standard (criterion 5.14.).  
1219 Interview with manager D1. 
1220 Interview with manager D1. 
1221 Interview with manager D7.  
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representatives stated that Unilever’s activities had no negative environmental 
impact1222.  
However, there was a report of water pollution due to dangerous chemicals which 
Unilever uses annually on crops for fertilisation purposes1223. This clashes with the 
Rainforest Alliance requirement that Unilever efficiently manage its pesticide use1224, 
with enforcement of non-applications zones, establishment of vegetative barriers, or 
employment of other effective mechanisms to reduce spray drift and separate 
application zones from areas of human activities1225 and natural ecosystems1226. 
Potential affected persons or communities must also be identified, alerted, warned in 
advance about pesticide applications, and prevented from access to pesticide 
application areas1227. Unilever’s practice is also in conflict with the OECD 
Guidelines1228 which require Unilever to assess and mitigate foreseeable 
environmental, health, and safety-related impact associated with their activities. The 
firm must also maintain contingency plans for preventing, mitigating, and controlling 
serious environmental and health damage from their operations. Furthermore, this 
pollution clashes with Unilever’s Sustainable Agriculture Code, which requires the 
firm to protect water bodies from pollution by agricultural bodies1229. The local 
government reportedly discussed the issue with the company in 2017, and Unilever 
said that they would take precautions from then on as they marked up places where 
water would run so as to avoid spraying there during the fertilisation process1230. If the 
situation does improve, it will therefore be because of the local government’s 
intervention, and not because the relevant standards prescribed a certain behaviour.  
Moreover, a local government representative also said that the company polluted by 
releasing smoke1231, which would be in conflict with the Rainforest Alliance, the 
OECD Guidelines, and Unilever’s Sustainable Agriculture Code, as mentioned above.  
 
1222 Interviews with manager D8 and workers B17, B18, B19, B23, B24, B25, B27, B28, B31, B32, 
B33, and B49, and community members C52, C53, C54, C55, and C56.  
1223 Interviews with community member C51, and local government representative E3.  
1224 The Rainforest Alliance also requires Unilever to reduce water and wind erosion, including by 
minimising herbicide use (Continuous improvement criterion 3.8.). 
1225 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 3.28. 
1226 Ibid, Continuous improvement criterion 3.27. 
1227 Ibid, Continuous improvement criterion 3.32. 
1228 OECD Guidelines, Guideline VI.5. 
1229 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), F43. 
1230 Interview with local government representative E3.  
1231 Interview with local government representative E1. 
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Finally, Unilever uses eucalyptus trees for firewood1232, which grow on 1.405 hectares 
– leased from the government alongside the tea plantations – and are cut on an eight-
year rotation1233. This practice seems to be in line with Unilever’s Sustainable 
Agriculture Code1234, although I could not identify any impact of the Code’s standards 
on Unilever’s practice.  
As mentioned above in Section 4.1.3.2.3.1., Unilever has gone through environmental 
impact assessments, as the OECD Guidelines recommend1235. However, I cannot 
analyse the findings of these assessments as I was unable to get access to them1236.  
In conclusion, becoming certified with the Rainforest Alliance has substantially 
improved Unilever’s environmental impact, although the impact of the rest of the 
firm’s self-regulatory instruments could not be positively established. 
 
5.3.2.2. Waste disposal 
Unilever’s waste disposal management does not seem to be an issue1237. The company 
has specific mechanisms in place, using waste segregation, dumping sites with 
compartmentalisation, and recycling1238. They follow the Rainforest Alliance’s 
Integrated Waste Management protocols1239, which complement the company’s 
environmental guidelines1240. The Rainforest Alliance includes criteria related to the 
 
1232 Interview with manager D7.  
1233 Baffes (n. 749), 13. 
1234 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F137.  
1235 OECD Guidelines, Guideline VI.3. 
1236 As explained in Chapter 4, I have contacted Unilever and the organisation who conducted the 
assessments in an effort to get access to the content of the assessments but, after multiple email 
exchanges, it became clear that difficulties were too great and that I would not be able to gain access.  
1237 Interviews with manager D8 and workers B7, B24, B25, B27, B28, B29, B31, B32, B33, B34, and 
B49. 
1238 Interview with manager D7.  
1239 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criteria 3.37.-
3.43. These criteria were also included in the previous standard (criteria 10.1-10.6.). 
1240 Interview with manager D7. 
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management and treatment of wastewater1241 1242, which Unilever seems to follow and 
to have been directly influenced by the certification’s requirements. However, it is 
acknowledged that I had limited capacity to assess the technical aspects of these 
measures. 
 
5.3.3. Right to health 
This section will first cover the main health issues reported around Unilever’s 
operations, and second the health services available to workers and community 
members. 
 
5.3.3.1. Health issues 
The main health issues around Unilever’s plantations are poor access to water and 
sexually transmitted diseases [STDs] (and especially HIV/AIDS). 
First, access to water is a big issue in the Mufindi region and more specifically around 
Unilever’s plantations1243. There is no running water in the area1244, so the population 
mostly uses pumps form the Danish International Development Agency1245 1246 and 
natural wells1247, which do not provide the population with drinking water1248. There 
 
1241 Unilever must ensure that no untreated water is discharged into aquatic ecosystems or certain types 
of soil. The company must also manage pit latrines and sewage disposal sites to minimise risk to aquatic 
ecosystems and to drinking water supplies (Continuous Improvement Criteria 3.20.-22.). The Rainforest 
Alliance also requires Unilever to follow certain procedures for the disposal of general waste, starting 
with adopting a waste management plan (Continuous Improvement Criterion 3.38.). Waste is to be 
segregated (Continuous Improvement Criterion 3.40.), and waste burning is prohibited, except in certain 
circumstances (Continuous Improvement Criterion 3.39.). Finally, waste minimisation and use of 
recycled products is to be taken into account by Unilever when the firm selects its product providers 
(Continuous Improvement Criterion 3.42.), and the company must check that service providers in 
charge of waste disposal do not pose risks to natural ecosystems, drinking water supplies, or the health 
and safety of people living near the disposal sites (Continuous Improvement Criterion 3.43.). All these 
criteria were also included in the previous standard (criteria 10.1-10.6.). 
1242 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical Criteria 3.1 and 3.2.  
1243 Interviews with manager D8, local government representatives E2 and E3, workers B7, B17, B18, 
B19, B27, B32, B33, B34, B49, and community members C24, C25, C26, C27, C29, C30, C43, C44, 
C51, C52, C53. C54, C55, and C56.  
1244 Interview with worker B24. 
1245 These pumps are from the Danish International Development Agency. 
1246 Interview with workers B7, B24, and community members C47, C49, C51, and C56. 
1247 Interviews with local government representatives E2 and E3 and community members C24, C25, 
C26, C27, C43, C44, C47, C49, C50, C51, C53, C54, C55, C56, workers B32 and B49. 
1248 Interview with local government representative E2, community members C27, C29, and C30 (who 
said that people catch typhoid fever from drinking water from some wells), and worker B32. 
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are only two wells in Kibao for over 5.000 people. When wells are dry, community 
members must buy bottled water1249, which is expensive1250. As a consequence, some 
people drink from the river or rainwater and get sick1251. Moreover, as mentioned 
above in Section 5.3.2.1., there were reports that the fertilisation chemicals used by 
Unilever ended up in the water, making the local population ill1252. There is a current 
project1253 to provide water to four villages – Sawala, Mtwango, Lufuna, Kibao – by 
installing pumps which will purify the water and bring it to a big tank to be built in 
each village. This will supply water to taps which will be installed in houses in all four 
villages. However, two community members1254 said that the project was suspended 
because the supplier had not been paid – although the project coordinator only said 
that the project would take a year to complete and did not mention any suspension1255. 
It is therefore unclear when the pumps will be operational.  
Faced with this situation, the local government has reportedly asked Unilever to 
help1256, but the company had yet to contribute when the fieldwork took place1257. This 
failure to help clashes with the Rainforest Alliance requirement that Unilever’s 
management implement and document activities to support identified needs and 
priorities of the community1258. The silence of the company on this issue also clashes 
with Unilever’s own report from 2015 that they had “taken significant steps forward, 
[including in respect to their] commitment to recognise and respect the human right to 
water”1259. Finally, it conflicts with the OECD Guideline stating that “[stakeholder] 
engagement can be particularly helpful in the planning and decision-making 
concerning projects or other activities involving, for example, the intensive use of […] 
water, which could significantly affect local communities”1260. An important question 
 
1249 Interviews with community members C24, C25, C26,  
1250 Each bottle costs Tsh 400. 
1251 Interviews with worker B7, and community members C29, and C30. 
1252 Interview with local government representative E2. 
1253 Interview with project coordinator C48.  
1254 Interviews with community members C53 and C54. 
1255 Interview with project coordinator C48. 
1256 Interview with local government representative E3. 
1257 Interview with local government representatives E2 and E3, and manager D1 (who acknowledged 
that the company did not contribute, but not that they had received requests from the community). 
1258 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.47. 
Although this criterion is a ‘continuous improvement criterion A’ which is not binding on firms for the 
first six years, and therefore will not become a requirement for Unilever before 2023, the previous 
standard already included a similar criterion (critical criterion 7.2.) – the firm therefore had to implement 
this criterion when the fieldwork took place.  
1259 Unilever ‘Human Rights Report’ (n. 836), 1. 
1260 OECD Guidelines, Commentary on the policies, §25, Guideline VI.3. 
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would therefore be whether water use by Unilever uses up resources which the 
community needs. The company has a water abstraction permit, delivered by 
government authorities1261, and may only extract a certain amount of water. Unilever 
uses man-made dams and pumps1262, and water use is managed according to the 
company’s water resources management policy. Water use is also monitored and 
recorded for the purpose of certification with the Rainforest Alliance1263, and a 
manager said that being certified has helped the company with documenting their own 
water use1264. However, it is unclear whether, despite these precautions, Unilever’s 
water use leads to shortages for the community living around the firm’s plantation, and 
further investigation would be required. 
Second, the main diseases reported around Unilever’s plantations are STDs, and 
especially HIV/AIDS1265. Iringa, where Mufindi is, has the second highest rate of 
HIV/AIDS nationally, with 11.3% of the population living with the disease1266. The 
national average is 4.7%1267. This high rate has been linked by the local government 
and a doctor to the high number of migrant workers, and especially seasonal workers, 
living in the area and interacting with the locals1268. As tea companies are responsible 
for the existence of Kibao1269,  Unilever has a particular responsibility to mitigate any 
negative impact which the large number of workers employed by the corporation may 
have on the local community. This argument is also supported by the various 
commitments about HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment which Unilever has made. 
These commitments, which I outline below, seem to (mostly) be fulfilled: in 
accordance with their CBA1270, Unilever runs a weekly prevention programme1271 in 
partnership with local NGOs1272 to raise awareness about the disease – although one 
 
1261 Interview with manager D7. 
1262 Interview with manager D1.  
1263 Interview with manager D7. 
1264 Interview with manager D7. 
1265 Interviews with civil society representative A13, doctors C20, C45, and C46, and community 
member C27.  
1266 For adults aged 15-64 years old (Tanzania HIV/AIDS Indicator Survey, 2016-2017, in US 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, ‘Tanzania Country Operational Plan COP 2018 Strategic 
Direction Summary’, 2018, 6).  
1267 Ibid, 5.  
1268 Interviews with doctor C20 and local government E2. 
1269 Interview with local government representative E2.  
1270 TAT-TPAWU CBA, Article 18(1) and 18(3). 
1271 Interviews with managers D1 and D8, doctor C20, and workers B23, B26, B29, B31, B32, and B33.  
1272 Interview with civil society representative A14. 
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worker said that the programme had not run in four months1273. The company also 
offers free HIV/AIDS testing, treatment, and counselling1274, and a union 
representative said that TPAWU leaders provide training on HIV1275. Local 
government said that Unilever provides significant help with HIV/AIDS prevention 
and treatment, including by educating the youth about the disease and how to prevent 
it from spreading, and that the situation would be worse without the company’s 
contribution1276. Unilever’s hospital also partners with a local hospital to circumcise 
men so as to thwart the spread of diseases1277. These activities are in line with 
Unilever’s Sustainable Agriculture Code1278 and with the company’s 2015 Report, 
where the company writes that they are “committed to deploying effective 
programmes on health education (using [their] skills in communication) and to 
securing access to appropriate treatment for [their] employees at all stages of 
HIV/AIDS”1279. They also outline in the report their “comprehensive framework to 
manage the HIV/AIDS programme in Sub-Saharan Africa, which addresses the needs 
of individuals at key stages of prevention and treatment”1280. It includes awareness 
through educational programmes for all employees, prevention, including prevention 
and treatment of occupational exposures, and distribution of condoms, acceptance of 
status by encouraging HIV/AIDS-positive individuals to seek treatment, and treatment 
and care, including access to anti-retroviral therapy1281. They offer “free HIV/AIDS 
testing, as well as education programmes to raise awareness, teach safe practices and 
prevent discrimination”1282, and support the “de-stigmatisation of HIV/AIDS through 
voluntary confidential testing by healthcare providers”1283. Finally, they “help with 
treatment to prevent mother-to-child transmission”1284. These policies are “aligned 
with the key principles of the International Labour Organization Code of Practice on 
HIV/AIDS”1285, and is (mostly) fulfilled in the context of their Tanzanian tea 
 
1273 Interview with worker B49. 
1274 Interviews with manager D1, local government representative E2, and doctor C49; although 
community member C55 said that the HIV/AIDS programme was only for workers. 
1275 Interview with trade union representative F2.  
1276 Interview with local government representative E2. 
1277 Interview with local government representative E2. 
1278 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standard F79. 
1279 Unilever ‘Human Rights Report’ (n. 836), 41. 
1280 Ibid. 
1281 Ibid. 
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operations. Unilever’s Tanzanian practice also helps implement the firm’s 
commitment to the right to health as guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights1286 and the ICESCR1287. Finally, it follows the OECD Guidelines 
recommending that companies “assess, and address in decision-making, the 
foreseeable environmental, health, and safety-related impacts associated with the 
processes, goods and services of the enterprise over their full life cycle with a view to 
avoiding or, when unavoidable, mitigating them”1288. However, no positive evidence 
of a link could be established between Unilever’s mechanisms and the firm’s 
HIV/AIDS programme.  
 
5.3.3.2. Health services 
The community mainly uses dispensaries in Sawala and Kibao1289, although no doctor 
works there. Only two nurses work in each dispensary1290 which reportedly lack 
adequate tools1291; nurses can only provide first aid, check-ups for malaria, and 
maternity services1292. This includes deliveries if no surgeon is needed, although one 
community member said that women avoid delivering there because they know that 
they offer poor services1293. For serious issues, including for testing for anything but 
malaria1294, community members who cannot afford private care must go to Mafinga’s 
hospital1295, which is reportedly crowded. The government provides health insurance 
for a monthly amount of Tsh10.000 covering two adults and up to four children; 
insured citizens get treated for free in government health facilities1296. However, 
medication is in short supply in government-run hospitals1297, and most patients must 
buy it from privately-run pharmacies, which are not covered by health insurance1298. 
One civil society representative and two community members complained that there 
 
1286 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25. 
1287 ICESCR, Article 12(1). 
1288 OECD Guidelines, Guideline VI.3. 
1289 Interviews with civil society representative A14, local government representatives E2 and E3, and 
community members C24, C25, C26, C43, C44, C45, C46, C50, C51, C52, C53, C54, C55, and C56,. 
1290 Interviews with community members C27, C29, C30, C43, C44, C45, and C46, doctor C49. 
1291 Interviews with community members C45 and C46. 
1292 Interview with doctor C49. 
1293 Interview with community member C51. 
1294 Interview with community member C27.  
1295 Interviews with community members C24, C25, C26, and C27.  
1296 Interviews with community members C71, C72, C74, and C76.  
1297 Interviews with community members C27, C28, and worker B7. 
1298 Interviews with community member C27, and worker B7.  
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were not enough dispensaries as most of the population in the area is poor and cannot 
afford to travel to the existing centres in Sawala and Kibao1299. Some also complained 
that there were not enough dispensaries for the whole population living in the area1300. 
Although some disagree1301, most interviewees state that Unilever’s hospital offered 
good services1302, but only if one can access its services for free as a worker (or as a 
worker’s dependent) since it is otherwise too expensive1303 1304. The company’s 
hospital has 83 beds, an operational theatre and a maternity ward with adequate 
equipment1305, and provides most services which are found in regular hospitals1306. It 
also provides family-planning counselling1307, and delivers free medication1308 and 
services, including occupational health check-ups1309, to all workers and up to four 
dependants. This includes seasonal employees1310 – although until recently dependants 
of seasonal workers did not have access to free treatment1311. A worker with a serious 
medical condition said they mainly wanted to keep working for Unilever because of 
the free surgery and treatment available at the company’s hospital1312. Unilever’s 
provision of free healthcare to its workers and their dependents is in line with the 
Rainforest Alliance standards1313. It also respects the right to health as guaranteed by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1314, although Unilever has not, once again, 
translated this high-level principle into concrete standards for direct implementation 
 
1299 Interview with civil society representative A14 and community members C43 and C44. 
1300 Interviews with community members C45 and C46. 
1301 Interviews with community members C23, C29, C30, and workers B2. The latter said that services 
were good only for upper management, and that workers preferred to go to government-run hospitals 
or private clinics. 
1302 Interviews with community members C24, C25, C26, C27, C28, and workers B7. 
1303 Services reportedly cost Tsh100.000/day for a bed (C51); Tsh60.000 for a consultation (C24, C25, 
and C26); and Tsh150.000 for delivery (C24, C25, and C26). 
1304 Interviews with local government representative E2, community members C27, C28, C29, C30, 
C47, C50, C51, C53, C54, C55, and C56, doctor C49, and workers B32; manager D1 and local doctor 
C20 confirmed that community members who were not workers or workers’ dependents had to pay for 
services. 
1305 Interview with manager D1. 
1306 Interview with doctors C20, C45 and C46. 
1307 Interview with doctors C45 and C46. 
1308 Interview with manager D1. 
1309 Interview with doctor C20. 
1310 Interviews with workers B7 and B23. 
1311 Interview with manager D1. 
1312 Interview with manager D9. 
1313 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous Improvement Criterion 4.31. 
This criterion was also included in the previous standard (criterion 5.16.). 
1314 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25.  
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on the ground. In any case, no positive evidence linking the firm’s mechanisms and 
Unilever’s contribution to the health of its employees was found. 
However, contrary to workers who can access Unilever’s health services for free, 
community members must pay high fees to be treated at Unilever’s hospital1315 and 
therefore do not benefit from living near the company’s hospital apart from 
HIV/AIDS-related services1316. This is in conflict with the Rainforest Alliance 
requirement that management implement and document activities to support identified 
needs and priorities of the community1317, and with the right to health as guaranteed 
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1318.  
 
5.3.4. Right to education 
There are a dozen primary and secondary schools in the villages around Unilever. The 
firm’s school was founded in 1994, originally for managers’ children (although 
enrolment is no longer restricted) and is still currently run by the corporation. Although 
Unilever partially subsidises enrolment for their employees1319, annual fees are too 
high for most workers except for management1320 1321. Consequently, only 30% of the 
125 pupils enrolled are Unilever employees’ children1322. Most workers send their 
children to government-run schools1323, which are in need of refurbishment1324 and of 
housing facilities for teachers1325. There were reports of complaints to Unilever about 
it1326, although I could not independently verify these allegations. Moreover, there 
 
1315 For detail of prices, see (n. 1303). 
1316 See the section above. 
1317 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.47. 
Although this criterion is a ‘continuous improvement criterion A’ which is not binding on firms until 
they have been certified for six years, and therefore will not become a requirement for Unilever before 
2023, the previous standard already included a similar criterion (critical criterion 7.2.) – the firm 
therefore had to implement this criterion when the fieldwork took place. 
1318 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25. 
1319 The company subsidises 40% of the fees (interview with community member C21). Manager D1 
only said that the company offered subsidies. 
1320 Annual school fees are: full secondary boarders: Tsh3 million; primary full boarders: Tsh2.7 
million; day primary pupils: Tsh1.4 million (interview with community member C21). 
1321 Interviews with manager D8, local government representative E3, workers B7, B17, B18, B19, B23, 
B26, B29, B32, B33, and B34, and community members C27, C47, C52, C53, C54, C55, and C78. 
1322 Interview with community member C21. 
1323 Interviews with manager D8, local government representative E3, workers B26, B29, B32, B33, 
and B34, and community members C47, C55, and C51.  
1324 Interviews with local government representative E2, and community members C28, C29 and C30.  
1325 Interview with schoolteacher C28. 
1326 Interviews with community members C29 and C30. 
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were reports of a lack of teachers in public schools1327, especially science teachers1328, 
although other community members disagree1329. It was usually acknowledged that 
there were enough schools1330, however there were conflicting reports concerning 
attendance1331 and one report of poor performance1332 and of difficulties encountered 
by parents to provide their children with all necessities1333. The fact that Unilever’s 
school is so expensive means that workers and community members alike cannot 
benefit from it, which clashes with the Rainforest Alliance requirement that the firm 
provides all workers with access to basic education1334, as well as with the (already 
mentioned) label’s requirement that management implement and document activities 
to support identified needs and priorities of the community1335. Finally, it fails to fulfil 
Unilever’s commitment to the right to education as guaranteed by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights1336 and the ICESCR1337. Indeed, the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights interprets the right to education to include 
“affordability”1338. 
However, it is important to note that Unilever built the Lugoda primary school, which 
is now run by the government1339, and that the company still materially contributes to 
it1340. They have also provided funds for a biology laboratory for a secondary school 
in Kibao1341 and have built some dormitories for secondary students1342. It is usually 
acknowledged by the local government, community members, and the firm itself, that 
 
1327 Interviews with civil society representative A14, worker B7, and community members C24, C25, 
C26, and C56. 
1328 Interview with civil society representative A14. 
1329 Interviews with local government representative E2, and community member C23.  
1330 Interviews with local government representative E2, and community members C27, C28, C43, C44, 
and C50. 
1331 Community member C27 said that attendance was poor while community member C47 said that all 
children were going to school. 
1332 Interview with community member C27. 
1333 Interview with community member C50.  
1334 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.31. 
This criterion was also included in the previous standard (criterion 5.17.). 
1335 Ibid, Continuous improvement criterion 4.47. Although this criterion is a ‘continuous improvement 
criterion A’ which is not binding on firms until they have been certified for six years, and therefore will 
not become a requirement for Unilever before 2023, the previous standard already included a similar 
criterion (critical criterion 7.2.) – the firm therefore had to implement this criterion when the fieldwork 
took place. 
1336 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26.  
1337 ICESCR, Article 13.  
1338 UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 13, 1999, §6. 
1339 Interviews with managers D5 and D6. 
1340 Interviews with managers D5 and D6. 
1341 Interview with local government representative E2.  
1342 Interview with manager D1. 
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the company contributes to the needs of schools in the area1343, which helps Unilever 
fulfil the commitments it made to the different instruments mentioned above – 
although no positive evidence linking the company’s mechanisms to the firm’s support 
for schools in the area was found. To the contrary, a representative from the local 
government linked the contributions made by Unilever to the needs of the community 
in the past few years to the influence of the current government1344; another 
representative of the local government confirmed this by explaining that the firm had 
contributed desks following President Magufuli’s call to the private sector for desks to 
be provided to schools1345. 
 
Now that I have assessed Unilever’s human rights performance against the firm’s 
standards and attempted to link practice on the ground to commitments on paper, I will 
use the framework of ‘key features’ developed in Chapter 3 to investigate the 
effectiveness of Unilever’s self-regulatory mechanisms.  
 
5.4. Preliminary investigation into the effectiveness of Unilever’s 
self-regulatory mechanisms 
In Chapter 4, I outlined what Unilever publicly states it is doing to implement its 
commitments. In this chapter, I have investigated what the company is doing in 
practice, focusing on its tea operations in the Tanzanian region of Mufindi. It is now 
important to assess the effectiveness of the firm’s self-regulatory mechanisms using 
the framework of ‘key features’ developed in Chapter 3: Unilever’s standards drafting 
(and the potential impact of Mufindi’s stakeholders), the embedding of its standards 
into its everyday tea operations in Mufindi, the monitoring and reporting of the 
compliance of its Mufindi tea operations with its standards, the firm’s complaints 
mechanism, and the potential sanctions for breaches of standards by its workers and 
contractors in Mufindi.  
 
1343 Interviews with managers D5 and D6, local government representative E2, and community members 
C24, C25, and C26. 
1344 Interview with local government representative E3.  
1345 Interview with local government representative E2. 
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First, workers or community members are not involved in the drafting or updating of 
global policies1346. Locally, the only contribution which workers make is at the level 
of the negotiation of CBAs through their trade union representatives1347. This may 
explain why so few workers – and no community members – are aware that Unilever 
has made human rights commitments or adopted self-regulatory mechanisms, and why 
there is no feeling of standards ownership: workers are trained on certain standards, 
but that is the end of it. Another issue is the fact that some of Unilever’s high-level 
commitments – mainly made using company-level mechanisms – have no translation 
into concrete behaviour on the ground. In this case, it is unclear how the firm expects 
its employees (and subcontractors) to behave so that these commitments are met, 
which makes their implementation difficult. For instance, for lack of more specific 
guidelines, it is difficult to determine whether the right to a family life as guaranteed 
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1348 and the ICCPR1349, and the right to 
an adequate standard of living, including adequate housing, as guaranteed by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights1350 and the ICESCR1351 are upheld by 
Unilever when the firm provides small houses to its workers with (for most of them) 
no electricity. Even though the Rainforest Alliance sets specific standards on minimum 
size for housing, the fact that workers must share their one-room house with their 
children and no electricity, and sleep in the same room as they cook and eat may lead 
to the violation of their rights under the different instruments mentioned above – but 
whether it is actually the case is unclear, in the absence of detailed standards using 
‘means’-type command. In the same vein, the lack of specific requirement that all 
workers be compensated for work-related injuries means that it may be difficult to 
determine whether or not the fact that seasonal workers are not entitled to 
compensation violates the ICESCR guaranteeing the right to “the enjoyment of just 
and favourable conditions of work”1352. This leaves an important potential gap in the 
human rights protection afforded to workers. Finally, even the most ground-level 
instruments have gaps. Indeed, the Rainforest Alliance, despite its set of 119 
 
1346 Interviews with local government representative E2, workers B17, B18, B19, B23, B24, B27, B28, 
and B34, and community members C53, C54, C55, and C56. 
1347 Interviews with manager D8 and workers B31, B32, B33, and B34. 
1348 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16. 
1349 ICCPR, Article 23.  
1350 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25. 
1351 ICESCR, Article 11. 
1352 ICESCR, Article 7.  
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criteria1353, fails to cover some issues, which may lead to important human rights 
consequences. 
Second, as covered in Chapter 3, the embedding of standards into everyday activities 
include external and internal communication of standards, training of workers and 
managers, reward systems for standard implementation and whistleblowing, and 
establishing special units to implement policies affecting the well-being of employees. 
In Unilever’s tea operations in Mufindi, communication about the firm’s policies 
mainly takes place during training. External and internal communication seems to 
focus on the Code of Business Principles as it appears to be the main instrument about 
which workers and subcontractors are trained by Unilever1354. Indeed, a manager said 
that they had started a “huge drive” on the Code of Business Principles because it was 
not being implemented; the firm therefore says that it has trained all its employees (and 
subcontractors) on the Code’s standards to ensure that the latter would be cascading 
down to the workers. This demonstrates that the firm itself does not consider that the 
mere adoption of a code automatically guarantees its implementation – the embedding 
of an instrument, most importantly carried out through regular training of all 
concerned, is considered by the firm to be required if that instrument is to be effective. 
However, it is important to note that, beyond the general statement of a general “drive” 
towards training of workers and subcontractors, no positive evidence of a link was 
found between the Code (or any other of Unilever’s self-regulatory instruments) and 
the specific training courses mentioned by interviewees. It is therefore difficult to find 
evidence of any real impact of this “drive”, despite management’s motivation to 
implement the Code’s standards.  
These trainings are conducted by the workers’ union or by the corporation, and mainly 
focus on health and safety, HIV/AIDS, sexual harassment, and general provisions of 
CBAs1355. These are issues where the firm performs particularly well and where its 
practice is mostly respectful of human rights. This tends to confirm that, even though 
self-regulatory instruments may not trigger training courses and though it is not 
explained to workers that the rules may come from certain human rights policies1356, 
 
1353 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, 8. 
1354 Interview with manager D1. 
1355 Interviews with manager D8 and workers B24, B27, B28, B29, B32, B33, B34, and B49.  
1356 Interviews with workers B17, B18, B19, and B24. Also, interview with worker B49, who 
specifically said that they were never trained about the label’s standards. 
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training stakeholders on human rights standards may have a positive impact on 
whether Unilever respects (relevant) human rights. It would therefore appear that the 
training offered to workers helped change their behaviour1357 – and consolidate it. 
Moreover, managers are trained by the human resources department on the provisions 
contained in CBAs1358 but no mention of further training was made. This may explain 
why certain standards included in the Code of Business Principles which are relevant 
to management are not followed, such as anti-discriminatory policies protecting 
pregnant women, and requirements that contracts be made available to workers, that 
all overtime remain voluntary, and that workers have access to a confidential, fair, and 
transparent complaints mechanism. Overall, this shows that the mere presence of a 
code is not as important as the content of the code (and the training offered to 
individuals who should implement it), contrary to some scholars’ view1359. 
Moreover, no reward system for implementation of standards or whistleblowing seems 
to be in place. In conclusion, the embedding of Unilever’s standards in its Tanzanian 
tea operations partially include the key characteristics identified as important to ensure 
that corporate self-regulatory mechanisms are effective, and those human rights issues 
where embedding has been actively and consistently implemented do appear to have 
improved. 
Finally, an important feature would be ‘establishing special units to implement policies 
affecting the well-being of employees’, as suggested by Philip Selznik1360. Indeed, 
Unilever has improved its record in terms of gender-related issues after setting up its 
Welfare Office, which helped embed respect for women into the firm’s practice and 
structure. However, it is interesting to see that the firm did not do so in order to 
implement its standards. This ‘feature’ may therefore help firms respect human rights 
even in the absence of self-regulatory mechanisms – however, it is acknowledged that 
the importance of this ‘feature’ is linked to the financial health of the company, which 
is one of the external factors covered in Chapter 8. Indeed, only companies which are 
financially healthy can afford to set up specific departments and hire employees 
dedicated to these issues. 
 
1357 Dean (n. 405), 285; Maclagan (n. 405), 415; Kearney (n. 363), 211; Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166), 
228; and Schwartz (n. 320), 258; and Sims (n. 395), 504.   
1358 Interview with manager D1.  
1359 Adams, Tashchian, and Shore (n. 387), 208. 
1360 Selznick (n. 351), 101.  
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Third, monitoring of Unilever’s compliance in Mufindi with standards takes place 
internally (through impact assessments, the firm’s relationship with the community, 
and reports by health and safety officer) and externally (third-party audits). Tanzanian 
consulting firm TRES Consult has conducted 11 studies and environmental impact 
assessments between 2014 and 20161361 for Unilever Tea Tanzania Limited. Although 
these assessments are not publicly available, it is stated on their website that the firm 
has conducted assessments of environmental impact of the tea plantations 
specifically1362, but that the most recent ones were mostly conducted in preparation for 
the construction of small irrigation dams and for the expansion of smallholder farms 
in nearby villages1363. This practice seems to be in line with the OECD Guidelines 
recommend1364 and may have contributed to the generally good environmental record 
of Unilever’s tea activities. However, I could not find trace of any other impact 
assessment carried out by Unilever’s Mufindi tea operations, whether human rights-
focused or not, and no positive evidence of the conduct of human rights due diligence 
was found. Carrying out such due diligence may have helped with identifying priority 
issues for workers such as higher wages and equal working conditions for permanent 
and seasonal workers, and for community members such as access to water and to 
affordable and adequate health services. Moreover, internal monitoring also takes 
place through the firm’s relationship with the local community and its health and safety 
officer. The local government stated that they had a strong relationship with 
Unilever1365 – although their complaints have been met with mixed success. On the 
one hand, the firm has not responded to calls from local government representatives to 
help with access to water1366, and a manager acknowledged that the company did not 
help with this issue1367.  On the other hand, the same government representatives stated 
that, following a meeting with corporate representatives in 2017, the company had 
taken measures to ensure that their fertiliser would no longer pollute water sources1368. 
Furthermore, Unilever monitors its compliance with health and safety standards by 
having a dedicated officer regularly tour the facilities and plantations to ensure that all 
 
1361 TRES Consult (n. 841).  
1362 TRES Consult, ‘Clients’ <http://www.tresconsult-tz.com/clients> (accessed on 21 October 2019) 
1363 TRES Consult (n. 841).  
1364 OECD Guidelines, Guideline VI.3. 
1365 Interview with local government representative E3.  
1366 Interview with local government representative E3.  
1367 Interview with manager D1. 
1368 Interview with local government representative E3. 
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relevant policies are implemented1369. As I have seen in this chapter, health and safety 
is an issue which Unilever seems to take particularly seriously, and this compliance 
with relevant OHS standards may be explained by the fact that the firm has a dedicated 
officer monitor the situation. This shows that internal compliance monitoring plays a 
role in the effectiveness of self-regulatory standards.  
External monitoring is done via Rainforest Alliance audits, conducted every three 
years to check that all the label’s standards are implemented. The latest audit took 
place in August 2018 and Unilever’s renewed certificate is now valid until 2021. 
Added to the clearly-defined threat of non-renewal of certification, audits seem to play 
an essential role in Unilever’s compliance with product-level standards: in 2014, after 
losing its Rainforest Alliance certification, the firm modified its behaviour to meet the 
criteria and earn the certification back. However, it is notable that some issues which 
were flagged up as inconsistent with the label’s standards during my own fieldwork 
(e.g. denial of free PPE to seasonal workers) do not appear to have been identified 
during the certification audits. Third-party monitoring of performance was overall 
found to be crucial for the effective implementation of standards, but also showed 
important limitations inherent to the audit process and problematic for the firms’ 
human rights performance. 
Furthermore, a feature identified as important regarding monitoring and reporting of 
corporate behaviour is, as outlined in Chapter 3, transparency, and it is notable that the 
Rainforest Alliance organisation publishes summaries of all its audits, and therefore 
ensures that the process is, to some extent, transparent1370, allowing for a higher level 
of scrutiny and accountability of firms, but also of organisations in charge of product-
level mechanisms. However, the rest of Unilever’s monitoring is unreported: even 
though Unilever covers the ‘human rights’ performance of some of its factories and 
plantations around the globe, its Mufindi tea operations were not one of those sites 
about which the firm did its reporting. The only reporting which I have found was 
about sexual harassment in the tea plantations1371, which is an issue where Unilever 
performs fairly well and has shown improvement. However, it is difficult to determine 
whether Unilever performs well because they chose to be transparent about it, or 
 
1369 Interview with manager D1. 
1370 AfriCERT (n. 780). 
1371 Unilever ‘Human Rights Report’ (n. 836), 35. 
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whether they reported on this issue because they were performing well. Moreover, 
another key feature (which was found to be important) may have played a role in this 
good performance: Unilever organises training sessions on sexual harassment and 
broader gender-related issues. This may suggest that transparency does play an 
important role in the implementation of standards and in corporate respect of human 
rights, but that it is particularly effective when combined with other factors.  
In conclusion, it is difficult to assess Unilever’s internal monitoring as different 
accounts have been collected about the firm’s complaints mechanism and relationship 
with the community, and the various processes offer limited transparency. However, 
external monitoring of the company’s operations is more firmly established and is 
regularly conducted in a fairly transparent manner – although more systematic 
reporting by the company about its own operations is desirable to ensure that all sites 
are covered, and some important limitations of the auditing process were uncovered. 
Overall, Unilever’s self-regulatory mechanisms therefore implement, to some extent, 
the suggestions of scholars as outlined in Chapter 3, which was shown to help (to some 
extent) with the implementation of standards and the firm’s respect of human rights.  
Fourth, there seem to be recent efforts on the part of Unilever to set up a free phone 
complaint mechanism1372, which is linked to the firm’s Mufindi welfare office. 
Managers stated that they could identify three phases since the phoneline was set 
up1373: first, workers were wary and therefore did not much use the phone number; 
second, as they became used to it, Unilever started receiving a significant number of 
complaints and the welfare department was reportedly kept significantly busy for a 
couple of years; and third, the department no longer receives as many complaints since 
many grievances have now been resolved. Managers also said that they used to receive 
threats, and that a significant number of complaints concerned private matters such as 
child abuse or domestic violence1374. It follows that this complaints hotline seems to 
have been successful in helping not only workers but also the community, in line with 
Unilever’s commitments. However, the majority of workers whom I interviewed did 
not know about the phone complaints mechanism1375, and the two workers who knew 
 
1372 I have seen signs on Unilever’s premises advertising a phone number which workers may call if 
they want to make a report.  
1373 Interviews with managers D5 and D6. 
1374 Interviews with managers D5 and D6. 
1375 Interviews with workers B7, B17, B18, B19, B23, B25, B26, B28, B31, B33, and B49.  
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about it said that it was not anonymous1376. Moreover, no worker knew about their 
right to contact the Rainforest Alliance or the label’s certification bodies. This situation 
conflicts with Rainforest Alliance requirements1377, Unilever’s Code of Business 
Principles1378 1379, and the firm’s Human Rights Policy1380, Sustainable Agriculture 
Code1381, and Responsible Sourcing Policy1382. It also clashes with Unilever’s own 
report of existing “internal and external channels for raising concerns, anonymously if 
required” and of “an external channel to third parties”1383. In particular, the fact that 
workers do not know about their right to access certification bodies for grievance 
purposes is surprising since Unilever stated that effective complaints mechanisms in 
certification programmes were very important and an area of focus for the firm since 
they “provide a channel for workers to address and seek remedy to non-conformance 
issues that may also initially go undetected or develop over time”1384. As a result, 
workers do not know about these channels of communication and only rely on their 
trade union representatives to let management know of any concerns1385, which is not 
an anonymous process and may contribute to the fact some human rights issues are 
still taking place in Unilever’s operations, such as the inadequate working conditions 
of seasonal workers or issues with freedom of association and TPAWU’s 
representation of workers. Moreover, community members do not have access to it or 
any other complaints mechanism1386 and may only call on to their local government 
representatives and district commissioner1387 – which does not allow for anonymity. 
A few interviewees said that it would be useful to have access to such a free and 
anonymous mechanism1388 to bring certain issues to the attention of the company. 
Indeed, a formal complaints mechanism open to community members could have 
 
1376 Interviews with workers B24 and B29. 
1377 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical Criterion 4.9. 
1378 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 6, 24.  
1379 The Code of Business Principles makes reference to a “Code Support Line” using EthicsPoint. 
1380 Unilever ‘Human Rights Policy’ (n. 144), 3. 
1381 Unilever ‘Sustainable Agriculture Code’ (n. 827), Standards F103, 108, and 176. However, the 
Code’s mechanism is soft: it only requires farms to have “mechanisms in place to take up ideas and 
suggestions from the workers and provide regular opportunities for two-way dialogue”.  
1382 Unilever ‘Responsible Sourcing Policy’ (n. 826), Standard 10. 
1383 Unilever ‘Human Rights Report’ (n. 836), 58. 
1384 Ibid. 
1385 Interviews with workers B23, B25, B28, B29, B31, B33, and B49. 
1386 Interviews with local government representative E2, and community members C47, C50, C52, C53, 
and C56.  
1387 Interviews with local government representative E2, civil society representative A14, and 
community members C53 and C56. 
1388 Interviews with worker B26, and community members C52 and C53. 
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allowed for the direct communication of important grievances affecting community 
members to the company, such as access to water, water pollution, and access to 
healthcare. This is especially important considering that, as explained above, their 
complaints have until now been met with mixed success. It is uncertain whether a 
formal complaints mechanism – which Unilever has committed to set up and which 
was identified by some scholars as important for effective implementation of human 
rights standards – would have more success in addressing community’s concerns but 
it would certainly offer one more avenue for redressing negative human rights impacts 
of the firm’s activities. It follows that it is difficult to assess the actual added value 
which such mechanisms may have if they were set up, although they could play a role 
in ensuring that stakeholders’ voices are heard and taken into account1389, along with 
other members of the local community, and therefore would contribute to the effective 
implementation of Unilever’s standards.  
Finally, I will address the issue of sanctioning practices by covering first individual 
sanctions for non-compliance and secondly collective sanctions. First, when policies 
are breached by workers, the general consensus (with one exception) among 
interviewees was that Unilever does give out sanctions: workers will first be issued a 
warning (or two), and will ultimately be terminated if they do not change their 
behaviour1390. In particular, management is pushing for the implementation of the 
Code of Business Principles, with the aim of educating workers about it and making 
sure that the principles are respected, and sanctions are included1391 to ensure that the 
code if enforced1392 – let me recall that, of all of Unilever’s company-level 
mechanisms, only the Code includes sanctions. However, this chapter has shown that 
not all of the standards included in the Code are implemented, and that sanctions are 
not necessarily given every time there is a breach: while sanctions for failing to uphold 
the relevant health and safety standards are provided and mostly enforced1393, a few 
workers reported that there was no control from the company, and that it was up to the 
workers to ensure that they were wearing the proper equipment1394. Since it is widely 
 
1389 Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166), 228. 
1390 Interviews with manager D1 and D8, and workers B23, B27, B28, B29, B31, B32, B33, and B34. 
1391 Unilever ‘Code of Business Principles’ (n. 823), 8. 
1392 Interview with manager D1.  
1393 Employees are not allowed to work if they are not wearing the necessary equipment, are sent home 
with no pay (interviews with manager D1, civil society representative A10, and workers B23, B24, B25, 
and B26.)  
1394 Interviews with workers B17, B18, and B19.  
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considered that health and safety standards are taken seriously in Unilever’s Tanzanian 
tea operations, as is outlined in Section 5.2.3. above, this tends to show that sanctions 
are only one of a range of incentives behind the implementation of standards. Second, 
the collective sanction of (Rainforest Alliance) certification non-renewal has forced 
Unilever to change its behaviour on environmental issues1395. Moreover, the fact that 
non-renewal is clearly outlined as the direct consequence for non-compliance sends 
the clear message that Unilever must comply if they want to keep their certification: 
clear sanctioning guidelines therefore help1396. However, these sanctions may be 
insufficient: when, as was explored above, audits are not reliable, the need for 
sanctions for upper management for violations of standards is particularly important. 
Indeed, if non-compliance with (product-level) standards is not necessarily detected 
during audits and therefore punished with non-renewal of the certification, another 
enforcement mechanism would be helpful to ensure that workers’ human rights are 
respected. In a country such as Tanzania where, as explained in Chapter 4, labour 
inspections are rare, enforcement mechanisms for breach of self-regulatory standards 
would be particularly important. It follows that, overall, sanctioning seems to play an 
important role in the effectiveness of Unilever’s self-regulatory mechanisms.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter had a double aim: first, to determine whether Unilever’s operations were 
in line with the firm’s self-regulatory standards; and second, to identify any impact 
which the firm’s self-regulatory mechanisms may have had on the way which the 
company carries out its activities.  
On the first point, Unilever’s human rights performance is mixed. In some respects, 
the company fulfils (or even exceeds) its human rights commitments; it is the case 
regarding the right to freedom from exploitative child labour, to a clean environment, 
and to health. However, the firm fails to implement its own standards – and may even 
breach Tanzanian law – on some issues, such as certain workers’ rights (because of 
the firm’s practice in respect to leaves and seasonal workers’ working conditions), and 
community members’ right to water. For most human rights, Unilever’s performance 
 
1395 Interview with manager D1. 
1396 Sims (n. 395), 504; Jenkins (n. 379), 26; and see (n.78), 56. 
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is mixed as parts of its practice is in line with its own commitments, while others are 
not. For example, on the issue of contracts, Unilever now offers all its employees a 
written contract – which is consistent with the different self-regulatory mechanisms to 
which the firm has adhered – but the company does not provide its workers with a 
copy of their contract – which clashes with its own standards. Other issues on which 
Unilever’s practice is mixed are pay, working time, health and safety, accidents and 
compensation, handling of strikes, discrimination issues, onsite housing, and finally 
health and education services.  
On the second point, only one of Unilever’s self-regulatory instruments was identified 
as having had some discernible impact on the way which the company carries out its 
activities: the Rainforest Alliance certification – although its influence remain focused 
on a few issues. It is notable that, apart from a general statement from Unilever about 
the “huge drive” on the company’s Code of Business Principles currently 
underway1397, I could not identify any concrete impact which the Code has had on 
Unilever’s human rights performance. However, I could determine that the Rainforest 
Alliance has had a positive influence on working time for factory workers, on health 
and safety, and on the relationship between the union and management. A local 
government representative also said that the relationship between the company and the 
community had improved when Unilever got certified, although no more detail was 
provided1398. However, the label’s main influence has been on the environmental 
impact of Unilever’s operations. This is perhaps not surprising considering that the 
label has historically been environmentally focused.  
It is also important to note that factors outside of self-regulatory mechanisms have also 
led to improvements in Unilever’s human rights performance: bottom-up action from 
workers, management’s cooperation with trade unions, the adoption of a collective 
agreement, and the set-up of a welfare department.  I will explore these external factors 
in more detail in Chapter 8.  
In conclusion, Unilever does meet its human rights responsibilities in certain respects 
but (sometimes severe) issues with the firm’s operations and what could be construed 
as violations of the firm’s standards (and possibly of national legislation) were also 
 
1397 Interview with manager D1.  
1398 Interview with local government representative E3. 
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uncovered. And, even when the situation on the ground seemed to be in line with 
Unilever’s commitments, only rarely could I find positive evidence linking the firm’s 
practice with its standards (and other factors were found to also play a role). Overall, 
the self-regulatory mechanisms which Unilever has adopted seem to have had a limited 
impact on the firm’s operations and respect of human rights. I will build upon these 
findings in Chapter 8 to understand the effects which corporate self-regulatory 
mechanisms have had on the behaviour of Tanzanian tea corporations, and to 
determine the extent to which such mechanisms may harness other influential factors 
with the aim to improve corporate human rights performance.  
I will now investigate the human rights performance of MTC, the second company of 
this case study. Chapter 6 will therefore bring more evidence to this case study and 
will allow for a better-informed assessment of the value of corporate self-regulation in 
helping Tanzanian tea businesses improve their human rights performance. 
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Unlike Unilever, MTC does not have an overarching human rights framework. While 
Unilever has committed to the UNGPs and adopted a Human Rights Policy outlining 
the high-level human rights principles which the firm has committed to respecting 
throughout its operations, MTC’s main self-regulatory mechanisms are product-based: 
MTC’s tea has been certified with the Rainforest Alliance since 20131399, with 
Fairtrade since 19941400, and the firm is also a member of ETP. However, the company 
has also adopted company-level instruments; Rift Valley, the corporate group which 
owned MTC until recently, has committed to four ILO conventions1401: ILO 
Convention C100 on equal remuneration, C111 on non-discrimination, and C138 and 
C182 on child labour. Although these four ILO conventions contain high-level 
principles, they also contain operational standards which aim to explain how to 
implement these principles on the ground. Both the Rainforest Alliance and 
Fairtrade1402  also require the implementation of these four ILO conventions by 
certified farms. For more details about the detailed human rights and standards to 
which MTC has committed, please see Annex 3. 
In this chapter, I will assess MTC’s human rights performance as set against the firm’s 
various self-regulatory mechanisms: ILO Conventions C100, C111, C138, and C182, 
the Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade sets of standards. Most importantly, I will 
attempt to determine whether practice on the ground can be linked to these 
mechanisms1403.  
 
1399 Interview with manager D2.  
1400 Loconto ‘Sustainabilitea: Shaping Sustainability in Tanzanian Tea Production’ (n. 209), 193. 
1401 Rift Valley Tea ‘Sustainability Report’ (n. 793). 
1402 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, 44; Rainforest Alliance, ‘Sustainable 
Agriculture Standard’, 2010, 6 and 9; and Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, 19, 21, 26.  
1403 As explained in Chapter 5, the Rainforest Alliance has adopted a new set of standards in 2017. 
However, MTC has been certified since 2013 and until 2017 therefore had to implement the previous 
Rainforest Alliance set of standards, whose last version came into force in 2010. Moreover, a significant 
number of new standards (from 2017) are similar to the old standards (from 2010). Consequently, I will 
assess MTC’s performance against the 2017 critical criteria but will take the 2010 set of standards into 
account for the purpose of assessing the firm’s performance regarding the continuous improvement 
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Once I have assessed MTC’s human rights performance and the impact of the firm’s 
standards, I will build on these findings to assess the effectiveness of MTC’s self-
regulatory mechanisms using the framework of ‘key features’ developed in Chapter 3. 
This chapter is therefore divided into two main parts. The first section will review 
MTC’s human rights performance as assessed against the firm’s own self-regulatory 
standards, first focusing on human rights relevant to workers and second on those 
relevant to community members. The second section of this chapter will investigate 
whether MTC implements in its Tanzanian tea operations the key features which have 
been identified by scholars as helping corporate self-regulation be effective, with the 
aim to evaluate the extent to which they are helpful in reality.  
The company’s human rights performance will now be assessed. As I did for Unilever, 
I will do so for each section by outlining the situation on the ground before laying out 
MTC’s relevant commitments and specific standards and explaining whether the 
firm’s practice is consistent with its standards and, if relevant, whether evidence was 
found to link practice to mechanism(s).   
 
6.2. Worker-related rights 
This section assesses the extent to which the right to just, equitable, and safe working 
conditions of MTC’s workers is respected, and will therefore cover the following 
issues: contractual terms offered to workers, health and safety, freedom of association 
and collective bargaining, the working conditions specific to seasonal workers, and 
finally discrimination issues. 
 
6.2.1. Contractual terms 
This subsection covers all contractual terms offered to MTC’s permanent and seasonal 
workers: presence of contracts, pay, working time, and leaves.  
 
 
criteria which were already standards with which the firm had to comply since 2013. I will also take the 
2017 continuous improvement criteria into account to the extent that firms must prepare for the 
implementation of those criteria which will become applicable in the future. For ease of reading, I will 
refer to both sets of standards as ‘Rainforest Alliance standards’, unless it is important to make a 
distinction between the old and new standards. 
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6.2.1.1. Contracts 
All seasonal and permanent workers have a contract1404, and in that regard the firm 
performs better than some companies operating in Mufindi, as was outlined in Chapter 
5. This practice is also in line with – if not motivated by – Fairtrade1405 and ETP1406 
standards. However, not all workers are provided with copies of their contract1407 
which, combined with the fact that some workers were not given enough time to read 
the terms before signing1408, clashes with Fairtrade requirement that workers be made 
aware of employment terms1409 and with ETP standards that all workers should be 
provided with a copy of their contract1410. Contracts are in Swahili1411, which is in line 
with Fairtrade1412 and ETP1413 requirements that contracts be in a language understood 
by workers, although a worker said that contracts used to be in English and that MTC 
changed their practice after workers complained about it1414. Seasonal workers are 
offered three-, six-, or nine-month contracts1415. A worker on a nine-month contract 
may only start working again once three months have passed after the end of their 
contract, so that they only work nine months for every twelve-month cycle1416. Back 
in the 1960s, there used to be a probation period of three months with no contract, after 
which workers would get a contract1417. However, no changes in MTC’s practices were 





1404 Interviews with manager D2, and workers B3, B4, B5, B6, B37, B38, B39, B40, B41, B42, B43, 
B44, B46, B47, B48, B50, B51, B52, B53, B54, B55, and B56. 
1405 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.6. and 3.5.7. 
1406 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 8.1. 
1407 Workers B37, B39, B40, B47, B48, B52 and B54 did not have a copy. 
1408 Workers B37, B38, B39, B46, and B52 were not given enough time to read their contract before 
signing it, whereas workers B41, B42, B43, B47, B48, B51, B53, B54, and B56 did have time to read 
it. 
1409 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.8. 
1410 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 8.1. 
1411 Interviews with workers B3, B4, B5, B6, B37, B38, B39, B40, B41, B42, B43, B44, B46, B47, B48, 
B50, B51, B52, B53, B54, B55, and B56. 
1412 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.8. 
1413 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 8.1. 
1414 Interview with worker B55.  
1415 Interview with manager D2.  
1416 Interview with worker B56.   
1417 Interview with a former worker, who is now a community member, C62. 
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6.2.1.2. Pay 
Considering that Unilever and MTC are bound by the same CBA signed by TPAWU 
and TAT, they offer the same basic levels of pay to their workers: Tsh154.000 monthly 
for plantation and factory workers1418, up from Tsh145.000 last year1419. However, a 
few workers1420 said that they were paid less (Tsh130.000 monthly), although this 
figure may come from the previous year’s minimum wage minus deductions1421. A 
worker who has been working for the company for over two decades said that they 
receive Tsh175.000 monthly after deductions1422, and other workers said that they 
were paid up to Tsh250.000 during high season1423. The salary of Tsh154.000 
corresponds to the average harvest expected of workers since, similarly to Unilever, 
plantation workers are paid by the kilo. However, MTC has introduced machines in all 
its estates1424 and decreased the price per kilo of tea to Tsh331425, so that workers 
receive the same monthly salary despite a much higher tea picking rate (with the firm 
keeping the difference). A manager explained that, every year, salaries are indexed to 
inflation, and that the cost of living is taken into account when calculating the 
increase1426. In-kind benefits, such as housing, are also considered. Moreover, in line 
with the CBA, MTC offers free onsite housing to workers and provides Tsh30.000 
monthly to cover the rent of workers living offsite1427, although there were mixed 
reports as to whether the firm does implement this provision and provide (even 
permanent) workers with an additional offsite rent allowance1428. However, if the 
company cannot offer seasonal workers accommodation because of a shortage of 
houses – as it sometimes happens –, they do not offer them any financial help for 
 
1418 Interviews with manager D2, and workers B3, B4, B40, B41, B42, B43, B44, B46, B54, and B56.  
1419 Interview with manager D2.  
1420 Interviews with workers B6, B51, B52, and B53. 
1421 Deductions, which may include a contribution to the National Social Security Fund, retirement, 
TPAWU fees, funeral services as well as potential loan payback, amount to Tsh15.000 monthly on 
average (worker B50), which is in line with Fairtrade (Standard 3.5.2.) and ETP (Standard 5.4.) 
requirements as deduction of TPAWU fees from salary is included in the CBA (Article 4(3)).  
1422 Interview with worker B50.  
1423 Interviews with workers B37, B47, and B48. 
1424 Interview with worker B40.  
1425 Interviews with workers B37, B39, B40, B47, and B48. 
1426 Interview with manager D2, who explained that in 2010-11, salaries had increased by 20% because 
of high inflation levels.  
1427 Interview with manager D2.  
1428 Worker B3 said they did, whereas worker B4 said that they did not.  
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rent1429. This clashes with Fairtrade standards which requires that all workers living 
offsite be compensated if the company offers free housing onsite1430.  
Payment of wages higher than minimum wage – Tsh100.0001431 – is in line with ETP 
standards1432, and the collective negotiation and yearly review of wages seems to be in 
line with Rainforest Alliance standards1433 1434 and with Fairtrade requirements1435, 
although no positive evidence linking the labels to the practice was found. Moreover, 
there does not seem to be any discriminatory practices in the payment of wages 
between male and female workers, which is in line with the Rainforest Alliance1436, 
ETP1437, and the ILO Convention C1001438. 
However, as for Unilever, MTC’s practice does not take living wage levels into 
account when negotiating workers’ salaries. A manager – to whom I explained the 
concept of ‘living wage’ as they were not familiar with it – said that it would be 
difficult to determine living wage levels1439. Yet, as I have outlined in Chapter 5, the 
Rainforest Alliance requires wages to progress towards living wage levels1440. 
Fairtrade also requires wage levels to increase every year to close the gap with living 
wage1441. It was reported that wages are too low, and that workers must farm or conduct 
other business on the side to survive1442, despite the fact that they are entitled to 
important in-kind benefits such as free housing and healthcare for themselves and their 
dependents. A worker reported that work in the boiler room – which was reported to 
be especially hard and sometimes lethal1443 – was made particularly dangerous because 
workers cannot reportedly afford a balanced diet on their salaries and their health 
 
1429 Interview with manager D2.  
1430 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.28. 
1431 Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania (n. 583). 
1432 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 5.1. 
1433 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.5 and continuous 
improvement criterion 4.27. 
1434 It is notable that MTC did not have to comply with that requirement at the time when the fieldwork 
was conducted. 
1435 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 3.5.1. and 3.5.3. 
1436 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical Criterion 4.3. 
1437 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 7.1.  
1438 ILO Convention C100, Article 2.  
1439 Interview with manager D2.  
1440 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criteria 4.29. and 
4.33. 
1441 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.4. 
1442 Interviews with workers B3 and B4.  
1443 Interviews with workers B42 and B50.  
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therefore fails faster than it would otherwise1444. It follows that MTC’s employees do 
not receive a living wage – although it is acknowledged that the firm does provide 
important in-kind benefits – and that the firm’s practice therefore clashes with its 
standards.  
Finally, one tea plucker complained that they had not been paid for four months and 
that, even though MTC had reportedly acknowledged that it was a mistake, nothing 
had been done1445. This clashes with Fairtrade1446, Rainforest Alliance1447, and ETP1448 
standards stating that pay should be made at regularly scheduled intervals. Some local 
civil society representatives said that disputes over underpayment of wages are 
common in the area1449.  
 
6.2.1.3. Working time 
Working time is different depending on the categories of workers: I will first review 
MTC’s practice regarding tea pluckers; second, factory workers; and third, security 
workers. Finally, I will investigate the firm’s practice regarding overtime.    
First, tea pluckers work six days a week, between 7am and 5pm or 6pm during high 
season, and from 7am until 2pm during low season1450. Working time during high 
season therefore clashes with the Rainforest Alliance1451, Fairtrade1452, and ETP1453 
requirements that employees do not work more than 48 regular hours per week. There 
is no overtime for plantation workers1454 except for the workers who pack tea into 
trucks at the end of the day1455 – although one worker said that the extra hours were 
not paid at the overtime rate, despite the fact that it means that those workers can work 
up to 12 hours a day during high season1456. Beyond the potential clash regarding 
working hours, Fairtrade requires that all overtime be paid at least 1.5 times the regular 
 
1444 Interview with worker B42 
1445 Interview with worker B51.  
1446 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.5. 
1447 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.21. 
1448 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 5.2. 
1449 Interviews with civil society representatives A11 and A12.  
1450 Interviews with workers B6, B37, B39, B40, B47, B48, B51, B52, and B53. 
1451 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.10. 
1452 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.9. 
1453 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 6.1. 
1454 Interview with workers B37, B51, B52, and B53 
1455 Interview with worker B51.  
1456 Interview with worker B51.  
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rate1457, which is the level of overtime pay fixed by the CBA1458 – although I have no 
information about whether this premium rate was really offered to MTC workers. 
Finally, all plantation workers are given one hour for lunch1459, which is in line with 
the Rainforest Alliance1460 and Fairtrade1461 requirements, although there is no 
evidence that MTC’s practice was motivated by the labels.    
Second, factory workers work for eight hours a day, six days a week1462, which is 
consistent with the Rainforest Alliance1463, Fairtrade1464, and ETP1465 requirements. 
One employee said that workers had complained in 2012 about long working hours as 
they worked 12 hours a day. As a result, the company changed practice and decided to 
schedule three 8-hour daily shifts instead of two 12-hour shifts1466. No overtime is 
allowed1467, although one worker said that sometimes overtime is permitted in the 
factory and paid double the usual rate1468, which would be consistent with Fairtrade1469 
and ETP1470 standards. Factory workers are also given one hour for lunch1471, which is 
in line with both labels’ standards as outlined above.  
Third, security workers work eight hours a day, six days a week1472, which is, again, 
consistent with the Rainforest Alliance1473, Fairtrade1474, and ETP1475 requirements, 
although no positive evidence linking the firm’s mechanisms and its practice was 
found.  
Finally, I will review MTC’s practice on overtime. There are conflicting reports about 
whether security workers must do four hours of compulsory weekly overtime1476. 
 
1457 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.12. 
1458 TAT-TPAWU CBA, Article 17(2). 
1459 Interviews with manager D2 and workers B6, B37, B47, B48, B52, and B53. 
1460 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.10. 
1461 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.14. 
1462 Interviews with workers B41, B42, B43, B46, B54, and B55. 
1463 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.10. 
1464 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 3.5.9. and 3.5.10. 
1465 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 6.1. 
1466 Interview with worker B55.  
1467 Interviews with workers B41, B43, B46, and B54.  
1468 Interview with worker B56.  
1469 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.12. 
1470 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 6.2. 
1471 Interviews with manager D2 and workers B54 and B55.  
1472 Interviews with workers B3, B4, B38, and B50. 
1473 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.10. 
1474 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 3.5.9. and 3.5.10. 
1475 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 6.1. 
1476 Workers B3 and B4 said that there was weekly compulsory overtime, while workers B38 and B50 
said that there was no overtime. 
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Moreover, one worker said that no overtime was available for plantation or factory 
workers1477 but, according to a manager, overtime is generally allowed and some 
overtime, when it is approved by a manager, is compulsory, although limited so that 
workers do not work for no more than 54 weekly hours1478. This practice, which seems 
to follow the CBA’s provisions1479 as already mentioned in Chapter 5, clashes with the 
Rainforest Alliance1480, Fairtrade1481, and ETP1482 standards.  
  
6.2.1.4. Leaves 
Permanent and seasonal workers are not entitled to the same leaves. 
On the one hand, permanent workers are entitled to 28 days of annual leave1483 
(although a few workers said 26 days1484), with a travel allowance amounting to 65% 
of their salary1485 in addition to their regular wages. This exceeds the two-week annual 
vacation required by both the Rainforest Alliance1486 and Fairtrade1487, and is in line 
with ETP standards1488 requiring that firms’ practice regarding annual leave follow 
national legislation1489. In line with national legislation, permanent workers are also in 
theory also entitled to 63 days of sick leave with full pay and another 63 days with 
half-pay1490 1491. However, most workers said that they were only entitled to two 
days1492 1493, although some specified that an extension was allowed if the illness is 
 
1477 Interview with worker B42. 
1478 Interview with manager D2.  
1479 TAT-TPAWU CBA, Article 17(1). 
1480 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criteria 4.10. and 4.11. 
1481 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.11. 
1482 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 6.2. 
1483 Interviews with manager D2, and workers B4, B38, B41, B42, B43, B46, B50, B51, B53, B54, B55, 
and B56.  
1484 Interviews with workers B3, B5, and B6.   
1485 Interview with manager D2. A few workers (B38, B50, B55) also said that they had an additional 
payment on top of their salary for their annual leave, although there were conflicting reports as to the 
amount.   
1486 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.23. 
1487 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.13. 
1488 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 6.3.  
1489 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 31(1). 
1490 Interview with manager D2. 
1491 All workers need a medical certificate to get sick pay (for details of the relevant legal provision, see 
(n. 1010)). 
1492 Interviews with workers B3, B38, B41, and B43, although worker B42 said that workers were 
entitled to 63 days with full pay, and another 63 days with half pay. Workers B50, B51, B54, and B55 
did not specify how long workers were allowed to take sick leave. 
1493 Worker B6 said that permanent workers were entitled to three days a week, depending on how 
serious the illness is. 
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serious1494 – for instance, a worker fell sick and was reportedly given five days of sick 
leave after spraying (and inhaling) chemicals1495. However, if it is true that MTC 
generally limits its sick leave policy to two days, the practice would clash with 
Fairtrade standards protecting sick workers from termination and loss of income1496, 
and with the ETP requirement that workers be offered sick leave as legally defined by 
national legislation1497. Moreover, workers seem to be offered the statutory 84 days of 
maternity leave to which they are entitled by law with full pay1498. One worker also 
said that she had received Tsh300.000 on top of her salary as part of her maternity 
leave1499. This maternity leave policy is in line with Rainforest Alliance1500, 
Fairtrade1501, and ETP1502 standards. For the first six months after they return to work, 
nursing mothers are allowed to take two (paid) hours off every day to breastfeed their 
new-born1503, which is consistent with Fairtrade requirements1504. Finally, a manager 
said that permanent workers may take up to four days of paternity leave with full 
pay1505, although workers said that it was only three days1506.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
On the other hand, seasonal workers stated that they do not have access to maternity 
leave1507. This clashes with Rainforest Alliance1508, Fairtrade1509, and ETP1510 
standards. A seasonal worker stated that she was fired when the company found out 
that she was pregnant, and that it was more difficult for her to get hired again after the 
birth of her child than it was for her seasonal colleagues1511 – although I could not 
verify this information myself. This is at odds with Rainforest Alliance1512, 
 
1494 Interviews with workers B4, B5, and B47.  
1495 Interview with worker B51.  
1496 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.15. 
1497 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 6.3. 
1498 Interviews with manager D2, and workers B3, B4, B5, B6, B38, B41, B42, B43, B46, B50, B51, 
B53, B54, and B56.  
1499 Interview with worker B54.  
1500 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.25. 
1501 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.17.  
1502 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 6.6. 
1503 Interview with manager D2.  
1504 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.18. 
1505 Interview with manager D2.  
1506 Interviews with workers B6, B38, and B46. 
1507 Interviews with workers B37, B39, B40, B47, B48, B52, and B56. 
1508 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.25. 
1509 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.13. 
1510 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standards 6.3. and 6.6. 
1511 Interview with worker B43.  
1512 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.3. 
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Fairtrade1513, and ETP1514 standards. Moreover, seasonal workers say that they are not 
entitled to paternity leave1515, which is at odds with national legislation1516 – but none 
of MTC’s self-regulatory instrument include requirements for paternity leave. 
Furthermore, the absence of annual leave for seasonal workers1517 clashes with the 
Rainforest Alliance standards requiring a pro-rata of the two-week annual vacation 
time to which permanent workers are entitled1518, and with ETP standards1519. Finally, 
despite what a manager said1520, most seasonal workers said that they could only take 
one or two days of sick leave1521, and a few stated that it was unpaid1522 (workers 
therefore go to work even if they were sick). This is at odds with Fairtrade1523 and 
ETP1524 requirements as mentioned above.  
 
6.2.2. Health and safety 
This section will first provide a general assessment of MTC’s health and safety 
practice, second its specific practice regarding medical check-ups, and finally its 
record on accidents and compensation.  
 
6.2.2.1. General considerations 
MTC have a health and safety committee which oversees all relevant policies and 
measures1525, and a compliance officer conducts checks on a regular basis. This is 
consistent with the Rainforest Alliance1526, Fairtrade1527, and ETP1528 standards, 
 
1513 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.16. 
1514 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standards 6.6. and 7.3. 
1515 Interviews with workers B37, B39, B40, B47, B48, B52, and B56. 
1516 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 34(a).  
1517 Interviews with workers B37, B39, B40, B47, B48, B52, and B56. 
1518 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.23. 
This criterion was also included in the previous standard (criterion 5.6.). 
1519 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 6.3. 
1520 Interview with manager D2.  
1521 Interviews with workers B37, B40, B47, and B48.  
1522 Interviews with workers B37 (said that beyond one day, it was unpaid), B39, and B40. 
1523 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.15. 
1524 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 6.3. 
1525 Interview with D2.  
1526 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.14. 
1527 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 3.6.2., 3.6.3., and 3.6.4.  
1528 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standards 3.2. and 3.8.  
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although it is unclear whether these checks are conducted jointly with workers’ 
representations, as the latter require1529.  
Workers have different safety equipment depending on their position. Tea pluckers’ 
equipment consists of an overall, coat, hat, and of boots1530 1531, whereas chemical 
sprayers must wear masks, gloves, helmet, glasses, and an overall1532. They also have 
access to a special room for storing and mixing chemicals, and of changing rooms for 
workers1533, which seems to be consistent with Rainforest Alliance1534 and 
Fairtrade1535 requirements. Factory workers, depending on the department, may have 
to wear gloves, mask, helmet, ear protection, eye and ear protection, and safety 
boots1536. However, workers are not always provided with gear1537, and therefore must 
buy it themselves1538 1539. This is also true for workers in dangerous jobs (e.g. boiler, 
where workers have reportedly died from work-related illnesses1540). A manager 
admitted that the company does not always provide safety gear despite the fact that 
they are supposed to do so1541 as they say that they are not at full capacity because of 
late deliveries and the fact that equipment wears out faster than anticipated1542 1543. 
Workers said that they are not allowed on company premises if they are not wearing 
adequate equipment1544, or if they are intoxicated1545, but a manager stated that, 
because of the lack of safety gear, they sometimes work without the appropriate 
gear1546. The same manager also explained there were no sanctions for not wearing 
 
1529 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.6.4.; and ibid, Standard 3.8.  
1530 Interviews with workers B6, B47 and B48.  
1531 However, it would seem that only the boots and aprons are compulsory (interviews with workers 
B47 and B48). 
1532 Interviews with workers B51 and B52. 
1533 Interview with manager D2 and researcher’s observation.  
1534 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.17. and continuous 
improvement criterion 4.38. 
1535 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.6.1. 
1536 Interviews with workers B5, B41, B43, B46, B50, B55, and B56.  
1537 Interviews with workers B39, B40, B41, B42, B43, B44, B46, B47, B48, B50, B51, B53, B54, B55, 
and B56.  
1538 Interviews with workers B40, B46, B51, B52, and B55.  
1539 Worker B40 said that boots cost Tsh13.000 and aprons Tsh15.000.  
1540 Interviews with workers B42 and B50.  
1541 Interview with manager D2. 
1542 Interview with manager D2.  
1543 However, a worker (B44) said that it was mainly because the company was in a financial crisis – 
although they now have a new investor. 
1544 Interviews with workers B6, B46, B51, B53, B54, B55, B56,  
1545 Interview with worker B5.  
1546 Interview with manager D2.  
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safety gear as the company was opting for education for the moment1547 1548. Overall, 
MTC’s practice may clash with Rainforest Alliance1549, Fairtrade1550, and ETP1551 
requirements that all protective gear be provided to workers free of charge. Finally, 
security workers must wear boots and raincoats but are only provided with clothes1552 
and torches1553, so they must purchase the rest themselves1554. This means that they do 
not reportedly wear adequate boots as they are too expensive to buy on a worker’s 
salary1555. This poses the same problem as for general workers and may clash with 
afore-mentioned standards.  
Finally, workers are trained about health and safety, including relevant Fairtrade and 
Rainforest Alliance standards1556. A manager added that workers were trained in how 
to use and maintain machines, as well as in labour law1557. This general training seems 
to be in line with Fairtrade1558 and ETP1559 standards. 
 
6.2.2.2. Medical check-ups 
A medical examination is conducted when workers are hired1560. Management said 
that there were supposed to be an exit check-up, to verify how the work has affected 
workers and to adapt policies accordingly1561, although all workers but one said that 
there was no such thing1562. No regular medical check-ups during employment and no 
 
1547 Interview with manager D2.  
1548 However, worker B39 said that they would be terminated if they do not wear appropriate gear. 
1549 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criteria 4.5 and 4.15. 
1550 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 3.6.1. and 3.6.24. 
1551 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.4. 
1552 Interview with worker B3. 
1553 Interview with worker B38. 
1554 Interviews with workers B3 and B38. 
1555 Interview with worker B3. 
1556 Interviews with workers B46 and B55. 
1557 Interview with manager D2. 
1558 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 3.6.1., 3.6.6., and 3.6.7. 
1559 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.3. 
1560 Interviews with workers B37, B38, B39, B40, B41, B42, B43, B46, B47, B48, B51, B53, B54, B55, 
and B56.  
1561 Interview with manager D2. 
1562 Interviews with workers B37, B38, B39, B40, B41, B43, B46, B47, B48, B51, B53, B54, B55, and 
B56. 
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exit examination are reportedly conducted, which is at odds with Fairtrade1563, the 
Rainforest Alliance1564, and ETP1565  standards, and with national legislation1566.  
 
6.2.2.3. Accidents and compensation 
Although work-related accidents are reportedly rare1567, it is important to investigate 
whether injured workers have access to free medical treatment and whether they are 
compensated. Here again, permanent and seasonal workers are treated differently. 
On the one hand, permanent employees have access to free medical treatment in case 
of a work-related injury1568, which is consistent with Fairtrade1569 and ETP1570 
requirements, although there is no evidence that standards drove MTC’s adoption of 
this practice. Moreover, they have access to compensation after a work-related 
accident1571, although a few employees complained that MTC usually says that it is 
the injured worker’s fault and so denies them compensation1572. A worker stated that 
employees had been complaining about this practice, but that there had been no 
changes1573. This practice is at odds with ETP standards1574, but neither the Rainforest 
Alliance nor Fairtrade require compensation.  
On the other hand, seasonal workers only have access to free medical treatment until 
their contract expires1575, which clashes with the Fairtrade requirement that MTC 
provide access to appropriate healthcare in case of work-related illness or injury1576. 
Furthermore, seasonal workers do not have access to compensation1577. Some 
employees stated that they have been complaining about the situation, but that there 
 
1563 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.6.20.  
1564 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.41. 
1565 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.12. (although this standard is specifically for workers who come 
into contact with hazardous chemicals). 
1566 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 24. 
1567 Interviews with workers B5, B6, B53, B54, B55, and B56. 
1568 Interviews with manager D2, and workers B51, B52, and B56. 
1569 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.6.18. 
1570 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.12. 
1571 Interview with manager D2, and workers B5, B6, B37, B38, B39, B41, B42, B46, B50, B54, and 
B55. 
1572 Interviews with workers B37, B38, B42, and B50. 
1573 Interview with worker B50.  
1574 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.12. 
1575 Interviews with workers B39, B40, B44, and B51. 
1576 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.6.18. 
1577 Interviews with workers B38, B39, B40, B42, B44, B47, and B48. 
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had been no changes1578. It is notable that, again, ETP is the only self-regulatory 
mechanism adopted by MTC which includes standards about compensation for 
workers in case of work-related injury1579. This gap in the rest of the instruments 
negatively impacts the right of workers to the enjoyment of just and favourable 
conditions of work – especially considering that ETP no longer carries out audits to 
check compliance with their standards –, which I will discuss further in the conclusion 
to this chapter.  
 
6.2.3. Freedom of association and collective bargaining 
This section will first provide a general assessment of MTC’s practice regarding 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, and second of the firm’s specific 
practice regarding strikes. 
 
6.2.3.1. General considerations 
TPAWU is the trade union for MTC workers1580. Registration appears to be 
compulsory for all workers, with a fee taken out of their monthly wage1581, which 
clashes with the right to free association as required by the Rainforest Alliance1582, 
Fairtrade1583, and ETP1584. 
Trade union representatives are workers elected by their peers1585, who regularly meet 
with the company to discuss potential issues1586, which is consistent with Fairtrade 
requirements1587. At national level, TPAWU leaders negotiate CBAs with TAT on a 
biannual basis1588. Such activities are consistent with Rainforest Alliance1589, 
 
1578 Interviews with workers B47 and B48.  
1579 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.12. 
1580 Interviews with manager D2, and workers B3, B4, B5, B6, B37, B38, B39, B40, B41, B42, B43, 
B46, B47, B48, B51, B52, B53, B54, B55, and B56.   
1581 The monthly fee is Tsh3.900; interviews with workers B6, B37, B38, B39, B40, B41, B42, B43, 
B46, B47, B48, B51, B52, B53, B54, B55 and B56.  
1582 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.4. 
1583 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.4.2. 
1584 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 2.1. 
1585 Interviews with workers B38, B46, B51, and B53. 
1586 Interviews with workers B3, B4, and B6.  
1587 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.4.8. 
1588 Interview with manager D2. 
1589 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.4. 
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Fairtrade1590, and ETP1591 standards. A worker stated that TPAWU also trained them 
about CBAs1592 and a trade union representative stated that TPAWU leaders trained 
workers on relevant issues1593, but others said that they did not know anything about 
CBAs1594, so it is difficult to assess the extent to which workers are trained by TPAWU 
leaders. Civil society representatives stated that TPAWU representatives were not 
properly trained in labour laws and related issues, and so cannot defend workers’ rights 
appropriately1595. This clashes with Fairtrade standards1596.  
There are conflicting reports about the effectiveness of TPAWU as a trade union 
defending workers’ interests: some workers said that it was effective1597, while others 
stated that representatives had the interests of the company at heart1598. If the union is 
indeed influenced by management, it would be at odds with the Rainforest Alliance 
requirement that the right to free association be guaranteed by MTC1599. Moreover, 
there were concerns about the political bias of TPAWU as the union representatives 
were alleged to be members of the ruling party1600, although I could not verify this 
piece of information myself. 
Finally, there was no report of discrimination against trade union representatives, or 
of attempts by the company to stop representatives from meeting with workers, which 
is in line with Fairtrade1601 and ETP1602 requirements, although there is no indication 






1590 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.4.10. 
1591 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 2.2. 
1592 Interview with worker B55.  
1593 Interview with trade union representative F2.  
1594 Interviews with workers B51, B52, and B56.  
1595 Interviews with civil society representatives A11 and A12.  
1596 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 2.4.4. 
1597 Interviews with workers B4, B5, and B6. 
1598 Interviews with workers B41, B51, and B54. 
1599 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.4. 
1600 Interviews with civil society representatives A11 and A12. 
1601 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 3.4.1. and 3.4.5. 
1602 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 2.4. 
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6.2.3.2. Strikes 
In 20141603, a strike organised by workers turned violent1604. Workers started striking 
to protest against low wages paid late1605, and against a specific manager1606. A 
manager said that the company called the police because the strike was illegal and 
admitted that some striking workers were arrested and/or terminated1607 1608. As 
mentioned in Section 5.2.4.2. about Unilever, the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association and the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations have frequently stated that the right to strike is a fundamental right 
of workers and of their organisations based on ILO C087’s provisions1609. The 
Committee on Freedom of Association has also emphasised that responsibility for 
declaring a strike illegal should lie with an independent body which has the confidence 
of the parties involved1610 – which was not the case here. It follows that MTC did not 
implement its standards in this instance.  
Another important point to make is the fact that, as will be investigated later in this 
chapter1611, no free and anonymous complaints mechanism is available to workers; yet 
having access to such a mechanism could perhaps ensure that complaints are 
peacefully resolved. 
 
I will now investigate the working conditions of MTC’s seasonal workers, especially 





1603 Interviews with manager D2 and workers B37, B38, B39, B40, B41, B42, B43, B46, B47, B48, 
B51, B52, B53, B54, B55, and B56. 
1604 Interviews with workers B38, B39, B41, B46, B47, B48, B51, and B55.  
1605 Interviews with manager D2 and workers B4, B5, B37, B38, and B51. 
1606 Interview with manager D2.  
1607 Interviews with manager D2 and workers B37, B38, B39, B40, and B42. 
1608 According to trade union representative F2, the strike did not follow proper procedure which 
requires 28 days’ notice to given to the company (during which negotiations occur) because workers 
were too angry to wait before starting the strike.   
1609 Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero And Horacio Guido, ‘ILO Principles Concerning the Right to 
Strike’, International Labour Reviews 137(4), 1998, 9. 
1610 Ibid, 32.  
1611 See Section 6.4. 
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6.2.4. Working conditions of seasonal workers 
MTC’s permanent and seasonal workers are treated differently, based on their 
employment status. Seasonal workers do not have access to leaves – although it is 
unclear whether this includes paid sick leave or not, as explained in Section 6.2.1.4. 
Moreover, as will be explained in the section below, pregnant women are reportedly 
discriminated against when they apply for seasonal contracts, and a seasonal worker 
said that she had been fired when the company found out that she was pregnant 
(although I could not verify this information myself). Another discriminatory practice 
is the reported fact that seasonal workers only have access to free healthcare after a 
work-related accident until their contract expires, and that they are not entitled to 
compensation. Finally, MTC does not provide financial help to seasonal workers 
whom they cannot accommodate onsite, while permanent workers are given a rent 
allowance, as explained above in section 6.2.1.2. This differentiation in treatment of 
MTC’s workers based on their employment status is at odds with multiple certification 
standards, as is outlined in each relevant section.   
  
6.2.5. Right to non-discrimination 
This section will be divided between discrimination at the hiring stage and during 
employment, and will be mainly focused on gender.  
 
6.2.5.1. Hiring stage  
There have been reports of cases of discrimination, mainly based on gender, at the 
hiring stage. There were multiple reports of discrimination against pregnant 
women1612, for seasonal and permanent jobs1613. A manager admitted that pregnant 
workers would only be hired for seasonal jobs if they were deemed fit enough to 
perform their duties for the entirety of their contract, so that their recruitment remains 
financially coherent for the company1614. Moreover, as explained in the section above, 
a worker stated that her seasonal contract had been terminated when her manager 
 
1612 Interviews with workers B38, B39, B40, B41, B44, B46, B50, B51, and B56.   
1613 Interview with worker B46.  
1614 Interview with manager D2.  
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found out that she was pregnant, and that it had been difficult to get rehired after she 
gave birth1615 – although I could not verify this information myself. However, a 
corporate manager stated that pregnant women were hired for permanent positions1616, 
although there were multiple reports of discrimination also for permanent positions1617. 
As was the case with Unilever, this practice clashes with Rainforest Alliance 
requirement that there be no discrimination against pregnant women1618, as well as 
with ILO Convention C111 as seen above and with ETP standards1619 . However, it is 
notable that the company does not seem to require that women take pregnancy tests 
before offering them employment1620, which would be in line with Fairtrade1621 and 
ETP1622 standards.  
However, as was the case with Unilever, it is notable that there is no discrimination 
against people living with HIV/AIDS1623. Although it is consistent with Rainforest 
Alliance1624, Fairtrade1625, and ETP1626 standards, there was no indication from 
interviewees that the company’s practice was driven by it.    
 
6.2.5.2. Employment stage 
MTC’s performance in terms of gender-based discrimination is mixed. On the one 
hand, most workers said that there was gender equality1627 and the company paid male 
and female workers the same rate for the same work, which is consistent with the 
Rainforest Alliance1628 and ETP1629 requirements and with ILO Convention C100. 
Moreover, a manager stated pregnant workers are given light factory jobs1630, although 
 
1615 Interview with worker B43. 
1616 Interview with manager D2.  
1617 Interviews with workers B38, B39, B40, B41, B46, B50, B51, and B56.  
1618 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical Criterion 4.3. 
1619 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standards 7.1. and 7.3. 
1620 Interview with worker B43.  
1621 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.3.2.  
1622 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 7.3. 
1623 There were no reports from workers, community members, local government or civil society 
representatives of such discrimination, and a manager said that they hired people living with HIV/AIDS.  
1624 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.3.  
1625 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.1.1. Fairtrade standards refer specifically to 
“HIV/AIDS status” as a prohibited ground for discrimination.  
1626 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 7.1. 
1627 Interviews with workers B37, B38, B39, B40, B42, B46, B47, B48, B50, B52, B53, B54, B55, and 
B56. 
1628 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical Criterion 4.3. 
1629 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 7.2. 
1630 Interview with manager D2.  
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I could not verify this claim. If it is true, it would be in line with Rainforest Alliance 
requirements1631– however, no link has been established by the company between this 
policy and the certification standards. On the other hand, there are reports of gender-
based discrimination. For instance, some positions are reserved for men (although it is 
acknowledged that this practice aims to guarantee women’s safety). Indeed, women 
are not allowed to operate machines in the plantations1632 – although workers do say 
that it does not affect their level of pay1633. It was also reported that women are not 
allowed to do chemical spraying1634, and that easy jobs in the factory are for 
women1635. This practice may clash with Rainforest Alliance standards1636 as well as 
the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention No 111, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights1637, and the ICESCR1638. Finally, night 
security shifts are also reserved for men1639, which is in line with ILO Night Work 
(Women) Convention No 891640 but may clash with the instruments mentioned before.  
Finally, there were no reports of crèche facilities offered to workers, which may be 
inconsistent with Fairtrade1641 and ETP1642 requirements and with the firm’s own 
report1643.  
Furthermore, as explained in Chapter 5, a particularly problematic issue in tea 
plantations in Mufindi is sexual harassment1644. A manager stated that MTC had 
adopted a relevant policy following their zero-tolerance approach1645, which is in line 
with ETP standards1646 (although no positive evidence of a link was found): women 
can reportedly go to women representatives if they need to speak about any gender-
 
1631 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.18.  
1632 Interviews with workers B47 and B48. 
1633 Interviews with workers B47 and B48. 
1634 Interview with worker B52. 
1635 Interview with manager D2. 
1636 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical Criterion 4.3.  
1637 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(1) and (3).  
1638 ICESCR, Articles 2(2) and 7.  
1639 Interview with manager D2.  
1640  
1641 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.28. 
1642 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.13. 
1643 On its website, the company says that the provide “creches for staff to provide care for their children 
during working hours” (Rift Valley Tea, ‘The future and the edification of societies that will determine 
tomorrows’ Africa’ <http://www.riftvalley.com/education/#1466502267340-4fff5b5b-62b3fe77-
89b5> (accessed on 21 October 2019)). 
1644 Interviews with civil society representatives A10 and A13.  
1645 Interview with manager D2. 
1646 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 9.1. 
P a g e  | 250 
 
related issues, which will lead to an investigation and potential severe consequences. 
Indeed, following a complaint and an investigation, a manager was reportedly 
terminated for sexual harassment1647. This procedure for sexual harassment with 
potential sanctions if found guilty is in line with Rainforest Alliance1648, Fairtrade1649, 
and ETP standards1650, although no evidence linking the standards and the practice was 
found. The company was also looking to hire a gender activist to train workers because 
there is a gap to fill, according to a manager1651; this would be in line with Fairtrade 
requirements1652. Although the project is now on hold because of the change of 
investors1653, TPAWU leaders reportedly give seminars about gender-related issues 
independently from the company1654 – although a civil society representative said that 
trade union representatives did not always manage to protect women adequately1655. 
A manager stated that certification with Fairtrade and the Rainforest Alliance had 
helped by putting an emphasis on the implementation of the firm’s policies on gender-
related issues1656. Certification audits are also reportedly used to educate workers about 
the policies1657.  In conclusion, even though the firm’s practice is not entirely 
compliant with its standards, MTC takes this issue seriously, and certification 
mechanisms have reportedly had a positive impact on the firm’s practice.  
 
6.3. Community-related rights 
In this section, I will review MTC’s performance as set against community-related 
human rights standards, which will be relevant to workers and the broader community 
living around MTC’s plantations. I will therefore investigate living conditions onsite, 
MTC’s contribution to the health and education needs of the population (and any other 
contribution) in the area, and the company’s impact on the environment. 
 
 
1647 Interview with manager D2. 
1648 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criterion 4.2.  
1649 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 3.1.5., 3.1.6., and 3.5.27. 
1650 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 9.2. 
1651 Interview with manager D2. 
1652 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 2.2.6. 
1653 Interview with manager D2. 
1654 Interview with trade union representative F2 and worker B56.  
1655 Interview with civil society representative A13.  
1656 Interview with manager D2. 
1657 Interview with manager D2. 
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6.3.1. Housing and living conditions 
Although I could not access the houses, workers reported that they were too small for 
families1658, and that there was no running water1659 apart from communal taps outside. 
A manager said that water testing was done onsite annually to verify that water was 
safe1660 – although workers must still boil it before they can drink it. This clashes with 
the Rainforest Alliance1661, Fairtrade1662, and ETP1663 requirements that the firm 
provide potable water to its workers onsite, although it is important to keep MTC’s 
environment in mind; running water remains rare in the area1664, and the population 
makes sure that water is drinkable by boiling it or using special pills. Community 
members also stated that, in contrast to the situation in the village, access to water was 
easy on MTC’s premises1665. Moreover,  electricity is available in some of the houses 
but not all1666 1667, which is consistent with the living conditions in the region, 
considering that only about 60% of houses have electricity in the area1668. However, 
none of MTC’s mechanisms includes standards about the availability of electricity in 
workers’ housing.  
Some workers also complained that onsite housing was overcrowded, and that houses 
for general labour were in bad conditions with stoves and beds in the same room1669, 
whereas houses for managers were in adequate condition1670. As a result, some workers 
decided to move offsite1671. This clashes with Rainforest Alliance1672, Fairtrade1673, 
and ETP1674  requirements about reasonable levels of decency, privacy, and hygiene in 
 
1658 Interviews with workers B4, B5, B39, B51, and B53. 
1659 Interviews with workers B4, B5, B37, B40, B41, B54, and B56. 
1660 Interview with manager D2.  
1661 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical Criterion 4.12. 
1662 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 2.2.10. 
1663 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.14. 
1664 Interviews with community members C61, C63, C67, and C68. 
1665 Interviews with workers B42, B43, B46, B47, B48, B52, B53, B54, and B55, and community 
member C74.  
1666 Interviews with manager D2 and workers B4, B5, B37, B39, B40, B41, B46, B54, and B56.  
1667 Manager D2 said that the company intended to install electricity in more houses when they have the 
funds.  
1668 Interviews with local government representatives E4 and E5.  
1669 Interviews with workers B38, B39, B40, B41, B42, and B53. 
1670 Interview with worker B41.  
1671 Interviews with workers B38, B40, B42, B51, and B53. 
1672 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous Improvement Criterion 4.30. 
This criterion was also included in the previous standard (criterion 5.14.). 
1673 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.28. 
1674 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.14. 
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company housing. A community member also said that workers moved offsite because 
it was too difficult to farm or raise cattle as a business onsite1675.  
 
6.3.2. Right to health 
This section will first cover the main health issues reported around MTC’s operations, 
and second the health services available to workers and community members. 
6.3.2.1. Health issues 
The main health issues around MTC’s operations are poor access to water and STDs 
(and in particular HIV/AIDS). 
First, as discussed in the previous section, there is no running water in the area, and 
access to water in general is difficult1676. Unless community members own a pump or 
are wealthy enough to afford to pay for water in the village1677, they may have to walk 
for an hour to reach wells1678. The local government said that there was a project of 
water supply, but that it was only still at the first stage – although it will reportedly 
involve MTC at a later stage1679. Even though a manager said that shallow wells were 
built in the village as part of Fairtrade1680, many community members and local 
government representatives said that MTC had never contributed to improving access 
to water in Itona1681. MTC have reportedly built dams, but villagers are not allowed to 
fetch water there1682. As noted in Section 5.3.3.1., Rainforest Alliance requires firms 
to “implement and document activities to support identified needs and priorities of the 
community”1683. By not contributing – or not in a way which substantially helps the 
 
1675 Interview with community member C62.  
1676 Interviews with local government representatives E4, E5, and E6, workers B3, B4, B5, B38, B42, 
B43, B44, B46, B50, B51, B52, B53, B54, B55, B56, and community members C61, C62, C63, C64, 
C65, C66, C67, C68, C70, C71, C72, C73, C74, C75, C76, C77.  
1677 Interviews with community members C58, C59, C60, and C69. 
1678 Interviews with community members C68, C75, C76, and C77. 
1679 Interview with local government representative E6.  
1680 Interview with manager D2.  
1681 Interviews with local government representatives E4 and E5, workers B37, B38, and B55, and 
community members C58, C59, C60, C61, C62, C63, C64, C65, C67, C68, C69, C70, and C76. 
1682 Interview with community member C61.  
1683 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.47. 
Although this criterion is a ‘continuous improvement criterion A’ which is not binding on firms until 
they have been certified for six years, and therefore will not become a requirement for Unilever before 
2023, the previous standard already included a similar criterion (critical criterion 7.2.) – the firm 
therefore had to implement this criterion when the fieldwork took place.  
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community – to the urgent needs of the community in terms of access to water, MTC 
fails to meet the Rainforest Alliance requirements.  
Second, one of the main health issues in Mufindi, as outlined in the previous chapter, 
is STDs, and specifically HIV/AIDS. The fact that many migrant workers live in the 
area1684 and work for tea corporations (including MTC) has been identified as one of 
the causes of this phenomenon. Immigration due to tea activities has been so high in 
the last few decades that Itona, the local village, would not reportedly exist if it was 
not for MTC1685. A few community members estimated that 90% of Itona inhabitants 
were migrant tea workers1686. Because HIV/AIDS is so widespread in the area, 
TPAWU leaders reportedly train workers about HIV/AIDS1687, and MTC provides an 
HIV/AIDS-prevention programme to workers from time to time. However, most 
workers agree that the programme has not run in some months1688, which means that 
they must go to the dispensary to get support. A manager stated that the company’s 
clinic operates the programme monthly and that the firm’s doctor goes around the area 
and provides support to workers and community members1689. However, it is unclear 
whether this is the same programme as the one described by workers. Indeed, no 
community members was aware of an MTC’s programme open to community 
members1690, and local government representatives said that there was no company-
sponsored HIV/AIDS programme for community members1691. The clinic also 
provides Community-based Therapeutic Care, which is conducted as part of a national 
programme which was started a few years ago and is run in partnership with 
USAID1692. An HIV/AIDS-positive worker said that they get all medicine and support 
for free1693. It is therefore unclear if MTC’s practice is consistent with Fairtrade1694 
and ETP1695 standards requiring MTC to adopt and implement a policy to prevent and 
 
1684 Interviews with local government representatives E4 and E5, and community members C22, C58, 
C59, C60, C61, C62, C63, C64, C65, C66, C67, C68, C69, C70, C71, C72, C73, C74, C75, C76, and 
C77. 
1685 Interviews with local government representatives E4 and E5.  
1686 Interviews with community members C62, C67, and C68. 
1687 Interview with union representative F2.  
1688 Interviews with workers B37, B38, B39, B41, B43, B46, B47, B48, B51, B52, and B53. 
1689 Interview with manager D2.  
1690 Community members C58 and C59 denied having ever heard of an HIV/AIDS programme run by 
MTC and open to community members.  
1691 Interviews with local government representatives E4 and E5.  
1692 Interview with manager D2.  
1693 Interview with worker B50.  
1694 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.6.30. 
1695 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.12.  
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deal with contagious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, with the Rainforest Alliance 
requirement that the company contributes to the specific needs of the community1696, 
or with the firm’s report that they pursue “vigorous wellness programmes focusing on 
preventative healthcare and HIV/AIDS awareness”1697.  
 
6.3.2.2. Health services 
MTC has one dispensary in each estate1698 1699; treatment is free for workers, their 
spouse, and up to four of their children until they turn 18 years old1700. This is 
consistent with Fairtrade’s requirements that workers be provided with free 
healthcare1701, although there is no evidence that the label has influenced MTC’s 
practice.  There was no report of a shortage of doctors or medicines in MTC’s 
dispensaries.   
Community members may use MTC’s health centres but must pay for treatment1702 
1703, which many cannot afford1704. Community members therefore go to local 
government’s dispensary1705, where only two nurses work and there is no doctor1706. 
There is also no family planning service1707, so women must go to Mafinga for 
deliveries1708, and there were multiple reports of a lack of medicines in local 
dispensaries1709. The fact that MTC’s health centre is expensive for community 
 
1696 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.47. 
Although this criterion is a ‘continuous improvement criterion A’ which is not binding on firms until 
they have been certified for six years, and therefore will not become a requirement for Unilever before 
2023, the previous standard already included a similar criterion (critical criterion 7.2.) – the firm 
therefore had to implement this criterion when the fieldwork took place.  
1697 Rift Valley, ‘Social Impact’ < http://www.riftvalley.com/#impact> (accessed on 21 October 2019).  
1698 Apart from the estate in Ikanga and the Head Office in Dar es Salaam.  
1699 Interview with manager D2. 
1700 Interviews with manager D2, and workers B4, B5, B6, and B50. 
1701 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.6.29. 
1702 Treatment usually costs Tsh 5.000, and Tsh 15.000 per bed per day.  
1703 Interviews with community members C22, C61, C62, C64, and C65. 
1704 Interviews with community members C64, C65, and C76.  
1705 Interviews with local government representatives E4, E5, and E6, and community members C58, 
C59, C60, C61, C62, C63, C64, C65, C66, C67, C68, C69, C70, C71, C72, C73, C74, C75, C76, and 
C77. 
1706 Interviews with local government representatives E4, E5, and E6, and community members C61, 
C63, C68, and C69. 
1707 Interview with community member C60. 
1708 Interviews with community members C58, C59, and C60.  
1709 Interviews with community members C60, C70, C73, C74, and C75. 
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members despite the lack of full health facilities in the area may be at odds with 
Rainforest Alliance standards1710.  
 
6.3.3. Right to education 
Most interviewees said there were enough schools and teachers in the area1711 1712, 
although a few disagreed1713 and stated specifically that more science teachers were 
needed1714. There were generally no reported issues, although the local government 
said that infrastructures were poor1715, and other interviewees said that performance 
was poor1716 (which one interviewee linked to overcrowded classrooms1717). Some 
community members complained that schools were very far and that children had to 
walk a long distance every day1718, and I indeed observed children walking down long 
roads between Itona and Mtili (where one of the schools is). 
MTC has made significant contributions to the education needs of the community: the 
firm built a school in the area1719 and, although the firm does not run it anymore1720, it 
still contributes to its activities by donating its old electronics and paying for the 
school’s water and electricity bills1721. MTC also used to provide security staff to the 
school but can no longer afford to do so1722. Teachers are provided with free water and 
electricity1723, and the Fairtrade premium was used to build houses for secondary 
 
1710 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.47. 
Although this criterion is a ‘continuous improvement criterion A’ which is not binding on firms until 
they have been certified for six years, and therefore will not become a requirement for Unilever before 
2023, the previous standard already included a similar criterion (critical criterion 7.2.) – the firm 
therefore had to implement this criterion when the fieldwork took place.  
1711 There are two primary and one secondary schools in the area (interviews with local government 
representatives E4, E5, and E6). 
1712 Interviews with local government representatives E4 and E5, workers B5, B6, B37, B40, B41, B43, 
B46, B47, B48, B51, B52, and B55, and community members C58, C59, C61, C62, C63, C64, C65, 
C66, C67, C68, C71, C72, C73, C76, and C77. 
1713 Interviews with worker B54 and community member C74. 
1714 Interviews with workers B38, community members C22, C69, and C75. 
1715 Interviews with local government representatives E4 and E5.  
1716 Interviews with worker B51 and community member C61. 
1717 Interview with worker B51. 
1718 Interviews with community members C58 and C59.  
1719 Interviews with manager D2, local government representatives E4 and E5, workers B3 and B6, and 
community members C62, C64, C65, C68, and C69. 
1720 Interviews with manager D2, local government representatives E4 and E5, worker B3, and 
community member C62.  
1721 Interviews with manager D2 and worker B6.  
1722 Interview with manager D2.  
1723 Interview with manager D2.  
P a g e  | 256 
 
teachers1724 1725. Local government representatives also stated that Fairtrade had 
improved its relationship with the firm and that MTC now contributed more, for 
instance by building a laboratory for science classes in addition to Itona school1726. 
However, it is unclear whether the funds came directly from MTC or from the 
Fairtrade Premium Fund. MTC’s efforts to provide children with education are in line 
with the Fairtrade standard requiring the firm to ensure access to primary education 
for the children of all workers1727. It is also consistent with the above-mentioned 
Rainforest Alliance requirement to ensure that important needs of the community are 
met1728. Finally, it is consistent with the firm’s own report that they provide “schools 
for employees’ children, including kindergarten, and primary schools up to the age of 
14 years old”1729 1730.  
 
6.3.4. Other contributions to the community 
The company also contributes to other needs of the community. First, a manager said 
that the firm contributed towards road maintenance when they had the funds1731, 
although some workers complained that the roads were not safe1732. Second, the 
company reportedly contributes towards funeral expenses for community 
members1733, although it is unclear whether the company’s contribution is made 
through the Fairtrade premium or not. Third, a manager from the company said that 
MTC makes a monthly contribution towards the district council’s social responsibility 
fund1734, although I could not independently verify this information.  
 
1724 Interview with manager D2.  
1725 The Fairtrade logo was painted on the houses. 
1726 Interview with local government representatives E4 and E5. 
1727 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 2.2.8. and 2.2.9.  
1728 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 4.47. 
Although this criterion is a ‘continuous improvement criterion A’ which is not binding on firms until 
they have been certified for six years, and therefore will not become a requirement for Unilever before 
2023, the previous standard already included a similar criterion (critical criterion 7.2.) – the firm 
therefore had to implement this criterion when the fieldwork took place.  
1729 Rift Valley Tea ‘The future and the edification of societies that will determine tomorrows’ Africa’ 
(n. 1639). 
1730 However, MTC also says the following: “The primary schools have over the years provided a good 
quality of education for its students and have performed highly in the national league tables.” (see ibid), 
which contrasts with reports that performance was poor.  
1731 Interview with manager D2.  
1732 Interviews with workers B38 and B41. 
1733 Interviews with worker B53, and community members C64, C65, and C67.  
1734 Interview with manager D2. 
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In general, there were mixed opinions about the overall relationship between the 
company and the community. On the one hand, some interviewees stated that the 
relationship was good1735, with some specifying that it took place through local 
government representatives1736 and others stating that it was because the company 
provided local employment opportunities1737. A couple of workers added that MTC 
was increasingly contributing to the needs of the community1738, and a few community 
members made reference to Fairtrade’s contributions1739. On the other hand, a few said 
that there was no relationship between the community and the company1740, or that the 
relationship was bad1741. Overall, and despite the complaints, the company’s 
engagement with, and contribution to, the community is in line with Fairtrade1742 and 
the Rainforest Alliance1743 requirements. However, it is important to note that one of 
the main priorities of the community – access to water – has not been addressed by the 
firm, as was outlined above in section 6.3.2.1. 
 
6.3.5. Right to a clean environment 
Almost all interviewees stated that the firm’s operations had no impact on the 
environment1744, which is consistent with the Rainforest Alliance1745, Fairtrade1746, and 
ETP1747 standards. In particular, there has been no report of pesticide or chemicals 
spraying near zones of human activities1748. A manager stated that the Rainforest 
 
1735 Interview with workers B37, B39, B40, B42, B46, B47, B48, B51, B53, B55, and B56, and 
community members C62, C63, C64, C55, C66, C67, C68, C69, C70, C71, C72, C73, C74, and C77.  
1736 Interviews with community members C75 and C76.  
1737 Interviews with worker B44 and community member C61.  
1738 Interviews with workers B53 and B55.  
1739 Interviews with worker B42, and community members C63, C64, C65, and C66. 
1740 Interviews with workers B43, and community members C22, C58, C59, and C60.   
1741 Interviews with workers B38, and B41. 
1742 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 2.2.8. and 2.2.9.  
1743 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criteria 4.46. and 
4.47. Although this criterion is a ‘continuous improvement criterion A’ which is not binding on firms 
until they have been certified for six years, and therefore will not become a requirement for Unilever 
before 2023, the previous standard already included a similar criterion (critical criterion 7.2.) – the firm 
therefore had to implement this criterion when the fieldwork took place. 
1744 Interviews with local government representatives E4, E5, and E6, workers B37, B38, B39, B40, 
B41, B43, B44, B46, B47, B48, B51, B52, B53, B55, and B56, and community members C58, C59, 
C60, C61, C62, C63, C64, C65, C66, C67, C68, C69, C70, C71, C72, C73, C75, C76, and C77.  
1745 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criteria 2.1.-2.4., 3.8, 3.9. 
1746 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 4.2.6., 4.2.7., and 4.2.9. 
1747 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standards 10.1.-10.7. 
1748 Both the Rainforest Alliance (Continuous improvement criteria 3.27. and 3.28.) and Fairtrade 
(Standards 4.2.6. and 4.2.7.) require that there be buffer zones or barriers between areas sprayed with 
chemicals and natural ecosystems and areas of human activities.  
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Alliance and Fairtrade standards helped the company with its environmental impact, 
although no more detail was provided1749. 
Moreover, regarding specifically the firm’s waste management, a manager stated that 
the firm had special dumping places and a specific system to ensure that nothing ends 
up in the water1750, which is in line with Rainforest Alliance1751, Fairtrade1752, and 
ETP1753 standards. They also have latrines for the use of workers living onsite, which 
is consistent with Rainforest Alliance requirements1754, and MTC collect employees’ 
plastic and glass waste1755, in line with ETP’s standards1756. Apart from a worker and 
a community member1757, all interviewees agreed that MTC’s waste management was 
good1758. A manager stated that certification had helped the company improve its waste 
management1759; in particular, MTC changed its water waste policy to comply with 
the labels’ standard1760 1761, although it is unclear which label in particular is 
concerned. However, it is acknowledged that I had limited capacity to assess such 
technical processes, and that the Rainforest Alliance audit reports from 2016 and 2019 
state that the company does not comply with the relevant standards regarding their 
waste management1762.  
 
Now that I have assessed MTC’s human rights performance against the firm’s 
standards and attempted to link practice on the ground to commitments on paper, I will 
use the framework of ‘key features’ developed in Chapter 3 to investigate the 
effectiveness of MTC’s self-regulatory mechanisms.  
 
1749 Interview with manager D2.  
1750 Interview with manager D2.  
1751 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical and continuous improvement 
criteria 3.2., 3.37., 3.40., and 3.41. The last two criteria were also included in the previous standard 
(criteria 10.1.-10.6.) 
1752 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standards 4.2.10. and 4.4.2. 
1753 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 10.7. 
1754 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Continuous improvement criterion 3.21. 
1755 Interview with manager D2. 
1756 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.14. 
1757 Interviews with worker B54 and community member C74.  
1758 Interviews with local government representative E6, workers B37, B38, B41, B46, B51, and B52, 
and community member C61.  
1759 Interview with manager D2.  
1760 Interview with manager D2. 
1761 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical criteria 3.1., 3.2., and 3.21.; and 
Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 4.3.13. 
1762 NEPCon Kenya (n. 797), 5-6; and Rainforest Alliance, ‘Public Summary of Audit Report – MTC’, 
Rainforest Alliance, 2016, 6.  




6.4. Preliminary investigation into the effectiveness of MTC’s self-
regulatory mechanisms  
In Chapter 4, I outlined what MTC publicly states it is doing to implement its 
commitments. In this chapter, I have investigated what the company is doing in 
practice. It is now important to assess the effectiveness of the firm’s self-regulatory 
mechanisms using the framework of ‘key features’ developed in Chapter 3. However, 
as explained in the same chapter, MTC has no control over the substantial development 
of the standards included in the self-regulatory mechanisms which it uses; 
investigating the drafting process of MTC’s mechanisms is therefore outside the scope 
of this thesis. I will therefore focus on the following features: the embedding of its 
standards into its everyday activities, the monitoring and reporting of the compliance 
of its operations with its standards, the setting up of a complaints mechanism, and the 
potential sanctions for breaches of standards in Mufindi.  
First, the embedding of a firm’s commitments into its everyday activities was 
identified in Chapter 3 as important to ensure that corporate self-regulation is 
effectively implemented. It includes communication to workers about the content of 
policies and training of workers and managers on standards, as well as reward systems 
for upholding the standards and for whistleblowing. In the case of MTC, workers 
whom I interviewed only knew that the company had adopted policies, but not their 
specific content1763. However, as for Unilever, it would appear that communication of 
some MTC’s policies does take place1764, albeit only as part of training on the specific 
issue of health and safety1765. Training on CBAs is also supposed to take place, 
although it is unclear whether it does take place or whether it is conducted in a 
satisfactory way1766, as was explained above in section 6.3.2.1. Training on HIV/AIDS 
prevention is also supposed to be offered to workers – although, when the interviews 
took place, it did not seem to be running1767, and community members are in any case 
 
1763 Interviews with workers B4, B5, and B6. 
1764 I focus here on internal communication because MTC does not reportedly have subcontractors and 
the firm’s policies do not apply to its suppliers.  
1765 Interviews with manager D2 and workers B46 and B55. 
1766 Interviews with civil society representatives A11 and A12 and workers B51, B52, B55, and B56. 
1767 Interviews with workers B37, B38, B39, B41, B43, B46, B47, B48, B51, B52, and B53. 
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excluded1768. Moreover, a training programme on gender-related issues was supposed 
to start, but plans were derailed when the company was taken over, as was mentioned 
above in section 6.2.5.2. This failure on the part of the company to provide education 
on gender-related issues may explain why a worker reported that TPAWU have started 
running their own seminars, leading to behavioural improvement. It therefore appears 
that the training offered to workers helped change their behaviour, as suggested by 
some authors1769 – and consolidate it. Finally, no reward system for upholding MTC’s 
policies is in place as the company does not review the performance of low-skilled 
labour1770. No evidence of a reward system for whistleblowing was found either, and 
it is therefore difficult to assess the difference such a system would have on the 
effective implementation of MTC’s standards.   
Second, the monitoring of MTC’s compliance with its own commitments takes place 
internally and externally. Internal monitoring is conducted by the company’s 
compliance manager, who reportedly inspects all estates on a rolling basis1771. 
However, even though it is required by ETP1772, I could not find any due diligence or 
human rights impact assessment which MTC has conducted, and no evidence was 
found of the implementation of the firm’s ESMS. If such assessments had been 
conducted, it could have helped identify and address the negative human rights impact 
and risks of MTC’s operations, such as low pay, problematic health and safety 
practices and working conditions of seasonal workers, and poor access to water. This 
feature is therefore important in ensuring that standards are effectively implemented. 
Furthermore, external monitoring is done via Fairtrade and the Rainforest Alliance 
audits (there is no third-party monitoring of compliance conducted by ETP itself or 
with ILO conventions standards), conducted every three years to check that all the 
respective label’s standards are implemented. The latest Rainforest Alliance audit took 
place in September 2017 and MTC’s renewed certificate is now valid until 2020 – 
although they did undergo a surveillance audit in March 2019. As Fairtrade reports are 
not publicly available, I do not know when the latest audit took place. These audits 
 
1768 Community members C58 and C59 denied having ever heard of an HIV/AIDS programme run by 
MTC and open to community members.  
1769 Dean (n. 405), 285; Maclagan (n. 405), 415; Kearney (n. 363), 211; Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166), 
228; and Schwartz (n. 320), 258; and Sims (n. 395), 504.   
1770 Interview with manager D2.  
1771 Interview with manager D2.  
1772 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 3.2., 3.7., 3.14., and 10.1. (although it focuses on health and safety, 
including in workers’ housing, and environmental impact assessments).  
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have encouraged the company to implement the standards, and have had a surprising 
impact on MTC’s performance for sexual harassment and gender-related issues: it is 
seen by management as a chance to educate workers about these issues1773. 
Nevertheless, these findings suggest that third-party monitoring helps with the 
implementation of standards. However, it is notable that, as for Unilever, some issues 
which were flagged up as inconsistent with the label’s standards during my own 
fieldwork (e.g. denial of free PPE to seasonal workers) do not appear to have been 
identified during the certification audits – this important limitation of auditing 
processes will be explored in more detail in Chapter 8. Moreover, it is notable that, in 
the event that the company loses its certification, workers and the community will lose 
the benefits associated with it – so the answers given by all employees during audits 
may be influenced by the need to retain said benefits. This was acknowledged by a 
manager1774. It follows that third-party monitoring of performance was found to be 
crucial for the effective implementation of standards, but also showed important 
limitations inherent to the audit process and problematic for MTC’s human rights 
performance. Furthermore, a feature identified as important regarding monitoring and 
reporting of corporate behaviour is, as outlined in Chapter 3, transparency, and it is 
notable that the Rainforest Alliance publish summaries of all its audits, and therefore 
ensures that the process is, to some extent, transparent1775. However, Fairtrade audits 
are not publicly available1776. It follow that, while I was able to assess the Rainforest 
Alliance’s findings against my own (and found inconsistencies), I could not verify the 
results of audits conducted for the purpose of the Fairtrade certification since the 
certifying bodies choose to keep their reports confidential. This shows that transparent 
reporting allows for a higher level of scrutiny and accountability of firms, but also of 
organisations in charge of product-level mechanisms. Moreover, MTC’s internal 
monitoring goes unreported: the company does not offer a detailed account of the 
implementation of its standards on the ground in its ‘Sustainability Reports’, which 
are not published on a regular basis – the latest one dating back to 2015. Solely relying 
 
1773 Interview with manager D2. 
1774 Interview with manager D2.  
1775 Public summaries of audits are available at this address: <https://www.rainforest-
alliance.org/business/solutions/certification/agriculture/certificate-search-public-summaries/> 
(accessed on 21 October 2019) 
1776 When I contacted Fairtrade hoping to get access to reports, they replied the following: “Fairtrade 
audit reports as such are confidential, as our auditors gather very detailed commercial information that 
might be relevant in a competitive context”. 
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on MTC’s case study, it is therefore difficult to draw conclusions as to the importance 
of internal transparency as a key feature but, adding evidence from Unilever and Chai 
Bora’s studies, I will draw a more robust conclusion in Chapter 8.  
Third, regarding complaints mechanisms and as mentioned above in section 6.2.5.2., 
MTC has set up a specific procedure for sexual harassment via trade union women’s 
representatives, although the process is not anonymised. More broadly, Rift Valley 
(MTC’s parent company until early 2018) stated in its latest Sustainability Report that 
the firm had recently drafted and adopted its ESMS, which is supposed to help the firm 
to “determine if gaps exist in this area and thereafter ensure that both internal and 
external grievances have an appropriate method of review and resolution”1777. 
However, no worker knew about any formal complaints mechanism; employees 
therefore only stated that they had to go to their trade union representatives or 
managers if they wanted to make a complaint1778 1779 1780, or raise the issue during the 
daily assemblies attended by management and workers1781. This approach may be 
problematic since it does not guarantee anonymity, which may deter workers from 
raising issues. Workers may be particularly reluctant to speak up since TPAWU, as 
explained above in section 6.2.3.1., is perceived by some employees as having the 
company’s interests at heart rather than their own1782. Community members use their 
local government1783, who may contact the company with letters and organise meetings 
with corporate representatives1784 1785. Overall, these practices may be at odds with 
Fairtrade1786 and ETP1787 standards requiring that MTC set up (and communicate 
about) a complaints mechanism allowing workers and third parties to lodge 
anonymous complaints. As the Rainforest Alliance only requires firms to “implement 
 
1777 Rift Valley Tea ‘Sustainability Report’ (n. 793), 2. 
1778 Manager D2 stated that plantation managers get together before shifts to discuss any issues raised 
by workers.  
1779 Interviews with manager D2, and workers B5, B38, B39, B40, B41, B42, B43, B46, B47, B48, B50, 
B51, B52, B53, B54, B55, and B56. 
1780 Manager D2 stated that workers may go to female representatives if they wish to speak with a 
woman.  
1781 Interviews with workers B42, B43, B44, B46, B53, and B54.  
1782 Interviews with workers B41, B51, and B54. 
1783 Interviews with community members C68, C69, C71, C72, C74, and C77. 
1784 Interview with local government representative E6.  
1785 Local government representative E6 stated that the company usually responds to their letters and 
takes complaints on board. 
1786 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, Standard 3.5.27. 
1787 ETP ‘Global Standard’, Standard 9.1.  
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complaints or grievance mechanisms to protect workers’ rights”1788, MTC’s 
mechanisms is in line with the certification label’s standards1789. Furthermore, no 
worker or community members knew about their right to reach out to the Rainforest 
Alliance or the label’s certification bodies to lodge a complaint, which may be in 
conflict with Rainforest Alliance standards1790. The fact that workers and community 
members do not have access – or do not know that they have access – to a free and 
anonymous complaints mechanism means that breaches of MTC’s standards may not 
be reported, and the situation not redressed. Indeed, several interviewees reported that 
they would use such complaints mechanisms to bring MTC’s attention to certain 
problems such as working conditions, poor access to water or health services, or the 
firms’ employment practices1791. However, it is important to note that a local 
government representative said that the company usually responded to letters and took 
complaints on board1792. Moreover, some workers’ complaints have reportedly been 
taken into account in the past and the situation redressed1793, although others have been 
ignored by the company1794. In conclusion, setting up official complaints mechanisms 
could play an important role in ensuring that stakeholders’ voices are heard and taken 
into account1795, along with other members of the local community – however, it is 
unclear what the exact added value of these mechanisms would be in a context where 
stakeholders’ grievances are already, to some extent, addressed by the company.  
Finally, MTC does not always enforce sanctions for breaches of standards by its 
managers and workers in Mufindi. On the one hand, as outlined in section 6.2.5.2., a 
manager stated that another manager was reportedly terminated after an internal 
investigation found that they had been engaged in sexual harassment1796 and that, on 
this issue, the company had a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach. As I have explained in this 
 
1788 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical Criterion 4.9. 
1789 The audit conducted by the Rainforest Alliance in 2017 states that MTC does comply with the 
relevant criterion as “the workers are effectively utilising the complaints and grievance procedure to 
protect their rights” (page 7 of the public summary) 
1790 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, Critical Criterion 4.9. 
1791 Interviews with workers B13 and B16 and community member C32, C33, C34, C35, C36, C37, 
C38, C39, C40, and C41. 
1792 Interview with local government representative E6.  
1793 As mentioned above in Section 6.2.1.1., the change of language on contracts from English to Swahili 
was reportedly driven by workers’ complaints instead of by Fairtrade requirements, and the reduction 
of working hours in the factory from 12-hour to 8-hour shifts. 
1794 As mentioned above in Section 6.2.3.3, some workers have been complaining about the lack of 
compensation for work-related accidents. 
1795 Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166), 228. 
1796 Interview with manager D2. 
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chapter, sexual harassment seems to be an issue which MTC does take seriously and 
on which the firm performs well, which may be partially explained by the 
implementation of sanctions for non-compliance. On the other hand, the same manager 
explained that MTC did not give sanctions to workers who did not follow the health 
and safety standards, because the firm focused on educating employees on this 
issue1797. The company’s record in terms of sanctions is therefore mixed and is driven 
by the priorities of the firm, and what management thinks will be most effective in 
making workers implement standards – thus, it is difficult to assess the role which 
individual sanctions against workers could play in the effective implementation of 
MTC’s standards. Finally, the firm has improved its human rights performance in a 
number of areas, as explained above, because it needed to comply with the Rainforest 
Alliance and Fairtrade standards. This tends to show that the pressure felt by the firm 
when the whole structure is in danger of being sanctioned (i.e. loss of certification) is 
effective in incentivising compliance and improving human rights performance. 
Moreover, the fact that non-renewal is clearly outlined as the direct consequence for 
non-compliance sends the clear message that the firm must comply if they want to 
keep their certification: clear sanctioning guidelines therefore help1798.  
 
6.5. Conclusion 
Similarly to Chapter 5, this chapter had a double aim: first, to determine whether 
MTC’s operations were in line with the firm’s standards; and second, to identify any 
impact which the firm’s mechanisms may have had on the way which the company 
carries out its activities.  
On the first point, as was the case for Unilever, MTC’s performance is mixed. The 
company fulfils its human rights commitments in some respects, for instance regarding 
the right to freedom from exploitative child labour, to a clean environment, and to 
education. However, the firm fails to implement its own standards – and may even 
breach Tanzanian law – on other rights, such as certain workers’ rights (because of the 
firm’s practice in respect to strikes, discrimination against pregnant women at the 
hiring stage, and seasonal workers’ working conditions), and community members’ 
 
1797 Interview with manager D2.  
1798 Sims (n. 395), 504; Jenkins (n. 379), 26; and see (n.78), 56. 
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right to water and to health. For most issues, MTC’s performance is mixed as parts of 
its practice comply with its own commitments, while others do not. For example, on 
the issue of contracts, all workers sign a contract – which is consistent with the 
different self-regulatory mechanisms which the firm has adopted –, but they are not 
systematically given enough time to read it or offered a copy for their own records – 
which clashes with the firm’s standards. Another example is gender-related issues: 
while it is generally acknowledged that there is gender equality, issues of sexual 
harassment and discrimination against employed pregnant women are at odds with 
MTC’s various self-regulatory instruments. Other areas where the firm’s practice is 
mixed are pay, working time, leaves, health and safety1799, medical check-ups, 
accidents and compensation, freedom of association, onsite housing, and health issues. 
It is acknowledged that the corporation has been facing important financial problems, 
which may affect its operations and its implementation of those standards which may 
require investments. However, MTC has a responsibility to ensure that its activities do 
not negatively impact working and living conditions in and around its factory and 
plantations, and therefore to make the necessary investments to that effect. This is 
especially the case considering that the company has voluntarily decided to adopt self-
regulatory instruments, and that it uses three of these instruments (Fairtrade, Rainforest 
Alliance, and ETP) in its communication and marketing strategy1800.     
On the second point, only the product-level mechanisms have been reported as having 
some impact on MTC’s practice – although not ETP –, while the ILO conventions to 
which the firm has committed do not seem to have been influential. Fairtrade has been 
singled out by members of the community (including local government 
representatives) as having had a positive impact on MTC’s relationship with, and 
contribution to, the community. In particular, the use of the Fairtrade Premium Fund 
to pay for education structures in the area was widely acknowledged by community 
members and workers – although it is notable that the use of Fairtrade Fund is decided 
not by the company but by the community themselves. This is the only issue for which 
one certification label has been individually named as having had some kind of impact. 
For the rest, it was generally reported that both labels had an impact. All the same, I 
 
1799 Trade union representative F2 stated that the company has been struggling with health and safety, 
and that they were hoping that the situation would improve with the new investor.  
1800 Interview with manager D2. 
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was able to link both certification mechanisms to MTC’s practice in the following 
areas: health and safety, sexual harassment, and the company’s environmental 
footprint, and especially its waste disposal practice. However, these are the only issues 
for which I have been able to find positive evidence of the impact of MTC’s self-
regulatory instruments.  
It is also important to note that factors outside of self-regulatory mechanisms have also 
led to changes in MTC’s human rights performance: bottom-up action from workers, 
the adoption of a collective agreement, and the firm’s financial health. I will explore 
these external factors in more detail in Chapter 8. 
In conclusion, similarly to Unilever, MTC does meet its human rights responsibilities 
in certain respects but (sometimes severe) issues with the firm’s operations and what 
could be construed as violations of the firm’s standards (and possibly of national 
legislation) were also uncovered. And, even when the situation on the ground seemed 
to be in line with MTC’s commitments, only rarely could I link the firm’s practice with 
its standards (and other factors were found to also play a role). Overall, the self-
regulatory mechanisms which MTC has adopted seem to have had a limited impact on 
the firm’s operations and respect of human rights. I will build upon these findings in 
Chapter 8 to understand the effects which corporate self-regulatory mechanisms have 
had on the behaviour of Tanzanian tea corporations, and to determine the extent to 
which such mechanisms may harness other influential factors with the aim to improve 
corporate human rights performance. 
 
I will now investigate the human rights performance of Chai Bora, the third company 
of this case study. This assessment will allow for the analysis of the performance of a 
company which has not adopted any self-regulatory mechanism and will help to 
strengthen the conclusions made in Chapter 8 about the impact of voluntary self-
regulation when they are made by the other companies.  
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As explained in Chapter 4, Chai Bora has not adopted any self-regulatory human rights 
mechanisms. However, the UNGPs state that the “responsibility to respect human 
rights is a global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises”, and specify 
that that responsibility covers “internationally recognized human rights – understood, 
at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the 
principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International labour 
Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work”1801. It 
follows that the fact that Chai Bora has not explicitly adopted human rights self-
regulatory mechanisms – including the UNGPs – does not mean that the firm does not 
have any human rights responsibilities. It is therefore relevant to assess Chai Bora’s 
performance against the international human rights standards cited above. I will also 
evaluate it against national law as this may be an important influential factor on the 
firm’s behaviour, and the firm may behave a certain way because it must, according to 
national legislation.  
Once I have assessed Chai Bora’s human rights performance, I will build on these 
findings to determine whether some of the key characteristics identified by scholars as 
important may play a role in the firm’s human rights performance even in the absence 
of formally adopted standards. This will help determine the role played by these key 
features in helping corporations respect human rights, even outside of formal self-
regulatory mechanisms. This chapter is therefore divided into two main parts: first, the 
assessment of Chai Bora’s human rights performance; second, the investigation into 
the effectiveness of key characteristics outside of formal self-regulatory instruments. 
As explained in Chapter 1, including Chai Bora as one of my case studies helps 
strengthen my findings. This is especially true, as will be covered in this chapter and 
 
1801 UNGPs, Principles 11 and 12. 
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in Chapter 8, of the assessment of the human rights performance and impact of self-
regulation (if relevant) across the three companies for the following issues: wage-
related issues (pay levels and payment regularity), gender-related issues (sexual 
harassment), discrimination issues (specifically against people living with 
HIV/AIDS), and health issues (HIV/AIDS prevention programmes). On all these 
issues, data collected from Chai Bora has put the data collected at Unilever and MTC 
in perspective and allowed me to confirm or reject the explanations for firms’ good 
human rights performance which are considered as ‘rivals’1802 of the adoption of self-
regulation (e.g. bottom-up action from stakeholders).  
 
7.2. Worker-related rights 
This section assesses the extent to which the right to just, equitable, and safe working 
conditions of Chai Bora’s workers is respected, and will therefore cover the following 
issues: contractual terms offered to workers, health and safety, freedom of association 
and collective bargaining, the working conditions specific to seasonal workers, and 
finally discrimination issues. 
 
7.2.1. Contractual terms 
This subsection covers all contractual terms offered to Chai Bora’s permanent and 
seasonal workers: presence of contracts, pay, working time, and leaves.  
 
7.2.1.1. Contracts 
Chai Bora’s practice on the issue of contracts differs depending on the category of 
workers (permanent or seasonal). First, all permanent workers have a contract1803, 
although one worker said that the terms of employees’ contracts were not 
implemented1804. Second, all interviewees said that seasonal employees only have a 
one-day contract1805, which reportedly runs out after the first day and is never officially 
 
1802 Yin (n.169). 
1803 Interviews with corporate manager D3, trade union representative F3, and workers B1, B8, B14, 
and B15. 
1804 Interview with worker B14.  
1805 Interviews with workers B13, B14, B15, and B16.  
P a g e  | 269 
 
renewed1806. However, a manager said that casual labour had a contract and were paid 
daily1807 – so it is unclear whether the company considers that seasonal employees are 
tacitly bound by this daily contract, or not, and whether the practice is therefore legal 
or not1808. Indeed, as mentioned in Section 4.1.2.3.1.2., Section 15 of the Employment 
and Labour Relations Act requires employers to provide employees with, among 
others, a job description, date of commencement, form and duration of contract, place 
of work, working hours, and remuneration. However, the contract must be in writing 
only for employees stationed outside of Tanzania. As for international human rights 
obligations, the ICESCR requires the guarantee of just and favourable conditions of 
work1809 but no more precisions are given – it is therefore difficult to assess whether 




Employees receive different levels of pay depending on their position: I will first 
review permanent workers’ pay; secondly, seasonal workers’ salary; thirdly, security 
workers’ wages.  
First, permanent factory workers earn between Tsh230.000 and Tsh300.0001810 
monthly, and permanent employees from the printing department receive 
Tsh270.0001811. Permanent workers therefore receive higher wages than Unilever’s 
and MTC’s workers. Wage levels offered by Chai Bora to permanent workers 
highlights the possibility for companies to perform better on certain human rights 
issues, even in the absence of self-regulatory mechanisms. I will look into the reasons 
why (including the role played by key features outside formal self-regulation) in 
Section 7.4.   
 
1806 Interview with worker B16. 
1807 Interview with manager D3.  
1808 As mentioned in Section 4.1.2.3.1.2., Section 15 of the Employment and Labour Relations Act  
requires employers to provide employees with, among others, a job description, date of commencement, 
form and duration of contract, place of work, working hours, and remuneration. However, the contract 
must be in writing only for employees stationed outside of Tanzania. 
1809 ICESCR, Article 7. 
1810 Interviews with manager D3, and workers B1, B8, and B14. 
1811 Interview with worker B15.  
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Second, seasonal workers earn Tsh5.500 per day worked1812, except on Saturdays 
when they are paid Tsh6.000 (for the entire day) as the afternoon is considered 
overtime1813. This means that seasonal workers earn on average Tsh145.000 per month 
– counting overtime on Saturday. In contrast, managers reportedly receive between 12 
and 15 times more1814. Employees may also work all day on Sunday, for which 
overtime is paid between Tsh19.000 and Tsh21.000 for the day to permanent 
workers1815 1816 but only Tsh6.000 to seasonal workers1817.  It is important to note that 
seasonal workers used to be paid on a daily basis but the policy was changed after 
seasonal workers reportedly complained collectively and demanded to be paid 
weekly1818. Chai Bora’s improved performance regarding wage payment regularity 
highlights the possibility for companies to better respect human rights, even in the 
absence of self-regulatory mechanisms. As mentioned above, I will look into the 
reasons why in Section 7.4.   
Third, security officers are outsourced, and Chai Bora does not oversee their working 
terms and conditions1819. Perhaps as a result, they are paid Tsh99.000 monthly1820, 
which is significantly less than Chai Bora’s (direct) employees.  
Moreover, permanent workers are provided with a rent allowance in addition to their 
regular salaries1821, but not seasonal employees1822. This lumpsum is scaled up to the 
worker’s salaries1823. Permanent employees working in the factory therefore receive 
Tsh25.000 monthly and those working in the printing department Tsh32.000, whereas 
managers receive Tsh80.000. Workers reported that renting a house in Mafinga would 
cost between Tsh40.000 and Tsh100.000 monthly, and so Tsh25.000 is insufficient to 
cover workers’ rental needs1824.  
 
1812 Interviews with manager D3, workers B13 and B16, and community member C13. 
1813 Interviews with workers B13 and B16.  
1814 Interview with manager D4.  
1815 The exact amount is determined by the worker’s position and salary.  
1816 Interview with workers B14 and B15.  
1817 Interviews with workers B13 and B16.  
1818 Interviews with workers B8, B13, and B16. Seasonal workers used to be paid daily but, after they 
complained collectively to management, it was changed (interview with worker B8).  
1819 Interview with manager D3.  
1820 Interview with worker B11.  
1821 Interviews with managers D3 and D4, trade union representative F3, and workers B8, B14, and B15.  
1822 Interviews with manager D3, and workers B13 and B16. 
1823 Interviews with manager D3 and worker B14.  
1824 Interviews with trade union representative F3, and workers B1 and B14.  
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It is therefore clear that, even though wages are higher than the national minimum set 
by the government for the tea sector – Tsh100.0001825 – , general workers’ pay is low. 
This is especially true regarding seasonal workers’ wages, which a workers’ 
representative said was one of their main challenges1826. Being paid below living wage 
levels means that workers must rely on farming or conduct other business on the side 
to survive1827. Moreover, a local doctor stated that low levels of income also led to the 
spread of STDs and specifically of HIV/AIDS, to unplanned pregnancies due to the 
increase of paid sexual encounters1828 1829, as well as to increased cases of waterborne 
diseases such as typhoid fever and cholera as some individuals, who are too poor to 
buy water, drink from unsafe sources such as rainwater or the river outside 
Mafinga1830.  
Low levels of pay clash with several international human rights standards: the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights1831, which guarantees the right of workers to 
a just and favourable conditions of work and to an adequate standard of living, 
including adequate housing, clothing, and food, ILO Convention C100 covers the right 
to a fair wage, and the Economic and Social Council specified that the right to food 
(as outlined in the ICESCR1832) had two core dimensions: first, food must be available 
“in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free 
from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture”1833; second, food must 
be accessible “in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere with the enjoyment 
of other human rights”, which means that “personal or household financial costs 
associated with the acquisition of food for an adequate diet should be at a level such 
that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or 
compromised”1834. It is therefore important to assess wage levels by taking into 
account the extent to which workers can afford all other basic necessities (beside food). 
As explained in Section 5.2.2.2., a family of two parents with two children would need 
– as the bare minimum – Tsh10.000 per day, solely for food, to survive in Mufindi. 
 
1825 Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania (n. 578). 
1826 Interview with trade union representative F3.  
1827 Interviews with trade union representative F3, and workers B8, B9, B10, and B16. 
1828 Interviews with civil society representative A8 and doctor C7.  
1829 Low income reportedly leads some women to seek additional income by engaging in sex work.  
1830 Interview with local doctor C7. 
1831 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 23 and 25. 
1832 ICESCR, Article 11. 
1833 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, 1999, §4 
1834 Ibid, §8. 
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Even if this amount is split two ways, it would leave next to nothing for seasonal 
workers and too little to permanent workers to make sure that their (and their family 
members’) basic needs are not threatened. It follows that Chai Bora’s pay levels are 
inconsistent with international human rights standards. 
There also seems to be a recurring issue of delayed payment of wages1835 – although 
two workers said that they were usually paid on time1836 – and, when the interviews 
took place, some workers were not being paid1837 and could not quit lest they never 
receive the payment which they were owed1838. This practice may be interpreted as 
clashing with the ICESCR, which requires the guarantee of just and favourable 
conditions of work1839. However, in the absence of relevant operational standards 
implementing this principle, it is difficult to assess whether Chai Bora’s practice is in 
line with the Covenant’s principle.   
 
7.2.1.3. Working time 
The factory is always in operation, so working time is divided into three 8-hour 
shifts1840 1841. Employees work eight hours a day, five days a week, and five hours on 
Saturday, with possibility of overtime on both Saturday (three hours) and Sunday 
(eight hours)1842. A manager said that overtime was negotiated with the workers1843. 
The regular hours seem to follow national legislative provisions as outlined in Section 
4.1.2.3.1.7.1844. However, working hours will be over the legal limit if employees work 
the full 11 hours of possible weekend overtime more than once a month. Moreover, 
(outsourced) security staff work for 12 hours, seven days a week1845, which is over the 
 
1835 Interviews with trade union representative F3 and worker B8. 
1836 Interview with workers B13 and B16.  
1837 Interviews with workers B8, B9, and B10.  
1838 Interview with worker B8. 
1839 ICESCR, Article 7. 
1840 Shifts are: 6:30am-2:30pm; 2:30pm-10:30pm; 10:30pm-6:30am (interview with worker B8). 
1841 Interviews with manager D3 and worker B8.  
1842 Interviews with managers D3 and D4, trade union representative F3, and workers B13, B14, B15, 
and B16. 
1843 Interview with manager D3.  
1844 National legislation provides for a maximum 45 hours a week, 6 days a week, and overtime capped 
to 3 hours per day and to 50 hours in a four-week cycle. The Employment and Labour Relations Act 
also provides for a 60-minute break every 5 hours, and a daily rest of at least 12 consecutive hours in 
between two shifts.  
1845 Interview with worker B11.  
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legal limit. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights1846 and the ICESCR1847 state 
that all workers be offered “reasonable limitation of working hours”. However, in the 
absence of relevant operational standards implementing this principle, it is difficult to 
assess whether Chai Bora’s practice is compliant.   
 
7.2.1.4. Leaves 
Permanent and seasonal workers do not have access to the same leaves.  
First, permanent workers are offered between 28 and 31 days of annual leave – I 
understand that it is 28 days for general workers in the factory1848, 30 days for skilled 
workers and some employees from the printing department1849, and 31 days for 
managers1850 –, with an additional lumpsum of Tsh120.0001851. They are also entitled 
to three months of maternity leave with full pay1852, and four days of paternity 
leave1853, although there are conflicting reports as to whether workers on paternity 
leave are paid1854. Finally, they may take up to 63 days of sick leave with full pay, and 
63 more days with half pay, after which the worker will be terminated1855. Chai Bora’s 
leave policy for permanent workers is therefore in line with Tanzanian legislation1856, 
as well as with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1857 and the ICESCR1858’s 
standard that all workers be given “periodic holidays with pay”. 
Second, temporary workers have no leaves1859; if they do not work, they are not paid. 
This is also reportedly the case for outsourced security staff1860. This practice is at odds 
with Tanzanian legislation which does not differentiate between temporary and 
permanent employees for the purpose of determining to which leaves they are 
 
1846 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 24. 
1847 ICESCR, Article 7(d). 
1848 Interviews with trade union representative F3 and workers B8, B9, B10, and B14. 
1849 Interviews with workers B1 and B15.  
1850 Interview with manager D4.  
1851 Interviews with managers D3 and D4, trade union representative F3, and worker B14. 
1852 Interviews with manager D4, trade union representative F3, and workers B1, B8, B9, B10, and B14. 
1853 Interviews with manager D4, trade union representative F3, and workers B8, B9, B10, and B15. 
1854 Manager D4 and workers B8 said that it was paid, whereas trade union representative F3 and worker 
B15 said that it was unpaid.   
1855 Interviews with manager D4, trade union representative F3, and workers B1, B8, B9, B10, and B14. 
1856 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Articles 29, 31, 32, 33, and 34.  
1857 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 24. 
1858 ICESCR, Article 7(d). 
1859 Interviews with manager D3, trade union representative F3, and workers B13, B14, and B16.  
1860 Interview with worker B11.  
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entitled1861. The only differentiation made by legislation is between employees with 
less, or more, than six months service1862. Considering that all interviewees had more 
than six months service, the relevant legal provisions shall apply. The practice is also 
inconsistent with the above-mentioned Universal Declaration of Human Rights1863 and 
ICESCR1864 provision.  
 
7.2.2. Health and safety 
This section will first provide a general assessment of Chai Bora’s health and safety 
practice, second its specific practice regarding medical check-ups, and finally its 
record on accidents and compensation.  
 
7.2.2.1. General considerations 
Workers have different equipment depending on their role. First, workers in the 
blending department wear glasses, masks, boots, and coats1865. However, it was 
reported that the glasses provided by the company were not adequate as dust may get 
into the workers’ eyes1866. There was also one report of milk being provided to workers 
to mitigate against the effect of dust on their throats1867. Second, workers in the 
production department wear masks and caps1868. They are also required to wear closed 
shoes1869, although they are not provided with them1870. They reportedly also need eye 
protection because of the dust1871 but Chai Bora only provides the blending department 
with glasses1872. Finally, employees in charge of printing wear boots, glasses, masks, 
and gloves1873, which are provided free of charge by Chai Bora1874. Printing is 
 
1861 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Articles 29, 31, 32, 33, and 34. 
1862 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 29. 
1863 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 24. 
1864 ICESCR, Article 7(d). 
1865 Interviews with manager D4 and worker B16.  
1866 Interview with trade union representative F3. 
1867 Interview with worker B8.  
1868 Interviews with workers B9, B10, B13, B14, and B16.  
1869 Interviews with workers B14 and B16.  
1870 Interviews with workers B13 and B14.  
1871 Interviews with trade union representative F3 and worker B8 – although worker B14 stated that 
employees did not need glasses in the production department.  
1872 Interviews with trade union representative F3 and workers B9 and B10. 
1873 Interview with manager D3.  
1874 Interview with worker B15.  
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reportedly very dangerous for the eyes, and workers can lose their eyesight if they do 
not wear glasses1875.  
A manager stated that workers were trained on health and safety1876, and some 
interviewees said that it was safe to work for Chai Bora1877, although most agreed that 
all protection measures were not taken1878. A worker said that their medical condition 
got worse because the protective equipment was not adequate1879. It was also reported 
by one interviewee that, because of the race for productivity, accidents happened 
regularly as workers were not allowed to stop operating faulty machines1880. Moreover, 
a worker noted that workers sometimes must work without proper equipment as there 
is not always enough PPE available for all workers1881, and others stated that they had 
to buy part of their protection equipment themselves1882. Chai Bora’s practice is 
therefore at odds with the Occupational Health and Safety Act requiring that, “where 
in any factory or workplace, workers are employed in any process involving exposure 
to any injurious or offensive substance or environment, effective protective equipment 
[…] be provided and maintained by employer for the use of the persons employed”1883. 
It is also inconsistent with the ICESCR, which recognises all workers’ right to safe 
and healthy working conditions1884.  
Furthermore, a manager said that the company does not sanction workers for not 
wearing gear and prefers to issue them a warning1885 and educate them about the 
importance of wearing protective equipment1886. Most workers confirmed that there 
was no sanction1887. No worker has reportedly ever been terminated for not wearing 
their PPE1888, although the same manager said that no one is allowed to work without 
protection1889. However, workers said that whether or not workers wore protection did 
 
1875 Interview with worker B15.  
1876 Interview with manager D3.  
1877 Interview with community member C13.  
1878 Interviews with trade union representative F3 and workers B8, B13, B14, and B16. 
1879 Interview with worker B8.  
1880 Interview with worker B8.  
1881 Interview with worker B8.  
1882 Interviews with workers B13 and B14. 
1883 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Article 62. 
1884 ICESCR, Article 7(b). 
1885 Manager D4 said that management would issue an oral warning and two written warnings before 
terminating the worker. 
1886 Interview with manager D3.  
1887 Interviews with workers B8, B13, B15, and B16. 
1888 Interview with manager D3.  
1889 Interview with manager D3.  
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not matter to the company1890 1891. This lack of sanctions may lead to poor health and 
safety performance.  
 
7.2.2.2. Medical check-ups 
Medical check-ups are conducted for all workers, although there are mixed accounts 
as to their regularity: monthly1892, bimonthly1893, every three months1894, twice a 
year1895, and every two years1896. Such differences in assessments come from the fact 
that different types of check-ups are conducted, by OSHA (as described by a manager) 
and by local doctors (as described by workers). All check-ups are paid for by Chai 
Bora1897. Furthermore, medical tests are conducted before hiring new employees, and 
applicants with communicable diseases (except for HIV/AIDS) are not hired – or at 
least not before they are treated1898. Chai Bora’s practice is in line with Tanzanian 
legislation which requires employers to conduct medical examinations before hiring 
new employees (to check applicants’ fitness for employment), periodic examinations 
during employment, and an exit check-up1899, and to bear all related costs1900. It may 
also be considered that the practice is consistent with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights1901 and the ICESCR recognising all workers’ right to safe and healthy 
working conditions1902 (although, in the absence of operational standards 
implementing this principle, it is difficult to assess whether organising medical check-
ups is a compliance requirement). 
 
7.2.2.3. Accidents and compensation 
 
1890 Interviews with workers B8, B13, B15, and B16. 
1891 Worker B13 said that, so long as workers meet their targets, Chai Bora does not care whether they 
wear PPE or not, although worker B14 said that workers were not allowed in if they were not wearing 
shoes. 
1892 Interview with worker B13.  
1893 Interview with worker B1.  
1894 Interviews with workers B14 and B15.  
1895 Interview with manager D4.  
1896 Interview with manager D3, who said that check-ups take place every two years because of the high 
cost of OSHA examinations.   
1897 Interviews with manager D3, and workers B13, B14, B15, and B16. 
1898 Interview with manager D3.  
1899 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Article 24(1) and (2). 
1900 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Article 24(3). 
1901 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(1).  
1902 ICESCR, Article 7(b). 
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A manager said that there had not been an accident in the company in two years1903 
but one worker said that accidents were frequent1904. It is therefore important to 
investigate whether injured workers have access to free medical treatment and whether 
they are compensated. Here again, permanent and seasonal workers are treated 
differently. 
First, Chai Bora reportedly pays for the hospital bills of permanent workers who get 
injured at work1905, which is in line with Tanzanian legislation and presumably with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1906 and the ICESCR recognising all 
workers’ right to safe and healthy working conditions1907 (although, again, in the 
absence of operational standards implementing this principle, it is difficult to assess 
whether this is a compliance requirement). However, seasonal workers are not 
provided by the firm with health insurance1908 and therefore cannot access free 
healthcare after work-related accidents. Moreover, Chai Bora does not reportedly pay 
for medical treatment for seasonal workers1909 1910, which is unlawful. Indeed, an 
“employee” as defined in the Workers Compensation Act is “any person, including an 
apprentice but excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person and 
who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and any other person who in 
any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an employer”1911. Chai 
Bora seasonal workers are therefore considered as “employees” of the firm under 
Tanzanian law1912, whether or not they have a formal contract, and should have their 
medical treatment paid by their employer on the same basis as permanent workers1913. 
This practice may also be in conflict with the above-mentioned ICESCR and Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights provision.  
 
1903 Interview with manager D3. 
1904 Interview with worker B8.  
1905 Interviews with worker B1, and community members C8 and C9.  
1906 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(1).  
1907 ICESCR, Article 7(b). 
1908 Interview with manager D3.  
1909 Interviews with community members C8 and C9.  
1910 Two community members (C8 and C9) said that the company may take seasonal workers to the 
hospital right after the injury happens, but would do no more.  
1911 Workers Compensation Act, Article 4. 
1912 Moreover, under Section 61 of the Labour Institutions (General) Regulations, Chai Bora’s seasonal 
workers would benefit from the ‘presumption of employee status’. 
1913 Workers Compensation Act, Articles 61 and 61. 
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Secondly, permanent workers are generally compensated for work-related injuries or 
death1914, although it may take time1915 and some interviewees said that it was difficult 
to get any compensation at all1916. As for seasonal workers, there are conflicting 
reports: a Chai Bora manager, while saying that the WCF does not cover seasonal 
workers1917, stated that the company itself steps in to compensate seasonal workers in 
case of work-related injuries or death. However, all workers (and another manager) 
said that they were never compensated for work-related accidents1918. In any case, it is 
important to note again that, under Tanzanian law, all workers are covered by the WCF 
and are therefore entitled to compensation for work-related injuries1919 – as explained 
above and in Chapter 4. Chai Bora’s practice regarding compensation may therefore 
also be considered at odds with the ICESCR and Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights provision mentioned above. 
 
7.2.3. Freedom of association and collective bargaining 
This section will first provide a general assessment of Chai Bora’s practice regarding 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, and second of the firm’s specific 
practice regarding strikes. 
 
7.2.3.1. General considerations 
The local branch of TUICO is the union used by Chai Bora’s workers. Although 
membership is not compulsory1920 1921, most permanent workers are unionised1922. 
Monthly membership fee is Tsh2.000-5.000, depending on the worker’s salary1923. 
Seasonal workers are not allowed to join the union1924 and therefore have nowhere to 
voice complaints1925. This is in contradiction with the legal provisions of the 
 
1914 Interviews with workers B1, B9, and B10, and community members C8 and C9. 
1915 Interview with worker B14.  
1916 Interview with worker B8.  
1917 Interview with manager D3. 
1918 Interviews with manager D4 and workers B13, B15, and B16.  
1919 Workers Compensation Act, Articles 4 and 19(2). 
1920 Interviews with manager D3, and workers B14 and B15.  
1921 However, manager D4 said that it was compulsory.  
1922 Interviews with workers B14, B15.  
1923 Interviews with managers D3 and D4, workers B14 and B15. 
1924 Interviews with trade union representative F3 and workers B13, B14, and B16.   
1925 Interview with worker B16.  
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Employment and Labour Relations Act protecting the right of temporary and 
permanent employees to form and join trade unions1926, as was covered in Chapter 4. 
TUICO representatives are elected by fellow workers1927. According to a worker1928, 
TUICO representatives are in charge of ensuring that labour standards are upheld, 
dealing with workers’ work-related injuries and deaths, and offering legal assistance 
to workers if their rights are violated. TUICO district leaders also join the local TUICO 
leaders to negotiate a CBA with the company, which is valid for two years and 
applicable to all Chai Bora workers1929. Chai Bora’s TUICO representatives meet 
quarterly with management to discuss any issues raised by workers1930, but their 
success in helping workers get positive change within the company is mixed. Indeed, 
some civil society representatives said that TUICO representatives were not properly 
trained and so could not defend workers’ rights properly1931, and a local government 
representative confirmed that TUICO could not always help workers1932. Moreover, 
the independence of TUICO representatives was also questioned by some 
interviewees1933.  
It is notable that sexual harassment cases are handled by TUICO female 
representatives1934 and that the handling of these cases has reportedly improved1935, 
although a civil society representative stated that the union is not capable of adequately 
protecting women1936.  
As was the case for Unilever and MTC, it is therefore difficult to draw a general 
conclusion as to the effectiveness of the union in protecting workers’ (and related) 
rights. However, the main problem from a human rights perspective is perhaps the fact 
that seasonal workers are barred from joining TUICO. This practice clashes with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights1937, the ICESCR1938, and ILO Conventions 
 
1926 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Articles 4, 9(1), and 9(3). 
1927 Interview with trade union representative F3.  
1928 Interview with worker B1.  
1929 Interviews with managers D3 and D4, and trade union representative F3.  
1930 Interviews with manager D3, trade union representative F3, and workers B1 and B15.  
1931 Interviews with civil society representatives A11 and A12.  
1932 Interview with local government representative A1.  
1933 Interviews with civil society representatives A8, A11, and A12. 
1934 Interview with trade union representative F3.  
1935 Interview with worker B8. 
1936 Interview with civil society representative A13.  
1937 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(4).  
1938 ICESCR, Article 8. 
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C087 and C098 recognising all workers’ freedom of association and right to organise 
and to engage in collective bargaining. 
 
7.2.3.2. Strikes 
Management stated that workers had to follow proper procedure if they decided to go 
on strike1939. Although managers said that there had never been a strike1940, and that 
workers confirmed that there had been no recent ones1941, I understand that one took 
place in 2006, over poor management, and was successful as a new manager reportedly 
came in1942. Chai Bora therefore respected its workers’ right to strike, consistently with 
the ICESCR1943 and with the interpretation of ILO C087’s provisions by the ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association and the ILO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations1944.  
However, seasonal workers said that there was such a gap between the working 
conditions of permanent and seasonal workers that seasonal workers would not strike 
and would prefer to keep on working as they need an income1945. 
 
7.2.4. Working conditions of seasonal workers  
Seasonal employees, who only work during the high season, and permanent workers 
are treated differently. As outlined above in Section 7.2.1.4., seasonal workers are not 
allowed any leave (which, after six months of work, is illegal1946), they are also not 
provided with health insurance or a rent allowance. They are also reportedly denied 
access to a trade union, payment of their medical bills, and any compensation after 
work-related accidents, which is illegal, as seen in relevant sections above. It also 
 
1939 Interview with manager D3.  
1940 Interview with managers D3 and D4.  
1941 Interviews with workers B13, B14, B15, and B16.  
1942 Interview with worker B13 and B14.  
1943 ICESCR, Article 8(1)(d). 
1944 Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero And Horacio Guido, ‘ILO Principles Concerning the Right to 
Strike’, International Labour Reviews 137(4), 1998, 9. 
1945 Interview with worker B13.  
1946 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Section 29. 
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clashes with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1947, the ICESCR1948, and ILO 
Conventions C087 and C098, as seen above.  
 
7.2.5. Right to non-discrimination 
This section will be divided between discrimination at the hiring stage and during 
employment, and will be mainly focused on gender.  
 
7.2.5.1. Hiring stage  
At the hiring stage, there are reports of discrimination based on gender. Pregnant 
women are not hired, be it for permanent or seasonal positions1949. A woman who did 
not tell Chai Bora that she was pregnant when she was hired was dismissed when the 
company found out1950. This is in contradiction with national legislation prohibiting 
discrimination in employment policy or practice based on “pregnancy”1951 if the 
practice is not based on an inherent requirement of the job1952. It also conflicts with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1953, the ICESCR1954, and ILO Convention 
C111.  
However, as was the case with Unilever and MTC, it is notable that Chai Bora does 
not discriminate against people living with HIV/AIDS, and offers them the same 
employment opportunities as individuals who do not live with the disease1955 as 
prescribed by Tanzanian law1956. This is in line with the international conventions cited 
above and highlights the possibility for companies who have not adopted self-
regulatory mechanisms to respect certain human rights as well as self-regulated firms, 
and suggests that the culture of the area where companies operate may play a (much 
more) important role in corporate behaviour on specific issues.  
 
1947 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(1). 
1948 ICESCR, Article 7. 
1949 Interviews with manager D3, and workers B14 and B15.  
1950 Interview with manager D3.  
1951 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 7(4)(j). 
1952 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 7(6)(b). 
1953 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 7 and 23.  
1954 ICESCR, Articles 2(2) and 7.  
1955 Interviews with manager D3, and workers B13, B14 
1956 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Article 7(4)(m). 
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7.2.5.2. Employment stage 
Equality of opportunities between men and women is a reality within the company1957, 
as is required by law1958. This is in line with Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights1959, the ICESCR1960, and ILO Convention C111, and was explained by some 
workers as perhaps resulting from the fact that more women than men work for Chai 
Bora1961 1962. However, a few interviewees said that there used to be more cases of 
sexual harassment and gender discrimination1963, and that the situation has improved 
thanks to workers’ meetings – sometimes informally alongside management –, and 
education about women’s rights1964. Seminars are sometimes conducted by a 
company’s representative1965 or TUICO representatives1966, although they would only 
be reserved for permanent workers. Seasonal workers have therefore reportedly 
organised their own education1967. Training has also helped with domestic issues, 
which are reportedly commonplace in the area1968.  Finally, as mentioned above, 
women can go to female managers if they would like to report an issue, and a worker 
stated that women’s complaints are now taken more seriously by management than 
they used to1969.  
Chai Bora’s improved performance regarding issues of sexual harassment highlights 
the possibility for companies to better respect human rights, even in the absence of 
self-regulatory mechanisms. I will look into the reasons why (including the role played 
by key features outside formal self-regulation) in Section 7.4.   
 
 
1957 Interview with managers D3 and D4, local government representative E7, workers B1, B8, B13, 
B15, B16, and community members C8 and C9. 
1958 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Articles 7(4)(h) and (i), and 7(10). 
1959 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 7 and 23.  
1960 ICESCR, Articles 2(2) and 7.  
1961 As of April 2018, Chai Bora employed 73 women and fewer than 50 men (interview with manager 
D3). 
1962 Interviews with workers B13, B14, B15, and B16.  
1963 Interviews with workers B8, B14, B15, and B16.  
1964 Interviews with workers B8, B14, B15, and B16.  
1965 Interview with manager D3.  
1966 Interviews with workers B15 and B16.  
1967 Interview with worker B16.  
1968 Interview with manager D3.  
1969 Interview with worker B8.  
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7.2.6. Outsourcing 
Chai Bora outsources its security staff and does not oversee the working conditions of 
the outsourced workers1970. Perhaps as a result, security workers are paid Tsh99.000 
monthly and work 12-hour shifts every day with no rest days or leaves1971, as seen 
above in Sections 7.2.1.2., 7.2.1.3., and 7.2.1.4. Such working conditions seem to be 
at odds with Tanzanian labour law1972 1973. It also clashes with the recent government’s 
circular requiring firms to take responsibility for the behaviour of their service 
providers, including by adopting a policy to that effect1974. Finally, it is at odds with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1975 and the ICESCR1976. 
Now that I have reviewed Chai Bora’s human rights performance regarding workers’ 
rights, I will move on to community-related rights.  
 
7.3. Community-related rights 
It is notable that, contrary to Unilever and MTC, Chai Bora does not offer onsite 
housing to its workers, who therefore must find their own accommodation1977. It 
follows that I will not in this chapter evaluate the housing situation onsite. However, 
this section will cover Chai Bora’s impact on the environment, as well as the firm’s 
contribution to two of the most important community members’ rights: the right to 
health and to education. It is important to do so since the UNGPs require companies 
to avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own 
activities and as a result of their business relationships, and address such impacts when 
they occur1978. This includes impact on their employees but also local communities. 
Chai Bora has business relationships with both Unilever and MTC who supply it tea1979 
and who, as we have seen in Chapters 5 and 6, have significantly contributed to the 
 
1970 Interview with manager D3.  
1971 Interview with worker B11.  
1972 Employment and Labour Relations Act, Articles 19(1), 19(2)(a) and (b), 19(3)(b), 19(5). 
1973 Minimum wage for private security workers was set in 2013 at Tsh 150.000 monthly, or Tsh 100.000 
for a small company (Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania (n. 578), Second Schedule (e) (a) and 
(e)(b)). 
1974 Interview with civil society representative A3. 
1975 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(1). 
1976 ICESCR, Article 7. 
1977 Interview with worker B1.  
1978 UNGPs, Article 13.  
1979 Interview with manager D3. 
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influx of tea workers to Mufindi, with resulting negative human rights impacts. It 
follows that it is important to investigate the extent to which Chai Bora addresses the 
adverse impacts of its activities on the local communities’ right to health and education 
(as covered in the ICESCR1980). Before I do so, I will briefly review Chai Bora’s 
general relationship with the community.  
Most interviewees said that there was no relationship between Chai Bora and the 
community1981, which some interviewees complained the firm does on purpose by 
excluding themselves1982. Two interviewees stated that Chai Bora does not attend local 
meetings with the community1983, although a manager said that they sometimes do1984. 
It is notable that a local government representative said that Chai Bora maintains a 
good relationship with the community by offering employment opportunities to the 
local population (but no more)1985. A manager said that Chai Bora has contributed 
towards building laboratories for local schools, orphanages centres, football teams, as 
well as fuel for police cars1986. However, a local government representative said that 
they did not reply to their letters asking the firm to contribute to the needs of the local 
population, including about education, and that they do not follow up on their promises 
to help, such as with access to water1987. I was shown the letters sent to Chai Bora but 
was not able to independently verify either side’s allegations. 
I will now review the firm’s impact on the environment.  
7.3.1. Right to a clean environment 
Although a few interviewees complained that Chai Bora was operating in the middle 
of town, where people live and work1988, and therefore could negatively impact the 
health of the population with the factory’s emissions, most agree that the company’s 
 
1980 ICESCR, Articles 12 and 13. 
1981 Interviews with workers B13, B14, B15, B16, and community members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, 
C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, C15, C19, C32, C38, C39, C40, C41, and C42. 
1982 Interviews with worker B14, and community members C38, C39, and C40. 
1983 Interviews with workers B15 and B16.  
1984 Interview with manager D4. 
1985 Interview with local government representative E7.  
1986 Interview with manager D3.  
1987 Interview with local government representative E1. 
1988 Interviews with local government representative E7 and community members C11 and C19. 
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operations do not have a negative impact on the environment1989, be it on water1990, 
air1991, soil1992, or nearby forests1993 1994. However, a local doctor said that they were 
treating airborne diseases and that the air around the company was polluted1995. It is 
therefore difficult to provide clear conclusions regarding the environmental impact of 
Chai Bora’s activities is, or the potential human rights impact implications. If the 
firm’s operations led to heath problems for the population living around its factory, 
Chai Bora’s practice would be inconsistent with the ICESCR1996.  
 
7.3.2. Right to health 
This section will first cover the main health issues reported around Chai Bora’s 
operations, and second the health services available to workers and community 
members.  
 
7.3.2.1. Health issues 
As was already outlined in Chapter 5 and 6, the main issues in the area are access to 
water, and STDs and related problems.  
First, poor access to water is a big issue in Mafinga1997, especially in the summer1998, 
which leads to diseases such as typhoid fever and cholera1999. Indeed, water resources 
do not cover the needs of the population, who mostly uses wells2000. Since salaries are 
 
1989 Interviews with managers D3 and D4, local government representatives E1 and E7, and workers 
B1, B13, B14, B15, and B16, and community members C19, C32, C33, C34, C35, C36, C37, C38, C39, 
C40, and C41. 
1990 Interviews with local government representative E7, workers B1, B9, B10, and B11, and community 
members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, and C15. 
1991 Interviews with local government representative E7, workers B1, B9, B10, and B11, and community 
members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C8, C9, C10, C12, C13, C14, and C15. 
1992 Interviews with local government representative E7, workers B1, B9, B10, and B11, and community 
members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, and C15. 
1993 Manager D3 said that the company does not use firewood for energy but fuel and electricity.  
1994 Interviews with manager D3, and community members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C8, and C9. 
1995 Interview with doctor C7. 
1996 ICESCR, Article 12(1) and (2)(b). 
1997 Interviews with local government representative E1, civil society representative A9, community 
members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, C15, C19, C32, C34, C35, 
C38, C39, C40, C41, C42, and worker B8.  
1998 Interviews with civil society representative A9, and community members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C12, 
C13, C14, and C15. 
1999 Interviews with doctor C7 and civil society representative A9.  
2000 Interviews with community members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C8, C9, C10, C11, and C41. 
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generally below living wage levels, those who cannot afford to buy potable water may 
drink rain water during raining season2001, and water from a small river nearby2002 if 
wells dry up during the summer. A local government representative denied that there 
was a problem with the town’s supply of water2003, but another local representative 
stated that the situation was bad and that it was difficult to improve it for lack of 
funds2004. The government financially supported the town so that a tank of 500.000 
litres capacity could be purchased, and the local government are now are trying to find 
funding for a tank twice that capacity2005. Although the tank transports water from 
pumps and distributes it to taps around town, not all taps can be supplied with water at 
the same time2006. This means that taps work only two to three days a week2007 and that 
only a minority of people have constant access to water. A few inhabitants have private 
taps or wells, but others have to pay to use them2008. Finally, Mafinga’s water 
infrastructure is old and has not been renovated since 19802009. Added to the issue of 
Mafinga’s poor sewage system, it means that waste easily contaminates water sources; 
the population however does not know about it and may therefore fall sick2010. 
However, Chai Bora has not reportedly contributed to improving the community’s 
access to water2011, which may be inconsistent with the ICESCR2012. The company told 
a local community representative that they would help, but they had yet to contribute 
when the fieldwork took place2013. 
Second, STDs, including HIV/AIDS2014, and unplanned pregnancies2015 2016 are 
common in the area as most people have not received any reproductive health 
 
2001 Interviews with community members C32, C38, C39, and C40. 
2002 Interview with doctor C7 and community member C32.  
2003 Interview with local government representative E7.  
2004 Interview with local government representative E1.  
2005 Interview with local government representative E1. 
2006 Interview with local government representative E1. 
2007 Interviews with local government representative E1 and workers B8 and B14.  
2008 According to community members C36, C37, C38, C39, and C40, a bucketful of water costs Tsh100 
from a private tap and Tsh150 from a private well.  
2009 Interviews with local government representative E1 and community members C34 and C35. 
2010 Interview with civil society representative A9.  
2011 Interviews with manager D3, workers B13, B14, and B16, and community members C12, C13, C14, 
C15, C32, C33, C34, C35, C36, and C37. 
2012 ICESCR, Article 12(1) and (2)(b). 
2013 Interview with local government representative E1.  
2014 Interviews with community members C12, C13, C14, and C15.  
2015 Interviews with doctor C7. 
2016 STDs treatment and abortions are respectively 3rd and 10th on the list of the most common operations 
in one of Mafinga’s dispensaries (interview with doctor C7).  
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education2017. Two doctors at the local dispensaries started a programme to provide 
said education at the local market in town, but they had to discontinue the initiative 
because of a shortage of doctors in the area – although one doctor said that they would 
try to start the programme again2018. Other local health centres2019, NGOs2020, 
schools2021, and the local government2022 are also trying to help with education, and it 
was reported that secondary schools conducted tests to detect STDs2023.  
As seen in previous chapters, Iringa has the highest HIV/AIDS rate in Tanzania after 
Njombe, and Mafinga is the most problematic area in Iringa in this regard2024. In 
addition to issues of education, a local doctor2025 and a local government 
representative2026 stated that the fact that Mafinga was a business centre, with over 100 
trucks stopping by every day to load and unload goods and drivers sometimes spending 
the night in town, contributed to the spreading of STDs. The local doctor also pointed 
to the nearby army camps, and most importantly to tea plantations where high numbers 
of migrants work. This environment, added to the area’s low levels of income, fosters 
risky sexual encounters, including paid and unprotected relations. Another interviewee 
also blamed alcohol and alcoholism in the rise of STDs and unwanted pregnancies2027. 
The important role played by migrant workers in the spread of STDs and in unplanned 
pregnancies has also been highlighted by a number of interviewees2028.  
Facing these challenges, Chai Bora organises monthly HIV/AIDS-prevention 
programmes2029 – although not all workers are aware of them2030 –, run by other 
workers who are first sent away on training seminars2031. A few interviewees also said 
 
2017 Interview with doctor C7.  
2018 Interview with doctor C7.  
2019 Interviews with community representatives C8 and C9.  
2020 Interviews with civil society representative A13, and community members C8, C9, C32, C38, C39, 
and C40.   
2021 Local teachers C16 and C17 said that sexual health was in the syllabus, and that teachers have one-
on-one sessions with pupils, especially when they reach puberty. They also reportedly meet with parents 
to explain the role they have to play in the sexual education of their own children. 
2022 Interviews with local government representative E7, and community members C12, C13, C14, and 
C15.   
2023 Interview with civil society representative A9.  
2024 Interview with civil society representative A9.  
2025 Interview with doctor C7.  
2026 Interview with local government representative E7.  
2027 Interview with civil society representative A9.  
2028 Interviews with local government representatives E1 and E7, civil society representative A9, and 
community members C12, C13, C14, C15, and C19.  
2029 Interviews with managers D3 and D4, and workers B14, B15, and B16.  
2030 Worker B13 did not know about the company’s programme. 
2031 Interviews with manager D3, and workers B14, B15, and B16.  
P a g e  | 288 
 
that the firm organises voluntary testing every year for workers, although one of them 
also reported that it did not happen in 20172032. Another stated that the company 
encouraged workers to get tested with free food and other incentives2033. Workers do 
not have to disclose their HIV/AIDS status to Chai Bora; however, if they are 
HIV/AIDS-positive and decide to tell Chai Bora, the company will give them an 
additional lump sum every month to cover some costs related to the disease2034. In 
conclusion, the company seems to try and contribute to the prevention of HIV/AIDS 
among its workers, consistently with the ICESCR2035. Here again, this highlights the 
possibility for companies who have not adopted self-regulatory mechanisms to respect 
certain human rights as well as self-regulated firms, and suggests that the culture of 
the area where companies operate may play a (much more) important role in corporate 
behaviour on specific issues. However, it is important to note that most interviewees 
said that Chai Bora does not help the community in this regard2036.  
 
7.3.2.2. Health services 
Chai Bora does not operate a health centre2037, although it was reported that they had 
plans to do so in the past2038. Permanent workers get health insurance2039 – although 
one worker said that it did not cover all diseases and conditions2040 –, but not seasonal 
workers2041. Without health insurance, health services and medicines are 
expensive2042; it was reported that a doctor’s appointment costs Tsh 10.0002043. Most 
people in Mafinga depend on the town’s hospital2044, where access to medicines is 
 
2032 Interviews with worker B14 and community member C32.  
2033 Interview with worker B15. 
2034 Interviews with manager D4, and workers B14 and B15.  
2035 ICESCR, Article 12(1) and (2)(b). 
2036 Interviews with worker B13, and community members C8, C9, C32, C33, C34, C35, C36, C37, 
C38, C39, and C40.  
2037 Interviews with local government representative E7, workers B8, and community members C1, C2, 
C3, C4, C5, C6, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, C15, and C19. 
2038 Interview with doctor C7. 
2039 Interviews with manager D3, doctor C7, and worker B14. 
2040 Interview with worker B14.  
2041 Interviews with manager D3, and workers B13 and B16.  
2042 Interviews with community members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C8, C9, and C42.  
2043 Interviews with community members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C8, and C9. 
2044 Interviews with local government representative E7, local doctor C7, worker B8, and community 
members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C8, C9, C10, C11, C19, C33,  
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reportedly poor2045 and doctors and nurses are too few2046. The hospital was generally 
also reported to be crowded2047, although a local government representative 
disagreed2048. Some interviewees said that a significant part of the population visited 
private dispensaries because of the better services and access to medicines2049, even 
though they are expensive. Moreover, poor access to medicines at the local public 
hospital means that patients will have to buy medication privately and will therefore 
bear the expense as private medication is not covered by health insurance (as explained 
in Section 5.3.3.2.). The general lack of funding for Mafinga’s hospital may be 
explained by the fact that, following a council restructuration, the government divided 
its contributions to the local hospital by almost seven – Tsh 32 million yearly from Tsh 
220 million previously2050 – while, in a short amount of time, population coverage was 
almost multiplied by six – 400.000 people from 70.000 people previously2051. Patients 
now come from Njombe, Mufindi, Mbeya, and Iringa generally2052. In this context, 
Chai Bora reportedly does not contribute to the health needs of the community2053 even 
though the local government said that migrant tea workers put a strain on health 
services in the area2054. This practice could therefore be interpreted as being 
inconsistent with the ICESCR2055. 
 
7.3.3. Right to education 
It was reported that all children in the area go to school, although some must walk 
from quite far and therefore reach school tired2056. In a public school in Mafinga, girls 
 
2045 Interviews with worker B8, and community members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C8, C9, C10, C11, 
and C42. 
2046 Local government representative E1 said that hospital employee numbers were reduced when the 
town council was divided, and that there was therefore a shortage of nurses and doctors. Community 
members C8 and C9 also said that there was a shortage of doctors.  
2047 Interviews with local government representative E1, civil society representative A9, and community 
members C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C19, and C33. 
2048 Interview with local government representative E7. 
2049 Interviews with community members C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, C15,   
2050 Interview with local government representative E1. 
2051 Interview with local government representative E1. 
2052 Interview with local government representative E1. 
2053 Interviews with trade union representative F3, and community members C12, C13, C14, C15, and 
C33. 
2054 Interview with local government representative E1. 
2055 ICESCR, Article 12(1) and (2)(b). 
2056 Interviews with local teachers C16 and C17.  
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outnumber boys2057, but it was reported that the situation was not the same in villages 
surrounding the town, where girls – and children in general – tend to stay more at 
home2058. Most interviewees said that there were enough schools in the area2059 but not 
enough teachers2060 2061 or that infrastructure was poor2062. Local teachers also said that 
they were lacking supplies2063. Moreover, even though a local government 
representative said that there was no issue2064, a local government representative 
reported that there were 130 pupils in one primary class2065, and local teachers said 
that they had between 60 and 80 pupils in class2066. A local government representative 
also reported that infrastructures were poor2067. For instance, some classrooms have no 
chairs and pupils must therefore sit on logs2068. Finally, a few interviewees said that 
migrant workers put a strain on education services in the area2069, and that it is difficult 
to help them as some migrant children have very low levels of education2070. This 
situation was made reportedly worse after President Magufuli publicly stated that, as 
government schools were free, parents no longer should help schools financially2071 – 
but the government did not provide extra funding to compensate for the families’ 
former contributions. Schools are now therefore in general need of help2072.  
In this context, Chai Bora offered chairs when they were asked to do so by the 
government after President Magufuli took power2073, but a local government 
representative said that the company otherwise does not contribute to the education 
 
2057 50 boys and 71 girls graduated last year, according to local teachers C16 and C17. 
2058 Interviews with local teachers C16 and C17. 
2059 Interviews with local government representative E7, community members C8, C9, C12, C13, C14, 
C15, C19, C32, C33, C36, C37, C38, C39, C40, and C41. 
2060 Interviews with local teachers C16 and C17, workers B8, and community members C8, C9, C10, 
C19, C33, C34, C35, C38, C39, and C40. 
2061 According to local teachers C16 and C17 and community members C8 and C9, there was a shortage 
of teachers because President Magufuli dismissed those who were not qualified.  
2062 Interview with local government representative E1. 
2063 Interviews with local teachers C16 and C17. 
2064 Interview with local government representative E7.  
2065 Interview with the local government representative E1.  
2066 Interviews with local teachers C16 and C17.  
2067 Interviews with local government representative E1 and community member C38, C39, and C40. 
2068 Interview with local government representative E1. 
2069 Interviews with local government representative E1, civil society representative A9, and community 
members C33, C38, C39, C40, and C41.  
2070 Interviews with local teachers C16 and C17. 
2071 Interviews with local teachers C16 and C17.  
2072 Interviews with local teachers C16 and C17.  
2073 Interviews with local government representative E7 and community members C12, C13, C14, C15,  
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needs of the community2074 even when they are contacted directly by schools2075. A 
local government representative has reportedly visited Chai Bora and subsequently 
tried to reach out again to the company, but the firm had yet to reply when the 
fieldwork took place2076. However, Chai Bora said that they had contributed towards 
the building of two school laboratories2077. Overall, it appears that the firm does not 
often contribute to the education needs of the community, which may be interpreted 
as being inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights2078 and the 
ICESCR2079.  
 
Now that I have assessed Chai Bora’s human rights performance, I will use the 
framework of ‘key features’ developed in Chapter 3 to investigate the role played by 
these features in the firm’s behaviour.  
 
7.4. Impact of key features outside of formal self-regulatory 
mechanisms 
Chai Bora has not adopted any human rights self-regulatory mechanisms. However, it 
would be important to see if the firm has set up processes, and in particular the ‘key 
features’ identified in Chapter 3, to minimise any negative human rights impact which 
its activities may have, even in the absence of formal self-regulatory mechanisms. This 
will help investigate whether the key features are also effective in helping a firm which 
has not adopted any self-regulatory mechanisms respect human rights, which would 
confirm (or not) the important role they (can) play in effective self-regulation. I will 
do so by using the framework of ‘key features’ developed in Chapter 3 – although only 
covering the features relevant to a firm which has not adopted any such mechanisms: 
the embedding of human rights-related rules into its everyday activities; the 
monitoring of the human rights impact of its operations; any complaints mechanisms 
 
2074 Interviews with trade union representative F3, workers B13 and B14, and community members C1, 
C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C8, C9, C10, C12, C13, C14, C15, C19, C32, C33, C34, C35, C36, C37, C41,  
2075 Interviews with local teachers C16 and C17.  
2076 Interview with local government representative E1. 
2077 Interview with manager D3.  
2078 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26.  
2079 ICESCR, Article 13.  
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which the firm has set up; and the potential corporate sanctions for violations of human 
rights. 
First, Chai Bora could embed human rights into their everyday activities by training 
of their workers and managers and setting up reward systems for the implementation 
of rules related to human rights and for whistleblowing. On the one hand, the only 
feature which is implemented is the training of workers, mainly on health and safety, 
HIV/AIDS, and sexual harassment, as mentioned throughout this chapter. However, 
the latter is only available for permanent workers, as explained in Section 7.2.5.2. 
above. Although health and safety is still problematic, the company does perform well 
regarding its treatment of people living with HIV/AIDS, and its handling of sexual 
harassment on company grounds. Similarly, the training organised by seasonal 
workers themselves was reported as improving behaviour. This would support the 
theory that the embedding of ‘values’ into the firm’s practice and structure – which 
may be done by training employees – is essential2080. The suggestion by interviewees 
that the fact that trade union representatives cannot defend workers’ rights correctly 
stems from their lack of training2081 would also confirm this. On the other hand, as 
with Unilever and MTC, there is a general lack of training offered to Chai Bora 
managers, which could have contributed to the poor implementation of certain 
standards. This is particularly true regarding non-discrimination against pregnant 
women: while it is a human rights violation, Chai Bora managers do not see it as a 
problem.  
Second, Chai Bora does not have any internal system in place to monitor the human 
rights impact of its activities. Apart from quarterly health and safety risk 
assessments2082, Chai Bora does not seem to conduct any human rights-related risk 
assessment, due diligence, or related processes. As for external monitoring, no (non-
governmental) third-party organisations carries out verifications: a local government 
representative said that they conducted regular environmental inspections2083 and 
OSHA reportedly carry out quarterly health and safety inspections2084 – although I 
 
2080 Selznick (n. 351), 101.  
2081 Interviews with civil society representatives A11 and A12. 
2082 Interview with manager D3.  
2083 Interview with local government representative E7.  
2084 Interview with manager D3.  
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could not independently verify these claims –, but all these inspections would in any 
case remain government-led and would therefore sit outside the scope of this study. 
Third, there is no free and anonymous complaints mechanism available to Chai Bora 
workers2085 2086. If a permanent worker has a complaint, they need to go through the 
local branch of the TUICO. There is a separate process for sexual harassment cases: 
female TUICO representatives handle the complaints and pass it on to the TUICO 
chairman, who will then speak with management2087. It was reported that TUICO 
representatives did not always use to take women’s complaints to management; 
however, the situation has reportedly improved, women’s complaints are now taken 
more seriously2088, and Chai Bora’s general performance on this issue was reported as 
having improved. However, it is a challenge to determine the extent to which 
complaints mechanisms have played a role in this improvement considering that 
training was also offered on this issue. Moreover, as TUICO is not open to seasonal 
workers2089, they may only complain to their manager, and do not have any other way 
to express concerns or complaints to management2090. One seasonal worker also said 
that their managers do not usually report their complaints to upper management2091. 
Seasonal workers regretted that an official, free, and anonymous complaints 
mechanism was not in place, as they would reportedly use it2092. Furthermore, there is 
no free and anonymous complaints mechanism available to community members2093, 
which a few interviewees regretted as they would have used it to express grievances 
about issues such as the poor access to water and to health services2094. Community 
members were especially concerned with the absence of such a mechanism since Chai 
Bora does not seem to engage with the community in other fora, as explained in this 
chapter. It follows that it is difficult to assess the actual added value which such 
mechanisms may have if they were set up, although they could play a role in ensuring 
that seasonal workers’ and community members’ voices are heard and taken into 
 
2085 Interviews with trade union representative F3, and workers B13, B14, B15, and B16. 
2086 Manager D3, when asked about any complaints mechanism which the company had, only mentioned 
the fact that anyone could talk about any issues they may have with the Human Resources department.  
2087 Interviews with trade union representative F3.  
2088 Interview with worker B8. 
2089 See Section 7.2.3.1. 
2090 Interview with worker B13.  
2091 Interview with worker B13. 
2092 Interviews with workers B13 and B16.  
2093 Interview with community member C32, C33, C34, C35, C36, C37, C38, C39, C40, and C41. 
2094 Interviews with community members C32, C34, C35, C38, C39, and C40. 
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account2095 which, in turn, is likely to lead to improvement in corporate human rights 
performance.  
Finally, no sanctions are given for failing to implement health and safety regulations 
as the company favours education to penalties2096. No other positive evidence of 
sanctions for human rights-related breaches was found. Only looking at Chai Bora, it 
is therefore difficult to draw conclusions as to the effectiveness of individual sanctions 
for workers and for managers, but I will expand on the importance of sanctions for 
improving corporate human rights performance in Chapter 8 by drawing evidence 
from all three companies.   
 
7.5. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed first to determine the human rights impact of Chai Bora’s activities, 
and second the effectiveness of some of the key features on a company’s human rights 
impact in the absence of formal self-regulatory mechanisms.  
First, Chai Bora’s operations have a negative human rights impact in some areas: 
treatment of seasonal workers; health and safety; outsourcing of security staff; and 
discrimination against pregnant women. One of the most important areas of concerns 
are the working conditions of seasonal workers, especially as compared with those of 
permanent workers. Indeed, seasonal workers do not have access to a trade union, sick 
leave, annual leave, maternity or paternity leave, or healthcare and compensation in 
case of work-related accidents. They also have no access to health insurance or to a 
rent allowance, while the company provides it to its permanent workers. Another issue 
relates to health and safety, as Chai Bora may not take all necessary security measures. 
Moreover, another issue is the outsourcing of security staff with no effort to check on 
the employees’ working terms and conditions, resulting in problematic practices as set 
against national and international standards. Finally, discrimination against pregnant 
women is also a problem within Chai Bora, in potential contradiction with 
international human rights law. However, Chai Bora meets its human rights 
responsibilities in some respects. This is the case for the right to freedom from 
exploitative child labour, permanent workers’ rights, right to non-discrimination 
 
2095 Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166), 228. 
2096 Interview with manager D3.  
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against people living with HIV/AIDS, right to equal pay between men and women, 
and to a clean environment. 
Second, Chai Bora trains its workers – mainly on health and safety, HIV/AIDS, and 
sexual harassment – but does not give out sanctions for non-compliance. It is unclear 
whether the training provided on health and safety and HIV/AIDS has helped, but the 
sessions on sexual harassment have been reported as having improved individual (and 
therefore collective) behaviour. Moreover, considering that Chai Bora’s activities are 
not internally or externally monitored, that no complaints mechanism has been set up, 
and that no sanctions are given out for non-compliance with specific (health and 
safety) standards, it is difficult to rigorously assess the extent to which these measures 
would help the firm improve its human rights performance, although they may have 
helped the firm become aware of some of the issues reported in this chapter. The only 
external audits which may take place within the company are conducted by the 
Ministry for Labour and OSHA. As they are both facing difficulties in terms of 
capacity, as mentioned in Chapter 4, Chai Bora may not be audited for years. 
Furthermore, even when government-sanctioned audits take place and end up in fines 
for companies in the area, practices reportedly only change for a few weeks before the 
situation returns to normal2097. Overall, considering the environment in which Chai 
Bora operates, having an internal or external mechanism for respecting human rights 
would mean adding another layer of oversight to the firm’s activities – although not 
all mechanisms are equally efficient in that regard, as observed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Finally, it is important to note that two factors (which are not ‘key features’) have also 
led to changes in Chai Bora’s human rights performance: bottom-up action from 
workers and the adoption of a collective agreement. I will explore these external 
factors in more detail in Chapter 8. 
Informed by the theoretical discussions outlined in Chapters 1 to 4, and building on 
the findings of my case study laid out in Chapter 5 to 7, Chapter 8 will draw 
conclusions as to the kind of effect which corporate self-regulation has had on 
corporate practice and the extent to which it has helped Tanzanian tea corporations 
meet their international human rights obligations.  
 
2097 Interview with local government representative E1.  
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In this thesis I have explored the extent to which self-regulatory mechanisms were 
effective in helping corporations meet their international human rights responsibilities, 
with a focus on the Tanzanian tea industry. I have developed a typology of corporate 
human rights self-regulatory mechanisms and identified categories of ‘key features’ to 
help measure their effectiveness. I have come up with a methodology which allowed 
me to test out the kind of effect self-regulatory mechanisms had on corporate 
behaviour and investigate the features which made the different types mechanisms 
effective – if any. As was uncovered in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, none of the mechanisms 
are entirely effective. As I will explain in this chapter, this is because the adoption of 
corporate self-regulatory mechanisms does not automatically lead to standard 
implementation, because the design of some of the mechanisms is partially flawed, 
and because self-regulation is necessarily limited in the kind of human rights issues it 
can feasibly address. I will go over these different findings in more detail in the rest of 
this chapter. Another important finding is the fact that external factors also played a 
role in changing firms’ behaviour: as it was uncovered, factors such as bottom-up 
action from affected stakeholders and company’s financial resources may have a 
crucial impact on a company’s human rights performance, whether or not self-
regulatory mechanisms are in place.  
In order to reach these conclusions, this chapter will first build on Chapters 1 and 2 to 
answer the thesis’s first set of sub-questions (‘What are the self-regulatory 
mechanisms used by corporations to improve their human rights performance? Why 
should one analyse them collectively?’). To do so, I will recall the typology which was 
developed for this research. Secondly, this chapter will build on Chapters 3 and 4 to 
answer the thesis’s second set of sub-questions (‘What academic scholarship has been 
undertaken which evaluates the effectiveness of self-regulatory mechanisms from a 
human rights perspective? How does one develop a methodology for testing out their 
human rights effectiveness ‘on the ground’?’). To do so, I will recall the ‘key features’ 
which were identified as important for measuring the effectiveness of self-regulation 
across all mechanisms and used to design a methodology for testing them out. Next, I 
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will build on Chapters 5, 6, and 7 to answer the thesis’s third set of sub-questions 
(‘Testing out that methodology, what kind of effect do these mechanisms have on 
corporate human rights performance with regard to a particular industry in a particular 
geographical setting? To what extent are those findings generalisable to other 
industries and geographical settings?’2098). To do so, I will conduct a linked analysis 
of the three companies’ human rights performance, which will inform my investigation 
into the impact which self-regulatory mechanisms (and key features) have had on the 
(relevant) companies’ performance.  This will in turn support my assessment of the 
role played by the various features identified by scholars as important to guarantee the 
effectiveness of self-regulation in the context of Tanzanian tea, as well as the 
identification of any other influential factors. At that point, it will be essential to 
answer this thesis’s main research question (‘To what extent is it possible to evaluate 
the effectiveness of voluntary corporate self-regulatory mechanisms in ensuring that 
companies meet their international human rights responsibilities?’). Drawing from this 
(although necessarily limited) piece of research, I will outline my conclusions as to the 
(potential) place and role of self-regulation in the process of regulating corporate 
behaviour. Finally, I will investigate the limitations of my methodology and propose 
areas for future research. 
 
8.2. Answer to the thesis’s first set of sub-questions  
The first set of sub-questions which this thesis aims to answer was: What are the self-
regulatory mechanisms used by corporations to improve their human rights 
performance? Why should one analyse them collectively? 
As explained in Chapter 1, a key argument made in this thesis was that it is important 
to examine the different corporate human rights self-regulatory mechanisms 
collectively, in a way that has not been done in existing scholarship: first, because of 
their substantive content and objectives; second, because of the way which firms use 
them; and third because of the similar ‘key features’ potentially improving their 
effectiveness, as identified in Chapter 3. In order to understand the different types of 
mechanisms better, it was important to create a typology sorting them out based on 
 
2098 The second question (‘To what extent are those findings generalisable to other industries and 
geographical settings’) will be fully addressed later in Section 8.5., once I have outlined my findings. 
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criteria which are relevant to the objectives of this thesis. Since the object of study of 
this research is the effectiveness of mechanisms on corporate behaviour, it was crucial 
to place corporations at the heart of the typology. I therefore broadly divided the 
different types of self-regulatory mechanisms into company- and product-level 
mechanisms, depending on whether the standards applied to the whole firm – requiring 
holistic compliance within the firm – or solely to one product – requiring compliance 
only as far as the making of the specific product is concerned. I then divided the 
company-level mechanisms into two categories, depending on whether the author of 
the standards was the firm itself (internal mechanisms) or external actors (external 
mechanisms). Finally, I sub-divided the latter into three sub-categories, depending on 
who the (external) author of the standards was: governments and/or intergovernmental 
organisations (intergovernmental mechanisms), industry actors (industry 
mechanisms), or multi-stakeholder organisations (multi-stakeholder initiatives).  
This innovative typology allows for the assessment of the effectiveness of the different 
types of mechanisms informed by their own operational dynamic and by their role in 
corporate human rights strategy. 
 
8.3. Answer to the thesis’s second set of sub-questions  
The second set of sub-questions which this thesis aims to answer was: What academic 
scholarship has been undertaken which evaluates the effectiveness of self-regulatory 
mechanisms from a human rights perspective? How does one develop a methodology 
for testing out their human rights effectiveness ‘on the ground’? 
In Chapter 3, I reviewed the literature on impact of the different types of corporate 
self-regulatory mechanisms and found that no study had yet empirically investigated 
the effectiveness of these different mechanisms together, and from a comprehensive 
human rights perspective. Yet it is crucial to examine the actual impact on the ground 
of these mechanisms to assess whether self-regulation mechanisms do help companies 
effectively implement their human rights standards. Once this was established, I 
identified ‘key features’ put forward by scholars as helping improve the effectiveness 
of corporate self-regulation, which I organised using the following different 
categories: drafting of standards; embedding of standards into everyday operations; 
monitoring and reporting of compliance; setting up of complaints mechanisms; and 
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sanctions for non-compliance. These ‘key features’ were tested out empirically to find 
out if they contribute to making human rights self-regulation effective.  
In order to design my empirical research, I then built on my evaluation of the various 
empirical methods carried out in Chapter 1 which identified the case study as the most 
appropriate method: they may be used to illuminate why decisions were taken, how 
they were implemented, and with what result. They also help to explain the 
complexities of real-life situations which may not be captured through other means of 
research and may be used when a phenomenon and context cannot be separated. I then 
designed my case study, keeping in mind that I needed to focus on a particular location 
and industry where human rights issues are widespread and standards are common. 
Accordingly, I explained in Chapter 4 why the Tanzanian tea industry in general was 
an appropriate setting for this thesis’s case study, and three specific tea corporations 
operating in the Mufindi region in particular.  
 
In the next four sections, I will provide an answer to the third sub-question of this 
thesis: when the methodology developed in this thesis is applied to a real-world 
scenario, what are the findings that are produced? I will dedicate most of this chapter 
to this question as I will need to pull together the work undertaken in Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7 in order to fully answer the question.  
 
8.4. Answer to this thesis’s third set of sub-questions  
In this section, I will first analyse the three firms’ human rights performance; second, 
the impact of mechanisms on the (relevant) firms’ human rights performance; third, 
the role played by the key features identified in Chapter 3 on the firms’ human rights 
performance and on the impact of mechanisms on the firms’ human rights 
performance; finally, I will analyse the role played by other factors on firms’ human 
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8.4.1. Firms’ human rights performance 
This section will review the human rights performance of the three firms of this thesis’s 
case study2099. I will in particular review the firms’ impact on the following human 
rights: right to an adequate standard of living, right to just and favourable terms of 
work, right to healthy and safe conditions of work, freedom of association, right of 
seasonal workers to favourable working conditions, freedom from discrimination, 
right to housing, right to health, right to education, and right to a clean environment.   
 
8.4.1.1. Right to adequate standard of living 
One of the most important human rights problems which I have found across all three 
companies was low wages (even taking into account in-kind benefits), leading to the 
breach of the right to an adequate standard of living. Workers at Unilever, MTC, and 
Chai Bora earn less than a living wage and must commonly work several jobs to feed 
their families – although Chai Bora pays its permanent employees better than the other 
companies do. This may show the limitations of self-regulatory mechanisms – despite 
the fact that both companies have adopted several types of mechanisms (most of which 
include multiple standards regarding wage levels), they pay their employees less than 
Chai Bora pays its permanent workers. This is a very crucial problem because it has 
significant human rights consequences, impacting on a broad range of rights going 
beyond the right to an adequate standard and living. In the context of this case study, 
I have found that it had consequences on the right to an adequate supply of water, to 
food, to health, to education, and to rest and leisure, across all three companies.  
 
8.4.1.2. Right to just and favourable terms of work 
Unilever and MTC have both improved their practice regarding workers’ contracts, as 
all their employees now sign a contract before starting work. All contracts are in 
Swahili, which did not used to be the case. However, both companies do not 
consistently ensure that all workers are given enough time to read through the contract 
before signing it, or to provide them all with copies of their contract. However, Chai 
 
2099 I have also compiled all aspects of the three firms’ human rights performance in a table (see Annex 
6). 
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Bora’s practice – while being adequate for permanent employees – is poor for seasonal 
workers, who are not provided with a contract after their first day of work. Such 
practice fails to uphold workers’ right to just and favourable terms of work.  
Another issue was working time, as some employees across all three companies work 
too many hours – although Rainforest Alliance standards have helped Unilever reduce 
their employees’ working hours. However, Unilever and MTC’s policy (implementing 
their CBA) on overtime is problematic as it obliges employees to work overtime. 
The practice of all three companies regarding leaves greatly varies, depending on 
workers’ status: permanent workers are generally offered all legally sanctioned leaves 
(with exceptions) whereas seasonal employees are either denied all leaves (for Chai 
Bora) or only allowed limited sick leave (for Unilever and MTC).  
Finally, Chai Bora’s practice regarding outsourced staff is poor, as they do not check 
these workers’ working terms and conditions. As a result, outsourced employees work 
illegally long hours, seven days a week, and are not offered any leaves. Unilever’s 
practice is very different as the firm checks that outsourced employees are offered the 
same working conditions as Unilever’s (permanent) employees. There was no report 
of outsourced activities in MTC’s operations.  
Overall, Chai Bora fails to uphold their seasonal workers’ right to just and favourable 
terms of work while guaranteeing it for their permanent workers. Unilever’s and 
MTC’s records are more mixed; while, for the most part, the practice in both 
companies guarantees their workers’ right to just and favourable terms of work, 
improvements (especially concerning seasonal employees) are needed.  
 
8.4.1.3. Right to healthy and safe conditions of work 
In general, Chai Bora appears to have the worst record of the three firms: there were 
complaints from workers about accidents and reports of the company’s potential 
carelessness regarding their health and safety practice – contrary to Unilever and MTC. 
However, Chai Bora organises medical check-ups for all its workers on a regular basis, 
whereas Unilever and MTC only have entry check-ups. MTC has regular follow-up 
check-ups but only for its permanent workers. Most importantly, there are problems 
with the provision of free protective equipment in all three companies, and no 
sanctions are given out for not wearing proper equipment in two companies. Moreover, 
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compensation for work-related accidents is a problem across all three companies, 
especially for seasonal workers who are never offered any compensation. This is so 
even though all workers are entitled to compensation by law. It follows that the 
practice of all three companies clashes with the right to healthy and safe conditions of 
work, albeit at different degrees – it is acknowledged that Unilever performs the best, 
and Chai Bora the worst. 
 
8.4.1.4. Right to freedom of association and collective bargaining 
Freedom of association was an issue across all three companies: Chai Bora’s seasonal 
workers are denied access to a trade union, while there were multiple reports of failure 
of union representatives to defend workers’ rights in Unilever and MTC – although 
the situation for Unilever has improved since the last strike. Indeed, Unilever’s 
management decided to build a better relationship with trade union representatives to 
avoid violent strikes in the future. MTC has also faced violent strikes in recent years 
but did not seem to have changed its practice since. Only Chai Bora did not report any 
strikes in recent years – although seasonal workers reportedly do not dare go on strike 
lest they lose their employment. In general, workers’ right to freedom of association 
and collective bargaining was only partially guaranteed in all three companies.  
 
8.4.1.5. Right of seasonal workers to favourable working 
conditions 
A major problem encountered with all three companies was their treatment of seasonal 
workers. Unilever obliges its seasonal workers to buy their own protective equipment 
and denies them sick leave or compensation for work-related accidents. MTC denies 
seasonal workers leaves, healthcare after a work-related accident once their contract 
expires, compensation for accidents, and a rent allowance if the firm cannot 
accommodate them onsite. However, of the three companies, Chai Bora performs the 
worst: seasonal workers do not have a contract, are paid (significantly) less than 
permanent workers, are not allowed any leave or access to a trade union, are not 
provided with health insurance or a rent allowance, or offered any compensation for 
work-related accidents. Although Chai Bora performs the worst of all firms, the 
practice of all three companies clashes with workers’ right to favourable working 
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conditions and, for MTC and Chai Bora, also clashes with the workers’ right to health, 
to housing, and to favourable working conditions. Finally, Chai Bora’s practice also 
clashes with the workers’ right to freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
 
8.4.1.6. Right to non-discrimination 
Corporate practices generally clashed with the right to non-discrimination based on 
gender. There have also been reports of discrimination against pregnant women by 
Unilever and MTC – although the companies denied it – and established 
discriminatory practices by Chai Bora, whose management admitted that the company 
did not hire pregnant women and had fired an employee who failed to disclose her 
pregnancy during the recruitment process. There were also multiple reports of gender-
related issues, and in particular sexual harassment, in all three companies – although 
all have improved their record regarding gender-related issues. However, despite these 
recent improvements, the firms’ practice clashes with workers’ right to gender-based 
non-discrimination. 
Finally, it is notable that in no company were there reports of discrimination against 
people living with HIV/AIDS.  
  
8.4.1.7. Right to housing 
Onsite housing is also a problem for Unilever and MTC, as houses only include one 
room and are too small, and most families are not provided with electricity. Chai Bora 
does not have onsite housing and most workers therefore live in Mafinga – but the 
amount which the firm offers to compensate is insufficient to cover workers’ rent. It 
follows that all three firms’ practice may clash with workers’ (and their family 
members’) right to housing and to adequate housing. However, it is notable that 
Unilever’s provision of drinking water onsite is a significant contribution to its 
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8.4.1.8. Right to health 
It is important to distinguish between the right to health of workers and that of 
community members.  
First, Unilever and MTC have health centres which are freely available (including free 
medication) to workers and their families. In the Tanzanian context of poor access to 
healthcare, this significantly contributes to fulfilling workers’ right to health. As for 
Chai Bora, the firm provides health insurance to its permanent workers but not its 
seasonal workers.  This practice therefore helps fulfils permanent workers’ right to 
health but clashes with that of seasonal workers. Moreover, Unilever has set up a 
weekly programme to train workers about HIV/AIDS prevention – although the firm 
had reportedly not run it for four months. Similarly, Chai Bora runs a monthly seminar. 
MTC has set up a similar programme, although there were multiple reports that it had 
not been run in months. Furthermore, MTC and Chai Bora financially support workers 
living with HIV/AIDS. All three firms’ practice therefore helps fulfil the right to health 
of workers living with HIV/AIDS.  
Second, all three companies fail to adequately contribute to the health needs of the 
community, in two ways. On the one hand, only workers (and their families) have free 
access to their health services. If community members wish to go to Unilever or 
MTC’s health centres, they must pay – and it is very expensive. On the other hand, 
none of the firms contribute to the offsite community’s most pressing health need: 
access to water. It follows that all three firms fail to contribute to fulfilling community 
members’ right to health.  
 
8.4.1.9. Right to education 
Only Unilever has a school, but it is so expensive that it is only accessible to managers’ 
children. Unilever and MTC have both built schools, which are now run by the 
government, and other facilities for local pupils such as biology laboratories or 
dormitories. However, Chai Bora has not participated beyond one recent action in 
response to a call by the Tanzanian President. It follows that Unilever and MTC 
partially contribute to fulfilling community members’ right to education, and that Chai 
Bora fails to do so. 
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8.4.1.10. Right to a clean environment 
The area where all three companies seem to perform best is their environment impact 
– although it is not perfect. There was no report of environmental degradation for MTC 
and Chai Bora, and Unilever has improved its environmental record since 2014. 
However, the latter’s practice of spraying chemicals near water sources infringe 
community members’ right to a clean environment. It is notable that for both Unilever 
and MTC, product-level mechanisms were identified as having had a positive impact 
– although Unilever’s pollution of water sources is a potentially grave human rights 
violation, and the firm’s Rainforest Alliance certification did not prevent or redress it. 
 
8.4.1.11. Other rights 
First, despite the high risk associated with running a tea operation in Mufindi, no 
company violated community members’ right to land. Second, and again despite the 
high risk associated with running a tea operation in Mufindi, no company violated the 
right to freedom from exploitative child labour.  
 
8.4.1.12. Conclusion 
For most of human rights issues evaluated above, the company with the worst record 
is Chai Bora – especially when it comes to the treatment of seasonal workers. Indeed, 
only in Chai Bora are seasonal employees not given a contract (beyond their first 
workday), denied a rent allowance, healthcare, and access to the trade union. 
Moreover, Chai Bora’s contribution to the community is the lowest of the three 
companies. However, it is interesting to see that Chai Bora performs well (and even 
better than the other two companies) regarding its permanent workers. Chai Bora’s 
permanent workers are paid (significantly) more than Unilever’s and MTC’s 
permanent workers and, contrary to the other two companies, are (usually) offered 
compensation for work-related accidents, and go through regular medical check-ups. 
Similarly to permanent employees at the other two firms, they are also offered 
contracts, leaves, healthcare, rent allowance, and HIV/AIDS programmes. However, 
Chai Bora’s permanent workers may still work too much (overtime) and may not be 
guaranteed the best health and safety standards. Overall, the company with the best 
human rights performance is Unilever, and the worst Chai Bora.  
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It is clear that the performance of all three companies – including the two firms which 
have adopted self-regulatory mechanisms – is problematic, and that some human rights 
issues are similar across all the companies, whether or not they have adopted 
mechanisms. It is now important to make a general analysis of the impact of the 
different types of self-regulatory mechanisms adopted by the (relevant) firms in my 
case study.  
 
8.4.2. General analysis of the impact of corporate self-regulatory 
mechanisms 
Now that I have analysed the three companies’ human rights performance, I will 
review the impact of the various self-regulatory mechanisms on this performance. 
Since only Unilever and MTC have adopted self-regulatory mechanisms, I will here 
focus on these two companies.  
First, as I have explained in Chapter 5, only the Rainforest Alliance was identified as 
having had some concrete impact on the way which Unilever carries out its activities 
– although its influence remains focused on a few issues. Similarly, only the Rainforest 
Alliance and Fairtrade have been reported as having some impact on MTC’s practice. 
It follows that only product-level mechanisms have had an impact on firm’s operations 
which was identifiable on the ground. It is important to note that the impact of these 
product-level mechanisms has been concentrated, for both companies, on the 
following two areas: health and safety, and the firms’ environmental footprint. The 
latter is perhaps not surprising, considering that the Rainforest Alliance was first 
created to help protect the environment. Beyond this, the Rainforest Alliance made 
Unilever shorten its employees’ working time, Fairtrade helped MTC contribute to the 
education needs of the community, and both certification systems have reportedly 
helped MTC improve its practice on gender-related issues. Moreover, it is true that, as 
mentioned in Chapter 5, there was a big ‘push’ to implement Unilever’s Code of 
Business Principles, but I was unable to observe any concrete impact which the 
instrument may have had on the way which Unilever operates. Second, as the first 
section of this chapter has shown, both companies fail to entirely meet many of their 
human rights responsibilities. In these areas, it is therefore obvious that the impact of 
self-regulatory mechanisms on the firms’ behaviour has been limited.  
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In conclusion, when companies performed well (and especially, better than the 
company without self-regulatory mechanism), only on certain areas have I been able 
to identify any impact which self-regulatory mechanisms may have had and, when the 
firms did not perform well, it is clear that the same mechanisms did not work. The 
most important question at this stage is: why is it so? What parts of the mechanisms 
worked? What parts did not work? What does that tell us about the potential of self-
regulation as a way to control corporate behaviour and ensure that it is respectful of 
human rights? What could be done to ensure that this potential is fully realised?  
In order to answer these questions, the rest of this chapter is structured as follows: first, 
I will summarise the role played by the ‘key features’ identified in Chapter 3 in the 
effectiveness of self-regulatory mechanisms. Second, I will recall the other factors 
which have influenced the effectiveness of the mechanisms. I will then, in the final 
section of this chapter (and of the thesis), summarise my findings, answer my main 
research question, and outline the limits of this study and areas for further research.  
 
8.4.3. Role played by key features  
This section will follow the structure which has been used throughout this thesis to 
analyse the ‘key features’, and will evaluate the role played by each feature in the 
following order: drafting of standards; embedding of standards into everyday 
operations; monitoring and reporting of implementation; setting up of a complaints 
mechanism; and sanctioning for non-compliance. To the extent possible, I will also 
address the role played by management’s motivation throughout the whole process.  
 
8.4.3.1. Drafting of standards 
It has become obvious that, at the drafting stage, it is crucial that a comprehensive set 
of high-level human rights principles be included and translated into operational 
standards. Committing to high-level human rights principles will define the direction 
taken by the firms to ensure that their operations do not negatively impact human 
rights. If they miss out on some rights, there may be important consequences on the 
ground, as is explained below. It is also important that mechanisms’ standards be 
detailed, as was recommended by some authors, who rightly warned that generalised 
instruments risk “being so open-ended that impartial and unambiguous application is 
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difficult”2100. It is therefore crucial to adopt operational standards which adequately 
and thoroughly translate these high-level principles into ground-level actions. Using 
‘means’-type command, these ‘operational’ standards aim to explain to the firm how 
to implement the high-level principles on the ground. For instance, Unilever has 
adopted different self-regulatory mechanisms with various levels of specificity and 
applicability. However, some high-level commitments – mainly made using company-
level mechanisms – have no translation into concrete behaviour on the ground. In this 
case, it is unclear how the firm expects its employees (and subcontractors) to behave 
so that these commitments are met, which makes their implementation difficult. For 
instance, for lack of more specific guidelines, it is difficult to determine whether the 
right to a family life as guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights2101 
and the ICCPR2102, and the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate 
housing, as guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights2103 and the 
ICESCR2104 are upheld by Unilever when the firm provides small houses to its workers 
with (for most of them) no electricity. Even though the Rainforest Alliance sets 
specific standards on minimum size for housing, the fact that workers must share their 
one-room house with their children and no electricity, and sleep in the same room as 
they cook and eat may lead to the violation of their rights under the different 
instruments mentioned above – but whether it is actually the case is unclear, in the 
absence of detailed standards using ‘means’-type command. In the same vein, the lack 
of specific requirement that all workers be compensated for work-related injuries 
means that it may be difficult to determine whether or not the fact that seasonal workers 
are not entitled to compensation violates the ICESCR guaranteeing the right to “the 
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work”2105. This leaves an important 
potential gap in the human rights protection afforded to workers. Finally, even the most 
ground-level instruments have gaps. Indeed, the Rainforest Alliance, despite its set of 
119 criteria2106, fails to cover some issues, which may lead to important human rights 
consequences. Fairtrade shows the same gaps: neither set of the standards covers 
healthcare after – or compensation for – work-related injuries, paternity leave, the 
 
2100 Weaver (n. 356), 367.  
2101 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16. 
2102 ICCPR, Article 23.  
2103 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25. 
2104 ICESCR, Article 11. 
2105 ICESCR, Article 7.  
2106 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, 8. 
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handling of strikes, or the provision of electricity to workers’ housing. These gaps may 
lead to important human rights consequences, as became obvious in this case study 
when corporations failed to uphold certain of these rights.  
 
8.4.3.2. Embedding of standards 
From the evidence collected for Unilever and MTC, it appears that the training offered 
to workers helped change their behaviour2107 – and consolidate it. It is interesting to 
see that firms themselves may acknowledge the importance of training on the 
implementation of their standards: when Unilever’s management saw that the 
principles included in the firm’s Code of Business Principles were not cascading down 
to the workers, they started training all their workers and contractors on the content of 
the Code (although it is acknowledged that no evidence of direct impact of the Code 
was found). This shows that the mere presence of a code is not as important as the 
content of the code, contrary to some scholars’ view2108. Moreover, it is interesting 
that Chai Bora also trained their workers on human rights-related issues: health and 
safety, HIV/AIDS, and sexual harassment (although the latter is only available for 
permanent workers). Although health and safety is still problematic, the company does 
perform well regarding its treatment of people living with HIV/AIDS, and its handling 
of sexual harassment on company grounds. Similarly, the training organised by 
seasonal workers themselves was reported as improving behaviour. This would 
support the theory that the embedding of ‘values’ into the firm’s practice and structure 
– which may be done by training employees – is essential2109. However, there is a 
general lack of training offered to managers in all companies, which could have 
contributed to the poor implementation of certain standards. This is particularly true 
regarding non-discrimination against pregnant women: while it is a human rights 
violation, Chai Bora managers do not see it as a problem. It also seems to be the case 
regarding workers’ rights, which trade union representatives may be able to defend 
more effectively if they were (better) trained2110.  
 
2107 Dean (n. 405), 285; Maclagan (n. 405), 415; Kearney (n. 363), 211; Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166), 
228; and Schwartz (n. 320), 258; and Sims (n. 396), 504.   
2108 Adams, Tashchian, and Shore (n. 387), 208. 
2109 Selznick (n. 351), 101.  
2110 Interviews with civil society representatives A11 and A12.  
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Finally, an important feature would be ‘establishing special units to implement policies 
affecting the well-being of employees’, as suggested by Philip Selznik2111. Indeed, 
Unilever has improved its record in terms of gender-related issues after setting up its 
Welfare Office, which helped embed respect for women into the firm’s practice and 
structure. However, it is interesting to see that the firm did not do so in order to 
implement its standards. This ‘feature’ may therefore help firms respect human rights 
even in the absence of self-regulatory mechanisms – however, it is acknowledged that 
the importance of this ‘feature’ is linked to the financial health of the company, which 
is one of the external factors covered below. Indeed, only companies which are 
financially healthy can afford to set up specific departments and hire employees 
dedicated to these issues. 
 
8.4.3.3. Monitoring and reporting of performance and 
compliance 
This section covers the assessment of the role played by the following aspects of 
monitoring and reporting of performance: human rights impact assessments and due 
diligence, third-party monitoring, high compliance requirement, and reporting of 
performance (and compliance). 
 
8.4.3.3.1. Human rights impact assessments and due diligence 
First, only Unilever has conducted impact assessments, although they were restricted 
to the environmental impact of its activities. Second, no firm reported conducting 
human rights due diligence. However, carrying out human rights impact assessments 
and due diligence aims to prevent and/or identify any adverse human rights impact of 
business activities. It follows that implementing these features would have helped 
identify important issues – which I could identify during my own fieldwork –, such as 
low pay, problematic working conditions for seasonal and outsourced workers2112, and 
poor access to water and to affordable and adequate health services.  
 
2111 Selznick (n. 351), 101.  
2112 Chai Bora did not conduct due diligence when making the decision to outsource their security staff 
and, perhaps as a result, these workers have (significantly) worse working conditions than the firm’s 
direct employees. If Chai Bora had conducted due diligence, the firm could have been made aware of 
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8.4.3.3.2. Third-party monitoring  
Third-party monitoring of performance was found to be crucial for the effective 
implementation of standards, but also showed important limitations inherent to the 
audit process and problematic for the firms’ human rights performance. 
On the one hand, third party monitoring of compliance has had an impact on Unilever’s 
and MTC’s implementation of product-level standards – although focusing on certain 
areas. Added to the clearly-defined threat of non-renewal of certification, audits seem 
to play an essential role in firms’ compliance with product-level standards: in 2014, 
after losing its Rainforest Alliance certification, Unilever modified its behaviour to 
meet the criteria and earn the certification back. However, the impact which they have 
had on MTC’s performance in terms of sexual harassment and gender-related issues 
has been surprising: it is seen by management as a chance to educate workers about 
sexual harassment2113. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that third-party monitoring 
helps with the implementation of standards.  
On the other hand, it may be difficult to check firms’ everyday compliance with the 
product-level standards which they have adopted: the 2017 Rainforest Alliance audit 
(conducted before my fieldwork took place)2114 and the one conducted in 2018 (after 
my fieldwork)2115 both state that MTC complies with its obligation to provide workers 
with free PPE, but my interviews revealed that it was not the case2116 2117. I have found 
the same situation with Unilever2118. This shows the limitations of the effectiveness of 
audits as instruments assessing firms’ compliance with standards and throws into 
question the value which some scholars put into audits as best placed to guarantee the 
implementation of standards. It is difficult to determine why the findings were 
different: for MTC, it could have been because the firm faced temporary difficulties 
during the time where the fieldwork was carried out, or because it made sure during 
 
the important human rights risks associated with their outsourcing decision and management could have 
taken steps to mitigate against these risks. 
2113 Interview with manager D2. 
2114 Rainforest Alliance, ‘Public Summary – MTC’, 2017, 7.  
2115 Rainforest Alliance, ‘Public Summary – MTC’, 2019, 6.  
2116 Interview with manager D2.  
2117 As Fairtrade audits are not publicly available, I was unable to compare their findings with mine and 
with that of the Rainforest Alliance’s auditors.  
2118 Interview with manager D1; AFRICert, ‘Public Summary – Unilever Tea Tanzania Limited’, 2017, 
6; and AfriCERT (n. 780), 7. 
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audits that all equipment was available to workers. It is even more difficult to 
hypothesise in Unilever’s case, since the company was not in financial trouble. For 
both firms, another hypothesis is the fact that employees (and community members) 
have a stake in whether or not the product retains its certification and may therefore 
not be completely truthful in their answers to auditors2119. This is especially the case 
regarding Fairtrade, which allows for the allocation of a Premium Fund to the 
community – if the Fairtrade certification is withdrawn, so will be the Fund. In any 
case, this raises doubts about the reliability of audits and would seem to confirm, as 
some authors write, that their weakness comes from audit design, power relations, and 
implementation2120. It also confirms the criticism that auditing may be more about 
legitimating “standards business aims and practice than driving environmental or 
social improvements”2121. 
 
8.4.3.3.3. High compliance requirement 
The product-level mechanisms which I have studied in this thesis do not require 
compliance with 100% of their standards, which may become an issue. I will first 
review the Rainforest Alliance and secondly Fairtrade. First, the Rainforest Alliance 
does not require compliance with 100% of its standards before issuing firms the 
certification. It was already the case for the 2010 set of criteria, for which compliance 
with only 80% of criteria was necessary (although including 100% of critical 
criteria)2122. The 2017 set of criteria is better as it requires compliance with 100% of 
critical criteria and of continuous improvement criteria B and C – albeit after six full 
years of certification2123 –, but only with 50% of the continuous improvement criteria 
A2124. It follows that firms may pick and choose which criteria they would prefer to 
meet and ignore the rest. Considering that continuous improvement criteria A include 
issues such as increasing wages following inflation2125, paying employees a living 
 
2119 Interview with manager D2. 
2120 LeBaron and Lister (n. 442), 924.  
2121 Ibid, 924.  
2122 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’ (n. 1389), 8.  
2123 Level C criteria must be complied with at a rate of 50% in year 0, 65% in year 1, 80% in year 2, and 
100% from year 3 onward. Level B criteria must be complied with at a rate of 50% in year 3, 65% in 
year 4, 80% in year 5, and 100% from year 6 onward.  
2124 Rainforest Alliance ‘Sustainable Agriculture Standard’, 8. 
2125 Ibid, Continuous Improvement Criterion 4.27.  
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wage2126, or supporting identified needs and priorities of the community2127, this may 
have important human rights consequences, as I have observed in the context of this 
case study. Secondly, Fairtrade follows the same system. Indeed, for each Fairtrade 
standard, there are five levels of compliance, called ranks; rank 1 and 2 indicate non-
compliance and ranks 3 to 5 different compliance levels2128. Fairtrade will issue 
certification if the firm fulfils all core requirements and reaches the minimum average 
score of 3.0 on the development requirements2129. It follows that non-compliance with 
some non-core criteria will be tolerated as long as compliance with other criteria 
reaches a high score. Considering that Fairtrade non-core criteria include conducting 
health and safety risk assessments2130, training of trade union representatives on labour 
legislation and negotiation skills2131, preventing the use of child labour2132, providing 
free occupational health and safety to workers2133, providing workers with free 
healthcare2134, prevention of contagious diseases and epidemics such as HIV/AIDS2135, 
and making a sustainable use of water by keeping informed of the status of the water 
sources in the area and participating to finding solutions in case of depleted water 
sources2136, this may have important consequences, and translate into human rights 
violations on the ground, as I have observed in the context of this case study. 
 
8.4.3.3.4. Reporting of performance and compliance 
It is unclear whether internal transparent reporting is important, as some authors 
argue2137. Unilever performs well on the only issue about which they have 
transparently reported: sexual harassment. However, it is difficult to determine 
whether Unilever performs well because they chose to be transparent about it, or 
 
2126 Ibid, Continuous Improvement Criterion 4.33. 
2127 Ibid, Continuous Improvement Criterion 4.47. Although this criterion is a ‘continuous improvement 
criterion A’ which is not binding on firms until they have been certified for six years, and therefore will 
not become a requirement for Unilever before 2023, the previous standard already included a similar 
criterion (critical criterion 7.2.) – the firm therefore had to implement this criterion when the fieldwork 
took place. 
2128 FLOCert, ‘Public Compliance Criteria List - Hired Labour’, 2017, 1.  
2129 Fairtrade ‘Hired Labour Standard’, 4.  
2130 Ibid, Standard 3.6.4. 
2131 Ibid, Standard 2.2.4. 
2132 Ibid, Standard 3.3.5. 
2133 Ibid, Standard 3.6.25. 
2134 Ibid, Standard 3.6.29. 
2135 Ibid, Standard 3.6.30. 
2136 Ibid, Standard 4.3.11. 
2137 Fung, O'Rourke, and Sabel (n. 353), 19.  
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whether they reported on this issue because they were performing well. Moreover, 
another key feature (which was found to be important) may have played a role in this 
good performance: Unilever organises training sessions on sexual harassment and 
broader gender-related issues. In any case, transparently reporting about the results of 
audits allows for the verification of auditors’ findings. While I was able to assess the 
Rainforest Alliance’s findings against my own (and found inconsistencies), I could not 
verify the results of audits conducted for the purpose of the Fairtrade certification since 
the certifying bodies choose to keep their reports confidential. This shows that 
transparent reporting allows for a higher level of scrutiny and accountability of firms, 
but also of organisations in charge of product-level mechanisms. 
 
8.4.3.4. Complaints mechanisms 
Building on this research, it is difficult to draw conclusions as to the importance played 
by complaints mechanisms in the effectiveness of self-regulation, and the extent to 
which such mechanisms must be made free and anonymous. Unilever’s welfare 
department (dealing with calls from the firm’s complaints mechanism) was reportedly 
successful in helping workers and their families deal with (mostly) personal issues, 
and particularly gender-related issues. Although they do not have general complaints 
mechanisms in place, MTC and Chai Bora have set up a specific procedure for sexual 
harassment, and the performance of both companies was reported as having improved. 
However, as was already the case in the previous section, it is a challenge to determine 
the extent to which complaints mechanisms have played a role in this improvement 
considering that training was also offered on this issue by both firms. Moreover, the 
majority of interviewed workers were not aware of general complaints mechanisms (if 
relevant) or of complaints mechanisms linked to product-level mechanisms (if 
relevant). Furthermore, no complaints mechanism open to community members is in 
place in any of the companies. It follows that it is difficult to assess the actual added 
value which such mechanisms may have if they were set up, although they could play 
a role in ensuring that stakeholders’ voices are heard and taken into account2138, along 
with other members of the local community. Indeed, several interviewees across all 
companies reported that they would use such complaints mechanisms to bring the 
 
2138 Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166), 228. 
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companies’ attention to certain problems such as working conditions, poor access to 
water or health services, or the firms’ employment practices2139.  
 
8.4.3.5. Sanctions 
In the context of this research, sanctioning systems may be divided into three types: 
individual sanctions for workers, individual sanctions for management, and collective 
sanctions for product-making units (i.e. loss of certification). First, it is difficult to 
draw conclusions as to the effectiveness of individual sanctions for workers as two 
firms out of three did not issue sanctions for non-compliance and it was found that, for 
the third one, sanctions were not the only incentive motivating the implementation of 
standards. Second, in the one corporation where I found sanctions in place for 
managers for non-compliance, albeit in one specific issue (i.e. sexual harassment), it 
was reported as being effective in sending the message that the firm took its 
commitments seriously. Third, the threat of non-renewal of certification was an 
important reason for the change in corporate behaviour and for the implementation of 
standards by the two firms which are certified. Moreover, the fact that non-renewal is 
clearly outlined as the direct consequence for non-compliance sends the clear message 
that firms must comply if they want to keep their certification: clear sanctioning 
guidelines therefore help2140. However, these sanctions may be insufficient: when, as 
was explored in Section 8.4.3.3.2. above, audits are not reliable, the need for sanctions 
for upper management for violations of standards is particularly important. Indeed, if 
non-compliance with (product-level) standards is not necessarily detected during 
audits and therefore punished with non-renewal of the certification, another 
enforcement mechanism would be helpful to ensure that workers’ human rights are 
respected. In a country such as Tanzania where, as explained in Chapter 4, labour 
inspections are rare, enforcement mechanisms for breach of self-regulatory standards 
would be particularly important. It follows that, overall, sanctioning seems to play an 
important role in the effectiveness of self-regulatory mechanisms. 
 
 
2139 Interviews with workers B13 and B16 and community member C32, C33, C34, C35, C36, C37, 
C38, C39, C40, and C41. 
2140 Sims (n. 395), 504; Jenkins (n. 379), 26; and see (n.78), 56. 
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8.4.3.6. Management’s genuine motivation 
Finally, management’s motivation to implement the standards does seem to play an 
important role2141. First, a Unilever’s manager stated that they had been pushing for 
the implementation of the firm’s Code of Business Principles because it was not 
happening, and management believed that it was important to ensure that standards 
would be implemented – although it is acknowledged that no positive impact of the 
Code was found. However, out of the three corporations, it is notable that Unilever has 
invested the most into the welfare of their employees: they created a whole department 
dedicated to it, which was linked to the improvement of certain aspects of the firm’s 
human rights performance, as seen above. So, genuine motivation and personal 
commitment of management does seem to be playing an important role in the 
implementation of standards and in the improvement of corporate human rights 
performance (to some extent).  
Second, MTC sought certification because it would open up new markets2142 – proving 
Ronen Shamir right when he wrote that corporations sought to invest in self-regulatory 
schemes that have the capacity to open up new market opportunities2143. This may 
explain why MTC seems to be less motivated than Unilever by the opportunity that 
self-regulatory mechanisms offer to help improve human rights and why the firm has 
not invested as much to improve its behaviour. However, it is difficult to draw 
definitive conclusions as to the link which may exist between MTC’s motivation 
driven by factors which are not related to the substantial standards (or what the 
mechanisms in question seek to achieve) and the fact that MTC performs less well than 
Unilever in terms of human rights record, especially considering the financial 





2141 Coglianese and Mendelson (n. 70), 161; Turcotte, Reinecke, and Den Hond (n. 455), 154-155; 
Hepple, ‘Equality and Empowerment for decent work’ (n. 358), 16; Royle (n. 155), 263; Kearney (n. 
368), 211; and Kaptein and Wempe (n. 355), 862.  
2142 Interview with manager D2.  
2143 Ronen Shamir argues that it is important (Shamir, ‘The age of Responsibilization: On Market-
embedded Morality’ (n. 99), 14).  
P a g e  | 318 
 
8.4.3.7. Conclusion 
Most of the features which were identified in Chapter 3 as potentially contributing to 
the effectiveness of corporate self-regulation do appear to help self-regulatory 
mechanisms be effective on the ground. At the drafting stage, the inclusion of a 
comprehensive set of human rights principles, all translated into operational standards 
for implementation on the ground, is paramount. At the embedding stage, the training 
of workers and managers is important. At the monitoring stage, third-party monitoring 
is crucial (with high compliance requirements), although it became obvious that audit 
processes have inherent flaws. As for complaints mechanisms, their setting up looks 
important – although there was insufficient evidence to draw credible conclusions 
about their importance in supporting the effectiveness of mechanisms. Moreover, 
sanctions play a crucial role in the implementation of standards – although the 
sanctions currently included in the various self-regulatory mechanisms may not be 
sufficient. Finally, the motivation of corporate managers looks important – although, 
as underlined in Chapter 3, it is difficult to rigorously evaluate it. 
This shows that most features which I used in this study to help assess the effectiveness 
of mechanisms look relevant and important for both types of mechanisms This allows 
me to reiterate that the scope commonly taken by scholars writing about product-level 
mechanisms is too narrow, and that it is important to investigate the rest of those 
features as well as audits. This is especially true considering that this research showed 
how unreliable audits could be on certain issues and that, in order to ensure that 
mechanisms are as effective as possible, behavioural change and consolidation of that 
change are required. Thorough drafting and embedding of standards are therefore 
necessary, as well as monitoring, addressing (and redressing) complaints, and 
sanctions. Third-party audits do have a crucial role to play in the implementation of 
standards – but only as part of a broader process. It is therefore paramount to look at 
the whole process when investigating the effectiveness of self-regulatory mechanisms 
in helping corporations meet their human rights responsibilities.  
 
Now that I have explored the importance of the key features, I will investigate any 
other factors which may have played a role in the effectiveness of self-regulatory 
mechanisms and in corporate human rights performance.  
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8.4.4. Role played by other factors 
In the context of this research, the following factors seem important: worker-led 
actions; cooperation with outside groups; firm’s financial health; other regulatory 
sources; and the human rights approach taken by the mechanisms. 
 
8.4.4.1. Worker-led actions 
For all companies, actions carried out by workers themselves have led to changes. 
Unilever management decided to intensify their relationship with TPAWU following 
the violent strikes in 2016 with more regular meetings to discuss issues and negotiate 
tea rates2144, and have introduced bonuses to keep workers happy2145. This shows that 
workers’ action led to improvements (although it is acknowledged that workers used 
violence), including higher wages and a better relationship with management, and that 
it contributed to the implementation of relevant standards as well as the firm’s human 
rights responsibilities. Moreover, working hours for MTC’s factory workers decreased 
in 2012 to levels complying with Fairtrade standards. However, it was workers’ 
complaints which made management change its practice. Similarly, the change of 
language on MTC’s contracts from English to Swahili was reportedly driven by 
workers’ complaints instead of by Fairtrade requirements. Finally, Chai Bora’s 
seasonal workers collectively (and successfully) demanded to be paid on a weekly 
basis instead of a daily basis. They have also organised themselves and set up 
educational sessions for themselves around issues of sexual harassment and gender 
discrimination because they were not allowed to take part in the firm’s official 
sessions. Although there is still room for improvement, these initiatives seem to have 
been effective and to have changed some practices in and around Chai Bora. It follows 
that actions by workers beyond and outside the scope of self-regulatory mechanisms 
to enforce their own rights seem to play a crucial role in the improvement of corporate 
human rights performance.  
 
 
2144 Management said that they have changed their approach to these negotiations and are more flexible: 
human resources officers are ready to go back to their hierarchical superiors to discuss TPAWU’s 
requests instead of simply presenting workers’ representatives with an immutable offer. 
2145 Interview with manager D1. 
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8.4.4.2. Cooperation with external groups 
Second, cooperation with relevant outside groups, such as trade unions2146, seems to 
play an important role in improving firms’ human rights performance. As mentioned 
above, Unilever’s management decided in 2016 to build a stronger relationship with 
TPAWU, to meet more regularly and to negotiate in a more open way with the union. 
The situation seems to have improved following these measures, and to have helped 
with the implementation of the firm’s mechanisms. This finding confirms one of the 
conclusions of César Rodríguez-Garavito, who suggested that a constitutive feature of 
initiatives should be to build the capacity of unions to ensure that their countervailing 
voices are considered2147. 
 
8.4.4.3. Firm’s financial health 
As explained in Chapter 1, one of the reasons why I selected these three companies 
was because of their size (and therefore financial resources), and because smaller 
corporations tended to be ignored in the business and human rights debate2148. And 
indeed, the company’s financial health – and size – is another factor which I have 
identified as influential. While Unilever could afford to set up a welfare department 
which contributed to the firm’s implementation of some of their standards, it is likely 
that MTC (or Chai Bora) does not have the financial resources to do so because they 
are not major multinationals. I am not suggesting that this exempts companies from 
implementing their self-regulatory standards (if relevant) or generally respecting 
human rights. However, financial constraints may mean that MTC (or Chai Bora) may 
not be able to adopt the same measures as a bigger company with more resources, 
which may translate into a worse human rights performance. Moreover, it became 
apparent during the fieldwork that MTC had been facing significant financial issues 
and that a new investor had recently been brought in. This necessarily means that 
resources for improving the firm’s human rights record are stretched thin; for instance, 
management put their search for an expert in gender issues on hold because of the 
 
2146 Selznick (n. 351), 101.  
2147 Rodríguez-Garavito (n. 166), 228.  
2148 Addo, ‘Business and Human Rights and the Challenges for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ 
(n. 201), 313.  
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change in investors. It follows that a firm’s financial health may impact its efforts to 
improve its human rights performance.  
 
8.4.4.4. Focus on ‘salient’ issues 
This section focuses on Unilever, as the only corporation which has publicly identified 
salient issues. Although the firm commits to respecting most internationally 
recognised human rights, it has identified eight salient human rights issues which it 
prioritises2149: land rights; forced labour; harassment; health and safety; working 
hours; discrimination; fair wages; freedom of association. From the sole experience of 
Unilever, this section draws three findings: first, on some issues labelled ‘salient’, the 
firm does perform well, but I could not link this good performance to self-regulatory 
mechanisms or to the fact that these issues are considered particularly critical by 
Unilever’s management. Second, some of the firm’s ‘salient’ issues are still 
problematic. Third, this top-down ‘salient issue’ approach may not be effective and 
even become problematic for companies operating in a variety of social contexts, each 
with their own set of specific human rights challenges. 
First, Unilever does perform well on some of its ‘salient’ issues. Indeed, there was no 
report of forced labour or land rights issues – although it is notable that MTC and Chai 
Bora also perform well on these issues. Moreover, the firm is addressing sexual 
harassment by training workers and is improving the situation, as was reported in 
20152150. Health and safety standards also seem to be well enforced despite some non-
conformities. The working hours system has changed to comply with the Rainforest 
Alliance criteria, although there are still some important issues with overtime. 
However, apart from working hours and a general statement about health and safety, I 
could not link this good performance to Unilever’s self-regulatory instruments, or to 
the fact that these concerns were given priority across the firm’s operations globally.  
Second, some of the firm’s salient issues are still problematic in Unilever’s Mufindi 
tea plantations, such as fair wages, discrimination, and freedom of association. Even 
though Unilever has adopted different self-regulatory mechanisms which include 
 
2149 Unilever ‘Human Rights Progress Report: Compliance and Beyond’ (n. 825), 16-17. 
2150 Unilever ‘Human Rights Report’ (n. 836), 35. 
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standards on these issues, and has committed to making them a priority, there are still 
some problems with how the firm deals with them.  
Third, this approach of focusing on ‘salient issues’, set at the highest level of the 
company, may not be consistent with a genuine human rights approach, and may 
become especially problematic for companies operating in a variety of social contexts, 
which may present very specific human rights challenges. For example, poor access to 
water is a very important problem around Unilever’s plantations, which may be 
overlooked because it is not one of the firm’s salient issues, set at global level. The 
same could be said of the generally problematic working conditions of seasonal 
workers. 
 
8.4.4.5. Other regulatory sources 
For all three companies, the influence of regulatory sources (other than self-regulation, 
for Unilever and MTC) has been acknowledged by various stakeholders, especially 
national legislation and CBAs. This is for example the case for leaves, working hours, 
housing allowance, and rates of pay2151. 
 
8.4.4.6. Human rights approach 
The human rights approach adopted by the self-regulatory mechanisms studied in this 
thesis is a factor which necessarily influences the effectiveness of self-regulatory 
mechanisms in helping firms improve their human rights impact. However, this 
approach shows limitations regarding some issues: the human rights lens will be 
inadequate to address certain important social and economic issues. In particular, this 
case study threw light on the issue of technological changes threatening livelihoods. It 
will be difficult to address (and redress) the crucial problem of mechanisation of tea 
work, which carries important human rights consequences, using a human rights lens. 
Both Unilever and MTC have started mechanising their estates, which comes at a 
heavy price for workers and community members. Although Unilever’s manager said 
that the firm had a responsibility towards the local community and therefore did not 
plan on mechanising further, it was also made clear that the estates which had not been 
 
2151 Interviews with managers D1, D2, and D3. 
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mechanised were the ones which would have been very difficult to mechanise in any 
case2152. As for MTC, the firm has mechanised all its estates, cutting many jobs and 
slashing the price paid to workers per kilo of tea. The mechanisation of tea work is 
unlikely to stop and will become increasingly problematic, leading to unemployment 
and thus to enhanced job competition, lower wages, and worse working conditions. 
This phenomenon is however not adequately addressed and redressed by a human 
rights approach, and what human rights self-regulatory mechanisms can achieve 
regarding such issues will necessarily be limited.   
 
8.5. General conclusion of the thesis 
This final section will first provide an answer to the thesis’s main question, before 
drawing from this research a perspective about the role and place of self-regulation in 
the broader regulation of corporate behaviour. It will then outline the generalisation of 
the findings and applicability of the methodology to other studies, as well as the 
limitations of the study and areas where further research is needed. Finally, it will 
provide a general conclusion to the thesis.  
 
8.5.1. Answer to the thesis’s main question 
This thesis aimed to answer the following question: To what extent is it possible to 
evaluate the effectiveness of voluntary corporate self-regulatory mechanisms in 
ensuring that companies meet their international human rights responsibilities? 
My case study allowed for the evaluation of: 1) the human rights performance of the 
three corporations; 2) the impact of the self-regulatory mechanisms used by two of the 
firms; 3) the role played by the ‘key features’ identified as potentially helping improve 
the effectiveness of self-regulatory mechanisms (and corporate human rights 
performance); and 4) the role played by any other factors in the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms (and in the improvement of corporate human rights performance). 
Although the methodology developed in this thesis shows limitations, as discussed 
below, it proved that it was possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the different types 
of self-regulatory mechanisms from a human rights perspective. The findings outlined 
 
2152 Interview with manager D1.  
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in this chapter contribute evidence to the literature on the impact of corporate human 
rights self-regulation and to a better understanding of what helps make these 
mechanisms effective on the ground. I will now outline the general findings of this 
research, confined to the context of the Tanzanian tea industry as it would not be 
rigorous to draw definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of corporate self-
regulation from this case study alone.  
First, in the context of the Tanzanian tea industry, none of the different types of 
corporate self-regulatory mechanisms studied in this thesis were entirely effective in 
helping firms meet their human rights responsibilities. However, this case study 
showed that self-regulatory mechanisms did have some positive impact on corporate 
behaviour – albeit to a smaller degree than what firms claim. In particular, mechanisms 
have had an important impact on environmental rights, on gender-related issues, and 
on working time.  
Second, my study was able to find more evidence of connection between human rights 
performance and product-level mechanisms than with company-level mechanisms. 
This could be because product-level mechanisms have built-in monitoring processes 
with more immediate – and visible – consequences for non-compliance. Consequences 
are also more collective: if standards are not implemented, the whole operation is de-
certified. However, this may also backfire for a certification system such as Fairtrade, 
which provides community members – often including workers – with direct financial 
benefits. Indeed, as outlined in Section 6.4. above, workers and community members 
have a stake in whether or not the firm retains its certification and may therefore not 
be completely truthful in their answers to auditors. This is one of the reasons why the 
feature identified by authors as most likely to guarantee product-level mechanisms’ 
effectiveness – audits – was shown to be much more fragile than expected. 
Third, the most important feature overall to guarantee that standards are implemented 
everyday seems to be the same for both types of mechanisms: training of employees 
and of management. 
Fourth, one of the weaknesses of self-regulation is the fact that it cannot address 
broader, systemic social issues such as entrenched poverty and the associated lack of 
agency of certain stakeholders. Indeed, issues of power and agency inequality have 
impeded the improvement of working conditions in Chai Bora: seasonal workers do 
not dare go on strike because they fear that they will lose their jobs. The extent to 
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which the adoption of self-regulatory mechanisms would help address this issue is 
limited. Similarly, some interviewees said that they were doing tea work only because 
they did not have a choice and that, given another employment opportunity, they would 
leave the tea industry because it is physically demanding and wages are too low. This 
shows that workers will accept bad working conditions because they need financial 
resources to feed themselves and their families. Such socio-economic power 
inequalities, which may negatively affect corporate human rights performance, will be 
difficult to redress with the adoption of self-regulatory mechanisms. Corporate self-
regulation operates within a limited and defined system and is not equipped to change 
it – and nothing short of this would be able to address certain problems leading to 
important human rights issues. However, certain processes within self-regulatory 
mechanisms may help reduce these inequalities (to some extent), as I will now explain.  
Indeed, it appears that mechanisms would be more effective if stakeholders (workers 
and community members first and foremost) were made more of a part of the process. 
As became obvious from this thesis’s case study, bottom-up action, whether or not 
taking place within the context of self-regulatory mechanisms, is one of the strongest 
factors of change. It may arise spontaneously and informally or as part of formal 
groups such as trade unions. Informing and consulting the stakeholders which are 
primarily affected by corporate activities has an important impact – and, if mechanisms 
do not ensure that it happens, they will miss out on a significant resource. Tapping into 
this resource may make the rest of the implementation process much easier: even in a 
difficult social and political context such as Tanzania, with massive financial and 
‘power’ inequalities, consultation and training may help ensure that the ones at the 
bottom of the ladder have opportunities to curb these inequalities by demanding better 
working and living conditions. It was observed that such demands happen in any case, 
whether or not firms have adopted self-regulation – although, either way, collective 
action will be much more limited in contexts where workers have no agency. By 
harnessing this collective agency, self-regulatory mechanisms will have a better 
chance at improving corporate human rights performance. This also suggests that a 
bottom-up approach is preferable to a top-down approach, for both company- and 
product-level mechanisms. However, it is acknowledged that this is not always easy 
to achieve, and that stakeholder consultation and training should not replace (top-
down) minimum standards, which are needed in all circumstances. The point is that 
mechanisms – whose aim is to guarantee standard implementation – should ensure that 
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the voice of those which are targeted is given proper weight and consideration by self-
regulating firms. Since stakeholders’ complaints are often about matters covered by 
standards, it will help with their implementation.  
 
Building on this, I will now explore the role and place of self-regulation in the broader 
regulation of corporate behaviour, especially by reflecting on scholars’ opinions about 
the value of self-regulation.   
 
8.5.2. The role and place of self-regulation in the broader regulation 
of corporate behaviour 
As explored in Chapter 1, scholars writing about self-regulation have highly mixed 
opinions regarding its potential as an instrument for controlling corporate behaviour. 
Based on this thesis’s findings, I will now briefly reflect on these authors’ positions. 
On the one hand of the spectrum, optimistic authors believe that the speedy and 
flexible nature of self-regulatory mechanisms could make them more effective than 
state regulation, especially in preventing and redressing infringements2153. Indeed, this 
study showed that self-regulation does have the potential to improve aspects of a firm’s 
human rights performance faster than formal regulatory mechanisms and processes, 
especially in a country where state resources are limited. Relatedly, another argument 
from the literature is that self-regulation allows for the regulation of business activities 
where the effectiveness of governmental authority is weak, limited, or non-existent2154. 
This study found that, albeit in the restricted context if the Tanzanian tea industry, self-
regulatory mechanisms with third-party monitoring and sanctioning processes have 
proved more effective – to some extent – in regulating aspects of corporate behaviour 
than Tanzanian state authorities. 
On the other hand, some authors denounce the flexibility of self-regulation as allowing 
firms to avoid adopting substantive measures and genuinely changing their 
behaviour2155. This study found that, on certain aspects, firms did favour superficial 
 
2153 Coglianese and Mendelson (n. 70), 152; Gunningham and Rees (n. 7), 366; and Ruhnka and 
Boerstler (n. 70), 314 and 316. 
2154 Vogel (n. 15), 73, also citing Koenig-Archibugi (n. 11), 235; and Short and Toffel (n. 82), 391.  
2155 Suchman (n. 102), 576. 
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commitments to deep-reaching change but, on other important issues, they did adopt 
transformative measures. Some sceptical scholars also believe that firms will only 
engage through self-regulation if it pays (e.g. by opening up new market 
opportunities), and that mechanisms will only stop violations which cost the company 
money2156. While it is true that companies may adopt self-regulatory mechanisms 
because they will financially benefit from it, as became obvious with this research, real 
human rights benefits may also result from it. I also identified initiatives which firms 
took to improve their social impact even though it would be financially costly. 
Some authors also criticise the discretion left to managers for the implementation of 
self-regulatory standards and say that it cannot work if there are no sanctions in case 
of non-compliance2157.  Part of the literature is also sceptical of the actual leeway 
afforded to managers in a broader context of a market economy2158. This study found 
that managers may indeed decide to ignore self-regulatory standards, but it also 
showed that management may be the ones pushing for the implementation of 
mechanisms – although it became obvious that external sanctions greatly encouraged 
management to take action. 
Finally, it is feared that voluntarism seeks to minimise the range of human rights 
responsibilities extendable to business2159. This criticism did prove true in the context 
of this research, and this is why one of the first key features (‘inclusion of a 
comprehensive set of human rights’) was found to be so important. Relatedly, some 
authors argue that voluntarism has constrained progress on CSR by separating it from 
firms’ legal and economic responsibilities and privileging the economic case for 
corporate policy2160. They also write that the wide discretion afforded to corporations 
by voluntarism, the lack of accountability of such corporate initiatives, and the 
challenges of implementation have all contributed to the credibility and effectiveness 
gaps in the field2161.  This study found that, while voluntarism has not constrained 
progress in terms of setting principles and adopting standards – if anything, it has 
 
2156 Braithwaite (n. 93), 1468-69; Vogel (n. 15), 79-80; Jones (n. 98), 35; Shamir, ‘The age of 
Responsibilization: On Market-embedded Morality’ (n. 99), 14; and Banerjee (n. 101), 74. 
2157 Maitland (n. 77), 139; De Jong, DeJong, Mertens, and Wasley (n. 104), 500; Coglianese and 
Mendelson (n. 70), 161; Short and Toffel (n. 82), 366; Ayres and Braithwaite (n. 106), 490; Segerson 
and Miceli (n. 105), 119; and Olson (n. 105), 44. 
2158 Maitland (n. 77), 133. 
2159 Baxi (n. 34), 23.  
2160 Addo and Martin (n. 10), 356.  
2161 Ibid, 349.  
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encouraged the proliferation of standards –, it is true that it means that not all available 
legal means will be harnessed with the objective of implementing these standards. 
Moreover, voluntarism necessarily means that only willing corporations will adopt 
self-regulatory mechanisms and implement the standards. And, as became clear with 
this research, the wide discretion afforded to corporations cannot always be curbed by 
internal and external processes, and the lack of accountability and challenges of 
implementation do lead to issues on the ground, and indeed to credibility and 
effectiveness gaps.  
However, and even though it was restricted to the context of the tea industry in 
Tanzania, this study showed that these mechanisms may act as an extra regulatory 
layer in addition to state legislation and enforcement. It allows motivated managers to 
determine their company’s human rights impact and its causes, to make adjustments 
to improve the situation if needed, and monitor it regularly. It is a tool which does not 
come with automatic implementation but rather with a guided approach to identifying, 
solving, and mitigating against potential human rights problems. Such a tool (in well-
meaning and motivated hands) can have a real impact in a country like Tanzania where 
government inspections are irregular and corruption issues are rife. However, 
corporate self-regulation in the context of the Tanzanian tea industry has also shown 
too many limitations to be considered a credible alternative to formally enforced 
regulation. Such regulation, as advocated by some scholars2162, still seems necessary 
for real and thorough behavioural change. 
This leads me to believe that, as some authors write2163, self-regulation does have a 
role to play in the realisation of human rights – but complementarily to state-based 
regulation, as advocated by others2164. Beyond state regulation, it is notable that 
governments are currently discussing the adoption of a binding international treaty on 
business and human rights, following a resolution of the UN Human Rights Council 
in 20142165. However, the most recent writings on the subject point to the political 
 
2162 Royle (n. 155), 271; Koenig-Archibugi (n. 11), 259; and Kolk and Van Tulder (n. 157), 262 and 
270.  
2163 Short and Toffel (n. 82), 391; Blackett (n. 163), 402; and Wettstein, ‘CSR and the Debate on 
Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great Divide’ (n. 64), 757. 
2164 Rametsteiner and Simula (n. 158), 97; Gunningham and Rees (n. 7), 396; and  Töller (n. 107), 507. 
2165 Human Rights Council, ‘Elaboration of an internationally legally binding instrument on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’ 
A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, 25 June 2014. 
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difficulties impeding such a project coming to fruition in the near future2166. In this 
context, corporate self-regulation may be particularly worth pursuing, although it does 
present important limitations, as explored in this thesis.  
 
I will now outline the extent to which this thesis’s findings and methodology are 
generalisable and applicable to other settings.  
 
8.5.3. General applicability of methodology and findings 
I will first address the issue of the generalisation of this thesis’s findings, and second 
the applicability to other settings of the methodology developed (and applied) for the 
purpose of this research.  
First, this thesis’s findings are confined to the Tanzanian tea industry. However, many 
of the issues which were identified in the context of this case study are likely to also 
appear in other settings (e.g. unfavourable working conditions for seasonal workers). 
Because entrenched inequalities are not restricted to the Tanzanian tea industry, it is 
probable that issues arising from these inequalities would also be found in other 
contexts. The inability of self-regulatory mechanisms to address these issues 
effectively, partly due to the structural limitations identified in this thesis, is also likely 
to replicate in other industry and geographical contexts. Moreover, this research 
allowed for the evaluation of the value of the ‘key features’ in the effectiveness of 
mechanisms, and it is likely that they would also play a role in the effective 
implementation of self-regulation in other industries or geographical regions (e.g. 
training will probably be necessary to ensure that standards are understood and 
implemented on the ground, be it in the tea industry or any other context). Although 
research in other contexts would be needed to gain empirical evidence supporting these 
assertions, entities developing self-regulatory mechanisms should be mindful of the 
 
2166 Doug Cassel, ‘Building a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: Context and Contours ed. by Surya 
Deva & David Bilchitz’, Human Rights Quarterly 41(2), 2019, 497, 497; Giorgia Papalia, ‘Doing 
Business Right: The Case for a Business and Human Rights Treaty’, Perth International Law Journal 
3, 2018, 96, 104; and David Bilchitz, 'The Necessity for a Business and Human Rights Treaty’, Business 
and Human Rights Journal 1(2), 2016, 203, 224.  
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issues and limitations found, albeit in a specific context, in this thesis, as they may be 
found in other industry and geographical environments.   
Second, this thesis’s methodology is not restricted to one type of mechanism, or to 
specific human rights. It is therefore transferable to other settings. Moreover, 
considering that they were drawn from literature which was not restricted to an 
industry or a region, the ‘key features’ will be relevant to (and important to investigate 
for) all types of self-regulatory settings, in any industry and anywhere in the world. 
Furthermore, the ‘human rights’ approach taken in this thesis is based on principles 
which are, by definition, universal and would therefore be applicable to any research 
environment. Finally, designing a linked case study as I did in this thesis is possible in 
other geographical regions and industries, and allows for in-depth analysis on the 
ground. Bringing in a broader range of evidence, it also strengthens the trustworthiness 
of findings over a single case study.  
 
8.5.4. Limitations of the study and further research needed 
Although this research was designed to best understand corporate human rights 
performance and the impact of self-regulatory mechanisms, it necessarily showed 
limitations. Firstly, the methodology adopted in this thesis meant that not all causal 
effects may be drawn out. As I mostly interviewed local managers and workers, I may 
have missed out on some causal links between corporate headquarters and the field. In 
order to try and remedy this, I contacted Unilever’s headquarters (being the only 
company which had adopted internal company-level mechanisms) but it became clear 
that they were not interested in setting up an interview. It follows that some central 
policies may have translated into the practices of the local branch of Unilever in 
Mufindi but that no manager or worker knew that certain rules or programmes were 
adopted because of their company-level mechanisms, such as Unilever’s Human 
Rights Policy.  Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, this research was necessarily 
restricted by the limited scope of this case study. Although many of the same human 
rights issues are likely to be found in other settings, as explained above in Section 
8.5.3., the tea industry is specific, and all issues encountered in this context may not 
be relevant to other agricultural fields or other industries. This is one of the main 
challenges when attempting to generalising this thesis’s findings to other contexts. 
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It follows that further research is needed, especially in other industries and countries. 
It would allow for the collection of more evidence about the effectiveness of corporate 
human rights self-regulation and features and factors influencing its impact on the 
ground.  
 
8.5.5. Conclusion to the thesis 
In conclusion, corporate self-regulation may play a positive role in the control of 
corporate behaviour, but it shows important limitations, especially on two levels: first, 
the standards used in mechanisms do not always cover a comprehensive set of human 
rights, leaving gaps in the human rights policies and therefore practices of 
corporations. Second, the system which is supposed to be in place to ensure proper 
implementation of standards presents inherent flaws, thus undermining the 
effectiveness of compliance monitoring and therefore of self-regulation. These two 
problems may lead to an imperfect implementation of standards and limited 
effectiveness. The first flaw can be remedied outside of the state regulatory system; 
however, the second limitation may require state intervention. This leads me to believe 
that self-regulation is valuable to a certain extent, but that it must sit within a state-
based regulatory system which would ensure that (at least) minimum human rights 
standards are effectively enforced.  
In conclusion, while corporate human rights self-regulation is not an entirely effective 
solution to mitigate against business-related human rights violations, it offers a partial 
answer to the crucial question of the control of corporate behaviour in the context of 
globalisation and has a role to play in its regulation. 
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Annex 1 – Self-regulatory mechanisms adopted by the ten biggest 
tea companies globally  
 
The list was taken from Technavio, Global Tea Market 2019-2023, 2018, 1-121. 
This list excludes Unilever (for details about Unilever’s self-regulatory mechanisms, 




- No company-level mechanism publicly available. 
Product-level mechanisms: 




- No company-level mechanism publicly available. 
Product-level mechanisms: 




- Human Rights Policy; 
- Code of Ethics; 
- Environmental Policy; 
- Health & Safety Policy; 
- Payment Authority Policy; 
- Sustainability Commitment; 
- Bribery & Corruption Policy; 
- Non-discrimination & Anti-harassment; 
- Policy on Diversity, Inclusiveness and Equality; 
- Responsible Marketing Policy; 
- Sustainable Procurement Policy & Supplier guidelines;  
- Whistleblowing Policy; 
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- UNGPs; 
- ILO Conventions; 
- UN Global Compact. 
Product-level mechanisms: 
- No product-level mechanism publicly available 
 
Harney and Sons 
Company-level mechanisms: 
- No company-level mechanism publicly available. 
Product-level mechanisms: 
- Fairtrade (Organic Earl Grey Supreme; Organic Black Tea; and Korakundah 
Fop) 
 
ITO EN  
Company-level mechanisms: 
- Corporate Social Responsibility Policy; 
- Human right policy (in progress); 
- Standards of Conduct; 
- Code of Practice. 
Product-level mechanisms: 




- Corporate Business Principles; 
- Code of Business Conduct;  
- Responsible Sourcing Standard; 
- Commitment on Child Labour in Agricultural Supply Chains; 
- Commitment on Land and Land Rights in Agricultural Supply Chain; 
- Supplier Code; 
- Commitment on Labour Rights in Agricultural Supply Chains; 
- UN Global Compact; 
- UNGPs. 
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Product-level mechanisms: 
- Rainforest Alliance (for Nestea) 
 
Tata Global Beverages 
Company-level mechanism: 
- Sustainability policy  
Product-level mechanisms:  
- Rainforest Alliance (Tetley Green Tea – India) 
- Ethical Tea Partnership (co-founders; certified in several countries, e.g. 
Kenya, Malawi and Uganda) 
 
The Republic of Tea 
Company-level mechanisms: 
- No company-level mechanism publicly available. 
Product-level mechanisms: 
- ETP (activities in Sri Lanka) 
- Fairtrade (specific products) 
 
Twinings (Associated British Foods) 
The brand does not own plantations, and therefore sources all its tea from external 
suppliers. 
Company-level mechanisms: 
- Supplier Code of Conduct  
Product-level mechanisms (supplied tea is certified with the following mechanisms): 
- Fairtrade (specific products) 
- Rainforest Alliance (specific products) 
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Annex 2 – Internal self-regulatory mechanisms adopted by the forty 
biggest companies globally 
 
For each industry, the code(s) of conduct (if any) of the biggest companies was 
identified, as outlined below:  
Food and drinks  
• Coca-Cola:  
o Human Rights Policy;  
o Code of Business Conduct;  
o Supplier Guiding Principles. 
• Associated British Foods (ABF):  
o     Anti-Bribery and Corruption Policy; 
o     Anti-Fraud Policy; 
o     Environment Policy; 
o     Health and Safety Policy; 
o     Payment Policy; 
o     Primark Code of Conduct; 
o     Supplier Code of Conduct; 
o     Tax Strategy; 
o     Whistleblowing Policy. 
• Danone:  
o Code of Business Conduct; 
o Fundamental Social Principles for Business Partners. 
• General Mills:  
o Policy on human rights; 
o Code of Conduct; 
o Supplier Code of Conduct; 
o Palm Oil statement. 
• Kellogg:  
o Global Code of Ethics; 
o Global Supplier Code of Conduct. 
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• Mars:  
o Human right policy; 
o Supplier Code of Conduct. 
• Mondelez International:  
o Code of Conduct; 
o Corporate Responsibility Expectations for Direct Suppliers and 
Supplier Contract Provisions; 
o Supply Chain Transparency and Labour Practices; 
o Palm oil position statement; 
o Cocoa Life approach; 
o Cocoa Life gender action plans. 
• Nestlé:  
o Corporate Business Principles; 
o Code of Business Conduct;  
o Responsible Sourcing Standard; 
o Commitment on Child Labour in Agricultural Supply Chains; 
o Commitment on Land and Land Rights in Agricultural Supply Chain; 
o Supplier Code; 
o Commitment on Labour Rights in Agricultural Supply Chains; 
• PepsiCo:  
o Human rights policy; 
o Supplier code of conduct; 
o Global Code of Conduct for employees. 
• Unilever: see Annex 3. 
 
Pharmaceutics 
• Johnson & Johnson: 
o Statement on human rights; 
o Policy on business conduct; 
• Statement on human rights to water.Pfizer:  
o Human rights statement; 
o Business code of conduct; 
o Supplier Conduct Position Statement. 
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• Novartis:  
o Human rights guidelines; 
o Corporate social responsibility guideline; 
o Code of conduct; 
o Supplier code. 
• Roche:  
o Code of conduct; 
o Supplier code of conduct; 
o Roche Group Employment Policy;  
o Policy on Safety, Security, Health and Environmental Protection. 
• Sanofi: 
o Human rights policy; 
o Code of Ethics; 
o Social Charter; 
o Suppliers Code of Conduct. 
• Merck: 
o Code of Conduct; 
o Environment, Health and Safety Policy; 
o Merck Responsible Sourcing Principles. 
• Sinopharm Group:  
o ‘Social responsibility’ statement. 
• GloaxoSmithKline: 
o Human rights policy; 
o Code of conduct; 
o Third party code of conduct. 
• Gilead Sciences: 
o Code of ethics; 
o Commitment to integrity. 
• Medipal Holdings:  








o Human rights policy. 
• Volkswagen: 
o  Code of conduct; 
o Group guiding principles; 
o Social charter. 
• Hyundai: 
o Ethics Charter; 
o Employee Code of Conduct; 
o Ethical Business Practice Guidelines. 
• General Motors: 
o Human rights policy; 
o Code of conduct; 
o Conflict minerals policy;  
o Global environmental policy; 
o Non-retaliation policy; 
o Supplier code of conduct. 
• Ford: 




o Code of conduct. 
• Glencore: 
o Human rights policy; 
o Code of conduct; 
• Trafigura: 
o Business principles; 
o Code of business conduct; 
o Corporate responsibility policy. 
• Cargill: 
o Human rights statement; 
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o Code of conduct; 
o Supplier code of conduct; 
• Al-Salam Investment: no code is publicly available 
 
Construction 
• China State Construction Engineering Corporation: no code is publicly 
available (however the firm states on its website that they are drafting ‘CSR 
plans’). 
• China Railway Construction Corporation Limited: no code is publicly 
available (the firm said in its 2016 Sustainability Report that it “insists on the 
equal rights, equal pay for equal work, non-discriminatory labor and labor 
policy, fair treatment of employees of different nationalities, races, sex, age, 
religion and cultural background, and fully protects the employees’ legitimate 
rights and interests. personal privacy, forbidding and resisting the use of child 
labor and all forms of forced labor.”) 
• China Railway Engineering Corporation: the company’s 2010 report refers to 
a “Corporate Governance Code”, but no such code was found on the firm’s 
website. 
• Vinci: 
o Guide on human rights; 
o Code of ethics and conduct; 
o Manifesto. 
• China Communication Construction Corporation: no code is publicly available 
 
Electronics 
• Apple:  
o Supplier code of conduct. 
• Samsung: 
o Code of conduct; 
o Business conduct guidelines; 
o Business guidelines (for suppliers). 
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• HP: 
o Global human rights policy; 
o Standards of business conduct; 
o HP Supply chain social and environmental responsibility policy; 
o Non-discrimination policy; 
o Contingent Worker Code of Conduct; 
o HP Environment, Health, and Safety (EHS) Policy; 
o Partner code of conduct. 
• Microsoft: 
o Global human rights statement; 
o Standards of business conduct; 
o Supplier code of conduct. 
• Hitachi: 
o Human rights policy; 
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Annex 3 – Self-regulatory mechanisms adopted by the corporations 
of the case study  
Human rights issues Human rights standards 
WORKER-RELATED RIGHTS 
Child labour 
Unilever: human rights policy + Rainforest Alliance (Critical 
Criteria 4.6 & 4.7); OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (V.1.c.); Code of Business Principles (“Unilever 
companies must not use child labour, i.e. individuals under the 
age of 15 or under the local legal minimum working age or 
mandatory schooling age, whichever is the higher.”); ILO 
Conventions C138 and C182; Sustainable Agriculture 
Convention (F172);  Sourcing Policy (Standards 5.1.-5.6.) 
MTC: ILO Conventions C138 and C182; Fairtrade (3.3.1, Y0: 
no children under 15 years old employed; 3.3.2, Y0: no 
dangerous or exploitative work for anyone under 18 years old; 
3.3.3, Y0: child labour policy; 3.3.4, Y0: child labour 
remediation policy; 3.3.5, Y0: prevention of child labour via 
adequate procedures); Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.6 
& 4.7); ETP (4.1: child labour is prohibited (below the age of 
15 years old))  
Forced labour 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical criterion 4.1.); 
Sustainable Agriculture Code (F171); Responsible Sourcing 
Policy (Standard 4); ETP (1.1/1.2./1.3); OECD Guidelines 
(V.1.d); Code of Business Principles (“Unilever companies 
must not use, or permit to be used, forced or compulsory or 
trafficked labour. We have a zero tolerance of forced labour.”); 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 23(1)); 
ICESCR (Article 7); ILO C029; and ILO C105. 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical criterion 4.1.); Fairtrade 
(3.2.1., Y0: no forced labour; 3.2.2., Y0: freedom for spouses);  
Contractual terms 
Contracts 
Unilever: Code of Business Principles (“Ensure all employees’ 
work is conducted on the basis of freely agreed and 
documented terms of employment, clearly understood by and 
made available to relevant employees and others working for 
Unilever”); Responsible Sourcing Policy (Standard 2: “All 
workers, both permanent and casual, are provided with 
employment documents that are freely agreed and which 
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respect their legal and contractual rights”); ICESCR (Right to 
just and favourable conditions of work); Sustainable 
Agriculture Code (F168: “All workers, both permanent and 
casual, are provided with employment documents that are 
freely agreed and which respect their legal rights”);  Rainforest 
Alliance (Continuous improvement criteria 4.22.). 
MTC: Fairtrade (3.5.6, Y0: written contracts for all permanent 
workers with specific information; 3.5.7, Y1: written contracts 
for all temporary workers of 3 months or more; 3.5.8, Y0: 
workers’ awareness of employment terms; 3.5.23, Y0: direct 
contracting; 3.5.24, Y0: rules for subcontractors, only in special 
circumstances/non-regular work; 3.5.25: subcontracted 
workers records);  Rainforest Alliance (Continuous 
improvement criteria 4.22.); ETP (8.1: written agreement with 
all workers (copy given to all workers, in a language they can 
understand); 8.2: valid reason for termination of contract; 8.3: 
probation period of no longer than 3 months). 
Pay 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.3: same pay 
for men and women; 4.5: payment of minimum wage + 
continuous improvement criteria 12, 4.29 & 4.33: living wage; 
4.21; 4.27: inflation-adjusted salary); “Ensure all employees 
are provided with fair wages including a total remuneration 
package that meets or exceeds legal minimum standards or 
appropriate prevailing industry standards, and that 
remuneration terms established by legally binding collective 
agreements are implemented and adhered to.” (Code of 
Business Principles); OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (V.4.b. “pay […] should be at least adequate to 
satisfy the basic needs of the workers and their families”);  
ICESCR (Right to just and favourable conditions of work;  
right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate 
housing, clothing, and food, article 11; right to food); ILO  
Convention C100 (right to a fair wage);   Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights  (right to an adequate standard of living, 
including adequate housing, clothing, and food, article 25; right 
to food); Sustainable Agriculture Code (F173); and 
Responsible Sourcing Policy (Standard 6). 
MTC: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.3: same pay for 
men and women; 4.5: payment of minimum wage + continuous 
improvement criteria 12, 4.29 & 4.33: living wage; 4.21; 4.27: 
inflation-adjusted salary); Fairtrade (3.5.1, F0: sets wages at the 
CBA level, with the intention of continually increasing pay; 
3.5.2, F0: no deductions from salaries; 3.5.3, F0: pay is 
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equivalent to minimum set hourly wage; 3.5.4, F1: wage level 
increase every year to close the gap with living wage, and 
negotiated with representatives; 3.5.5, Y0: documented pay, 
which is made at regularly scheduled intervals); ILO  
Convention C100; ETP (5.1: minimum wage (nationally or 
industry-set) for all workers; 5.2: monthly pay at least (accurate 
reporting of hours worked/kilos/overtime); 5.3: wage 
information for all workers (pay slips clearly show how wages 
are calculated + deductions); 5.4: fair, legal, and reasonable 
deductions (need to be permissible by law + written permission 
of workers); 5.5: social benefits/allowances (including pension 
fund, travel allowance, etc.)); 7.1: no discrimination in its 
labour policies and procedures (equal pay, training and 
promotion opportunities and benefits, irrespective of race, 
caste, national origin, religion, age, disability, gender, 
HIV/AIDS status, marital status, sexual orientation, union 
membership or political affiliation))). 
Working time 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.10 (weekly 48 
hours + 1 meal period break for 6 hours worked) & 4.11 
(regulation on overtime: all overtime is voluntary, no more 
than, overall, 60 hours/week)); Code of Business Principles 
(“Work more than the regular and overtime hours allowed by 
the laws of the country where they are employed. All overtime 
work will be on a voluntary basis.”);  Responsible Sourcing 
Policy (Standard 7); OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (§57: “employment  and industrial relations 
standards are understood to include […] working-time 
arrangements.”);  ICESCR (Right to just and favourable 
conditions of work);  Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
(Right to a family life, article 16); ICCPR (Right to a family 
life, article 23); Sustainable Agriculture Code (F81: “Workers 
must have the right to time off work, for medical appointments 
and counselling for themselves and their dependants.”; F174: 
“Working hours for all workers are reasonable” + voluntary 
overtime). 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.10 (weekly 48 
hours + 1 meal period break for 6 hours worked) & 4.11 
(regulation on overtime: all overtime is voluntary, no more 
than, overall, 60 hours/week)); Fairtrade (3.5.9, F0: no more 
than 48 hours/week on a regular basis, and no compulsory 
overtime; 3.5.10, F0: at 1 day of rest every 6 working days, 
exception: only 12 weeks per year; 3.5.11, F0: overtime only 
voluntary and no more than 12 hours per week, and no more 
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than 3 consecutive months; 3.5.12, Y0: premium rates for 
overtime work [1.5 the rate on regular work days; twice the rate 
on rest days, unless defined by CBA]; 3.5.14: lunch breaks); 
ETP (6.1: standard time of no more than 48 hours per week; 
6.2: overtime of no more than 12 hours per week (must be 
voluntary, paid at a premium in line with the law, irregular); 
6.3: one day off every week + public holidays; 6.4: hours 
records; 6.5: no two consecutive full-time shifts should be 
performed at night + at least 11 hours between two shifts + 
meals and beverage for night workers). 
Leaves 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Continuous Improvement 
Criteria: 4.23 (2 weeks’ paid vacation every year) & 4.25 
(maternity leave: 12 weeks before/after birth);  ICESCR (Right 
to just and favourable conditions of work);  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights  (right to rest, leisure, and paid 
holidays). 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Continuous Improvement Criteria: 
4.23 (2 weeks’ paid vacation every year) & 4.25 (maternity 
leave: 12 weeks before/after birth); Fairtrade (3.5.13, Y0: at 
least 2 weeks of annual leave; 3.5.15: regulations on sick leave 
[protection  from termination of workers on sick leave + 
income]; 3.5.16, F0: minimum of 8 weeks of maternity leave 
with no less of 2/3 weeks, no termination; 3.5.17, Y3: 
increasing up to 12 weeks of maternity leave; 3.5.18, Y0: 
breaks or reduction of working time for nursing mothers); ETP 
(6.3: one day off every week + public holidays + annual and 
sick leave; 6.6: maternity leave: in line with the law (women 
shall not lose any labour rights (including annual leave) due to 
pregnancy and maternity leave + daily break(s) for 
breastfeeding)). 
Health and safety 
General considerations 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 3.3: training of 
pesticides handlers; 4.5: free equipment; 4.14: OHS plan; 
4.15: PPE; 4.16, 4.17, & 4.18: working with pesticides; 
Continuous Improvement Criteria 4.34-4.45); Code of 
Business Principles (page 22); Responsible Sourcing Policy 
(Standard 9); OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(V.4.c. “Take adequate steps to ensure occupational health 
and safety in their operations”; §57);  ICESCR (Right to just 
and favourable conditions of work); Sustainable Agricultural 
Code (F78/F155: first aid on-site; F81: no handling of 
pesticide by minors/nursing/pregnant women;  F91: systems 
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in place to minimise the risk of workers sustaining injuries 
from machinery; F94-98: safe 
transportation/buildings/electrical systems + mitigation 
against risks caused by fire/noise/dust/explosions; F100: 
PPEs; F101: risk assessment with workers’ input; F144/145: 
continuous improvement on training plan and training 
records; F146: continuous improvement on training for 
pesticide handlers; F154: continuous improvement about 
health and safety measures). 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 3.3: training of 
pesticides handlers; 3.5: workers not present during aerial 
pesticides spraying; 4.5: free equipment; 4.14: OHS plan; 4.15: 
PPE; 4.16, 4.17, & 4.18: working with pesticides; Continuous 
Improvement Criteria 4.34-4.45); Fairtrade (3.6.1, Y0: 
workplace safety; 3.6.2, Y0: health and safety officer; 3.6.3, 
Y3: health and safety committee; 3.6.4, Y0: health and safety 
risk assessments, with workers H&S representatives; 3.6.5, Y0: 
H&S instructions visible; 3.6.6, Y0: annual recorded training 
on H&S; 3.6.7, Y0: training on hazardous work; 3.6.8, Y0: 
access to clean drinking water for workers; 3.6.9, Y0: access to 
toilets and hand washing facilities; 3.6.10, Y6: recreation and 
canteens; 3.6.11, Y0: maintenance of company premises; 
3.6.12, Y0: all indoor places have adequate lightning, heating, 
and ventilation; 3.6.13, Y0: maintenance of electric system; 
3.6.14: emergency exits marked; 3.6.15: evacuation training for 
staff; 3.6.16, Y0: first aid equipment and training; 3.6.19, Y0: 
cleaning and storing of PPE; 3.6.21, Y0: restrictions on 
conducting hazardous work; 3.6.22, Y0: safety measures for 
chemical handlers; 3.6.23, Y0: re-entry intervals after spraying; 
3.6.24, Y0: providing workers with appropriate tools); ETP 
(3.1: safe, clean, and healthy environment (health and safety 
policy and management system to ensure effective 
implementation of the policy + noise at harmful levels must be 
reduced); 3.2: hazard minimisation (regular health and safety 
risk assessment must be completed with action plan for each 
identified risk + training of workers in contact with hazard + 
signposting of all hazards + all equipment should be in good 
condition); 3.3: regular training (free + in workers’ language) 
on proper use of equipment/regular health and safety training, 
including of safe use of PPE (and specific training for handling 
hazardous chemicals + recording of training); 3.4: provision of 
free PPE to all workers (checks and balances in place to ensure 
that workers are wearing PPE at all times + PPE must be 
maintained and repaired by the estate); 3.5: adequate steps to 
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prevent accidents and injury in the workplace; 3.6: fire safety; 
3.7: chemical safety; 3.8: health and safety management and 
committee (senior management representative with 
responsibility for the health and safety of all workers + workers 
represented on committee); 3.9: sanitary facilities (safe and 
hygienic washing facilities + clean toilet facilities for all 
workers); 3.10: free and available drinking water (tested) for all 
employees; 3.11: hygienic storage of food + storage for 
personal belongings). 
Medical check-ups 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.14: includes 
medical exams; Continuous Improvement Criteria 4.36 & 
4.41); OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (V.4.c. 
“Take adequate steps to ensure occupational health and safety 
in their operations”; §57); ICESCR (Right to just and 
favourable conditions of work); ILO Conventions C155, C161, 
and C187. 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.14: includes 
medical exams; Continuous Improvement Criteria 4.36 & 
4.41); Fairtrade (3.6.20: monitoring of workers health with 
annual medical examinations for workers handling hazardous 
chemicals; 3.6.25, Y3: free occupational healthcare; 3.6.26, 
Y0: appointment of a medical officer; 3.6.27, Y0: duties of the 
medical officer; 3.6.28, Y1: regular and confidential medical 
check-ups for all workers, at least every three years); ETP 
(3.12: health of workers who come into contact with hazardous 
chemicals shall be monitored). 
Accidents and 
compensation 
Unilever:  OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(§57: “employment and industrial relations standards are 
understood to include compensation […] arrangements.”); 
ICESCR (Right to just and favourable conditions of work). 
MTC: Fairtrade (3.6.17, Y0: H&S Officer reports accidents; 
3.6.18, F0: access to healthcare in case of work-related 
accidents); ETP (3.12: measures to deal with emergencies and 
accidents (including first-aid arrangements (compensation for 
workers in case of injury or accidents in the workplace))). 
Freedom of association 
General considerations 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.4); Code of 
Business Principles (“Respect employees’ rights to join or not 
to join a legally recognised trade union, or any other body 
representing their collective interests, and establish 
constructive dialogue and bargain in good faith with trade 
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unions or representative bodies on employment conditions, 
labour management relations and matters of mutual concern, to 
the extent practicable taking national laws into consideration” 
+ “ Maintain a clear and transparent system of employee and 
management communication that enables employees to consult 
and have an effective dialogue with management”);  
Responsible Sourcing Policy (Standard 8); OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises (V.1.b.: “Respect the right of 
workers   employed by the multinational   enterprise to have 
trade unions and representative organisations of their own 
choosing recognised for the purpose of collective bargaining, 
and engage in constructive negotiations”); ICESCR (Right to 
just and favourable conditions of work);   Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Right to belong to a trade union 
and freedom of association); ILO  Conventions C087 and C098 
(Right to belong to a trade union and freedom of association); 
Sustainable Agriculture Code (F175). 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.4); Fairtrade 
(2.2.4, Y3: training of union representatives; 3.1.8, Y3: record 
of terminated contracts, including whether workers were union 
members or representatives; 3.4.1 Y0: no discrimination of 
union representatives; 3.4.2 Y0: generally respect labour rights 
by protecting union membership and related rights; 3.4.3, Y0: 
sign the Freedom of Association Protocol; 3.4.4, Y0: 
communicating Freedom of Association protocol to workers; 
3.4.5, Y0: allowing union representatives to meet with workers; 
3.4.6, Y0: workers’ association on site (with necessary support 
from management); 3.4.7, Y0: no interference, such as 
financial support, with worker’s right of association; 3.4.8, Y0: 
representatives may meet at least once a month among 
themselves during working hours and every three months with 
management; 3.4.9 Y0: meetings outcomes are documented 
and signed; 3.4.10, Y1: sign off on the national collective 
bargaining agreement); ETP (2.1: right to join trade unions; 
2.2: right to collective bargaining + effective means for 
negotiations; 2.3.: employers shall adopt an open attitude 
towards the activities of unions and their organisational 
activities + facilities; 2.4: non-discrimination of union 
members). 
Strikes 
Unilever:  ICESCR (Right to just and favourable conditions of 
work); ILO Convention C105 (right to strike, article 1.d.). 
MTC: --- 
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Working conditions of 
seasonal workers 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.8: no seasonal 
workers employed when work is permanent); Code of Business 
Principles (“Comply with legal requirements in relation to 
short-term, casual or agency employees”); ICESCR (Right to 
just and favourable conditions of work). 
MTC: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.8: no seasonal 
workers employed when work is permanent); Fairtrade (3.5.21, 
Y1: equitable remuneration and benefits for permanent and 
temporary and migrant workers, with equitable/alternatives 
means if no equivalent benefits are possible; 3.5.22, Y0: time-
limited contracts are permitted during peak periods, under 
special circumstances); ETP (7.1: no discrimination in its 
labour policies and procedures (equal pay, training and 
promotion opportunities and benefits, irrespective of race, 
caste, national origin, religion, age, disability, gender, 
HIV/AIDS status, marital status, sexual orientation, union 
membership or political affiliation)); 8.1: employees should not 
be given short-term contracts for long periods of time). 
Right to non-discrimination 
Non-discrimination 
during the hiring 
process 
Unilever: Human Rights Policy; Rainforest Alliance (Critical 
criteria 4.3 about freedom from discrimination, including 
against pregnant women); Code of Business Principles (“Treat 
everyone fairly and equally, without discrimination on the 
grounds of race, age, role, gender, gender identity, colour, 
religion, country of origin, sexual orientation, marital status, 
dependants, disability, social class or political views. This 
includes consideration for recruitment, redundancy, promotion, 
reward and benefits, training or retirement which must be based 
on merit”); OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(§54: principle of non-discrimination, “prevent discrimination 
or dismissals on the grounds of marriage, pregnancy or 
parenthood”);   Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(discrimination + right to work); ICCPR (discrimination); 
ICESCR (discrimination + right to work); ILO  Conventions 
C111; Sustainable Agriculture Code (F170). 
MTC: ILO Convention C111; Fairtrade (3.5.26: recruitment 
practices [e.g. pay all fees]); Rainforest Alliance (Critical 
criteria 4.3 about freedom from discrimination, including 
against pregnant women); Fairtrade (2.2.7, Y3: equity in the 
workplace; 3.3.1 Y0: non-discrimination [although it is defined 
by difference in treatment “on grounds that are not related to 
ability or merit”]; 3.1.4, Y1: policy on disciplinary measures, 
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which includes the prevents against discrimination; 3.3.2: no 
tests for pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, or genetic disorder); ETP (7.1: 
no discrimination in its hiring policies and procedures (race, 
caste, national origin, religion, age, disability, gender, 
HIV/AIDS status, marital status, sexual orientation, union 
membership or political affiliation)) 
Non-discrimination 
during employment 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.2: sexual 
harassment); Code of Business Practices (p. 24, about sexual 
harassment);  Responsible Sourcing Policy (Standards 3 and 
10.9); 2015 Report (p. 35, about sexual harassment); Unilever’s 
Human Rights Policy (“We seek  to manage  and grow socially 
responsible businesses where women participate on an equal 
basis.  We believe that women’s rights and economic inclusion 
are priorities to win long-term.  Our approach starts with the 
respect of the rights of women and extends to their promotion 
as well as helping to develop skills and open up opportunities, 
both in our own operations and our value chain.”); Sustainable 
Agriculture Code (F103:  “Farms or plantations employing a 
large workforce are expected to have women’s committees, 
that work with management, to resolve gender or other group-
specific issues”; F168: “No worker should be subject to any 
physical, sexual, psychological or verbal harassment, abuse or 
other form of intimidation”). 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.2: sexual 
harassment; 4.18:  Women who are pregnant, nursing or have 
recently given birth are not assigned to activities that pose risk 
to the woman’s, foetus's or infant’s health. In cases of job 
reassignment, there is no reduction in remuneration); Fairtrade 
(2.2.6, Y3: empowerment of women; 2.2.10, Y6: creche 
facilities; 3.1.5 & 3.1.6, Y0: zero tolerance for sexual 
harassment with adoption of a specific policy); ETP (3.13: 
“Employers should provide welfare and social services that 
meet the needs of women workers, particularly those with 
family responsibilities and pregnant female workers.  All 
measures compatible with national conditions and possibilities 
shall be taken (a) to enable workers with family responsibilities 
to exercise their right to free choice of employment; and (b) to 
take account of their needs in terms and conditions of 
employment and in social security.”: this includes childcare 
facilities such as crèches and or/private room for feeding 
children; 7.1: no discrimination in its labour policies and 
procedures (equal pay, training and promotion opportunities 
and benefits, irrespective of race, caste, national origin, 
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religion, age, disability, gender, HIV/AIDS status, marital 
status, sexual orientation, union membership or political 
affiliation)): “all terms and conditions of employment should 
be based on an individual's ability to do the job”; 7.2: equal pay 
for equal work for men and women; 7.3: no hiring 
discrimination against pregnant women (no pregnancy 
tests/requirement of use of contraceptives + estate must allow 
women workers to return to their jobs after giving birth); 9.1: 
“Physical abuse or discipline, the threat of physical abuse, 
sexual or other harassment and verbal abuse or other forms of 
intimidation shall be prohibited”). 
Transportation to site 
Unilever:  ICESCR (Right to just and favourable conditions of 
work); Sustainable Agriculture Code (F94). 
MTC: --- 
Migrant workers 
Unilever: OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(§40: “enterprises should respect the human rights of 
individuals belonging to specific groups or populations that 
require particular attention, where they may have adverse 
human rights impacts on them [e.g.] migrant workers and their 




Housing and living 
conditions 
Unilever:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.12 (access to 
potable water) & 4.13 (decent housing conditions); Continued 
Improvement Criteria 4.28, 4.30 & 4.32);  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Right to a family life, article 16; 
Right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate 
housing, article 25;  Freedom of housing, article 25); ICCPR 
(Right to a family life, article 23); ICESCR (Right to an 
adequate standard of living, including adequate housing, article 
11;  Freedom of housing, article 11). 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.12 (access to 
potable water) & 4.13 (decent housing conditions);  Continued 
Improvement Criteria 4.28, 4.30 & 4.32); Fairtrade (3.5.28, Y3: 
levels of decency, privacy, hygiene, safety, and security, and 
clean water/bathing facilities + compensate offsite workers if 
free rent); ETP (3.14: good condition, safe and hygienic 
housing (not overcrowded + toilet/washing facilities/access to 
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regularly tested drinking water/cooking facilities/organisation 
of domestic waste collection)). 
Right to a clean environment 
General considerations 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 2.1 – 2.4: 
natural ecosystems & wildlife; Continuous Improvement 
Criteria: 3.8 & 3.9: soil conservation: 3.27-3.29, 3.32: 
pesticides); OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(VI.3.: impact mitigation; and VI.5.: “Maintain contingency 
plans for preventing, mitigating, and controlling serious 
environmental and health damage from their operations, 
including accidents and emergencies; and mechanisms for 
immediate reporting to the competent authorities.”). 
DEFORESTATION: Sustainable Agriculture Code (F137: “Use 
fuel wood, firewood, wood crates and pallets from a sustainable 
source”); Rainforest Alliance (critical criteria: 2.2: “Farms 
conserve all natural ecosystems and have not destroyed forest 
or other natural ecosystems in the five-year period prior to the 
date of initial application for Rainforest Alliance certification 
or after January 1, 2014, whichever date is earlier”; 2.3:  
Production activities do not degrade any protected area.). 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 2.1 – 2.4: natural 
ecosystems & wildlife;  Continuous Improvement Criteria: 3.8 
& 3.9: soil conservation: 3.27-3.29: pesticides); Fairtrade 
(4.2.6, Y0: buffer zones for application of hazardous chemicals, 
with no application near zones of human activity; 4.2.7, Y0: 
same for air application; 4.2.8, Y0: chemicals storage; 4.2.9, 
Y0: prevention of accidents and spills; 4.2.10, Y0: cleaning, 
storing, and disposal of hazardous waste; 4.3.4, Y0: fertiliser 
storage to minimise water pollution); ETP (10.1: “The estate 
should have an environmental management system (EMS) 
which includes policies, procedures and programmes aimed 
both at managing the environmental aspects of its operations 
and reducing its environmental impact.” + “The estate should 
carry out environmental impact assessments (EIA) at regular 
intervals”, including before new works + continual 
improvement programme; 10.2: agrochemicals (training + 
should strive to reduce the use of agrochemicals); 10.3: soil 
conservation; 10.4: ecosystem conservation; 10.5: water 
conservation; 10.6: energy use; 10.7: waste management). 
DEFORESTATION: Rainforest Alliance (critical criteria: 2.2: 
“Farms conserve all natural ecosystems and have not destroyed 
forest or other natural ecosystems in the five-year period prior 
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to the date of initial application for Rainforest Alliance 
certification or after January 1, 2014, whichever date is 
earlier”; 2.3:  Production activities do not degrade any 
protected area.). 
Waste disposal 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 3.1 & 3.2: 
water; Continuous Improvement 3.20-3.22: water quality; 
3.37-3.43: waste management).  
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 3.1 & 3.2: water; 
Continuous Improvement 3.20-3.22: water quality; 3.37-3.43: 
waste management); Fairtrade (4.2.10, Y0: cleaning, storing, 
and disposal of hazardous waste; 4.3.13, Y3: handling of waste 
water from processing facilities; 4.4.1, Y0: storage and disposal 
of hazardous waste; 4.4.2, Y1: waste management plan; 4.4.3, 
Y3: organic waste use and disposal); ETP (10.7: waste 
management (waste should be minimised/recycled)). 
Right to health 
Health issues 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Continuous Improvement 
Criteria 3.32: warn communities potentially affected by 
pesticides);  Code of Business Principles (“Unilever strives to 
be a trusted corporate citizen and, as an integral part of society, 
to fulfil our responsibilities to the societies and communities in 
which we operate.”); OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (VI.3.:  “Assess, and address in decision-making, 
the foreseeable environmental, health, and safety-related 
impacts associated with the processes, goods and services of 
the enterprise over their full life cycle with a view to avoiding 
or, when unavoidable, mitigating them.”); 2015 Report (“We 
are committed to deploying effective programmes on health 
education (using our skills in communication) and to securing 
access to appropriate treatment for our employees at all stages 
of HIV/AIDS”);  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (right 
to health); ICESCR (right to health) ;  Sustainable Agricultural 
Code (F79: “Farms will promote a healthy lifestyle, and raise 
awareness of wider issues of health and safety (e.g. 
HIV/AIDS). These may extend into the wider community”). 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Continuous Improvement Criteria 
3.32: warn communities  potentially affected by pesticides); 
Fairtrade (3.6.30, Y6: adoption and implementation of a policy 
for the prevention of contagious diseases and epidemics, 
including a reporting structure for the incidence of epidemics); 
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2015 Report (“our intention is to extend the principle of 
'prevention better than cure' to all Rift Valley Tea communities, 
especially Tea estates […], in order to reduce absenteeism and 
the high cost of treatment through Wellness awareness 
principles”); ETP (3.12(d): “If relevant, the estate should have 
in place health awareness and prevention programmes and offer 
support for treatment (e.g. on HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB)”). 
ACCESS TO WATER 
Unilever:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.12 (access to 
potable water for workers and their families); Continuous 
Improvement Criteria 3.15, 3.16, 3.18 & 3.19: water use for 
irrigation purposes; 4.47: communication with the 
community);  Code of Business Principles (“Unilever strives to 
be a trusted corporate citizen and, as an integral part of society, 
to fulfil our responsibilities to the societies and communities in 
which we operate.”); OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (Commentary on the policies, §25: “[stakeholder] 
engagement can be particularly helpful in the planning and 
decision-making concerning projects or other activities 
involving, for example, the intensive use of […] water, which 
could significantly affect local communities”); 2015 Report 
(“we’ve taken significant steps forward, [including in respect 
to] our commitment to recognise and respect the human right 
to water”);  Sustainable Agricultural Code (F77: access to 
water on-site + hand-washing facilities). 
MTC: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.12 (access to 
potable water for workers and their families); Continuous 
Improvement Criteria 3.15, 3.16, 3.18 & 3.19: water use for 
irrigation purposes; 4.47: communication with the 
community); Fairtrade (4.3.10, Y1: optimisation of water use; 
4.3.11, Y3: sustainable use of water; 4.3.12, 6: optimising 
irrigation systems); ETP (10.5: water conservation: the estate 
should ensure the rational and sustainable use of all water 
resources + sustainable water procurement programme + waste 
water management programme.). 
Health services 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Continuous Improvement 
Criteria 4.47);  Code of Business Principles (“Unilever strives 
to be a trusted corporate citizen and, as an integral part of 
society, to fulfil our responsibilities to the societies and 
communities in which we operate.”);   Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (right to health); ICESCR (right to health). 
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MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Continuous Improvement Criteria 
4.47); Fairtrade (3.6.18, F0: access to healthcare in case of 
work-related accidents; 3.6.29, Y3: access to free medical care 
and advice at the workplace). 
Right to education 
Unilever:  Rainforest Alliance (Continuous Improvement 
Criteria 4.47);  Code of Business Principles (“Unilever strives 
to be a trusted corporate citizen and, as an integral part of 
society, to fulfil our responsibilities to the societies and 
communities in which we operate.”); OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (§52: “it is important to acknowledge 
and encourage the role of multinational enterprises in 
contributing to the search for a lasting solution to the problem 
of child labour. In this regard, raising the standards of education 
of children living in host countries is especially noteworthy”); 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (right to education); 
ICESCR (right to education). 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Continuous Improvement Criteria 
4.47); Fairtrade (2.2.8, Y1: all permanent workers; 2.2.9, Y3: 
all workers). 
Engagement with the 
community 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Continuous Improvement 
Criteria 4.46 & 4.47); Code of Business Principles (“Unilever 
strives to be a trusted corporate citizen and, as an integral part 
of society, to fulfil our responsibilities to the societies and 
communities in which we operate.”); OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (Commentary on the policies, §25: 
“[stakeholder] engagement can be particularly helpful in the 
planning and decision-making concerning projects or other 
activities [which] could significantly affect local 
communities”); Sustainable Agriculture Code (for suppliers: 
S39: “Suppliers are expected to work with farmers and farmer 
groups to generate opportunities for investment, loans and cost-
saving.”). 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Continuous Improvement Criteria 
4.46 & 4.47). 
Land rights 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.19 & 4.20); 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Commentary 
on the policies, §25: “[stakeholder] engagement can be 
particularly helpful in the planning and decision-making  
concerning projects or other activities involving, for example, 
the intensive use of land […], which could significantly affect 
local communities”); Human Rights Policy (“We recognise the 
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importance of land rights. We are committed to the principle of 
free, prior and informed consent, and support its 
implementation by national authorities.”); Sustainable 
Agriculture Code (F111-112 + F177); and Responsible 
Sourcing Policy (Standard 11). 
MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.19 & 4.20). 
OTHER ISSUES 
Complaints mechanism 
Unilever: Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.9); Code of 
Business Principles (“provide transparent, fair and confidential 
procedures for employees to raise relevant concerns. These 
must enable employees to discuss any situation where they 
believe they have been discriminated against or treated unfairly 
or without respect or dignity, with their line manager – or an 
independent manager – without fear of retaliation.”);  
Responsible Sourcing Policy (Standard 10); UNGPs (“business 
enterprises should have in place […] processes to enable the 
remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause or 
to which they contribute”, Principle 15); OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (Commentary on the Policies, §46: 
“operational-level  grievance  mechanisms for those potentially 
impacted by enterprises’ activities can be an effective means of 
providing for such processes when they meet the core criteria 
of: legitimacy,  accessibility, predictability,  equitability,  
compatibility  with the Guidelines and   transparency, and are 
based on dialogue and engagement with a view to seeking 
agreed solutions.”); “We offer both internal and external 
channels for raising concerns, anonymously if required. We 
also provide an external channel to third parties” (2015 Human 
Rights Report); Unilever’s Human Rights Policy (“We place 
importance on the provision of effective remedy wherever 
human rights impacts occur through company-based grievance 
mechanisms. We continue to build the awareness and 
knowledge of our employees and workers on human rights, 
including labour rights, encouraging them to speak up, without 
retribution, about any concerns they may have, including 
through our grievance channels. We are committed to continue 
increasing the capacity of our management to identify and 
respond to concerns. We also promote the provision of 
effective grievance mechanisms by our suppliers”); ICESCR 
(Right to just and favourable conditions of work); Sustainable 
Agriculture Code (F108, for complaints from community + 
F103 and F175 for workers). 
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MTC:  Rainforest Alliance (Critical Criteria 4.9); Fairtrade 
(3.1.7, Y0: no repercussions for grievance procedures; 3.5.27, 
Y0: anonymous grievance procedure open to workers and third 
parties, which includes procedure for sexual harassment); 2015 
Report (“The mechanism for grievance resolution currently 
varies within each business operation and circumstance. With 
the introduction of the newly drafted ESMS (Environmental 
and Social Management System), we will be able to determine 
if gaps exist in this area and thereafter ensure that both internal 
and external grievances have an appropriate method of review 
and resolution”); ETP (9.1: effective and confidential grievance 
and complaints procedures should be in place + be 
communicated to all levels of the workforce +  managers 
should be trained in fair treatment of workers and on 
disciplinary and grievance procedures; 9.2: “The estate should 
have in place disciplinary measures to deal with incidents of 
harsh or inhumane treatment” + “Incidents of abuse and 
harassment should be dealt with promptly and effectively, 
leaving no doubt about the willingness of management to 
discipline perpetrators in a way that would deter future 
incidents”). 
Other issues 
Unilever: In its Code of Business Principles, Unilever requires 
its “third-party business partners to adhere to business 
principles consistent with [their] own” (Code of Business 
Principles, 2016, 8). These expectations are set out in the firm’s 
Responsible Business Partner Policy, in which Unilever 
requires of its contractors that they comply with all applicable 
laws and regulations in the countries in which they operate, 
including relevant international laws and regulations. 
Moreover, contractors’ workers are to be provided with a total 
compensation package that includes wages, overtime pay, 
benefits and paid leave which meets or exceeds the legal 
minimum standards or appropriate prevailing industry 
standards, whichever is higher, and compensation terms 
established by legally binding collective bargaining 
agreements are to be implemented and adhered to (Responsible 
Business Partner Policy, 6). Workers will not be required to 
work more than the regular and overtime hours allowed by the 
law of the country where the workers are employed, and all 
overtime work by workers will be on a voluntary basis 
(Responsible Business Partner Policy, 6). Workers will be over 
15 years old, and young workers will not perform any 
dangerous duties and will not be deprived of the opportunity to 
attend school (Responsible Business Partner Policy, 7). A 






healthy and safe workplace will be provided to prevent 
accidents and injury arising out of, linked with, or occurring in 
the course of work or as a result of the employer’s operations 
(Responsible Business Partner Policy, 7). Finally, the legal 
right of workers to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining are recognised and respected (Responsible Business 
Partner Policy, 7). 
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Annex 4 – Interview Consent Form and Participation Information 
Sheet 
Annex 4A – Consent Form 
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Annex 4B – Participant Information Sheet 
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Annex 5 – Schedules of interview 
Annex 5A – Schedule of Questions for Unilever’s Management 
 
This schedule of questions for Unilever’s managers is a typical schedule of questions 
which I used to interview managers for all three companies. However, I adapted the 
questions for each company, depending on their self-regulatory standards and 
circumstances. All interview schedules are available upon request. 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS – KEY FEATURES 
DRAFTING  
• What was the drafting process for the corporate codes and policies which you 
strive to implement here? 
o How did you draft your policies? Was the process inclusive? Whom 
did you consult? Did you follow their recommendations? 
o Did you take steps to ensure that the process was transparent and open? 
(What does such a process look like?) 
EMBEDDING STANDARDS 
• Did you embed your codes’ principles in your everyday decision-making? 
How? 
• Did you give publicity, in a language that your employees understand, to your 
policies? 
• Do you have reward systems? 
• Do you take into account the respect of your policies when reviewing your 
employees’ performance?  
• Do you offer training on your policies to your employees? Is it compulsory or 
voluntary? Does it include practical cases? 
MONITORING 
• Do you monitor your performance? If so, who does it, how is it done, and how 
regularly? If not, why not?  
• Have there been any state inspections in recent years? If so, when was the last 
one? How regularly do you have state inspections? Have you ever been fined? 
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• Did adopting self-regulatory standards change your approach to performance 
monitoring? 
COMPLAINTS MECHANISM 
• Do you have a free and anonymous complaints mechanism, open to anyone? 
o If not, why not?   
o If so, do you communicate about it to workers and community 
members? 
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Rainforest Alliance, 4.9.; Code of 
Business Principles; OECD Guidelines/Sustainable Agriculture Code) change 
your approach to complaints mechanism?  
SANCTIONING 
• Do you sanction employees (and providers?) who breach your principles? 
• If so, how?  
• Has it ever happened? 
 
QUESTIONS ON SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 
ACCESS TO WATER 
• Does Unilever contribute to the needs of the community?   
• Do you pressure the government to accelerate borehole digging? If you 
irrigate, do you also truck in water to communities? What is the access to 
water in company housing? 
• Are you doing anything to anticipate meeting the Rainforest Alliance 
continuous improvement criteria 4.47 (from speaking with the local 
community in Kibao, we have identified that access to water was a pressing 
priority)? Any impact of the adoption of the Code of Business Principles? 
CONTRACTS 
• Do all employees have access to their contract? Are they given time to read 
them before signing? Are all contracts in Swahili?  
• Are there seasonal subcontractors? Who manages contracts with them? 
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• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Code of Business 
Principles/Responsible Sourcing Policy/Sustainable Agriculture Code) 
change your approach to contracts? 
PAY 
• How much do you pay your workers? What is the minimum pay?  
o Is paying your employees a living wage on your agenda?  
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Rainforest Alliance/Code of 
Business Principles/OECD Guidelines/ILO C100/Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights/Sustainable Agriculture Code/Responsible Sourcing 
Policy) change your approach to pay? 
WORKING TIME 
• What is the working time of factory workers?  
• Is there any overtime for managers/engineers? How much is it paid?  
• Details about overtime for plantation workers: is any allowed? Is it 
compulsory? How much is it paid?  
• Do workers receive lunch? Do they have access to drinking water? Do they 
have access to toilets? 
• Did workdays use to be longer? If so, what triggered the changes? (Did 
adopting self-regulatory standards (Rainforest Alliance/Code of Business 
Principles/Responsible Sourcing Policy/OECD 
Guidelines/ICESCR/ICCPR/Sustainable Agriculture Code) change your 
approach to working time?)  
LEAVES 
• Do temporary workers get leaves: sick leave (has the policy changed? 
Why?); annual leave; parental leave? 
• How do you calculate “full pay” for tea pickers?  
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Rainforest 
Alliance/ICESCR/Universal Declaration of Human Rights) change your 
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GENDER RELATED ISSUES 
• When is the last time a woman made a complaint? How was it resolved? 
How many sexual harassment complaints per year? Is retaliation a 
problem? 
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Rainforest Alliance/Code of 
Business Principles/Responsible Sourcing Policy/Sustainable Agriculture 
Code) change your approach to gender-related issues? 
HEALTH AND SAFETY 
• Are seasonal workers really required to provide their own equipment?  
• What kind of PPE is available for chemical sprayers? What is the 
purchasing schedule for boots? 
• Have your policy and practice changed in recent years? (Did adopting self-
regulatory standards (Rainforest Alliance/Code of Business 
Principles/Responsible Sourcing Policy/OECD 
Guidelines/ICESCR/Sustainable Agriculture Code) change your approach 
to health and safety?) 
HIRING PROCESS 
• For all employees: are there some diseases that will automatically exclude 
workers from employment?  
• For permanent employees, are women required to be less than 3 months 
pregnant as well? 
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Human rights policy/Rainforest 
Alliance/Code of Business Principles/Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights/ OECD Guidelines/ICESCR/ICCPR/Sustainable Agriculture Code) 
change your approach to your hiring process? 
HEALTH 
• Did you see any correlation between tea work and HIV/AIDS rates?  
• Are HIV/AIDS prevention programmes effective?  
• Is there TB in worker housing? 
• Do you know when Unilever first committed to “deploying effective 
programmes on health education and to securing access to appropriate 
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treatment for our employees at all stages of HIV/AIDS”, as written in your 
2015 report? 
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Rainforest Alliance/Code of 
Business Principles/OECD Guidelines/ICESCR/Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights/Sustainable Agriculture Code) change your approach to 
workers’ and community members’ health issues? 
SEASONAL WORKERS 
• How do you hire seasonal workers? Directly or through contractors? 
• Are there any differences in the working conditions of permanent and 
seasonal workers?  
• Have you hired more permanent workers in recent years?  
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Rainforest Alliance/Code of 
Business Principles/ICESCR) change the working conditions which you 
offer seasonal workers? 
WORK INJURIES AND COMPENSATION 
• Does the company compensate both permanent and temporary workers for 
work-related accidents and injuries? 
• How many workers have you compensated in the past 10 years? 
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (OECD Guidelines/ICESCR) 
change your practice regarding workers’ accidents and compensation? 
LAYOFFS 
• I was told that there had been layoffs: why? Is the work getting 
mechanised? How long does the average worker stay? 
MUFINDI OUTGROWERS PROJECT 
• Does this project have any actual economic or skills impact? Do you 
monitor it? 
TRADE UNIONS 
• Are TPAWU representatives workers themselves? 
• What percentage of the workforce is unionised? 
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Rainforest Alliance/Code of 
Business Principles/OECD Guidelines/ICESCR/Sustainable Agriculture 
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Code/ILO C087 and 098/Universal Declaration of Human Rights) change 
your approach to freedom of association/collective bargaining? 
STRIKE 
• Has there ever been a successful strike action? Why/why not? 
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (ILO C105/ICESCR) change your 
approach to strikes? 
HOUSING 
• Do all houses have running water and electricity? 
• Why are workers not allowed to farm onsite?  
• Is housing permanent? If not, where do workers live after they retire? 
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Rainforest 
Alliance/ICESCR/ICCPR/Universal Declaration of Human Rights) change 
your approach to housing? 
ENVIRONMENT 
• Are chemicals used on crops? If so, how do you make sure that they are not 
polluting soils and water, and do not endanger human life?  
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Rainforest Alliance/OECD 
Guidelines/Sustainable Agriculture Code) change your approach to 
mitigating any negative environmental impact of your activities? 
TRANSPORTATION 
• Is transportation provided for off-site workers? 
o If so, is it safe? Do workers have seats, and is the vehicle safe on muddy 
roads in rainy season? Have there been any accidents? 
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (ICESCR/Sustainable Agriculture 
Code) change your approach to workers’ transportation? 
WASTE MANAGEMENT 
• How do you manage waste? Do you have a specific place?  
• Did adopting self-regulatory standards (Rainforest Alliance) change your 
approach to waste management? 
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Annex 5B – Schedule of Questions for Unilever’s Workers 
 
This schedule of questions for Unilever’s workers is a typical schedule of questions 
which I used to interview community members for all three companies. However, I 
adapted the questions for each company, depending on their self-regulatory standards 
and circumstances. All interview schedules are available upon request. 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS – KEY FEATURES 
DRAFTING  
• Were you (or anyone you know, from work or the community) involved in the 
drafting of any of Unilever’s policies? Do you know anything about the 
drafting of these policies? 
EMBEDDING STANDARDS 
• Have you been made aware of the firm’s policies? 
• Do you know whether respecting the firm’s standards will get you rewarded? 
• Were you offered training on Unilever’s policies? Is it compulsory or 
voluntary? Does it include practical cases? How regularly does it take place? 
COMPLAINTS MECHANISMS 
• Do you have access to a free and anonymous complaints mechanism, open to 
anyone? If not, would it be helpful, in your opinion? 
SANCTIONING 
• Do employees get sanctioned if they breach Unilever’s principles? 
• If so, how?  
• Has it ever happened? 
 
QUESTIONS ON SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 
ACCESS TO WATER 
• Does Unilever contribute to the needs of the community?   
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• Does the company pressure the government to accelerate borehole digging? 
If the company irrigates, do they also truck in water to communities?  
• What is the access to water onsite and in company housing? 
CONTRACTS 
• Do you have access to your contract? It is in Swahili? 
• Were you given time to read it before signing? 
PAY 
• How much are you paid? What is the minimum pay for Unilever workers?  
• Is pay regularly re-evaluated? 
WORKING TIME 
• When do you work (days/times)? 
• Details about overtime for plantation workers: is any allowed? Is it 
compulsory? How much is it paid? 
• Do you receive lunch? Do you have access to drinking water onsite? Do 
you have access to toilets? 
LEAVES 
• Do temporary workers get leaves: sick leave (has the policy changed? 
Why?); annual leave; parental leave? 
HIRING PROCESS 
• Do you know whether there are some diseases that will automatically 
exclude workers from employment?  
• Do you know whether Unilever requires candidates for temporary positions 
to be no more than 3 months pregnant when applying?  
• If that is the case, do you know whether it is also true for permanent 
employees? 
GENDER RELATED ISSUES 
• Have employees been trained on gender-related issues (including about the 
company’s policies)? Do you feel like the situation has improved in recent 
years?  
• Are female employees able to reach out to a female staff member if needed? 
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• When is the last time a woman made a complaint? How was it resolved? Is 
retaliation a problem? 
HEALTH AND SAFETY 
• Are you/seasonal workers required to provide their own equipment?  
• What kind of PPE is available for chemical sprayers?  
• Are there many accidents in the plantations/factory? 
EDUCATION 
• If you have children, where do they go to school? If it is a private school, how 
much are the fees? (Is it Unilever’s school?) 
HEALTH 
• Have you ever been on a Unilever HIV/AIDS prevention programme?  
• Is there TB in worker housing? 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 
• Do you have to go through medical check-ups? How regularly? Who conducts 
them? Do you have to pay? 
TRADE UNIONS 
• Are TPAWU representatives workers themselves?   
• What percentage of the workforce is unionized? Are you unionised? 
STRIKE 
• When was the latest strike? How regularly are strikes organised? 
• Has there ever been a successful strike action? Why/why not?  
LAYOFFS 
• I was told that there had been layoffs: why? Is the work getting 
mechanised? How long does the average worker work for Unilever? 
MUFINDI OUTGROWERS PROJECT 
• Do you know anyone participating in this project? What kind of economic 
and/or skills impact does it have locally? 
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SEASONAL WORKERS 
• If you are a seasonal worker, do you work for Unilever directly or for 
another company? How did you find out about the job?  
WORK INJURIES AND COMPENSATION 
• Does the company compensate both permanent and temporary workers? 
• Do you know whether it has ever happened?  
HOUSING 
• Do all houses onsite have running water and electricity? 
• How big are the houses? Is it enough for a family? 
• Have you been pressured to live onsite? Would you not have access to the 
same benefits if you were living offsite?  
• Is housing permanent? If so, where do workers live after they retire? 
TRANSPORTATION 
• Is transportation provided for off-site workers? 
• And is it safe? Do workers have seats, and is the vehicle safe on muddy 
roads in rainy season? Have there been any accidents? 
ENVIRONMENT 
• Do chemicals used on tea crops affect the environment (soil; water; air)?  
WASTE MANAGEMENT 
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Annex 5C – Schedule of Questions for Unilever’s Community Members 
 
This schedule of questions for community members living around Unilever’s 
plantations is a typical schedule of questions which I used to interview community 
members for all three companies. However, I adapted the questions for each company, 
depending on their self-regulatory standards and circumstances. I also adapted 
questions for community members with an expertise (e.g. doctors, teachers). All 
interview schedules are available upon request. 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS – KEY FEATURES 
DRAFTING  
• Were you (or anyone from the community) involved in the drafting of any of 
Unilever’s policies? Do you know anything about the drafting of these 
policies? 
MONITORING 
• Do you have access to a free and anonymous complaints mechanism, open to 
anyone? If not, would it be helpful, in your opinion? 
 
QUESTIONS ON SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 
ACCESS TO WATER  
• How do you get water? Is it difficult to get access to water in the area? 
• Does Unilever contribute to the needs of the community?   
• Does the company pressure the government to accelerate borehole digging? 
If the company irrigates, do they also truck in water to communities?  
EDUCATION  
• Where do children go to school? 
• Are there enough teachers? Appropriate facilities? 
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HEALTH 
• Have you ever participated in a Unilever HIV/AIDS prevention 
programme?  
• Do you go to Unilever’s hospital? If not, why not, and where do you go? 
MIGRANT WORKERS 
• Does the migrant community (coming to work for tea companies, including 
Unilever) affect education and health services? (Same question for access to 
water.) 
HOUSING 
• Do all houses offsite have running water and electricity? 
MUFINDI OUTGROWERS PROJECT 
• Does this project have any actual economic or skills impact? 
LAYOFFS 
• I was told that there had been layoffs: why? Is the work getting 
mechanised? How long does the average worker stay? 
ENVIRONMENT  
• Do chemicals used on tea crops affect the environment (soil; water; air)? 
• Do Unilever’s activities affect the environment? 
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Annex 5D – Schedule of Questions for Civil Society Representatives 
This schedule of questions for an employee of the International Labour Organisation’s 
office in Dar es Salaam is a typical schedule of questions which I used to interview 
civil society representative. However, I adapted the questions for each civil society 
representative, depending on their field of expertise. All interview schedules are 
available upon request. 
 
- What does the ILO do in Tanzania?  
- What is your position?  
- Has the ILO published any relevant reports?  
- What are the human rights most at risk in the country?  
o What about human rights potentially affected by corporate activities?  
o Women’s rights?  
- Has the situation changed in the past few years? 
- What’s the implementation of labour laws and international conventions in the 
country? Especially regarding the following issues: 





▪ Sexual orientation 
▪ Religion 
▪ Age 
▪ HIV/AIDS status 
o Wages?  
o Sick leave? 
o Working hours/rest/holidays?   
o Rights of association and to strike?  
- What’s the biggest challenge to effective implementation?  
- Can you tell me more about the labour rights situation in the tea industry 
specifically (or agriculture, if does not know)? 
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o Do corporate self-regulatory mechanisms have any influence on the 
labour conditions on the ground?  
▪ If so, how so? 
▪ If not, why not?   
o Does any of these elements seem important for effective 
implementation of laws and self-regulation? 
▪ Inclusive process at the stage of drafting corporate 
commitments, or at the stage of drawing up plans to implement 
them? 
▪ Training of employees and managers? 
▪ Independent monitoring of the situation? 
▪ Human rights due diligence/impact assessments? 
▪ Strong unions? 
▪ Regular and transparent reporting on the part of the company? 
▪ Free and anonymous complaints mechanism? 
▪ Sanctions? 
o Do you usually find these in place within companies?  
o How do you explain the corporate human rights issues commonly 
reported in the country?  
- Do you know of cases related to corporate practices?  
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Annex 6 – Human rights performance of the three corporations of 
the case study 
 
Human rights issues Human rights standards 
WORKER-RELATED RIGHTS 
Child labour 
All companies: No child labour issues. All companies only 
hire individual aged 18 years old and above.  
Forced labour All companies: No forced labour issues. 
Contractual terms 
Contracts 
Unilever:  All employees have a contract, be it seasonal and 
permanent workers. Workers are not provided with copies (a 
manager said that it was because there were too many workers). 
Some workers were not given enough time to read the terms 
before signing. Contracts are in Swahili (although one case of a 
worker whose contract was only in English, and so 
unintelligible to them). Seasonal workers are offered 9-month 
contracts, which may be renewed once a period of 3 months has 
passed (maximum of one contract per year). Seasonal workers 
used to work without a contract. 
MTC:  All employees have a contract, be it seasonal and 
permanent workers. Not all workers are provided with copies. 
Some workers were not given enough time to read the terms 
before signing. Contracts are in Swahili (although a worker said 
that, a few years ago, contracts were in English, and that they 
had to complain before they changed it). Seasonal workers are 
offered 9-month contracts, which may be renewed once a period 
of 3 months has passed (maximum of one contract per year). In 
the past, there used to be a probation period of 3 months with 
no contract, and only then workers would get a permanent 
contract.  
Chai Bora: permanent workers have a contract. Seasonal 
workers have a one-day contract which is not formally renewed 
after their first day of work. 
Pay 
All companies: low wages, to the point where workers must 
farm or conduct business on the side to survive. Low pay leads 
to: 
P a g e  | 407 
 
- HIV/AIDS, STDs, unplanned pregnancies: as Mafinga 
and Mufindi in general are business hubs, a lot of men 
travel through the area and stay for short amounts of 
time. Because of low wages in the area, women are 
reportedly easily taken advantage of, in exchange for 
money. Because condom use is still low, the rate of 
HIV/AIDS, STDs, and unplanned pregnancies is high. 
- Diseases: some individuals will have no choice but to 
drink water from the river near Mafinga, catching 
typhoid and other waterborne diseases.  
Unilever: Average pay (not counting overtime):  
- Factory workers: Tsh145.000-154.000 [minimum pay 
was 145.000 in 2016 and 154,000 in 2017]; 
- Tea pluckers: Tsh145.000; 
- Plantation managers: 3 grades (Tsh186.000 > 210.000 > 
297.000); 
- Fixed-term engineers: Tsh300.000. 
- Security officers: Tsh120.000-270.000. 
Overtime for tea pluckers (with higher average pay) is reserved 
for workers who wait for trucks at the end of the day; overtime 
available for factory workers during high season. Although two 
workers complained that overtime had not been paid extra for 
some time (one said “a few months”, the other “3 years”). If the 
quality of tea is considered inadequate, workers are not paid.  
Low pay, which means that they have to farm or do business on 
the side to feed their families. Tea pickers are paid by the kilo, 
whereas the rest of the workers are paid per day.  Although they 
do have access to bonuses to encourage productivity 
(attendance/quality and quantity/managers/factory workers).  
MTC: Tea pickers are paid by kilo. Estimations as to the 
average daily harvest differs greatly between workers (between 
50 and 150 kilos per day). However, all agree that wages are too 
low, workers have to farm or conduct other business to survive. 
Average pay (not counting overtime):  
- Factory workers: Tsh154.000 [minimum pay was 
145.000 in 2016 and 154.000 in 2017]; 
- Tea pluckers: Tsh145.000 – 200.000 (up to Tsh250.000 
during high season) 
o Tsh33/kg, since machines were introduced; 
- Engineers: Tsh150.000-300.000; 
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- Security officers: Tsh154.000 (minimum pay for 2017) 
– Tsh190.000 (for workers who have been working for 
many years; after deductions, they receive Tsh175.000). 
Manager explained that, every year, salaries are indexed to 
inflation, and that the cost of life is taken into account when 
calculating the increase. Minimum wage is decided for various 
regions (e.g. Iringa, Tanga, Njombe). Also important to take 
other benefits into account (e.g. healthcare).  
One tea plucker complained that they had not been paid in four 
months; they company reportedly said that it was a mistake, but 
nothing has been done. 
Chai Bora:  
Low pay, which forces workers to rely on farming (or other 
business) to survive, despite being offered a rent allowance in 
addition to their salaries. Recurring issue of late payment of 
wages (especially currently, as workers are not being paid). 
Average pay:  
- Factory workers: Tsh250.000-500.000 (factory 
managers), with Tsh300.000 on average, although 
seasonal workers said that they earnt 5.500/day, which 
means that they earn on average about 
Tsh145.000/month (counting overtime on Saturdays); 
- Printing department: Tsh270.000; managers: 
Tsh320.000; 
- Managers: Tsh1.5 million and above. 
- Seasonal workers are paid Tsh5.500/day (Tsh3.500 for 
half-day on Saturday; Tsh6.000 if worked a full day as 
“overtime”), paid for each day worked, weekly. 
- Security guards (outsourced workers): 
Tsh99.000/month. 
Rent: no rent for seasonal workers. Permanent factory workers 
receive Tsh25.000/month (which is the minimum); printing 
department: Tsh32.000/month; managers: Tsh70.000-
90.000/month. Tsh25.000 is insufficient to cover renting needs 
of a family (a house would be Tsh100.000/month).  
 
Working time 
  Unilever:  
• Tea pluckers: during low season, they work from 7am 
until 2pm; during high season, can work until 5pm. 
Some (male) workers have to stay onsite to wait for 
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trucks (overtime available only for those workers). One 
hour for lunch (provided for); 
• Plantation managers: 7am-6pm, but may have to work 
longer hours as they have to wait for the trucks as well 
(sometimes not until 9-10pm); 
• Factory workers: 3 shifts, 8 hours each (used to have 
two 12-hour shifts, changed with the Rainforest 
Alliance); during high season, may have up to 4 hours’ 
overtime;  
• Security: 12-hour shifts (including overtime); 7 days a 
week. 
• Fixed-term qualified employees: may work for 3 hours 
per day (overtime allowed); 
• Electricians: 5 full days a week (8 hours, with 4 hours’ 
overtime possible) + half-day on Saturday (with 3 hours’ 
overtime possible) 
MTC:  
• Tea pluckers:  
o High season: 7am-5/6pm; 
o Low season: 7am-2pm;  
o 6 days/week; no overtime except for those who 
pack tea into trucks (can work up to 12 hours/day 
during high season); 1 hour for lunch (provided 
with makande);   
• Factory: 8 hours/day; 6 days/week; no overtime 
(although one worker said that sometimes overtime is 
allowed in the factory); 1 hour for lunch (not provided 
with lunch, only breakfast for those who are working in 
the morning); 
• Security: 8 hours/day; compulsory overtime of 4 
hours/week. 
Chai Bora:  
• General workers: 8-hour shifts, 5 days a week + 4-hour 
shift on Saturday. 
• Overtime allowed on weekend.  
• Security guards (outsourced workers): 12-hour shifts; 7 
days a week.  
Workers are reportedly provided lunch, breakfast, and tea, 
depending on their shifts. 
 





• Maternity leave: 3 months with full pay. 
• Paternity leave: 7 days, no pay.  
• No sure about annual leave or sick leave for permanent 
employees. 
Temporary workers: 
• No sick leave. 
• No annual leave.  
• No maternity leave. 
• No paternity leave. 
MTC: 
Permanent workers:  
• Annual leave: 28 days, with travel allowance of 65% of 
the salary, in addition to the regular salary. Same for 
management, although may be up to 75%. 
• Sick leave (with medical certificate):  
o In theory: up to 63 days with full pay, up to another 
63 days with half pay, and beyond 126 days, will see 
how can let the worker go; 
o In practice: accounts of 2 days (one worker said that 
it is usually a couple of days but that, if it is serious, 
63 days/63 days);  
• Maternity leave: 84 days with full pay for one baby; 
100 days for twins; breastfeeding policy: allowed 2 
hours every day with full pay for 6 months; 
o Three workers went on maternity leave once, were 
paid in full (one received Tsh300.000 on top of her 
salary); 
• Paternity leave: 4 days, with full pay. 
Seasonal workers:  
• Sick leave (with medical certificate): 1 or 2 days (some 
say that it is unpaid anyway – so that most workers still 
go to work while sick); 
o Manager said that seasonal workers also benefitted 
from 63 days/63 days. 
• No maternity leave: a seasonal worker was fired when 
the company found out that she was pregnant (and it 
was reportedly difficult for her to get hired again after 
birth); 
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• No paternity leave; 




• Annual leave: 28 days + Tsh120.000. 
• Maternity leave: 3 months with pay; 
• Paternity leave: 4 days without pay; 
• Sick leave: up until 63 days with full pay; next 63 days 
with half pay; over 126 days: termination. 
Temporary workers and outsourced security guards:  
• No leaves. 
Health and safety 
General considerations 
Unilever: policies are generally enforced, adequate, although 
seasonal workers have to provide their own gear.  
Safety equipment:  
- Factory workers: gloves, masks, ear protection, eye 
protection, and safety boots (depending on the position); 
- Tea pluckers: raincoats are optional; mandatory: gun 
boots and aprons. Apart from aprons, seasonal workers 
have to provide all safety equipment themselves; no 
gloves; 
- Chemical sprayers: boots; masks; eye protection;  
- Security workers: only provided with gun-boots. 
Workers are reportedly not allowed to work if they are not 
wearing necessary equipment (sent home with no pay). It may 
lead to termination. Although one worker said that there was no 
control from the company. 
Monday is the day of training for health and safety. 
MTC: Safety equipment:  
- Factory workers: gloves, masks, ear protection, eye 
protection, and safety boots (depending on the 
department); 
- Tea pluckers: overall; boots;  
- Chemical sprayers: masks; gloves; helmet; glasses; 
overall + special room for storing and mixing chemicals 
+ changing rooms for workers; 
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- Security guards: only provided with torches; have to 
purchase boots and raincoats; 
- Engineers (factory): overall; boots; gloves. 
Management admitted that the company does not always 
provide safety gear because of late deliveries/equipment wears 
out faster than anticipated (although some workers said that it 
was mainly because the company was in a financial crisis). 
Workers are not allowed on company premises if they are not 
wearing adequate equipment, or if they are intoxicated. 
However, no sanctions are given out for not wearing safety gear 
as the firm’s focus is on education – although one seasonal 
worker said that they would be terminated if they do not wear 
appropriate gear.  
Permanent and seasonal workers said that they are not supposed 
to work without safety gear on, but are not provided with gear, 
so have to buy it themselves, including workers in dangerous 
jobs (e.g. boiler). Boots reportedly cost Tsh13.000 and aprons 
Tsh15.000. 
A worker who used to work in the boiler room said that most of 
their former colleagues have since died because of the working 
conditions.  
A worker fell sick after spraying (and inhaling) chemicals (chest 
problems), was reportedly given 5 days of sick leave.  
Accidents do not happen often (mostly in the factory because of 
machines).   
Workers are trained about health and safety (including relevant 
Fairtrade/Rainforest Alliance standards). 
Chai Bora: Protective gear is overall insufficient (eye protection 
is not provided for production workers, even though they do 
need it; boots are not provided to everyone for free). Some said 
that it was safe to work there, although most agreed that all 
protection measures were not taken. A worker said that there 
were lots of accidents because of the race for productivity. No 
sanction for not wearing gear (apart from a warning), manager 
said that they preferred education to sanction. 
Safety equipment:  
- Blending: glasses (although not always adequate and 
the dust may still get into the workers’ eyes), masks, 
boots, and coats. 
- Production: masks; closed shoes. 
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- Printing: boots, glasses (otherwise, will lose your 
eyesight), masks, gloves. Provided by the company. 
Quarterly inspections by OSHA, who also conduct training on 
health and safety (every month). Management and worker 
representatives train workers (trainers are trained first). They 
have health and safety representatives. 
The firm reportedly accommodates its workers with health 
conditions. 
Medical check-ups 
Unilever:   Medical check-up is done before signing contracts, 
and then every 2 months for permanent workers, but not again 
for seasonal workers.  
MTC: A medical examination is only conducted when workers 
are hired. Management said that there were supposed to be an 
exit check-up, to verify how the work has affected workers (and 
adapt policies accordingly), but all workers (except for one) said 
that there was no such thing. No regular medical check-up while 
on the job. 
Chai Bora: Medical check-ups are conducted, although mixed 
accounts as to their regularity: some workers say every 2 
months, some every 3 or 6 months, and a manager said every 
two years (because of the cost). This may come from the from 
the fact that different types of check-ups are conducted, by 
OSHA (as described by a manager) and by local doctors (as 
described by workers). 
Accidents and 
compensation 
Unilever:   
Permanent workers:  
- Compensation offered in theory, although a few workers 
complained that the company usually says that it is the 
worker’s fault and so refuses to offer compensation; 
- Free medical treatment. 
Seasonal workers:  
- No compensation; 
- Free medical treatment until their contract expires. 
MTC:  
Permanent employees:  
- Compensation is offered in theory, although a few 
workers complained that the company usually says that 
it is the worker’s fault and so refuses to offer 
compensation; 
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- Free medical treatment. 
Seasonal workers: 
- No compensation; 
- Free medical treatment until their contract expires. 
Chai Bora:  
Permanent workers:  
- Compensation is offered, although it may take time; 
- Free medical treatment. 
Seasonal workers:  
- Manager said that they were offered compensation but 
workers said that they were not; 
- No access to free medical treatment. 
Manager said that there had not been an accident in two years, 
although some workers said that accidents were frequent 
because of the company’s race for productivity (and because 
safety gear is reportedly inadequate). 
Freedom of association 
General considerations 
All companies: right of association and collective bargaining is 
usually well respected. Official unions in all three companies, 
which are local branches of national unions (TPAWU and 
TUICO) negotiating collective agreement at national level. 
However, Chai Bora does not always listen to TUICO, and 
seasonal workers do not have access to the union.  
Unilever: TPAWU is the trade union for Unilever workers, with 
representatives chosen among workers. Representatives 
negotiate with the human resources department every month (or 
every few months) the price of tea, and report any issues raised 
by workers. They also train workers on labour rights and related 
issues (including CBAs). Although civil society representatives 
said that TPAWU representatives are not properly trained and 
so cannot defend workers’ rights properly. Moreover, a few 
workers said that they had the interests of the company at heart, 
one said that they were bribed. Some workers said that there had 
been no changes despite complaints. Some workers said that 
only permanent employees are members of TPAWU, although 
others said that it was open to all employees. There were also 
reports of compulsory adhesion for permanent workers, with a 
monthly fee taken out of their monthly wage.  
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MTC:  TPAWU is the trade union for MTC workers, with 
representatives chosen among workers. Representatives meet 
with the company every 3 months to discuss potential issues. 
They also train workers on labour rights and related issues 
(including CBAs, although a few workers said that they did not 
know anything about CBAs). Although civil society 
representatives said that TPAWU representatives are not 
properly trained and so cannot defend workers’ rights properly. 
Moreover, a few workers said that they had the interests of the 
company at heart. Adhesion is reportedly compulsory for all 
workers, with a monthly fee, taken out of their monthly wage.  
Chai Bora:  Seasonal workers are not part of TUICO. Most 
permanent workers are unionised, although it is not compulsory 
(monthly fee: Tsh3.000). They meet quarterly with 
management to discuss any issues. Although civil society 
representatives said that TUICO representatives are not 
properly trained and so cannot defend workers’ rights properly, 
and some workers say that they do not have workers’ interests 
at heart. A union representative said that they present 
complaints to the company, but that Chai Bora does not do 
anything about them. TUICO district leaders join the local 
TUICO leaders to negotiate CBA, which is applicable to all 
Chai Bora workers. 
Strikes 
Unilever:  Latest strike happened in 2016, over low wages, and 
the police/FFU were called and so workers went away. Manager 
said that that strike was bad, with people almost getting killed, 
so they have tried to intensify their relationship with TPAWU 
and introduced bonuses to keep workers happy. 
MTC:  In 2014, there was a strike that, according to some 
interviewees, led to injuries. Management said that police were 
called because the strike was illegal (it was over the late 
payment of wages + low wages + issues with a specific 
manager). Management said that, as a result, some workers (a 
few workers reported that it was about 10 workers) were 
arrested and/or terminated.  
Chai Bora:  No recent strikes (latest one seems to have been in 
2006, over poor management, and seems to have been 
successful). A seasonal worker said that there is such a gap 
between temporary and seasonal workers, seasonal workers will 
not strike (they need the work). 
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Right to non-discrimination 
Non-discrimination 
during the hiring 
process 
Unilever:  
- Reports of discrimination against pregnant women, for 
both temporary and permanent positions, although 
management deny it. 
- Discrimination against people with low immunity and 
people living with a disability. 
MTC:   
- Discrimination against pregnant women, for both 
temporary and permanent positions – although 
management deny discriminating against pregnant 
women for permanent positions. 
- Discrimination against people with low immunity, high 
blood pressure, and people living with a disability. 
Manager said that people who are sick (with the 
exception of people living with HIV/AIDS) or not 
physically fit will not be hired. 
Chai Bora:   
- Discrimination against pregnant women, for both 
temporary and permanent positions. 
- Discrimination against people with communicable 
diseases (with the exception of people living with 




Unilever:  Unilever has taken action to fight against gender-
based violence by starting a welfare department, where 
complaints can be registered by a female employee. Training 
seminars about sexual harassment and women’s rights take 
place every Monday. The situation has improved, and most 
workers said that there was no gender-based violence. Most 
workers said that pregnant women could not get hired, for 
permanent or seasonal positions, although the company denies 
it. Women are not allowed to do chemical spraying, or to stay 
behind to wait for the trucks (so no overtime) (practice is 
reportedly to guarantee women’s safety). 
MTC:  The company was looking to hire a gender activist to 
train workers as there is a gap to fill but it is now on hold 
because of the change of investors. Workers said that pregnant 
women could not get hired, for permanent or seasonal 
positions, although the company denies it (although only not 
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about seasonal workers). Women are not allowed to do 
chemical spraying or operate machines; night security shifts 
are for men; easy jobs in the factory are for women – although 
workers say that the fact that women cannot operate machines 
in the plantations does not affect their level of pay. Most 
workers say that there is gender equality, although a few 
workers say that women are not given time to breastfeed 
(including one worker speaking from personal experience). A 
worker also said that she was given night shifts after her baby 
was born despite the fact that this is not in line with corporate 
policy.  
Chai Bora:  Equality of opportunities (between men and 
women) seems to be a reality within the company, mostly 
because there are more women than men (73 women/fewer 
than 50 men). However, some interviewees mentioned issues 
of sexual harassment and related problems (e.g. sexual favours 
to get hired, or promoted, or paid more – all made worse 
because of poverty and working conditions) in the area. 
Situation has improved within Chai Bora because of (informal) 
meetings organised amongst women workers to inform them 
about their rights. TUICO and Chai Bora also train workers 
about them (although it is only for permanent workers). 
Training also helps with domestic issues. Women can go to 
female managers if they would like to report an issue. 
Transportation to site 
Unilever:  No transportation is available from villages to 
estates, although housing is made available so that workers do 
not have to walk far. Managers are provided with means of 
transportation.  
MTC:  The company does not offer transportation to the 
plantations or the factory. 
Chai Bora: The firm offers free transportation for workers on 
night shifts. The bus was reportedly adequate and safe. 
Migrant workers 
Unilever: Around the firm’s operations, there are a lot of 
migrant workers. The fact that many workers move around the 
region (and the country) is associated by some interviewees 
with the following issues: high rates of HIV/AIDS, STDs, and 
unplanned pregnancies (and single mothers). This 
phenomenon is accentuated by the high number of seasonal 
workers, who come and go regularly. The recruitment of tea 
workers from outside Mufindi has been so important for 
decades that it is reportedly the reason for the existence of the 
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villages around Unilever’s plantations (and especially the 
biggest one, Kibao).  
MTC:  The company has reportedly brought in significant 
numbers of migrant workers. The existence of the village 
where MTC operates, Itona, was said to be linked to migrant 
tea workers (a few community members estimated that 90% of 
inhabitants were migrant tea workers). This migration is said 
to have led to high rates of HIV/AIDS and other STDs. 
Chai Bora: There are reportedly a significant number of 
migrant workers in Mafinga. Migration has been associated 
with high rates of HIV/AIDS, STDs, unplanned pregnancies 
(which are all related to other issues such as prostitution). 
Another problem reported by some interviewees is the fact that 
children with low levels of education flow into local schools. 
Finally, overpopulation reportedly leads to strained education, 
health, and water services, in turn leading to poor economic 
development. Chai Bora does not seem to help with these 
issues. 
COMMUNITY-RELATED RIGHTS 
Housing and living 
conditions 
Unilever: The company offers housing to all employees, with 
free (although not running) water and (for some) solar power. 
However, most workers complained that houses are small and 
in bad condition (which is why some workers prefer to live 
offsite, although it means walking to work). Upon observation, 
houses are indeed small, with only one room that is separated 
into the kitchen area and the bedroom area with a piece of 
fabric. Raising cattle and farming are allowed (although 
growing maize is, in theory, prohibited), for private use only. 
They also have social halls, and dispensaries/health centres, as 
well as privately-run shops onsite. In the villages around the 
firm, there is no running water, and most houses have no 
electricity. Community members who can afford it use solar 
power. In general, poor living conditions around Unilever’s 
plantations. 
MTC: The firm offers free onsite housing to workers (as per 
collective bargaining agreement). Houses are very small. 
There is no running water but electricity is available in some 
of the houses. Some workers complained that it was 
overcrowded, and that houses for general labour were in bad 
conditions (whereas houses for managers were good). Shared 
toilets and water points are available onsite. The company has 
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rules on sanitation and reportedly sends a doctor around the 
houses regularly. Some workers have decided to move offsite 
because houses were too small or inadequate, or because it is 
difficult to farm, raise cattle, and/or run a business onsite. For 
permanent workers living offsite, the company provides an 
additional Tsh30.000 monthly for rent (15% of salary for 
managers). However, if the company cannot offer seasonal 
workers accommodation (as it sometimes happens, when there 
is a shortage of houses), they do not provide them with 
additional renting allowance. In the villages around the firm, 
there is no running water. About 60% of houses have 
electricity in the area. 
Chai Bora: No housing provided onsite. The company helps 
with rent, however the amount is usually said to be insufficient 
to cover their renting needs.  In Mafinga, there is no running 
water. Most houses have electricity.  
Right to a clean environment 
General considerations 
Unilever:  Most interviewees said that there was no 
environmental impact of Unilever’s activities, although a few 
mentioned the fact that chemicals used annually on crops (for 
fertilisation purposes) ended up in the water. The local 
government said that they had a meeting with the company last 
year about it, and that Unilever said that they would take 
precautions this year. A local government representative said 
that they released smoke. Unilever lost their Rainforest 
Alliance certification in 2014 because of environmental issues 
and have since made improvements (and regained their 
certification). 
DEFORESTATION: The firm uses a lot of wood for its factory 
but, as they get it from their own forests in the area, there was 
no reported impact. The company reportedly maintains forests 
in the area.  
MTC:  Most interviewees (including local government) said 
that the firm’s operations had no impact on the environment, 
although a local government representative said that they did 
produce smoke, and a worker and a community member said 
that their waste management was poor (no separation of 
different kinds of dust and waste and random dumping of 
waste).  
DEFORESTATION: MTC use their own forests for firewood; 
for instance, at the time of the interview, they were using trees 
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from a 50-year-old forest, which provided enough wood to 
cover the company’s needs. However, they sometimes must 
buy it from external sources when their forests cannot provide 
enough trees. 
Chai Bora:  While some interviewees complained that the 
company was operating in the middle of town, where people 
live and work, most agree that Chai Bora’s operations do not 
have an impact on the environment. 
DEFORESTATION: the firm does reportedly not use wood. 
Waste disposal 
Unilever:   No issue was reported with the firm’s waste 
disposal. The firm has a specific place where they dispose of 
waste. 
MTC: The firm has special waste disposal places and a system 
to ensure that nothing ends up in the water. They also have 
latrines onsite and a specific waste collection system for glass 
and plastic waste. However, a worker and a community 
member said that the firm’s waste management was poor (no 
separation of different kinds of dust and waste and random 
dumping of waste). 
Chai Bora: No issue was reported with the firm’s waste 
disposal. Underground pipes are used to dispose of waste – 
which is mainly dust, paper, and nylon. Management 
reportedly ensures that no waste ends up in the water. 
Right to health 
Health issues 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Unilever: There were reports of STDs, of HIV/AIDS, and of 
waterborne diseases around the firm’s operations.  
MTC: There were reports of HIV/AIDS around the firm’s 
operations.  
Chai Bora: There were reports of water- and airborne diseases 
around the firm’s operations. Moreover, HIV/AIDS, STDs, 
and unplanned pregnancies are big issues in the area, which 
were linked by some interviewees to the number of migrant 
workers and business activities around Mafinga. 
ACCESS TO WATER 
All companies: big problem, and no company contributes. 
Communities in Mafinga, Kibao, and generally around 
corporate operations all complain of issues related to access to 
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water. There are not enough wells, especially in the summer as 
they dry up. Communities must buy water, which is expensive 
and pushes some people to drink dirty rainwater or water from 
rivers in the area.  
Unilever:   Access to water is good onsite, where workers have 
access to drinking water. However, it is a big issue in all the 
villages surrounding Unilever’s plantations. Community 
members use natural wells and pumps from the Danish 
International Development Agency (for instance, there are 
only 2 wells in Kibao, for over 5.000 people). Community 
members have to buy bottled water, which is expensive. As a 
consequence, some people drink rainwater, which may get 
them sick. Moreover, the water from some wells also carries 
diseases, which some people complained come from 
fertilisation chemicals used by Unilever. The local government 
has asked Unilever to help but the firm has done nothing so 
far. There were reports of an unknown donor and a local 
government representative asking the community in 2012 to 
financially contribute to the project which they had started to 
improve access to water in the area. However, it would seem 
that nothing came of it (despite financial contributions from a 
number of community members). Finally, there is a current 
project to provide water to 4 villages (Sawala; Mtwango; 
Lufuna; and Kibao). It would involve inserting a pump in a 
natural water resource, which would supply purified water to a 
big tank and, in turn, to taps which would be installed in 
houses in all four villages. A tank will be installed in every 
village. But two community members said that the project was 
suspended because the supplier had not been paid – although 
the project coordinator said nothing of this, and only stated 
that the project would take a year to complete.  
MTC:  In the area surrounding MTC’s plantation, access to 
water in general is difficult. Unless community members own 
a pump or are wealthy enough to afford to pay for water in 
pumps in the village, they have to walk for over an hour to 
reach wells. The local government said that there was a project 
of water supply (which will involve MTC), but that it was only 
still at the first stage.  Management said that, as part of 
Fairtrade, shallow wells were built. The firm have built dams, 
but villagers are not allowed to fetch water there. Onsite, water 
testing is done annually to check that the water is safe 
(although workers still just boil it before they can drink it). 
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Chai Bora:  Access to water is a big issue in Mafinga (where 
Chai Bora operates), leading to diseases: some community 
members drink rainwater during the raining season and water 
from the local river during the summer if wells dry up. Local 
government representatives acknowledge that the situation is 
bad, and that they have tried to improve it. Indeed, they 
received some money from the government to buy a tank 
(500.000 litres) for the people of the town, and they are now 
trying to get funding to buy a tank with twice that capacity. At 
the time when fieldwork was conducted, people had access to 
water two or three times a week as taps around town were not 
supplied with water every day. Moreover, the town’s water 
infrastructure has reportedly not been renovated since the 
1980s and is therefore in poor condition – including the 
sewage system, which means that water gets contaminated. 
There are some privately-owned taps and wells, but 
community members must pay to use them. It appears that 
Chai Bora has never contributed to improving access to water 
for community members. A local government representative 
went to see Chai Bora, who reportedly said they would help, 




For workers: Unilever’s hospital (and medication) is free for 
workers and their spouse and up to four children and 
reportedly offer good services, including family planning, 
maternity services, and some surgical operations. Unilever’s 
hospital delivers free HIV/AIDS treatment and Community-
based Therapeutic Care, and HIV/AIDS-prevention 
programmes to workers every Monday. 
For community members: Unilever’s hospital is very 
expensive for the rest of the community (fees are six times 
higher than in government hospitals as it was reported that it 
cost Tsh100.000/day for a bed, Tsh60.000 for a consultation, 
and Tsh150.000 for a delivery), so the community does not 
benefit from having Unilever’s hospital around apart from 
HIV/AIDS-related services. The community therefore uses 
dispensaries in Sawala and Kibao, although no doctor works 
there (only two nurses in each; dispensaries provide first aid, 
check-up for malaria, and maternity services – including baby 
deliveries if no surgeon is needed, although one community 
member said that women avoid delivering there because they 
know that they offer poor services). For serious issues, they 
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must go to Tumahili or Mafinga’s hospitals. However, local 
government representatives said that Unilever helps a lot 
regarding HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. It was also 
reported that the company’s hospital had a partnership with 
Tumahili government hospital to circumcise men so as to 
thwart the spread of diseases (Thursday and Saturday). 
MTC: 
For workers: MTC’s dispensary is free for workers and their 
spouse and up to four children. No issue related to shortage of 
doctors or medicines was reported. Workers living with 
HIV/AIDS receive all HIV/AIDS-related medicine and 
support for free. MTC provides an HIV/AIDS-prevention 
programme from time to time, although most workers agree 
that the programme has not run in some months (they can still 
get support from the clinic, but they have to go there). The 
clinic also provides Community-based Therapeutic Care, 
conducted as part of a national programme which started a few 
years back (in partnership with USAID) and has built up 
gradually ever since. The manager said that the company’s 
clinic operates the programme monthly, and that their doctor 
goes around the area and provides support to workers. 
For community members: MTC’s dispensary is expensive for 
community members as it reportedly costs Tsh15.000 per day. 
Community members go to local government’s dispensary, 
although no doctor works there (only two nurses) and there is 
a lack of medicine and no family planning services, which 
means that must go to Mafinga for deliveries. There is 
government health insurance available, which some 
community members cannot afford. Finally, a manager said 
that the company’s doctor goes around the area and provides 
HIV/AIDS support to community members as well as to 
workers. Similarly, they said that MTC’s HIV/AIDS 
programme was also for community members, but no 
community members mentioned that they could go, and local 
government representatives said that there was no company-
sponsored HIV/AIDS programme for community members.  
Chai Bora: The firm does not operate a hospital, and does not 
provide health insurance, although workers may get insurance 
through the National Social Security Fund. Community 
members use government-run hospitals, where there is a lack 
of doctors and access to medicines. The company does not 
seem to contribute to the health needs of the community. 
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Right to education 
Unilever: The company has a school but only subsidises 40% 
of fees, which means that only managers can afford to send 
their children there (fees are very high). Most children, of 
workers and community members, go to government-run 
schools where the level of education is lower, and which need 
refurbishment (and some say need more teachers). However, 
Unilever’s nursery is free for all workers (children of age 3-5), 
and the company built the Lugoda primary school, which is 
now run by the government (although the company still 
materially contributes to it. The firm has also provided funds 
for a biology lab for a secondary school in Kibao and built 
dormitories for secondary students. Around Unilever’s 
plantations, the following villages have schools: Sawala (3 
primary schools and 2 secondary schools); Kibao (3 primary 
schools and 2 secondary schools; and Mtwango (2 primary 
schools and 1 secondary school). 
MTC: The firm built a school, which is now run by the 
government, although the company still materially contribute. 
There reportedly an adequate number of schools and teachers 
in the area. However, infrastructures are in poor condition and 
schools can be very far for some pupils. Teachers have free 
water and electricity, and the Fairtrade premium fund was used 
to fund for secondary teachers’ houses. In Itona (where MTC 
operates), one secondary school and two primary schools are 
open. 
Chai Bora: The firm does not run a school. There are 
reportedly not enough schools are in operation in Mafinga, and 
the schools which are running need more funding, supplies, 
and (according to some reports) teachers. The situation has 
reportedly worsened since President Magufuli told Tanzanian 
parents in 2015 that government schools were free, and that 
parents should therefore no longer offer financial contribution 
to their children’s schools. Following this announcement, 
families’ average annual contribution of tsh25 million stopped, 
and was not replaced by government funding. Classes are 
overcrowded (60-80 pupils per class), which is partially 
explained by the fact that many people choose to migrate and 
settle in Mafinga. Chai Bora does not usually contribute to the 
education needs of the community. The firm only contributed 
chairs once, following a call from the national government. 
Local government representatives have reportedly tried to 
reach out to Chai Bora to request that they contribute more, 
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but no response had yet been received at the time when 
fieldwork was conducted. 
Engagement with the 
community 
Unilever: There does not seem to be a strong relationship 
between the company and community members, who have 
reportedly tried to reach out to the company about the lack of 
access to water but were unsuccessful.  
MTC:  The firm seems to have a good relationship with 
community members, mostly through local government 
representatives. However, it was reported that the roads in the 
area were not safe, although a manager said that they 
contributed towards road maintenance when they had the 
funds. Local government representatives said that the company 
took complaints on board and that Fairtrade had improved 
their relationship as MTC now contributes more (e.g. Itona’s 
secondary school and dispensary; laboratory for science 
classes; funeral expenses). The community seems to be highly 
aware of the Fairtrade certification (e.g. loans to community 
members were mentioned by interviewees). Manager said that 
they make a monthly contribution towards the district 
council’s social responsibility fund. Local government 
representatives have regular meetings with the company, 
although at the time when fieldwork was conducted, no 
relationship had yet been established with MTC’s new 
investor.  
Chai Bora: There does not seem to be a relationship between 
the company and community members. A manager said that 
they contributed to community needs when asked, but local 
government representatives said that the firm did not reply to 
letters. 
Land rights 
All companies: not a problem. All companies started operating 
decades ago and have not expanded since. There was no report 
of land issues at the time when companies started operating. 
OTHER ISSUES 
Security 
Unilever:  There were no reported issues with the firm’s 
security guards’ behaviour. A small part of their services has 
been outsourced (control room with CCTV).  
MTC: There were no reported issues with the firm’s security 
guards. 





Chai Bora: There were no reported issues with the firm’s 
security guards’ behaviour. The company’s security services 
have been outsourced to an external company.  
Mechanisation of tea 
work 
Unilever:  Full mechanisation of one estate, which led to lay-
offs; introduction of scissors in the rest of the firm’s estates 
(only used by permanent workers), after which several 
workers complained of arm and chest pains.   
MTC:  Kibena Tea Limited (includes 2 estates: Itombe and 
Lukogosa) has been fully mechanised. The production on the 
rest of the estates is only about 5% mechanised (but the firm is 
moving towards greater mechanisation to save money on 
labour). 
Chai Bora: There was no report of mechanisation of the firm’s 
activities.    
Difficulties linked to the 
nature of tea work 
Unilever: A worker said that tea work was a very hard job; it 
affects their hands, their back, their chest (including because 
the basket is heavy). If they find another source of income, 
they will take it and not work in tea plantations anymore. 
MTC: A worker worked there for two years but did not renew 
their contract when it ended because picking tea is hard work 
and they wanted to get some rest. 
